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Abstract 
Despite the pervasiveness of the Internet and its importance to a wide 
range of state functions, we still have little understanding of the 
implications of this technology for power in the context of International 
Relations. 
The Internet has led to a power paradox which forms the central 
'puzzle' of this research project. President Obama has described as "the 
great irony of our Information Age" the fact that those states which 
have most successfully adopted and exploited the opportunities 
afforded by the Internet are also most vulnerable to the threats which 
accompany it. Power enhancing outcomes such as economic growth, 
and public diplomacy have to be balanced against the theft of 
intellectual property and attacks on critical infrastructure. No previous 
technology has been regarded concurrently as a source of power and 
vulnerability in quite the way that the Internet has. 
Existing International Relations theories of power, developed in the 
context of industrial technology, have struggled to incorporate the 
complexities of the Internet. For much of the 20th century, scholars of 
International Relations have regarded technology as a constitutive and 
material element of state power. An understanding of technology as an 
exogenous factor which impacts upon power and produces universal 
effects regardless of political context is a conception which misses as 
much as it reveals in the analysis of power in the information age. 
This thesis combines the Philosophy of Technology with theories about 
power from International Relations in order to build a conceptual 
framework for the study of state power in the information age. It 
utilises this framework for the study of how conceptions of US power 
have shaped and influenced three aspects of Internet technology; cyber 
security, Internet governance and network neutrality. In doing so, the 
study produces a set of findings which contribute some forward 
momentum to the stalled debates in International Relations about 
whether the Internet enhances state power more than it undermines it. 
The thesis clearly demonstrates that political decisions about 
technology have directly and profoundly influenced the way the 
Internet has developed that they have ongoing implications for how the 
power to control information is distributed. 
In addition, it was found that US politicians engage with multiple 
conceptions of power when they debate Internet technology. These 
conceptions of power can lead to contradictory policy implications and 
when they do, the decisions that politicians make about whether to 
privilege material power or social power lead to insights about how 
they expect US power to function in the information age. 
Finally, authority and legitimacy were found to be important factors in 
the exercise of power in this context but significantly, a sense of 
political authority was often absent in debates about Internet 
technology policy. 
These findings underscore the arguments running through this thesis. 
First, that the implications of the Internet for state power cannot be 
understood without deeply engaging in the political context in which 
they are situated and second, that the relationship between power and 
information technology differs qualitatively from the relationship 
between power and industrial technology. 
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Chapter One Introduction 
Chapter One: Introduction 
Over the course of the past two decades, much of the world has 
developed a dependence upon an unsecured, open computer network 
for communications, :financial transactions, military weapons systems, 
critical infrastructure, commerce and diplomacy. Despite the 
pervasiveness of the Internet and its importance to a wide range of 
state functions, we still have little understanding of the implications of 
this technology for power in the context of International Relations. 
How does Internet technology relate to other material elements of state 
power like the economy and the military? \Nhat are the implications for 
social power factors like legitimacy and authority? vVhy do states adopt 
different approaches to Internet technology? And does the Internet 
produce universal outcomes or does its impact on state power differ 
depending on context? Answers to questions like these are essential to 
the analysis of what this important new technology means for our 
understanding of state power in the information age. 
Existing International Relations theories of power, developed in the 
context of industrial technology, have struggled to incorporate the 
Internet and address these questions. For much of the twentieth 
century, scholars of International Relations have approached the 
relationship between power and technology in a relatively stable and 
consistent manner. Technology has been largely understood as a 
constitutive and material element of state power. Its military and 
economic relevance has lead to an understanding of technology as a 
mechanism through which power (or security) seeking states pursue 
relative advantage by the development of more efficient production 
methods (economic power) as well as advanced weaponry (military 
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power). 1 This has been the predominant view through major 
technological shifts including the industrial revolution and the 
emergence of nuclear technology. Even as International Relations 
power theories broadened to incorporate social elements as well as 
material factors, a singular, narrow approach to technology has 
prevailed. This approach is manifestly inadequate for the study of the 
relationship between state power and new technology like the Internet. 
In a umque way, information and communications technology more 
broadly, and the Internet specifically have led to a power paradox 
which forms the central 'puzzle' of this research project. President 
Obama has referred to it as "the great irony of our Information Age", 
the fact that those states which have most successfully adopted and 
exploited the opportunities afforded by the Internet are also most 
vulnerable to the range of threats which accompany it. 2 Power 
enhancing outcomes such as economic growth, advances in public 
diplomacy and the revolution in military affairs have to be balanced 
against the theft of intellectual property, attacks on critical 
infrastructure and the circumvention of conventional military force by 
asymmetric actors. No previous technology has been regarded 
concurrently as a source of power and vulnerability in quite the way 
that the Internet has. 
1 Hans Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Fifth 
Edition Revised, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), pg.322. 
2 President Barack Obama, 'Remarks by the President On Securing Our Nation's 
Cyber Infrastructure', Office of the Press Secretary, (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, May 29, 2009), !lt.lri:iJ~!'J>Y,:!YJl~!illJ'!Jl!l.,lfilYillll!L!lTil!lli..Q!ljg)L!i<l!!ll!.l'.k!t!!tllllL 
P1·esident·on·Securing-Out"Nations·Cvber·Infrastructurel. 
121 Pa g" 
Chapter One Introduction 
In addition, Internet technology affects many diverse state systems 
and functions which makes it difficult for analysts to sort through the 
implications to arrive at any kind of definitive answer about what the 
Internet means for state power. Technological developments which are 
beneficial for the online economy may be detrimental to cyber security. 
Those which enhance cyber security may undermine norms and values 
such as human rights or civil liberties. Technology policies which the 
telecommunications sector regards as essential may stifle innovation in 
software and applications development. Misaligned legal frameworks 
for dealing with online crime coupled with the capacity for actors to 
remain anonymous over the Internet undermine the state's monopoly 
on violence and make distinctions between crime, terrorism and state 
belligerence difficult or impossible. 3 These factors combine to render 
conventional approaches to understanding the relationship between 
technology and power in International Relations less useful than they 
have been in the context of industrial technology. 
The complex and diverse ways in which the Internet intersects with 
state power means that making generalisations about the impact of 
this technology is problematic. States which have little critical 
infrastructure running across the Internet may care less about cyber 
security issues, as do states which have little intellectual property to 
3 A recent example from September 2010 involves an online attack on an Iranian 
nuclear reactor. A purpose built computer worm caused the reactor to spin too 
quickly resulting in system failure and lasting physical damage. While there has 
been some speculation that the US and Israel were behind this attack, it has not been 
possible to trace its origins. Peter Beaumont, 'Stuxnet worm heralde new era of global 
cyberwar', The Guardian, September 30, 2010, 
http :/lwww g_11ardian.co.u k/te.ch.r19.!9_gy/2Q l Olsep/30/stuxnet·worm ·new·era·glol,t~l: 
i;yl;terwar, Larry Seltzer, 'Who's Behind Stuxnet? The Americans? The Israelis?', 
Security Watch blog, PC 1Wagazine, Sept.ember 26, 2010, 
http:l{blogs.pcmag.com/secyrit:l'.'i'ifil&h/~OI0/09iwhos behind sturnet the amerie.ph_u. 
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protect. Where the information infrastructure is state·owned, Internet 
technology which undermines the telecommunications industry may 
have little impact on the economy in contrast to states which rely on 
the private sector to build and upgrade infrastructure. 
When we acknowledge the wide range of variables at play in 
calculations about power and the Internet, it becomes clear that 
studies that find the Internet 'democratising' or 'empowering' have 
skipped an important analytic step. An alternative approach (and the 
one which drives this thesis) observes that Internet technology is not 
discriminating - it can be used by protesters to organise and it can 
simultaneously be used by authorities to track and arrest those same 
protesters. It can be used to enhance or undermine state power, in a 
multitude of ways and simultaneously. The Internet then, is neither 
democratising nor repressive, neither empowering nor disempowering. 
The Internet does not have a set of values or a purpose - those 
emanate from our interaction with the technology. In this view, the 
Internet is an expression of the interests and values of those who 
engage with it. 
In order to move beyond these assumptions about the relationship 
between technology and power, this thesis turns instead to an analysis 
of how states conceptualise Internet technology to relate to power and 
what steps politicians take to shape and influence the technology so 
that it best responds to those conceptions. The central research 
question of this thesis is: 
How have politicians' conceptions of American power influenced the 
development of the Internet? What are the implications for 
understanding the relationship between new technology and power in 
international relations? 
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These questions shift the analysis from a focus on 'what technology 
does to state power' which, as the previous pages have indicated can 
vary widely from state to state and even from issue to issue - to a more 
holistic approach which can investigates 'how states engage with 
technology' in the context of conceptions of power. The advantage of 
looking at how conceptions of power influence and shape technology 
rather than focussing on the outcomes is that it moves the debate away 
from assumptions that technology has a universally applicable impact. 
In fact, politicians have to decide which elements of state power are 
most important when making Internet policy. They sometimes have to 
choose between privileging one conception of power over another. 
Therefore, looking closely at the drivers of Internet policy can tell us 
not only about technology but about power. This approach provides 
insight into how different conceptions of power compete in these 
debates and why certain conceptions prevail in some cases and not in 
others. 
This thesis does the following three things: it explains how US political 
leaders' conceptions of power interact with approaches to technology to 
shape and influence the development of complex technological systems 
like the Internet. It also builds a conceptual framework for future 
studies of the relationBhip between power in International Relations 
and information and communications technologies (ICTs). Finally, it 
tells a story about the political evolution and development of the 
Internet in the United States which has been overlooked in the 
proliferation of technological histories. In doing these three things, this 
thesis offers important insights into the relationship between state 
power and technology in the information age. 
The following pages provide some context for the research question by 
outlining the broad parameters of existing literature, although this will 
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be explored in more detail in Chapter Two. Preceding this context, a 
number of terms and concepts fundamental to the project need to be 
defined. Some clarity is needed on what is meant by 'the Internet' in 
order to establish the parameters of the study. In addition, this 
Introduction will briefly outline a conceptual approach to 'technology' 
and 'power'. Although both of these are central to the conceptual 
framework of this study and consequently, they are also addressed in 
more detail in the following chapter, a brief overview of the approach 
taken in this study will allow for the rest of the Introduction to be read 
in some context. 
The chapter moves on to explain the methodology employed in this 
study including the materials used, the case study justification and the 
scope of the project. The Introduction finishes with an outline of the 
thesis chapters, briefly foreshadowing the findings of each case study 
as well as the findings of the thesis more generally. 
Definitions 
Technology 
Technology is a broad term with many competing conceptualisations. 
One of the important contributions of this thesis is that it integrates a 
conceptual approach to technology with International Relations 
theories of power in order to build an analytical framework which can 
better address questions of power and new technology. In that pursuit, 
a more extensive treatment of relevant technology concepts is handled 
in Chapter Two but for the purposes of contextualising this 
Introduction, it is sufficient to identify two main streams of thought 
here. The first regards technology as an artefact or object. In this 
conceptualisation, an artefact or object of technology has meaning and 
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purpose regardless of whether anyone observes it or interacts with it. A 
computer is a computer - regardless of whether it is used to compute 
data or as a doorstop. This definition is most closely aligned with 
studies based on an objectivist epistemology but Donald MacKenzie 
points out that few scholars are content with this definition of 
'technology as hardware' as it fails to engage with broader implications 
generated by our interactions with those artefacts. 4 
A second stream of thought regards technology as extended to include 
the human activity and body of knowledge which interacts with the 
artefact or object. This view, for example, regards mining as a 
technology in the sense that it includes not only the picks and drills but 
also the human processes involved and the science of geology as well. 
This is a more expansive concept which allows for a broader analysis of 
social engagement with technology. However, this approach can be 
difficult to contain. Once we begin to discuss human activity, 
boundaries between technology and science, art, politics and the 
economy appear unclear and more importantly, our perceptions of 
those boundaries can change over time. Those who favour the more 
parsimonious definition outlined above, find this broader approach too 
vague. 
This study does not seek to resolve these debates about the most 
appropriate definition of technology. However, in the context of this 
study which seeks to understand the relationship between Internet 
technology and ideas about US power, the second more complex 
• Donald MacKenzie, 'Introductory Essay', The Social Shaping of Technology: How 
the Refrigerator Got Its Hum, Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wacjman, (eds.), 
(Philadelphia: Open University Press, 1985), pg.3. 
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approach is most relevant. As pointed out earlier in this Introduction, 
the way actors interact with the Internet gives it meaning in the 
context of debates about power in International Relations. A definition 
of technology which did not include these factors but only looked at the 
physical infrastructure of the Internet - that is, the wires, cables and 
machines connected by them - would not facilitate the analysis 
necessary to this study. 
Power 
Understanding power m International Relations is an ongomg and 
unresolved academic project. The comprehension of how power is 
constituted, how it can be projected, transferred, balanced and 
measured has been the subject of a dynamic research project within 
the discipline resulting in the emergence of new theories and 
paradigms. 5 A key shift in recent years has seen some scholars, in 
particular those of Constructivist leanings, more comprehensively 
explore social aspects of power such as legitimacy, identity and 
interests. 
This thesis is not about defining power nor is it about measuring power. 
Rather, the focus in this study is US politicians' conceptions of power. 
This phrase is used throughout the thesis as a kind of shorthand that 
refers to how US politicians regard sources of power in the context of 
the Internet, how they seek to maximise them and how they believe 
the state can use those resources to project power. Understanding how 
5 These will be discussed in more detail in the following Conceptual chapter but in 
broad terms, one might consider change in the context of Neo·realism narrowing the 
parameters of power in contrast to the broader approach of Classical Realists who 
preceded them or the shift of Neo·liberal Institutionalists who introduced theories of 
the interdependence of power. 
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politicians respond when they are confronted with a new technology, 
(the Internet in this case) can provide insight into how they 
conceptualise power and how their decisions about how to manage or 
control this particular form of technology, actually shape and influence 
it. 
Conceptions of power can take many forms and International Relations 
theories provide a framework for understanding these. In seeking to 
understand how conceptions of power shape and influence Internet 
technology, it is necessary to remain open to a range of approaches. 
Some indicators of 'statements of power' with respect to technology are 
embedded in hard power factors such as the economy, the military and 
geopolitical concerns about managing borders and security. Other less 
tangible indicators include social power factors like identity, values, 
legitimacy, national character, governance and influence. In order to 
remain open to the conceptions of power expressed by politicians, a 
range of indicators of material and social power identified by 
International Relations scholars is relevant to this project. 
The Internet 
In each of the case study chapters, there is a section which goes into 
some depth about relevant aspects of Internet technology. This is 
necessary background to understanding the parameters of the case 
studies and is best dealt with in the context of those chapters. For 
definitional purposes it is sufficient to state that when this study refers 
to 'the Internet' it means the network of networks which is used 
globally for transferring data packets between computers. The Internet 
includes not only the physical infrastructure of the computers, routers 
and cables but a range of software and system protocols which are 
necessary for forming a connection between those physical elements. 
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The Internet should not be conflated here with the World Wide Web 
(the Web) which is a system running across the Internet. The Web is 
set of protocols developed in the early 1990s by Tim Berners·Lee and 
Robert Cailliau. It is designed to facilitate linking information already 
available on the Internet. While the Web is a major feature of broader 
Internet debates, it is only one system running across it. In many of 
the central debates which concern state power, the Web is an ancillary 
factor - not the central element. 
Brief Survey of the Literature 
Existing literature on the relationship between power and new 
technology in International Relations tends to fall into two broad 
categories. Some scholars regard information and communications 
technology as simply an extension or enhancement of existing 
technology and therefore reinforcing existing power structures. Many 
studies which take this view are conducted with a rigid adherence to 
conventional military concepts such as 'deterrence's and 'arms control'7 
- neither of which have particular relevance to information and 
communications technology. The vocabulary employed to discuss issues 
of 'cyberwar', 'cyberterror' or 'information warfare' is a product of Cold 
War military concepts blended with computer gaming terminology and 
leads to the commodification of information. The link between lexicon 
'Jason Ma, 'Information Operations to Play a Major Role in Deterrence Posture,' 
Inside Missile Defense, December 10, 2003, 
http://\vww.insidedefense.con1/secu:re/ftefense docnum.asp?f=defense 2002.ask&docn 
um=MISSILE·9·25·4l. Also, Gary F. Wheatley and Richard E. Hayes, Information 
Warfare and Deterrence, (Washington DC: NDU Press, 1996). 
7 Dorothy E. Denning, 'Obstacles and Options for Cyber Arms Controls', conference 
paper presented at Arms Control in Cyberspace, Heinrich Boll Foundation, Berlin, 
Germany, June 29·30, 2001. 
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and concept was a theme running through the work of George Orwell 
who refers to "staleness of imagery" and "lack of precision" as part of a 
self·perpetuating cause and effect of the decline of political thought and 
this could usefully be applied to these debates.8 
Mary Kaldor elaborates on this in the context of the Revolution in 
Military Affairs which she argues is conceived of within the "inherited 
institutional structures of war and the military". 9 She argues that 
within this structure, new techniques are perceived of as developing in 
a more or less linear extension from the past. rn Information and 
communications technology becomes another 'artefact' of power to be 
understood in the same way we have previously regarded new missile 
technology or energy sources.11 This literature ignores important and 
unique aspects of emerging technology which impact on its relationship 
to power in International Relations in diverse ways. These include the 
integration of the technology into civil society which broadens the 
range of interests that politicians must take into account, the 
decentralised drivers of innovation which make future developments of 
the technology somewhat unpredictable, and the complexities of states 
sharing and relying upon a central, unified system. 
The second broad category of literature concerned with the relationship 
between power and new technology in International Relations regards 
'George Orwell, 'Politics and the English Language', The Complete Works of George 
Orwell, littn://www.george·orwe!J.org/Politics and the English Language/O.html. 
•Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era, 2•d Edition, 
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), pg.3. 
10 Kaldor, New and Old Wars, pg.3. 
11 David J. Rothkopf, 'Cyberpolitik: The Changing Nature of Power in the Information 
Age', Journal of International Affairs, Spring, 1998, VoL51, No.2, pg.325. 
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this technology as a transformative force. This is particularly evident 
in the literature on the democratising nature of the Internet and 
changes to state sovereignty - both of which have attracted significant 
scholarly attention.12 Many studies have concentrated on the manner 
in which technology like the Internet has impacted on state power by 
eroding the institution of sovereignty. The general emphasis in these 
debates is that information technology is undermining state power in a 
variety of ways. Prominent among these is the proliferation and 
organisation of non-state actors which compete for power with states 
and the challenges of state control over extra-territorial issues which 
stem from interconnected networked systems. This literature is 
predominantly concerned with the way that the Internet affects the 
state's changing relationship with individuals, the non-governmental 
and private sectors. Of these, amendments to the domestic power 
dynamics between civil society and the state have been most 
thoroughly investigated - as demonstrated by the response to the 2011 
revolutions in the Middle East.13 
In early 2011, the people of Tunisia rose up to depose their President 
Zine El Abidine Ben Ali. Similar protests took place in Egypt and in 
the months following, this activity spread to Yemen, Libya and 
Bahrain. A defining feature of Western commentary covering these 
12 Darin Barney, Prometheus Wired, (Vancouver: The University of Chicago Press, 
2000), Jerry Berman and Daniel J. Weitzner, 'Technology and Democracy', Social 
Research, Fall 1997, Iss.64, No.3, pg.1313, Ira Katznelson, 'Liberal Maps for 
Technology's Powers: Six Questions', Social Research, Fall 1997, Iss.64, No.3, pg.1333. 
13 Maryam Ishani, 'The Hopeful Network', Foreign Policy, February 7, 2011, 
http:/fwww.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/07/the hopeful network, Anne 
Alexander, 'Internet Role in Egypt's Protests', BBCOnline, 9 February 2011, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world·middle-east· 12400il 19 and Corey Courtemanche, 
'Internet, the Engine Room of Revolution', The Age, February 25, 2011, 
http://\VW\y.theage.co.m.au/opinion/politics/internet-the·engine·room·of-revolution-
.:<O l l0224· lb7 lv.html. 
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protests was a focus on the use of social networking media by the 
proteswrs - a focus which was sharpened further when several of these 
states temporarily 'shut down' Internet access for their citizens. 14 
Vv'hile many felt that these tools had been instrumental in the success 
of the protest movements, others remained unconvinced, arguing that 
social networking media had also been used by the repressive regimes 
to track the protests. 15 This debate was epitomized in the 
'Shirky/l\forozov' debate which pitted a utopian view of the Internet 
which regarded these tools as liberating and democratising against a 
dystopian view which regarded them as tools of state surveillance and 
repression. 16 
l4 Christopher Williams, 'How Egypt Shut Down the Internet', The Telegraph, 
January 28, 2011, 
_b,tt:p ://w\\'YV, telegraph.co, ukln.evv§!.~9I ldnev<.cs/ a f1ica andindiauoceanlegvpt./82881 D3fI-Io 
w·Egypt·sh11t·d0Fn·th<dnl.ernet.html, 'Libya Goes Dark as Internet Shut Down' 
Sydney J'<fo111ing Herald, March 5, 2011, 
httn://w·ww.smh.com.aull;echnofogyltSf:hnology·newsllibya·goes·dark·as·internet·shut· 
tlown·20l I0305· lhijf,htJllJ, Dan Goodin, 'Internet use disrupted in Bahrain as 
protests tum bloody', The Re{l'ister, l''ebrua:ry 18, 2011, 
http:/iwwv;.theregister,eo.uk/2011102/18/bahrain internet disruption/. 
15 Stephen J.A. Ward, 'Social Media: Tool for Revolution or Repression?', 
1}fedirulforals, Cent"r for J ournaliem Ethics, University of Wisconsin· Madison, 
January 31, 201 l, http ://ethics.iournalism.wisc.edui2011101181/social:tnedia·tool·of-. 
revolution:or-repressionl, Scott Shane, 'Spotlight Again Falls on Web 'l'ools and 
Change', New York Times, ,January 29, 2011, 
http ://www:.nvti.111es.com/201110 J /~10/wee kinreview/30s\la ne. htl!ll? r';'J.&ref=scottshan 
g_. 
16 This debate was initiated by the Evgeny Momzov's observation that those who 
comment on the politics of the Internet tend to fall into 'utopian' or 'dystopian' camps. 
This was later articulated in the publication ofMorozov's book, The Net Delusion: 
The Dark Side of Internet Freedom, (New York: PublicAffairs, 20U), Clay Shirky 
responded arguing that despite its pitfalls, the Internet remains a "positive force for 
democracy". Clay Shirky, 'The Net Advantage', Prospect, Iss.165, December 11, 2009. 
These two views formed the poles of an ongoing debate which heightened during the 
events of the 'Middle East Spring'. 
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This particular debate was specific to the Middle East revolutions but 
it is indicative of these two broad approaches in the literature. They 
can be extrapolated to consider the questions raised here about state 
power and illustrate why neither of these approaches are useful for 
addressing the research question of this thesis. Both sides of this 
debate adopt a 'universal effects' approach to Internet technology. If 
one focuses on the many advantages which the Internet offered the 
protesters, one might conclude that the Internet is a democratising or 
liberating technology. Conversely, if one focuses on the ways the state 
used the same technology to apprehend protesters; one might conclude 
that the Internet reinforces existing power structures. 
The same matrix can be applied to those debates which examine the 
impact of the Internet on state power. Depending on their perspective, 
some scholars regard the Internet as a new realm or commons in which 
technologically advanced states may exercise power - through highly 
sophisticated surveillance, through information and cyber warfare 
strategies, and through the efficiencies and advantages which the 
Internet offers the state economic apparatus. 17 Other scholars cite the 
many ways in which the Internet undermines state power - by turning 
those same surveillance techniques against the state, by empowering 
non-state actors, by reassigning the functions of the state and, through 
anonymity - by affording individuals access to the same 'weapons' as 
17 Christopher R. Hughes, 'Fighting the Smokeless War: ICTs and International 
Security', China and the Internet: Politics of the Digital Leap Forward, Christopher R. 
Hughes and Gudrun Wacker, eds., (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp.139·161, 
David Mussington, 'The Proliferation Challenges of Cyberspace', Cyberspace and 
Outer Space: Transitional Challenges for Multilateral Verification in the 21st 
Century. Proceedings of the Fourteenth Annual Ottawa NACD Verification 
Symposium, Ed. by J. Marshall Beier and Steven Mataija, 1997, 
http://www.yorku.ca/yciss/pu bl ications/cy be rspace. htm 
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the state. is In fact, both of these approaches instils agency in the 
technology, and this leaves us only to argue over which view we find 
more compelling. 
As mentioned earlier, an alternative approach is one which recognises 
that the Internet itself is not in possession of values or purpose but 
rather, is an expression of the interests and values of those who engage 
with it. Nina Hachigian reflects this view in a journal article in which 
she has identified a range of strategies adopted by one-party East 
Asian states "designed to reinforce their broader strategies for 
retaining power" through balancing control of the Internet with 
expected economic gains. 19 Andrew Rathmell also picks up on these 
complexities in discussing how some states (but not others) are forced 
to balance the contradictory requirements of computer security which 
is beneficial for economic activity over the Internet, with military 
strategies which favour a low security threshold. 20 Both of these 
studies demonstrate that the Internet does not have universal effects 
on state power and that it is essential to understand more about 
political interactions with Internet technology if we are to reach any 
useful conclusions about state power in the information age. 
18 Ronald J. Deibert, 'Dark Guests and Great Firewalls: The Internet and Chinese 
Security Policy', Jou111al of Social Issues, Vol.58, No.I, 2002, pp.143·159, Gordon 
Smith and Moises Nairn, Altered States: Globalization, Sovereignty and Govewance, 
(Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 2000), and Karen •r. Litfin, 
'Public Eyes: Satellite Imagery, the Globalization of Transparency, and New 
Networks of Surveillance', in In.formation Technologies and Global Politics: The 
Changing Scope of Power and Governance, James N. Rosenau and J.P. Singh, fods.l, 
(Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002). 
rn Nina Hachigian, 'The Internet and Power in One· Party East Asian States', The 
Washington Quarterly, Vol.25, No.3, Summer 2002, pg.41. 
20 Andrew Rathmell, 'Controlling Computer Network Operations', Studies in Conflict 
and Terrorism, Vol.26, 2003, pp.215·232. 
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Viktor Mayer-Schoenberger and Gernot Brodnig write that the 
information age is "opening a new chapter in defining and 
understanding international affairs." 21 Much of the literature which 
has sought to engage with this 'new chapter' has done so through 
existing theory which, this thesis argues, is not able to accommodate 
the distinctive features of information and communications technology. 
Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello have observed this 
suggesting that too much work in this field had been primarily policy 
oriented with "little or no ambition to apply or contribute to theory".22 
Some scholars are working to remedy this. Joseph Nye has been 
consistently incorporating questions about the impact of new 
technology on state power into his work. As early as 1998, he published 
a journal article co-authored with Robert Keohane in which they 
explored the implications of the information age for interdependence 
and argued that the status quo would prevail. 23 Nye's conception of 
'soft' power also touched briefly on new technology. His later extension 
of this - 'smart power' - stresses the importance of knowing how to 
best combine soft and hard power and has recently been endorsed by 
21 Viktor Mayer-Schaenberger and Gernot Brodnig, 'Information Power: International 
Affairs in the Cyber Age', John F Kennedy School of Government Harvard 
University Faculty Research Working Papers Series, November 2001, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sola/papers.cfm?abstract id=292949. 
22 Johan Eriksson and Giampiero Giacomello, 'The Information Revolution, Security 
and International Relations: (IR)relevant Theory?', International Political Science 
Review, Vol.27, No.3, 2006, pg.235. 
23 At the time of writing, Nye had a forthcoming book called The Future of Power in 
the 21st Centuzy, (Public Affairs Press, 2011). In a pre-release essay entitled Cyber 
Powerpublished by the Belfer Center at Harvard University, he outlines, For earlier 
conceptualisations, see Robert 0. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, 'Power and 
Interdependence in the Information Age', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 77, No.5, 
September/October 1998, pg.81., Joseph S. Nye, The Paradox of American Power: 
Why the world's only superpower can't go it alone, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), and Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The means to success in world politics, (New 
York: Public Affairs, 2004. 
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US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton as the way forward for US 
foreign policy.24 Twelve years later, (with a number of observations in 
between which will be discussed throughout this thesis), Nye published 
an essay entitled Cyber Power.25 In it, he discusses the changes which 
information technology has had on state power in terms of 'diffusion'. 26 
Nye's essay offers an analysis of how new technology can be understood 
within existing International Relations concepts of hard and soft power. 
He specifically injects 'cyber power' into concepts of power developed in 
his earlier work.27 Nye makes an important contribution through the 
observation that 'cyberspace' is a "manmade domain''.28 This is a view 
which gives agency to society rather than technology which is a 
significant shift in International Relations literature dealing with new 
technology and power. This might be understood as the jumping off 
point for this thesis which is concerned with how we have made this 
domain and whywe have made it the way we have. 
Another important scholar in these debates is Karen Litfin. Litfin 
draws on Foucault's notion of 'disciplinary power' to argue that the 
diffusion of new technology can generate important shifts in both 
"Joseph S. Nye ,Jr., 'Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power', Forejgn Affairs, 
Vol.88, No.4, July-August, 2009, pp, 160· 163. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 
'Nomination Statement to become Secretary of State', Opening Statement to Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Washington, D.C., January 13, 2009, 
http://www.state, gov I sec re tarylrm[g_(/J)9ai011115196. h tm. 
'" Nye, Cyber Power. 
20 Nye defines 'cyber power' as "the ability to obtain preferred outcomes through use 
of the electronically interconnected information resources of the cyber domain". Nye, 
Cyber Power. 
27 He does this specifically with his analogy of the 'three level chess board' which 
represents the different facets of state competition - the economy, the military and 
soft power. 
"'Nye, Cyber Power. 
271 Pa g e 
Chapter One lntroduaion 
instrumental and constitutive power. 29 She broadens the debate by 
moving beyond an exclusive focus on the instrumental aspects of 
technology to point out that technology can also "influence the self· 
understandings and identities of social actors and perhaps even the 
very nature of power itself'. 30 Litfin clearly demonstrates how 
conceptions of power can influence the way in which we regard 
technology however she does not engage with the question animating 
this thesis which is concerned with the way conceptions of power can 
influence and shape technology. 
Mary McEvoy Manjikian has identified three dominant political views 
of cyberspace. Like Nye, Manjikian links analytical approaches to the 
Internet back to existing International Relations theory suggesting 
that those who favour a liberal view of power tend to regard the 
Internet and the 'cyberspace' it creates in one of two ways. The first 
view which is essentially utopian, regards cyberspace as a 'virtual 
world', subverting existing power structures, rendering nationality 
irrelevant by reassigning actors 'netizen' status and adhering to 
globally oriented communitarian norms.31 A second liberal view focuses 
more on regulatory aspects and the influence of market forces on the 
Internet. This view regards cyberspace as reproducing existing power 
structures and functioning like other international territories (like the 
ocean) where borders do matter. The third view identified by 
Manjikian is Realist and this perspective sees the Internet as an 
29 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, (New York: 
Vintage, 1979). 
30 Litfin, 'Public Eyes', in Information Technologies and Global Politics, pg.65. 
31 Mary McEvoy Manjikian, 'From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace: The 
Colonizing of the Internet and the Extension of Realpolitik', International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol.54, Iss.2, June 2010, pp.381·382. 
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'extraterritorial site of real world power' where existing power 
structures are strengthened and the US acts as a 'benevolent hegemon'. 
Manjikian's contribution is significant and paves the way for further 
research and analysis into the relationship between International 
Relations theory and new technology. Manjikian is addressing the lack 
of theoretical analysis into "the ways in which players will adapt and 
change in response to this new terrain". 32 However, her focus continues, 
as with Nye and Litfin, to be on adaptation rather than the social, 
cultural and political processes which shape technology - the concern 
of this thesis. In her conclusion, Manjikian cautions against the 
constraints of established theoretical frameworks and suggests that 
"an understanding of the various lenses used to visualize cyberspace" 
can assist in the analysis of political initiatives undertaken by actors 
engaging with new technology.33 
While these innovative approaches to International Relations power 
theory in the context of new technology provide a basis from which to 
move forward, this thesis argues that a full understanding of the 
'lenses' Manjikian refers to is not complete without the inclusion of 
some sort of a theoretical approach to technology. Just as International 
Political Economy would be regarded as theoretically impoverished 
without the incorporation of economic theory, understanding power in 
the information age requires engagement with theories and concepts 
applied to the relationship between society and technology. 
32 Manjikian, 'From Global Village to Virtual Battlespace, pg.398. 
33 Ibid. 
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Methodology 
In order to address this gap, this study engages with the Philosophy of 
Technology and seeks to integrate the theories and concepts from this 
field with International Relations theories of power. The Philosophy of 
Technology literature asks questions like 'how does technology impact 
upon power and how does power shape technology?', 'does technology 
follow a pre·ordained developmental path?', and 'if so, are we powerless 
to stop it?' These are important questions for International Relations 
because understanding power relations in the information age 
necessarily involves understanding the relationship between new 
technology and state power. 
Scholars working in the Philosophy of Technology have developed a 
range of conceptual approaches and methodological tools to aid the 
investigation of these questions. One of these, the Social Construction 
of Technology, forms the basis of the conceptual framework developed 
in this thesis for the analysis of the case studies. This cross· 
disciplinary approach retains a connection with the big questions in 
International Relations (in this case, power) while introducing a much 
more nuanced and sophisticated theoretical approach to technology 
which allows the analysis to move beyond the long held assumptions 
that technology is an artefact which impacts upon power. 
The Utility of Internet History 
This study takes an historical approach to the research question. In 
acknowledging the challenges which face those who chose to 
investigate the impact of new technologies on international relations, 
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Jonathon Aronson has observed that the scope of change is 
"widespread, deep and rapid". 34 As a consequence, analysts grappling 
with these changes often become "mired in generalities or focus on 
specific micro·issues, losing touch with the bigger picture". 35 Aronson 
suggests that historical contextualisation can help to develop 
perspective. 
The Internet is obviously relatively new and while 25 years may not be 
considered 'historical' by some scholars, there are three important 
reasons for taltlng an historical approach. First, the trajectory of 
Internet technology has been so steep that while a period of 25 years 
may be insignificant in many studies, it is a period densely populated 
with change, debate and contestation in the context of this technology. 
Conceptions of US power have intersected with the Internet's growth 
at many stages and over many issues over the past two and a half 
decades and the influence of those conceptions of power can be 
understood through an analysis of this history (which is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter Three). Initially funded by the US Department 
of Defense CDoD), the Internet evolved as a joint military/academic 
project before being made available for commercial activity. The ideas 
and values of the early developers of the Internet are fundamental to 
its structure and design and are therefore constantly reinforced 
through its use. Based on 'rough consensus' and bottom·up 
development guided predominantly by highly regarded technicians, the 
34 ,Jonathan Aronson, 'Global Networks and Their Impact', in Infbrmation 
Technologies and Global Politics: The Changing Scope of Power and Governance, 
James N. Rosenau and J.P. Singh, (eds.), (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 2002), pg.39. 
35 Jonathan Aronson, 'Global Networks and Their Impact', in Information 
Technologies and Global Politics, pg.39. 
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Internet consists of agreed standards and code which provide its 
structure and functionality. Paradoxically, considering the role of the 
Department of Defense, this technical evolution has come to be 
regarded as quite separate from state concerns. Consequently, the fact 
that these ideas arguably run counter to International Relations norms 
and institutions such as state control, sovereignty, or hierarchical rule 
has been of little concern in the dynamics of the technical community. 
However, the rapid 'informatisation' of the past two decades has made 
it very clear that Internet code and architecture is deeply political and 
how it is conceptualised and shaped has very real implications for 
states and the international system. This history is significant for 
understanding the political implications of Internet technology and 
demonstrates that there already exists a 'political history of the 
Internet' worthy of scholarly attention. 
The second reason why this study takes an historical approach is 
because there is a persistent focus in the relevant International 
Relations literature on contemporary issues. This provides valuable 
insight into the particular concerns of a given social context and time. 
However, without engaging with the debates, perceptions and decisions 
which accompanied the emergence of these issues, the arguments they 
put forward remain suspended in time with no connection to the past 
and no capacity to envisage a future. Mackenzie argues for an 
historical approach to studies of this nature because rather than a 
linear, pre-determined path, he argues that looking at the history of 
technology demonstrates that there were a number of options all along 
the way - what he refers to as a "constant turmoil of concepts, plans 
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and projects". 36 In bringing together the political history of the Internet, 
which this thesis does, it is evident that many key decisions have been 
made by US politicians about how the Internet could or should function. 
In addition, a close analysis reveals how normative ideas about the 
relationship between US power and the Internet have influenced those 
decisions. 
Finally, technology is frequently studied in an historical context 
because the history of technology can tell us much about what people 
wanted and how they viewed the future. It can also reveal much about 
how their perception of 'problems' with technology changed over time. 
Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas write that "the meanings 
attributed to new technologies are some of the most important evidence 
we can find of the visions, both optimistic and anxious, through which 
modern societies cohere". 3? By taking an historical approach to this 
research question, it is possible to encounter change, continuity and 
patterns · all of which better equip us for understanding not only the 
current state of the relationship between power and new technology in 
International Relations but provide the basis for studying future 
change and continuity. This thesis argues that states can and do shape 
Internet technology. Therefore, understanding how they have done so 
in the past is essential to conceiving of how they may do so in the 
future. 
36 MacKenzie, Knowing Machines, pg.6. 
37 Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas, 'Introduction: Technological Visions and the 
Rhetoric of the New' in Technological Visions: The Hopes and Fears that Shape New 
Technologies, Marita Sturken, Douglas Thomas and Sandra J. Ball·Rokeach (eds.), 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2004), pg.I. 
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Scope and Focus 
In seeking to understand the relationship between the Internet and 
state power, the United States offers a unique opportunity for a 
historical study and the focus of this thesis. The United States has 
played a seminal role in the evolution of the Internet and with over 
four decades of history in the development, implementation and 
management of Internet technology, it continues to globally influence 
key sectors of it. How the US has dealt with the rapid development and 
implementation of the Internet and how it has sought to shape it in 
such a way as to enhance US power needs to be understood not only 
through a snapshot of current circumstances, but through the analysis 
of the ideas and intentions of those politicians who facilitated or 
instigated the initial research phase as well as those who have 
continued to influence and shape the implementation and the 
development of Internet technology. 
The empirical material in this thesis demonstrates that US politicians 
arrive at decisions which impact on a global system. This is helpful for 
demonstrating that ideas about power can and do influence decisions 
which shape technology. However, while the US has been in a unique 
position to influence the evolution and development of the Internet, all 
states make important and individual decisions about new technology 
in the context of conceptions of power. The model developed in this 
thesis demonstrates how theories and concepts about technology can 
help to analyse and understand the nature and exercise of state power 
in the information age. This does not require the analysis of multiple 
states but it is aided by the breadth and depth of empirical material 
available for analysis - another advantage of a historical approach to 
the study based on the US. 
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Overview of the Conceptual Framework 
There are three essential elements of the conceptual framework which 
is fully developed in the following chapter. First, International 
Relations theory provides a starting point for the analysis of power. 
There is no single theory of power which proved most suitable or 
helpful for this study. Because the research dealt with conceptions of 
power, it was necessary to remain open to a range of views. The case 
studies demonstrated the utility of this approach as politicians 
expressed multiple conceptions of power - sometimes in the context of 
a single issue - and this allowed the research findings to be guided by 
politicians' conceptualisations rather than a particular approach to 
power. 
The second element of the conceptual framework is the Philosophy of 
Technology literature that identifies the range of approaches to 
technology. This is essential first to illustrate the long held 
assumptions about technology which are endemic in International 
Relations literature which deals with the relationship between power 
and technology. In addition, it provides a conceptual language for 
engaging with how politicians approach Internet technology. These are 
not self·consciously expressed positions; they are assumed just as 
approaches to power are assumed. However, it is important to remain 
aware that these approaches to technology carry with them a whole set 
of assumptions that inform political decisions about technology. The 
Philosophy of Technology provided a means to identify these as they 
emerged in the case studies. 
The third element of the conceptual framework developed in this thesis 
is a set of methodological tools borrowed from the Social Construction 
of Technology - one of several philosophical approaches to technology. 
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Specifically employed in this study, are the 'reverse salient' and the 
'relevant social group'. These are used in the research design to set the 
parameters and to generate the case studies. They also proved useful 
within those case studies when it became clear that there was not one 
single conception of power and/or approach to technology which was 
driving the political decisions about that particular aspect of Internet 
technology. 
The 'reverse salient' can be understood as a perceived problem or point 
of lag in a technological system - something which prevents it from 
fulfilling its 'potential'. 38 Social Constructivists have found that 
identifying an actor's normative assumptions about technology -
particularly what they regard as the 'problem' or reverse salient of a 
given technology - can lead to insights into how they conceptualise a 
whole range of other elements of social life. Wiebe Bijker uses the 
example of bicycle chain guards to illustrate the utility of the reverse 
salient.39 Bicycles in the 19th century did not have guards over the 
chain running between the pedals and rear wheel. They were not found 
necessary because only men rode bicycles and trouser legs were not 
prone to being caught in the chain. In the late 1800s, women began to 
ride bicycles and, finding their long skirts became easily entangled, the 
exposed chain came to be regarded as a 'problem' resulting in the 
development of a chain guard. 
38 Thomas P. Hughes, 'The Definition of Large Technological Systems', in The Social 
Construction of Technological Systems: New Directions in the Sociology and History 
of Technology, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989), pg. 73. 
39 Weibe E. Bijker, Of Bicycles, Bakelites, and Bulbs: Toward a Theory of 
Sociotechnical Change, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1997). 
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Bijker points out that the reverse salient of the bicycle chain emerged 
for social reasons rather than technological (or design) reasons. 
Furthermore, an analysis of the way this reverse salient prompted 
innovation in bicycle design reveals much more about how social 
systems Gn particular perceptions of gender restrictions) were 
changing at that time, than it does about technology. This example 
serves to illustrate the important point that Social Constructivists 
make about technology - that is, that technological change reflects 
wider social, cultural and political change and for this reason, its 
analysis can provide insight into important issues including 
understanding power in International Relations. 
In this study, the reverse salient has been applied for two purposes. 
First, it has been used to identify three empirical case studies (to be 
discussed more fully in the next section). The reverse salient has also 
been used within the case studies to provide a lens through which to 
examine the empirical data. Each of these three case studies was 
analysed to determine how politicians perceived the issue as a problem 
relating to US power. This included identifying which conception (or 
conceptions) of power they employed in the debates, which approach to 
technology they engaged with and how these conceptions and 
approaches impacted on the development of the technology. The 
research revealed that politicians engage with multiple conceptions of 
power in these case studies and so the reverse salient was usefol at 
this level to help distinguish the (sometimes competing) ideas driving 
policy decisions about the specific aspect ofinternet technology. 
In addition to these two ways in which the reverse salient contributes 
to the methodology of this thesis, there is a second important tool 
drawn from the Social Construction of Technology employed in this 
methodology. The 'relevant social group' is a mechanism for focusing on 
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whose needs or preferences are being privileged in decisions about 
technology. MacKenzie stresses that although it may seem that a 
decision about technology is 'best', we must ask the question 'best for 
whom?'40 Different actors or groups of actors may have very different 
responses to a particular technology as did men and women to the 
bicycle chain. 41 Scholars from the Social Construction of Technology 
argue that it is necessary to be clear about this in any study because in 
the context of technology, priorities and values can vary widely from 
one group or actor t-0 another. 
On a macro level in this study, the relevant social group is defined as 
US politicians, specifically those who are involved in policy decisions 
about the Internet. Within the case studies, this sometimes proves to 
be a useful mechanism for understanding how politicians regard the 
Internet as linked to US power through the way they privilege the 
needs or priorities of one section of US society over another. A focus on 
the relevant social group in these instances helps to clarify how 
politicians conceptualise US power and which factors they regard as 
most significant when formulating Internet policy. 
The Empirical Material 
The primary research question for this thesis generates a number of 
secondary research questions which are applied to the empirical 
material. These questions are: 
40 Donald Mackenzie, Knowing Machines, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pg.6. 
41 Certainly these distinctions need not be this stark. Factors like gender and class 
are obvious examples for illustrating this point but any two people of similar 
circumstances may have different responses to technology. 
38ff'ag~ 
Chapter One Introduction 
• vVhat aspect of US power is used to frame the 'reverse salient' or 
problem in each case study? 
• In what way is the 'problem' expected by politicians to enhance 
or undermine US power? 
• What policy options do politicians consider appropriate to direct 
the technology to enhance US power or to limit the extent to 
which it undermines it? 
• How do those normative expectations of Internet technology 
reflect conceptions of power? 
A range of material has been examined in the research of these case 
studies. A major component of the empirical material for this study has 
been Congressional hearings and because they may be less familiar to 
readers than more conventional sources like speeches or policy papers, 
it is useful here to elaborate briefly on how these hearings function. 
Congressional Committees are formed in order to create a body of 
expertise within Congress which is then able to offer broader advice. 
Committees are able to commission reports, to call hearings and to 
summon and interrogate witnesses so as to gain the knowledge and 
expertise they feel they need in order to formulate and vote on policy. 
They then report back to Congress and these reports are often 
submitted alongside a proposed Bill as supporting documentation. As 
politicians have to vote on many issues about which they may have 
limited practical knowledge, they rely to an extent on the advice of 
their colleagues who sit on relevant committees. These Committee 
assignments change over time sometimes as a c'Onsequence of 
restructuring and sometimes as relevant issues rise or recede m 
importance. 
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Hearings are called by Congressional committees for a number of 
reasons including the investigation of pertinent issues, the need to 
gather information on or debate a piece of proposed legislation, or as a 
means of conducting oversight of a government body or department. 
Prior to the hearing, a list of witnesses is drawn up. These can include 
government employees, experts and people affected by the issue. 42 
Hearings generally open with a statement by the chair followed by 
statements by a number of committee members. These statements are 
often used to frame the concerns each member has about the subject of 
the hearing and often, how they frame those concerns is as relevant for 
this research as the concern itself. Once these opening statements are 
concluded, the hearing moves to testimony by the witnesses followed by 
a question and answer session. During this time, committee members 
are free to ask candid questions of the witnesses either about their 
testimony or about related issues. Due to its unscripted format, these 
exchanges between committee members and witnesses can be 
extremely enlightening. They provide a means of accessing the 
conceptions, concerns and priorities of politicians in a way that formal 
speech does not always allow. 
Policy documents and speeches, though less frank, serve two purposes 
for this research. First, they provide an 'outcome' to the debates which 
transpire in Congressional hearings. Linking policy outcomes to 
debates can help to illuminate which approaches to power and 
technology prevail. In addition, policy documents often become the loci 
of further debate which is one of the benefits of adopting an historical 
42 Generally, the hearings call witnesses from a range of views but it can happen that 
the witness list is biased in a particular direction. 
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approach to this study, discussed briefly below and at more length in 
the following chapter. 
A third source of empirical material is the legislative record. This 
includes Bills proposed as well as Bills passed into law. Legislative 
proposals are very complex and the reasons behind the failure of a 
particular bill can be varied and in many cases, external to the issue at 
hand. However, an analysis of how politicians propose law is very 
useful in working to understand how they normatively approach issues 
of technology in the context of US power. 
Finally, as part of this research, a small number of interviews were 
conducted, particularly with senior policy makers who worked on 
Internet related policy in the late 1980s and early 1990s when 
documentary material was somewhat less readily available. 
The Case Studies 
Given that Internet technology has implications for so many aspects of 
state power and in diverse ways, an ordered approach to generating 
the case studies was necessary. Through the examination of 
Congressional hearings, policy documents, speeches and debates over 
the past 25 years, a number of Internet policy issues emerge as key 
'problems' for US politicians - in that they generated significant and 
complex debates. Of these problems, some had no clear implications for 
state power. Examples of these are the use of the Internet for primary 
school education, the use of the Internet for medical records and 
protecting children from obscene material or predatory behaviour on 
the Internet. 
Of the problems which politicians perceived as having clear links to US 
power, three stood out as issues which have been consistently regarded 
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as a significant problem for state power. These were cyber security, 
Internet governance and network neutrality. These issues were also 
identified through an assessment of the technology itself. Some 
technological issues have quite obvious implications for power in 
international relations while others are more obscure or still evolving. 
The case studies have all been consistently referred to by politicians as 
having significant relationship to US power through a mix of material 
and social factors. In addition, they are issues acknowledged by the 
technical community to have very serious implications for how the 
Internet develops. 
The notion that the Internet should be linked to US economic power 
rather than military power was promoted by the 'Atari Democrats' 
including Senator Albert Gore Jr., who would prove to be a key figure 
in political approaches to Internet technology. In the mid 1990s, the 
Clinton-Gore administration commercialised and privatised the 
Internet leading to an exponential increase in the number of people 
accessing it and the amount of data travelling across it. This 
introduced a range of problems - one of which was how to effectively 
and efficiently govern the names and numbers database - the Domain 
Name System (DNS). The debates around this and the problems 
associated with US power led to Internet governance being selected as 
one of the case studies for this thesis. 
A second consequence of the rapid uptake of Internet technology was 
increased concerns about security. Although politicians had been aware 
of security threats to Department of Defense systems from the 1980s, 
the adoption of the technology by the commercial sector and by private 
individuals introduced a whole range of evolving cyber security 
problems. Successive administrations have struggled to find a balance 
between the demands of cyber security which compete with norms and 
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values such as privacy, freedom of information and more recently, 
human rights. The long standing conviction of politicians that cyber 
security has implications for US power on a number of levels led to the 
generation of the case study on cyber security. 
Finally, changes in telecommunications legislation which directly 
impacts on how the Internet continues to develop not only in terms of 
technology but also in terms of our interaction with it have prompted a 
series of debates about how the Internet is and how it should be. These 
normative debates are linked to concepts of US power through material 
and social factors. In the US, there are some factors which have made 
refining laws to regulate new technology very difficult to resolve. These 
developments and the contentious views about how best they should be 
managed in ways that would promote - or at least not undermine - US 
power, resulted in the identification of the case study on network 
neutrality. 
Thesis map 
Chapter Two develops the conceptual framework for the study. One of 
the thesis' key contributions, this framework consists of International 
Relations theories about power combined with a conceptual approach 
to technology based in the Social Construction of Technology. An 
important aspect of this is to examine the relative merits of competing 
International Relations approaches to power and explain how those 
approaches engage (explicitly or implicitly) with theoretical approaches 
to technology. This provides a foundation for accurately locating 
existing work as well as laying down the parameters for how the 
research is conducted and the findings understood. 
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Chapter Three provides background material which is relevant to the 
case studies that follow. This chapter identifies the key players, the 
Congressional committees that have been responsible for Internet 
oversight and legislation, important Congressional hearings, as well as 
the Bills and policies that have shaped the development of the Internet 
both globally and in the United States. This material also provides a 
context for the three 'reverse salients' which generated the case studies 
for this thesis. While it is not possible to provide a complete political 
history of the Internet in this chapter, the material presented 
demonstrates the importance of acknowledging these factors. Chapter 
Three not only provides an important narrative background for the 
debates in this study, it demonstrates how cyber security, Internet 
governance and network neutrality emerge as key concerns for US 
politicians in the context of state power. 
Chapter Four is the first of three case studies and deals with the 
complex issues which surround cyber security and state power. Cyber 
insecurity has been consistently referred to by politicians as a threat to 
US power almost since the Internet's inception. The research reveals 
that politicians regard the 'problem' of cyber security in terms of 
material power factors. They perceive it as potentially undermining 
economic power, military power and even geopolitics. This is the 
reverse salient and explains why the security of the Internet is 
perceived as a 'problem' for US power. However, when politicians 
debate policy options to address this problem, they do so through a 
social power conception. Here, they privilege values and norms like 
freedom of speech, privacy, civil liberties and human rights which they 
also regard as an important source of US power. While the promotion 
of these norms and values would appear to be in conflict with better 
cyber security practices, politicians continue to show a preference for 
this conception of power. In fact, politicians articulate a view that 
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despite the risks of cyber insecurity to material power, the rewards of 
social power in this context are more likely to lead to security and 
power. They also express a sense of authority and indeed, 
responsibility to shape and influence the technology so as to best 
promote these values and norms internationally as an expression of US 
power. This sense of authority and responsibility, it will be argued, is 
related to the Social Constructivist approach to technology which is 
prevalent in these debates. 
Chapter Five engages with Internet governance by examrnrng the 
establishment and operation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN). This is a global body which controls 
key aspects of the Internet and yet continues to operate under 
California state law and the oversight of the US Department of 
Commerce. The reverse salient in this case study emerges from 
politicians' concerns about the capacity of early governance 
mechanisms to accommodate anticipated growth in commercial activity 
over the Internet. Without a robust and legitimate governance system 
in place, they feared that the potential for US economic growth would 
be undermined with a consequent negative impact on economic power 
- a factor increasingly regarded as important to post Cold War 
conceptions of US power. 
As with the previous case, politicians engage with multiple conceptions 
of power when debating Internet governance policy and two key 
themes emerge as significant; hegemony and legitimacy. The research 
for this case finds that US politicians established hegemonic control 
over global Internet governance in the late 1990s and used that power 
to ensure that governance developed in such a way as to promote their 
wider power agenda of economic growth. This material conception of 
power profoundly shaped Internet governance and continues to impact 
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on contemporary debates. Again, a Social Constructivist approach to 
technology was a feature here. US politicians believed (and still 
believe) that they had the authority and responsibility to oversee global 
Internet governance. When the US experienced challenges to this 
authority, politicians very clearly articulate a perceived need for 
legitimacy - in order to retain control. This perceived need to balance 
hegemony and legitimacy is one of the key findings of this case study. 
Chapter Six explores the complex issues surrounding network 
neutrality. This is a unique case study in that political opinion is 
divided on the merits and dangers which network neutrality poses for 
US power. Network neutrality refers to the principle that information 
packets pass unexamined and indiscriminately across the network. 
The reverse salient in this case is a product of both material and social 
power concerns. Politicians believe that if mismanaged, network 
neutrality has the capacity to stymie economic growth and also to 
diminish US 'leadership' in Internet technology. This case study 
generates findings about what happens when politicians fail to derive 
any sense of authority to shape technology according to conceptions of 
power. 
Chapter Seven offers conclusions on the thesis, revisiting the broader 
theoretical issues and linking the case studies back to the objectives 
and argument of this thesis. The study led to three major findings. 
First, when discussing Internet technology, politicians engage with 
multiple conceptions of power - sometime even in the context of one 
issue. Second, while both material and social power conceptions are 
evident in the case studies, the conception which shapes and influences 
the technology varies from case to case. Third, there was a correlation 
in this study between the conception of power which most significantly 
shaped Internet and the approach to technology which politicians 
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associated with that conception. The most influential conception of 
power was always accompanied by a Social Constructivist approach to 
technology which instilled a sense of authority and responsibility in 
politicians. 
These findings generate a set of conclusions about the relationship 
between state power and the Internet. First, we can investigate 
relevance of the range of conceptions of power which emerge in the case 
studies and to what extent they influence technology. Second, 
authority and legitimacy play a central role in the relationship 
between power and the Internet. Indeed, a sense of authority to shape 
and influence Internet technology may itself be considered a form of 
power in the information age. Finally, given the important relationship 
between conceptions of power and Internet technology, it is clearly 
time to develop a more integrated approach to these questions which 
focuses intently on the 'political construction of technology'. 
Contribution 
This project is able to contribute on both a theoretical level and an 
empirical level. While International Relations scholars have taken 
some steps to incorporate recent technological change into theories of 
power, it has been done without adequately engaging with either 
technology theory or emerging and complex technical issues. This work 
has therefore tended towards dystopian or utopian conclusions without 
developing a useful conceptual framework with which to examine these 
pressing issues. By incorporating the Philosophy of Technology which 
provides theory and concepts for engaging with the social implications 
of technology, and demonstrating its utility in the analysis of state 
power in International Relations, this study takes an important step 
forward. It illustrates how much of the literature has been driven by 
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assumptions about technology - particularly the assumption that 
technology has a universal effect on power regardless of social or 
political forces. The conceptual framework developed and employed in 
this study can contribute to International Relations scholarship which 
investigates questions dealing with new technology by moving debates 
beyond questions about whether technology like the Internet enhances 
power more than it undermines it. 
On an empirical level, this project contributes in a number of ways. 
First, the analysis of the political debates around Internet technology 
reveals the multifaceted and contradictory nature of US power in ways 
that studies which look at power through Realist, Liberal or 
Constructivist lenses are not able to. Politicians take into account 
many factors of power when they make critical decisions about Internet 
technology. These conceptions of power can lead to conflicting policy 
choices and when they do, politicians privilege one conception of power 
over another. 
Second, the three case studies reveal how conceptions of power have 
shaped and influenced these three aspects of Internet technology. This 
is an important shift away from the view that technology has its own 
path and produces universal effects - a view which pervades much of 
the academic literature on the Internet and politics. Observing how the 
Internet has been shaped by political conceptions of power in the US -
sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously as a function of 
ideas and norms about power - provides a model for a similar 
empirical analysis of other states and other technology issues. 
Finally, the empirical material provides a narrative of the 'political' 
history of three aspects of Internet technology which is absent other 
historical accounts. Despite states' increasing dependence upon and 
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interdependence over the Internet, the political history of how this 
technology was initially conceived, developed, governed and managed 
over time has not been critically examined. Although 'histories of the 
Internet' abound, they are almost exclusively concerned with 
documenting key technicians and developers and attributing their 
achievements and contributions to the code and architecture now in 
use. However, the political forces surrounding those developments are 
rarely referenced in these accounts and given no substantive place in 
understanding the progression of the Internet from a military project 
to a global information and communications network. As this thesis 
shows, early Internet research was largely funded by government 
research institutions, the infrastructure was owned and operated by 
government agencies until it could be privatised in the US, and 
political decisions continue to shape and influence the development of 
Internet technology. The empirical material in this thesis draws out 
this political history and contributes a significant aspect of the 
development of this important technology. 
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Chapter Two: International Relations Meets Technology 
Theory 
As outlined in the preceding Introduction, a central premise of this 
study is that existing approaches to understanding the relationship 
between technology and power in International Relations are 
struggling to deal with the complexities introduced by the information 
age. While the discipline of International Relations has a range of 
theories about power, it does not have an equivalent framework for 
understanding technology and this is proving to be a limitation for 
developing a deeper understanding of the relationship between power 
and new technology. As this chapter reveals, assumptions are made in 
International Relations literature about technology without an 
adequate critical analysis of how scholars and practitioners arrive at 
those assumptions. Furthermore existing theories for understanding 
power in International Relations were developed within the context of 
industrial technology and do not take into account the distinctive 
features of information and communications technology which can 
render the nature and expression of power more complex. This thesis 
demonstrates that by engaging with social theories of technology, 
International Relations can be better equipped to pursue answers to 
questions which have thus far proven difficult to grapple with 
including how we understand the relationship between new technology 
like the Internet and state power. 
In a sense, then, the conceptual framework for this project is also 
central to the rationale for the project as a whole. Indeed, it is one of 
the key contributions of this thesis. This chapter builds a theoretical 
and conceptual framework which incorporates insights from the 
Philosophy of Technology and more specifically, the Social 
Construction of Technology, in order to explore the manner in which 
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conceptions of US power have influenced the development of the 
Internet and what implications this has for understanding power in 
the information age. 
This chapter consists of four mam parts. In the first section, I 
introduce the field of the Philosophy of Technology. A full treatment of 
the Philosophy of Technology is beyond the scope of this chapter nor is 
it necessary for the development of the conceptual framework. Instead, 
through a discussion of three key debates which feature in the 
discipline, I introduce a number of important and relevant concepts 
and theoretical approaches to defining technology and to 
understanding its nature. These debates revolve around questions of 
how to define technology, whether technology is a positive, benign or 
negative force in society, and to what degree society influences the 
development of technology. 
The second section engages further with these debates in the context of 
an explanation of the theories of the Social Construction of Technology 
(SCoT). This is one approach of several put forward in the Philosophy 
of Technology but because it provides scope for the analysis of social 
factors of technology, it is best suited to the study of power. The 
justification for employing this approach is also made clear in this 
section. 
In the third section of this chapter, I demonstrate how the concepts 
and theories from the Philosophy of Technology can be integrated into 
International Relations theories of power. I do this first by 
demonstrating the unacknowledged role assumptions about technology 
already play in International Relations literature which seeks to 
explore questions about the relationship between technology and power. 
This is illustrated through my articulation of two dominant paradigms 
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within International Relations literature. Referred to in this thesis as 
the 'Industrial Age' view and 'Information Age' view, these paradigms 
are comprised of self consciously articulated theories of power coupled 
with (generally) unselfconscious - but clearly evident approaches to 
technology. As I suggest in section three, neither the Industrial Age 
paradigm nor the Information Age paradigm is proving effective for 
understanding the relationship between power and technology in the 
information age as they both remain embedded in restrictive theories 
about technology. 
In the final section of this chapter, I outline the conceptual framework 
which supports and guides this study. I also argue that this framework 
provides a way forward for future analysis of the relationship between 
new technology and power m International Relations. By 
contextualising this study within the Philosophy of Technology, it 
becomes clear why and how this methodological approach can ask and 
answer questions about the relationship between politics and 
technology which other approaches are unable to. 
The Philosophy of Technology 
The Philosophy of Technology is a body of scholarship which seeks to 
understand the human relationship with technology. The emergence of 
the field can be understood as a response to rapid changes in 
technology and science following the Industrial Revolution particularly 
from the mid 19th century. Prior to the Industrial Revolution, the pace 
of technological change was not generally sufficient to significantly 
affect the wider social fabric during the course of an individual's 
lifetime. While technology changed, it happened slowly and - more 
importantly - its impact on the human experience was gradual. 
However, the past two centuries have been a time of constant, rapid 
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and profound technological development. This development has been 
implicated in social, cultural, economic and political shifts which have, 
in some cases, altered the experience of individuals and societies 
profoundly over a short span of time. Attempts to better comprehend 
the impact of rapid changes in technology on the human condition 
emerged predominantly over the course of the latter half of the 2Qth 
century into a coherent study now referred to as the Philosophy of 
Technology. 
There are a number of key debates within the Philosophy of 
Technology. Some of these are of particular relevance to this thesis and 
provide a means of introducing some key concepts and theoretical 
approaches which inform the thesis. The first of these is an ongoing 
and unresolved debate about how to define technology and there are 
parallels here with International Relations debates about how to define 
power. Both debates are characterised by a spectrum of views, at one 
end of which is a very tightly focused and parsimonious definition 
while at the other end of the spectrum is a broader definition which 
accommodates a range of social factors. Those definitions, as they 
apply to technology, are explored in more detail later in this chapter. 
The second big debate to be discussed here revolves around whether 
technology is a positive, benign or negative force in society. The 
purpose of engaging with this debate is that it provides an opportunity 
to examine a range of approaches to technology · as distinct from 
definitions of technology. These approaches have been conceptualised 
differently by a number of scholars but key themes run through the 
literature as will be illustrated through a general and representative 
summation drawn from a wide survey of the literature. This debate is 
primarily concerned with the values and norms which technology does 
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or does not promote and the impact of those values and norms on the 
human condition. 
Finally, the third big debate of relevance for this thesis involves the 
degree to which society shapes and influences technology. As will be 
explained, some scholars argue that the answer is 'not at all', others 
feel that society could, but rarely does shape technology while yet 
others believe that not only does society shape technology but 
technology is in fact, an expression of the norms, values and 
expectations of society. It is this last view, embedded in the Social 
Construction of Technology, with which this thesis engages in order to 
answer the research question about how conceptions of US power have 
influenced the development of Internet technology. However, the 
broader range of views is essential to understand because they will 
feature in the analysis of the empirical material. Understanding how 
these approaches function and what conclusions they lead to is 
necessary to an informed reading of the case studies. 
First Bi{{ Debate: Jf1.iat defines technology? 
One of the big epistemological debates within the Philosophy of 
Technology is the question of what exactly technology is. 'Technology' 
is a term plagued by definitional ambiguity - in a similar manner to 
other terms from within International Relations including democracy, 
society, terrorism and indeed, power - a focus of this study. There are a 
range of approaches to understanding and defining technology with the 
essential point of difference being the scope and focus. Some 
approaches take a very narrow and specific view of technology while 
others argue that technology includes factors such as science, 
organisational structures and even systems of knowledge. 
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The most basic definition of technology is that of 'applied science'. This 
definition is based on the understanding that science is a "search for 
new laws of nature" while technology is the application of those 
scientific laws.43 Norman Vig understands this approach as essentially 
an Aristotelian concept whereby "technology refers to a device or 
method created by man [sic] (and thus external to him) as a secondary 
means of achieving his primary ends". 44 Technology, in this view, is a 
tool. In this definition, an artefact or object is what it is - regardless of 
whether anyone observes it or interacts with it, it has meaning and 
purpose. As pointed out in the Introduction, a computer is a computer -
regardless of whether it is used to compute or as a doorstop. The 
Internet, in this definition, would consist of the physical hardware -
the cables, routers and computers but it would not include the World 
Wide Web which runs over it and certainly not the decisions about how 
it is used, governed or interacted with. This definition of technology 
has three defining qualities: technology is distinct from science; its 
purpose is 'problem·solving'; and it is narrowly conceived of as 
'artefacts' or physical tools. This definition is most closely aligned with 
studies based on an objectivist epistemology but Donald MacKenzie 
points out that few scholars are content with a simple definition of 
'technology as hardware'.45 
4
' Mario Bunge, 'Technology as Applied Science', Technology and Culture, Vol. 7, No.3, 
Summer 1966, pg.329. Staudenmaier makes the point that few authors in his study 
theorised about this to the depth that Bunge does but that references to his argument 
can be found in many articles which take the same view. 
44 Norman Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', Technology and Politics, 
Michael E. Kraft and Norman J. Vig (eds.), (Durham and London: Duke University 
Press, 1988), pg.11. 
4
' MacKenzie, 'Introductory Essay', in The Social Shaping of Technology, pg.3. 
56 IP age 
Chapter Two /R Meets Technology Theory 
For those who believe an expanded definition of technology is 
warranted, justifications come m a number of ways. John 
Staudenmaier conducted a study which analysed every article 
published in the Technology and Culture journal between 1959 and 
1980. 46 One of his focus questions was this issue of defining technology 
which played a prominent role in the journal's content over two 
decades.47 Staudenmaier found that the notion of technology as applied 
science faced criticism from within that quarter of the discipline on the 
basis of two arguments. The first was a rebuke to the view of science as 
somehow more purely connected to the pursuit of true knowledge -
Pinch refers to this as an "over-idealised version of the nature of 
science". 48 Proponents of this position argue that science is as 
constructed as technology - that scientists do not 'discover the truth', 
rather, they construct facts. 49 This assertion is based on the 
acknowledgment that scientific knowledge changes - sometimes, a 'fact' 
is later found to be an error. 
The second argument against a definition of technology as an artefact 
and as distinct from science is based on an understanding of the 
interrelationships between art, technology and science. 50 MacKenzie 
points out that technology's boundaries with science, art and the 
46 John M. Staudenmaier, Technologies Storytellers: Reweaving the Human Fabric, 
(Cambridge and London: The Society for the History of Technology and The MIT 
Press, 1985). For a full reading of this debate, see pp.95 · 101. 
47 It is perhaps not surprising that a journal like Technology and Culture would be 
the site of criticism of a view of technology as 'applied science'. However, this is an 
excellent summary of how those criticisms are framed in the broader literature. 
48 Trevor Pinch, 'Understanding Technology: Some Possible Implications of Work in 
the Sociology of Science', Technology and Social Process, Brian Elliott (ed.), 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1988), pg. 72. 
49 Staudenmaier, Technologies Storytellers, pg.100. 
so Ibid. 
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economy are unclear and more importantly, our perceptions of those 
boundaries change over time. 5l The extension of this is to suggest then, 
that technology also refers to human activity. It is not just the tool (or 
artefact) itself, but what we do with the tool which constitutes 
technology. This definition would regard the technology of the Internet 
as including the software and systems like the web as well as the ways 
in which people interact with it. The processing of data and transfer of 
files as well as the systems of knowledge about the architecture and 
use of the Internet comprise technology in this expanded view. 
In one sense, this definitional approach seems intuitive - the cables 
and computers are not the Internet without data flowing through them 
and without people connecting across the network. However, this view 
is not without problems. As MacKenzie points out, this definition 
implies that technology includes what people do as well as the tools 
they use and when we start to discuss behaviour, "it could well be said 
that we are already talking about society, not about something 
separate."52 Despite the complexity which an expanded definition of 
technology introduces, many scholars feel that a parsimonious view 
leaves out too much of relevance. They therefore regard the distinction 
between not only science and technology, but the artefact and the way 
we use it, as artificial. 53 
The purpose of this study is not to refine the definition of technology, 
nor does it intend to isolate one of these layers of meaning from the 
others. In the context of this study which seeks to understand the 
51 MacKenzie, 'Introductory Essay', in The Social Shaping of Technology, pp.2·5. 
52 Ibid, pg.3. 
53 Pinch, 'Understanding Technology', pg. 72. 
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relationship between ideas about US power and Internet technology, 
all of these layers of meaning are relevant. It is not useful to look only 
at the physical infrastructru«? of the Internet because it is how policy· 
makers perceive the relationship between that technology and US 
power which gives meaning to this study. It is the more abstract (or at 
least less brutally objectivist) meaning of technology which is of 
relevance here - including the uses of artefacts and the organisation of 
people and systems of knowledge about the Internet. However, the 
artefacts themselves have often been the subject of political decisions 
which have influenced the abstract - material concerns are shown to 
impact on the social, political and cultural meaning of technology. 
Therefore, this study accepts the complex nature of this 
conceptualisation of technology (as do many other studies) and argues 
that the complexity is in fact, the very essence of why we need to study 
it so carefully. 
Second Big Debate: fJi1.iat is the Nature of Technology? 
Beyond the debates outlined above about the definition of technology, 
understanding the nature of technology is also a key pursuit of scholars 
working in the Philosophy of Technology. There is a tendency to 
employ a dichotomous framework of reference to technology which 
ascribes positive or negative attributes to it. 54 Significantly, this 
permeates not only literature in the Philosophy of Technology but also 
(as foreshadowed in the Introduction) International Relations 
literature on the relationship between technology and power. This 
debate engages with questions about whether technology is 'good' for 
us or 'bad' for us. 'l'his obviously raises a set of sub-questions like 'good 
M Sturken and Thomas, 'Introduction' in Technological Visions, pp. l · 18. 
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or bad for whom, exactly?', 'good and bad in which respects' and 'good 
or bad in whose opinion?' In the context of this thesis, these questions 
may be realigned to ask whether technology such as the Internet 
enhances or undermines state power. 
At their simplest, approaches to the nature of technology can be 
understood to see it either as positive and beneficial or as frightening 
and negative. Challenges like ecological destruction and nuclear war 
help to focus attention on the risks of technology and raise questions 
about the ability of humans to live sustainably on the planet. At the 
same time, advances in technology which can prolong life, more 
efficiently produce food or enhance our experiences through the ability 
to travel, communicate and ease many daily tasks are regarded as 
positive and liberating. In many of the debates which feature in this 
thesis, these two approaches can be observed struggling for prominence 
as politicians conceptions appear to be largely dependent on the 
context. The following section clearly outlines the key approaches to 
the nature of technology which are prominent in the literature and 
which feature in the analysis of the empirical material in this study. 
Instrumentalism 
Instrumentalism is an approach which regards technology as a means 
to address a human-defined problem or need. Innovation is always 
regarded in this approach as positive if it is 'successful'. If technology 
works, it is 'good'. Beyond this, technology is morally neutral and 
disconnected from its social consequences. Human use makes 
technology 'good' or 'evil' - the technology itself is detached from moral 
outcomes. Guns are an example of 'good' technology in that they are 
very effective at killing from a distance. Human use may include 
killing an animal for food or killing a human for gain but 
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Instrumentalists regard either of those ends as separate and distinct 
from the technology itself. 
Dominant m the commercial sector, Instrumentalism justifies 
continuous innovation while also implying that if there were to arise 
any negative social outcomes, the answer to them probably lies m a 
technologically based solution. The Instrumentalist assumption that 
science and technology are the means through which social problems 
should be solved is observed by Hans Morgenthau in Scientific Man vs 
Power Politics. 55 Morgenthau notes here that a belief in science "is the 
one intellectual trait which sets our age apart from preceding periods 
of history". 56 He also makes the point that this belief in science and its 
capacity to 'solve' the problems of society unites us all as it transcends 
other divergent philosophic, economic, and political beliefs we may hold. 
In this view, the problems of society and nature are essentially 
identical and the solution of social problems depends upon the 
quantitative extension of the method of the natural sciences to the 
social sphere. This, Morgenthau argues, is the "common ground on 
which Jeremy Bentham and Karl Marx, Herbert Spencer and John 
Dewey take their stand". 57 
In a political context, Vig links Instrumentalism to liberal theories of 
democracy which argue that "individuals should be free to pursue their 
own interests without interference from the state". 58 The empirical 
research for this study reveals a persistent notion on behalf of the 
55 Hans Morgenthau, Scientiflc Man vs Power Politics, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1946) Midway Reprint, 1974, especially pp.267-269. 
56 Morgenthau, Scientiflc Man vs Power Politics, pp.3-4. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', pg.13. 
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private sector that Internet technology should be developed without 
reference to normative expectations about how society will engage with 
it or what kind of impact it might have on those who use it. This tends 
to emerge most explicitly in Chapter Six on network neutrality which 
deals with political expectations of the public sector provision of 
Internet infrastructure. Innovation is regarded as an end in and of 
itself and is always a positive outcome in an Instrumentalist view. 
This is a point strongly refuted by Herbert Marcuse. In One 
Dimensional Man, Marcuse argues that technology is not neutral and 
the discourse which suggests that it is, in effect, closes off the space for 
any substantive critical analysis of values and norms.59 Certainly, in 
the context of this study, Instrumentalism has that effect on some US 
politicians by reducing their perceptions of the government's mandate 
to make decisions about Internet technology. If technology is to be held 
separate from the outcomes of its use and implementation as well as its 
relationship with power, debate about it is limited and constrained. 
This is a recurring theme in the empirical material and will be drawn 
out in each of the three case studies. 
In studying two concepts of a fundamentally social nature like power 
and the Internet, an approach which disengages from the social 
implications of technology is not useful. While Instrumentalism 
regards technology as value neutral which is the view running through 
this thesis, it stops there. Technology has no values, therefore values 
are irrelevant. In this study, an Instrumental approach would lead to 
questions about whether a particular aspect of Internet technology is 
'good' - that is; does it address the problem or purpose it was intended 
59 Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), pp.156· 169. 
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for? However, it would fail to engage with important factors for 
understanding power such as whose perception of the problem or 
purpose is being privileged in decisions about technology and how a 
legitimate use of technology is defined. Instrumentalism does not 
provide an appropriate conceptual framework for this research project 
as it leaves out too much of relevance for understanding power but it 
does play a role in some of the political debates about the Internet and 
is therefore important to identify. 
Technological Determinism 
In response to Instrumentalism, Technological Determinists argue 
against a view of technology as 'value neutral'. Instead, they believe 
that it is imbued with values like a desire for power, the quest for 
efficiency, and the profit motive - "over other human needs (including 
those of future generations) and against the integrity of nature." 60 
v\Thile Instrumentalists regard innovation as inherently positive and 
progressive, Technological Determinism tends to be an approach which 
focuses on the negative and dangerous aspects of technology. Indeed, 
Technological Determinism can be understood as a response to the 
negative effects of modern technology. Vig cites as an example, the 
Vietnam \¥ ar when practices like chemical defoliation and carpet 
bombing became "symbols of technological hubris". 61 Episodes like this, 
he argues, periodically prompt a re-evaluation of our relationship with 
technology and a fundamental questioning of its benign nature. 
oo Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', pg.17. 
a1 Ibid. 
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There are a number of strands of Technological Determinism but they 
are united by some overriding principles. One of these is the fact that 
Technological Determinists take a social view of technology which 
engages with the relationship between humans and technology. It is, 
however based on a mono-directional relationship. That is, technology 
has an impact on society - in many cases, a profound impact - but it is 
an external force over which society has minimal control or influence. 
Technological Determinism regards technology as having its own 
governing force; it "advances according to its own logic and shapes 
human development more than it serves human ends."62 It is the story 
of Frankenstein, of technology running along a predetermined 
evolutionary path which may or may not be beneficial for society but 
which is largely unstoppable. 
Technological Determinists also believe that society adapts to 
technology in a homogenous manner. They argue that the introduction 
of technology into different societies will have the same outcome 
regardless of cultural, political or social factors or influences. Although 
technology is not considered to be morally neutral, it is understood as 
autonomous from its context. 
Beyond these unifying characteristics, there exist a number of subtle 
but important distinctions in positions of Technological Determinism. 
Towards the end of the following discussion of these distinctions, this 
second debate about the nature of technology - whether essentially 
62 Bruce Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', 
Social Studies of Science, Vol.20, 1990, pg.338. Also Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and 
the State', pg.16. 
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positive, benign or negative - will begin to segue into the third big 
debate about whether or how societies shape technology. 
Variations in Technological Determinism 
One approach to Technological Determinism can be understood as 
'hard determinism' or what Bruce Bimber terms the "logical sequence" 
approach. 63 This approach suggests that one technological development 
emerges logically from its predecessors and we are witness to a certain 
segment of that evolutionary process which will continue to unfold 
more or less unabated. The logical sequence approach would argue that 
given the existence of both sailing ships and the steam engine, it was 
inevitable that steam powered ocean travel would eventually follow. 
This is expressed in Robert Heilbroner's idea of a single, pre· 
determined "grand avenue of advance".64 Heilbroner doubts however, 
that technology can provide society with the means to control it - for he 
and his fellow scholars who accept this view, technology remains 
determined and society must adapt accordingly. 
Other scholars see the problem of technology and Determinism in a 
slightly different light. For these scholars, the point of focus is not 
technology itself but rather society's inability to synthesise it with 
certain social norms and values. 65 Lewis Mumford makes a distinction 
between technology which is in harmony with the diversity of human 
63 Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', pp.333·350. 
64 Robert Heilbroner, 'Do Machines Make History?', Technology and Culture, Vol.2, 
Winter 1961, pp.335·45. 
65 Another scholar which takes this approach is Witold Rybczynski who has been 
active in defining 'appropriate' and 'inappropriate' technology in the context of 
development and aid practices. Witold Rybczynski, Paper Heroes: A Review of 
Appropriate Technology, (New York: Doubleday, 1980). 
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aspirations and that which he describes as mono· or authoritarian 
technology. Authoritarian technology, he argues, is ''based upon 
scientific intelligence and quantified production, directed mainly 
toward economic expansion, material repletion, and military 
superiority" - in short, toward power. 66 The fear of Technological 
Determinists like Mumford is that once large technological systems are 
in place, it becomes very difficult to alter or reverse them - they 
become so embedded in society that they are not necessarily responsive 
to changed human perceptions about their value or use. In this context, 
an elite group of 'technocrats' control what Mumford calls the 
'megamachine', which leaves the rest of society vulnerable to its effects 
but powerless to alter them. 67 
Mumford's approach has resonance with questions about power and 
Internet technology. Certainly, the Internet has become firmly 
embedded in social, cultural, economic and political aspects of life in 
industrialised and industrialising states. It could also be argued that 
decisions made early in the development of the Internet (for example, 
governance mechanisms) now have some very serious and binding 
consequences for any of us who use the Internet. In part, this tendency 
towards technological 'lock-in' is exactly why examining political 
decisions about technology is so important. 68 However, Mumford's 
66 Carl Mitcham, 'What is the Philosophy of Technology?', International Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 1, 1985, pg. 79. 
"This concept permeates much of Mumford's work but a good treatment can be 
found in Lewis Mumford, The Myth of the Machine: The Pentagon of Power, (New 
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970), especially chapter 10 'The New 
Megamachine', pp.263·300. 
" This concept of technological 'lock·in' is explained by Paul David in his account of 
the market dominance of the QWERTY keyboard in Paul A. David, 'Clio and the 
Economics of QWERTY, The American Economic Review, Vol.75, No.2, May 1985, 
pp.332·337. 
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approach is constrained by its focus on 'impact' and 'adaptation' which 
fails to engage with an analysis of how those decisions were made (or 
why they were not made) as well as the ways in which society does 
shape and influence technology. 
Certainly, in the context of the Internet, there have been many, many 
choices about how that technology should or would be developed. The 
Internet did not spring forth fully conceptualised, nor was it 
'discovered'. Rather, it was the consequence of many years of competing 
ideas, collaboration and - as this thesis demonstrates, political 
decisions - about what the Internet should be and how it should 
function. The case studies highlight this through the analysis of 
debates about how Internet governance should be arranged, how 
security mechanisms should function and who should have the power 
to control the flow of information over the Internet. Mumford's 
Technologically Determinist approach offers some important insights 
into the question driving this thesis but it does not offer a framework 
for analysis of the ways in which conceptions of US power have 
influenced and shaped Internet technology. Because it negates the role 
of social choice, a Determinist approach in this project would narrow 
the focus to an assessment of technology's impact on power which 
returns us to the circular debates about whether the Internet enhances 
state power more than it undermines it. 
The considerable contribution of Jacques Ellul to the Philosophy of 
Technology can also be understood in this context. Ellul believed that 
'technique' - not only technology itself but the organisational, political 
and social structures which support it - (here we see the broader 
approach to a definition of technology) - preferences principles of 
efficiency, logic and productivity over all else. This, he argues in his 
seminal work The Technological Society, subsumes the role of more 
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human-centric norms grounded in social justice. 69 As the framework of 
beliefs driven by 'technique' becomes more pervasive, society is in 
danger of losing touch with any other set of values which might 
suggest an alternative approach to technology. 
For scholars like Mumford and Ellul, technology itself is not the 
problem. Rather, it is the fact that technology is pre-disposed to 
promoting a certain set of values (efficiency, productivity, profit) which 
they feel has an alienating force on human relations and over-rides the 
projection of other values which may be more conducive to the overall 
health and well-being of society. Their view differs from that of 
Heilbroner in that they do not argue that it is impossible to control 
technology and shape its impact on society. They do, however, regard 
adequate control as very difficult and generally unsuccessful and they 
are pessimistic about the future of technology's impact on society. 
In perhaps a slightly more optimistic or self-determined approach, 
Jurgen Habermas argues that Technological Determinism is a choice 
societies make - either to exert some sovereignty over technology or to 
leave it to develop and evolve along a path uninfluenced by norms and 
values. 70 Bimber refers to this view as a "norm-based" account of 
Technological Determinism. 71 Because societies tend to privilege norms 
of efficiency and production in making decisions about technology, they 
effectively remove technology from political or ethical discourse and 
instead, embed it in a protective coating of Determinism. For scholars 
like Habermas, it is not that technology embodies those norms of 
69 Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, (New York: Knopf, 1964). 
70 Jurgen Habermas, Towards a Rational Society, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970). 
n Bimber, 'Karl Marx and the Three Faces of Technological Determinism', pg.337. 
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efficiency and production, rather that society tends to imbue 
technology with them. 
Prominent theorist, Langdon Winner takes a position of modified 
Technological Determinism - sometimes referred to in the literature as 
'Soft Determinism'. He argues that technology should better be 
regarded as shaping social change rather than determining it. 72 For 
him, the hard Determinist view which regards 'artefacts' as replete 
with political meaning is essentially a way of avoiding responsibility 
for the true sources of freedom and oppression, justice and injustice 
which are undeniably human. "Blaming the hardware seems even 
more foolish than blaming the victim when it comes to judging 
conditions of public life." 73 While he suggests that there is nothing 
inevitable about the direction of change, Winner warns against a 
pattern of 'technological drift'; that is, a largely random and 
thoughtless process of technical and social change to which people 
adapt like 'somnambulists'. 74 Along these lines, Albert Borgmann 
suggests that technology's power lies in our disinclination to think 
critically about its social and political implications but rather to accept 
them as inevitable. 75 For Borgmann, "living in an advanced industrial 
country, one is always and already implicated in technology" but 
because technology is so profoundly integrated into our way of being, 
72 For one of his most cited articles on this see Langdon Winner, 'Do Artefacts Have 
Politics?' in The Social Shaping of Technology: How the Refrigerator Got Its Hum, 
Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wacjman, (eds.), (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 
1985), pp.26·38. 
73 Winner, 'Do Artifacts have Politics?', pp.26·38. 
74 Langdon Winner, Autonomous Technology: Technics·out·of-Control as a Theme in 
Political Thought, (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1977), pp.88·99. 
75 Albert Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1984), pp.104· 105. 
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our involvement normally remains implicit rather than self-consciously 
examined. 76 
Technological Determinism is irreconcilable with an epistemological 
position of Constructivism which underpins the primary question 
driving this research project. Its assumption that technology and 
society have a mono·directional relationship and its disregard for the 
ways in which societies can and do shape technology preclude its 
usefulness in the exploration of how ideas about US power have shaped 
and influenced the development of the Internet. An essential starting 
point for this study is that politicians make decisions about how they 
believe the Internet should best promote the state's national interest 
and enhance state power. However, while Technological Determinism 
does not provide a conceptual framework for approaching this research 
project, it is nonetheless relevant here. As MacKenzie writes, while 
Technological Determinism may no longer be prevalent in academic 
work on the history and sociology of technology, "it still informs the 
way technology is thought about and discussed in society at large, 
especially where modern high technologies are concerned."77 As with 
Instrumentalism, Technological Determinism will be helpful as an 
analytical tool in identifying the approaches of US politicians as some 
of them engage with this view while formulating and debating Internet 
policies. In this way, rather than providing a methodology, it becomes a 
conceptual tool for making sense of particular points of view. 
76 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Lim, pp.104· 105. 
77 Donald MacKenzie, Knowing Machines, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pg.5. 
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Third Big Debate: Does Society Shape Technology? 
The most effective way to engage with the third key debate of 
relevance to this thesis is to introduce the Social Construction of 
Technology - another of the approaches from the Philosophy of 
Technology along with Instrumentalism and Technological 
Determinism. If we were to arrange these approaches to technology on 
a linear spectrum, we could locate Instrumentalism at one end with its 
positive view of technology detached from any moral or value reading. 
We might then place the 'hard' Determinist view which attributes 
values and political meaning to technology but regards society as 
unable to mediate or moderate them. The 'soft' Determinists would 
follow with their focus on the negative impact of technology on society 
and their views that it is either very difficult to intervene or that 
societies largely choose not to. As was evident in the preceding pages, 
these debates about whether technology is a positive, benign or 
negative force for the human condition segue into questions about 
whether society can shape technology. If technology can promote or 
express positive or negative norms and values, to what extent is society 
able to navigate and direct them? Furthermore, how can we 
understand this process and analyse social behaviour (including 
political approaches to power) within it? These are some of the 
questions which animate the Social Construction of Technology - the 
next point on this linear spectrum and the focus of the next section of 
this chapter. 
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The Social Construction of Technology 
A sense that Instrumental and Determinist approaches were limited in 
their scope led some scholars, particularly historians and sociologists, 
to adopt a new approach to technology. 78 These scholars argued that 
technology is neither a neutral instrument for problem solving (as 
Instrumentalists suggest) nor a value laden force which threatens 
human autonomy (the Determinist view). Rather, they believe that 
society shapes and influences technology, and technology must 
therefore be regarded as an expression of norms and expectations 
within society. In order to more fully elaborate on the Social 
Construction of Technology (SCoT) approach, it is helpful to lay down 
some parameters for how SCoT differs from the previously discussed 
approaches to technology and what questions each approach would 
raise were it to be employed in this study. 
In contrast to Instrumentalism, SCoT rejects the premise that a 
particular technology succeeds simply because it was 'superior' to other 
competing options. As noted earlier, Instrumentalists regard 
technology as the solution to a human-defined problem. The 'best' 
solution, they argue, will succeed - without acknowledging that the 
definition of 'best' is itself socially constructed. Social Constructivists 
argue that technological superiority is a subjective concept and 
dependent in part upon the articulation or preference of stated 
priorities. 
78 Some key scholars who initiated this shift include Donald MacKenzie, Judy 
Wajcman, Bruno Latour, Wiebe Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, and Trevor Pinch. Their 
work is cited throughout this thesis. 
72jPage 
Chapter Two IR Meets Technology Theory 
Instrumentalism also holds technology distinct and apart from any 
social consequences. For Internet technology, which has had such a 
considerable social impact, separating the threads of consequence for 
the state as distinct from those of other social groups is very difficult. 
The technology is so integrated and spans culture, economics, security 
and politics so comprehensively that studying the Internet in isolation 
from its social impact leaves out too much of significance for 
understanding power. An Instrumental view would raise questions like 
'what security factors can undermine e·commerce?' or 'how much 
bandwidth is necessary to conduct an effective cyberwar?' These are 
interesting questions but far too specific to lead to any better 
understanding of the relationship between power and new technology 
in International Relations. Instrumentalism asks the wrong questions 
for this study though it will emerge many times in the empirical data 
as it is the prominent approach of industry and is a widely (even if not 
consciously) held view in International Relations literature. As with 
Technological Determinism, rather than providing a methodology, 
Instrumentalism in this study becomes a conceptual tool for making 
sense of particular points of view. 
SCoT is also distinct from Technological Determinism in its view of the 
development of technology. Determinists broadly take one of two views 
on this. Some subscribe to Heilbroner's 'grand avenue' notion that 
technological development adheres to what equates to natural law -
that is, the discovery of one element leads inevitably to the next in a 
linear progression. Others take Mumford or Ellul's view that there is 
inevitability about technology which is driven by norms arising from 
the quest for power. SCoT theorists understand technology as an 
expression of broader social values and interests. They believe that 
there are many diverse forces at play which contribute to these 
developments. Not only do new technologies impact on society, but 
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society also helps to shape new technologies. Indeed, they argue that 
decisions about which technologies are developed and who benefits 
from them are "shaped more by cultural preferences and the 
distribution of financial and political power than by specific problems 
or technical opportunities." 79 
A Technological Determinist approach to this project would lead to 
questions about impact and adaptation. 'Does the Internet provide 
states with increased power to project diplomacy?' 'Can the Internet 
enhance states' economic power through market access?' Or 'does the 
Internet facilitate better communications during conflict situations?" 
As demonstrated in the introduction to this thesis, the answers to 
these questions are a complex mix of affirmations tempered by 
considerable vulnerabilities. Projection of diplomacy is easier with the 
Internet but the Internet also empowers a range of new actors who 
previously had little capacity to voice political dissent. The Internet 
certainly has been an enormous economic boon to states which have 
adopted it but it is also the source of massively expensive security 
problems. And while Internet technology can facilitate military 
communication, it also opens a portal for misinformation and theft of 
information.80 These questions - again all interesting and valid - are 
not able to delve any further into the complexities of the relationship 
between power and new technology in the information age. They 
remain tethered to the understanding of technology as a force which 
acts upon society - the paradigm of adaptation - and therefore, cannot 
79 Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', pg.15. 
so Note that some military operations are carried out on closed, proprietary networks 
but that they use the same technology as the Internet. 
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engage with questions about how conceptions of power can and do 
shape technology. 
In addition - and particularly relevant for the Internet - SCoT 
theorists believe that the adoption of technology can also change it. 
Those who use it, also improve, exploit, adapt and shape technology. In 
this process, priorities about how technology should continue to change, 
in what ways and to serve which purposes as well as the means by 
which success is measured, may change. Therefore, SCoT argues that 
the emergence of any new technology needs to be understood in the 
context of social and political forces at work which influence choices 
and preferences about the shaping of technology. illtimately, a SCoT 
approach to this project finds that a meaningful understanding of 
Internet technology cannot be achieved in abstraction from its human 
context. 
In an attempt to move beyond the previously articulated competing 
views of the Internet's impact on state power (that it enhances or 
undermines it), this project proposes a deeper engagement with the 
relationship between new technology and power. Rather than assess 
these issues exclusively through a determination of the positive or 
negative effects of technology, this study asserts that the Internet both 
enhances and undermines state power in complex and important ways 
but it does so at least in part, as a consequence of decisions by 
politicians. The Social Construction of Technology generates a set of 
questions which move beyond the conceptual and empirical stalemate 
of whether Internet technology enhances state power more than it 
undermines it or vice versa. Asserting that there is nothing determined 
or fixed about either of these outcomes, it moves on to more 
enlightening questions about how political ideas (in this case, ideas 
about power) and technology interact. 
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Scholars working from within the Social Construction of Technology 
ask questions like 'how are technological priorities ordered and by 
whom?' 'What happens to technology when those priorities are altered?' 
And, fundamentally for this project, 'what role do ideas play in this 
process of shaping technology?' These questions emerged long before 
the Internet but they have as much relevance in the context of 
information technology as they did to industrial era technology. Indeed, 
it is these questions and others like them which need to be applied to 
International Relations literature attempting to understand issues of 
the complex relationship between international politics, power 
relations and information technology. In the context of this study, they 
may be understood as questions about 'which ideas about Internet 
technology have been adopted and promoted by US politicians?', 'how 
have decisions about key technical issues been decided and which 
conceptions of technology and power have been influential in those 
decision making processes?', and 'how do competing ideas about power 
and technology play out in political debates about the Internet?'. 
The Social Construction of Technology is fundamentally about looking 
beyond the impact of a particular technology on society in order to 
understand how society itself (or in this case, politicians) shaped the 
evolution and adoption of that technology. With the United States' 
seminal role in the development of the Internet, exploring ideas and 
perceptions about how it relates to US power is essential to 
comprehending the evolution of that technology. The research 
methodology for this project focuses on the subjective processes which 
guided US politicians through two and a half decades of rapid 
development of Internet technology and entailed a range of critical 
decisions at every point about how it was to evolve and be integrated 
into state power. By bringing the political context into closer 
interaction with technological development, it is possible to better 
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understand both the challenges and opportunities which face states in 
a globally networked environment. It is also possible to better 
understand how the United States has responded to those factors and 
how state power interacts with technology in a post-industrial model. 
Existing Paradigms in International Relations 
The following analysis will sketch out two dominant paradigms which 
can be found in International Relations literature for understanding 
the relationship between power and technology. They demonstrate how 
ideas about power within the discipline have changed over time but 
that understandings of the relationship between power and technology 
have remained static - despite the emergence of quite distinct 
technology. This would pose no problem if International Relations 
theory retained its explanatory capability, however there are 
compelling reasons (explained earlier and elaborated here) to argue 
that it does not. 
The first paradigm which I refer to as the 'Industrial Age: Technology 
and National Power', identifies a propensity to unite Realist notions of 
power with an Instrumental approach to technology. This approach has 
(largely) dominated International Relations literature from the Second 
World War to the late 1980s and early 1990s. As noted earlier, a key 
characteristic of Instrumentalism is a view of technology as a morally 
neutral means to an end. Technology as an 'artefact' is divorced from 
its use and its social consequences. It is 'good' only if it solves the 
problem it was designed to address and 'bad' if it does not. Beyond 
those narrow parameters, technology has no values or political 
meaning embedded in it. That comes only from the human engagement 
with technology. This approach dovetails with Realist political ideas of 
the state as morally compelled to survive in a self-help system by any 
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means necessary. In this view, survival of the state is 'good' and as 
Martin Wight writes, "morality is the fruit of security". s1 
The second paradigm which I refer to as the 'Information Age: 
Technology and Social Power' identifies a tendency in much of the 
recent literature to link changes in approaches to power which have 
emerged largely since the conclusion of the Cold War, with the 
Information Revolution. Much of the literature in this section is 
characterised by a Technologically Determinist view which (often due 
to insufficient technical knowledge) tends to regard new technologies 
as value laden and autonomous - an exogenous force which exerts its 
influence upon societies and states and to which they must adapt. This 
leads to an assumption in the literature that Internet technology has 
universal implications for state power. 
Through an explanation of and discussion of these dominant 
paradigms, this section will elucidate the limitations of each view 
thereby justifying the adoption of a new framework for examining 
these issues. Both of the existing approaches can contribute to 
understanding certain questions about new technology but for different 
reasons, neither provides a comprehensive framework for analysis of 
the relationship between power and Internet technology. Essentially, 
these two oppositional paradigms will be exposed as arriving at a 
stalemate based on competing answers to the question of whether new 
technology enhances state power more than it undermines it. Part of 
the rationale for this project is the understanding that the Internet 
81 By way of explanation, Martin Wight also writes that "once security is destroyed, 
all the higher objects of politics are swallowed up in the struggle for self-preservation." 
Martin Wight, Power Politics, (Hammondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986) second 
edition, pp.296-297. 
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does both · simultaneously and in complex ways · and therefore, it 
would be more useful to ask some different and more enlightening 
questions. Those questions include how do states influence the 
emergence and management of new technologies to address their 
conceptions of state power? And what role do ideas (including those 
about power) play in the political shaping of social technology? These 
questions cannot be asked or answered within the two paradigms 
which currently dominate International Relations scholarship. The 
Industrial Age paradigm does not engage with the social elements of 
technology and the Information Age paradigm does not fully account 
for the role of political influence and shaping of technology. New 
technology can no longer be explained simply as a constitutive element 
of state power but no more can it be explained as entirely liberated 
from state control. In the midst of those polar positions lies a complex 
and largely unexamined relationship which forms the basis of enquiry 
of this project. A Social Construction of Technology approach which 
focuses on this very issue will, I argue here, prove more useful and 
enlightening. 
The Industrial Age: Technology and National Power 
The healthy functioning of cyberspace 1s essential to our 
economy and our national security.s2 
As pointed out in the Introduction, scholars of International Relations 
have approached the relationship between power and technology 
through the dominant lens of Realist theory which views the state as a 
82 President George W. Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (Washington, 
DC: The White House, 2003), pg. l. 
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self-interested, power-maximising (or security maximising) unit in an 
anarchical system with technology as a constitutive element of state 
power.s3 Its military and economic relevance has made technology a 
mechanism through which power (or security) seeking states pursue 
relative advantage by the development of more efficient production 
methods (economic power) as well as advanced weaponry (military 
power).s4 An Instrumentalist approach to technology coupled with a 
material view of power has provided a foundation for Realist 
conceptions about the relationship between technology and power. 
Having explained something above of the Philosophy of Technology and 
Instrumentalism, it is possible now to explain how that scholarship 
intersects with Realist power theory to produce what is referred to here 
as the 'Industrial Age' approach to the relationship between power and 
technology in International Relations. 
Realist power theory is regarded simultaneously by some as 
parsimonious (therefore robust) and by others as too narrowly defined 
(and therefore inadequate).ss However, in this context it is important 
to state clearly the reasoning which underpins this theory as it has 
implications for a corresponding approach to technology. There are two 
sa Within RBalist thought, there are a range of views on how power should be defined, 
ie. whether as a means to an end or an end in itself. This paper will not provide a 
comprehensive catalogue of variations in RBalist approaches to power. It is concerned 
here only with understandings of the relationship between technology and power in 
international relations and as such is proposing two broad conceptual approaches -
the first of which - the nation-state power view, is most closely associated with a 
broadly Realist approach. 
84 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pg.322. 
ss Some key proponents of the first view include Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of 
International Politics, (New York: Random House, 1979) and John J. Mearsheimer, 
The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). Prominent 
theorists who take the second view include Nye, Soft Power and Alexander Wendt, 
Social Theory of International Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). 
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important reasons why Realist scholars argue that power must be 
narrowly perceived as reliant primarily on material capabilities - first, 
their relative importance and second, their quantifiable nature. 
The importance of material power is an enduring feature of Realist 
power theories. Although many Realist scholars including Hans 
Morgenthau and E.H. Carr had nuanced approaches to power -
approaches which did include social factors such as the quality of 
national leadership and national morale - they generally regarded 
material resources (particularly military strength) as overwhelmingly 
important in determining overall national power.BG In The Tragedy of 
Great Power Pohlics, John Mearsheimer explains that while non-
material factors may impact (decisively in some cases) on the outcome 
of wars, material capabilities are the most reliable - and consequently 
the most important - indicator of which state will prevail in a 
conflict. 87 
The potential to measure capabilities is the second reason why Realists 
adhere to this view of power. While other scholars proposed alternative 
views on power which equate it with outcomes, ss Kenneth Waltz 
argues that this produces confusion as "the usefulness of force is 
86 See Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, pg.31, and E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years 
Crisis, 1919-1939."An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, (New 
York: Harper and Row, 1964), pg.vii. For an overview, see Brian C. Schmidt, 
'Competing Realist Conceptions of Power', Millenium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol.33, No.3, 2005, pp.523-549. 
B1 Mearsheimer is referring here to strategy, intelligence) resolve, weather, and 
disease among other non-material factors. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, pg.58. 
88 Some examples include Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in 
International Politics', International Organisation, 59, Winter 2005, pg.67, and 
Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2004). 
SI I Page 
Chapter Two IR Meets Technology Theory 
mistakenly identified with its use". 89 This approach, Waltz points out, 
erroneously asserts that "only power is needed in order to get one's 
way". However, the outcome of applying power, he argues, is 
necessarily uncertain and for that reason power has to be defined in 
terms of the distribution of capabilities including material resources. 
"The paradox that some have found in the so·called impotence of 
American power disappears if power is given a politically sensible 
definition." 90 Mearsheimer agrees, arguing that in attempting to 
understand power in International Relations, conflating material 
capabilities (the means) with political outcomes (the ends) leads to a 
circular argument. As a consequence, he continues to define power by 
capabilities thus avoiding the 'paradox of power' arguments which have 
risen in part in response to unipolarity. 91 
The Realist adherence to this view of power coupled with Neo· 
Realism's emphasis on the system structure as determining global 
order has underpinned the importance of technology as (despite the 
acknowledgement of other factors), material capabilities continued to 
be viewed as the most important and decisive element in determining 
international order. Indeed, the 2Qth century witnessed a growing 
emphasis on technology as material capability while other more 
conventional resources such as population and territory came to be 
regarded, by some at least, as diminishing in relevance.92 
89 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pg.191. 
90 Ibid, pg.192. 
"Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp.57·60. 
" Employing a Fordist approach, Alastair Buchan wrote of the decline of territory 
and population as a form of power with emphasis instead placed on states' technical 
and scientific base. In his view, "power, influence, or prestige can now be increased by 
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A material view of power sits comfortably with an Instrumental view of 
technology - indeed, they complement one another. The combination of 
an Instrumental view of technology as a value-free tool employed to 
achieve the ends of a state with only one moral end - survival - results 
in the approach to the relationship between power and technology 
described here as the Industrial Age view. In this view, nuclear 
weapons are neutral - in the hands of a 'rogue state' they are 
dangerous but in the hands of a 'responsible' state, they are justifiable 
and valuable. The technology is neutral - human use gives it meaning 
and value. Qualitative elements like social capital, influence or 
information as a source of power do not have a more prominent place in 
Realist theories of power - not because they deny their existence or the 
fact that they may have an impact on power, but because, as scholars 
like Waltz and Mearsheimer point out, they are unquantifiable and 
unpredictable.93 Thus, in this framework, technology is a mechanism to 
enhance state power and thereby has implications for world order. 
Despite more recent theoretical and empirical challenges, the 
'Industrial Age' view continues to resonate m contemporary 
international affairs as states persistently attach a high value to 
advanced technology as it relates to state power. Just as the Soviet 
launch of Sputnik in 1957 was enough to convince many Americans 
the better organization of existing domestic resources and the application of science 
and technology to them." Alastair Buchan, 'Technology and World Politics', The 
Aberystwyth Papers -International Politics: 1919-1969, pg.177. Richard Rosecrance 
also makes an argument for the declining relevance of territory in The Rise of the 
Virtual State: Wealth and Power 1n the Coming Century, (New York: Basic Books, 
1999). 
93 Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pg.191 and Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics, pp.57-60. 
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that the Soviet Union was acquiring strategic superiority, 94 the recent 
destruction by China of one of its defunct weather satellites lead to 
international conjecture about China's ambition to prevail in a 'space 
war'.95 America's subsequent decision to shoot down one of its own 
satellites in lVIarch 2008, despite its earlier condemnation of China's 
successful experiment, reinforces the view that advanced technology 
continues to be perceived as a key indicator of national power and a 
key determinant of world order. 96 
Clearly, the 'Industrial Age' view of the relationship between 
technology and power still has considerable currency in International 
Relations. However, there arise a range of problems in applying this 
paradigm to understanding the relationship between power and new 
technology that stem from the theoretical misfit of the 
Instrumental/material power view with the unique nature of 
information technology. Perhaps most importantly, this approach 
continues to treat information technology as an artefact which limits 
its ability to address the many contradictions in state responses to the 
impact of this technology. In this view, the vulnerabilities which come 
hand in hand with the rapid integration of information technology into 
contemporary state affairs are surmountable. States simply need more 
"'Buchan, 'Technology and World Politics', pg.162. 
95 Craig Covault, 'Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon', Aviation Week and Space 
11echnology, January 17i 2007> http://5;VW\v.soaceref.com/ne\vs/ 
viewnews.html?id=l 188 . Also, Marc Kaufman and Dafua Linzer, 'China Criticized 
for Anti-Satellite Missile Test', Washington Post, January 19, 2007, pg.AO 1, 
httn://ww..,v.v..rashingtonnost.com/yu£ 
dynlcontentlarticle/2007/0lll8/AR2007011801029.html. 
96 'U.S. to shoot down satellite Wednesday, official says', CNN, February 19, 2008, 
!>.ttp://edition.cnn.col!ll2.!!!!8.l!'EC_1:!/§JlliJ'BIQ2/.l9/satellite.shootdown/. Also, 'U.S. to 
shoot down satellit.e', BBC News, February 14, 2008, 
http:lfnBws.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7245578.Btm. 
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- more ICT capabilities, more rapid advances in the development and 
application of these technologies and more doctrine for their 
application. 
In this context, militaries the world over are rapidly developing 
'information warfare' or 'cyberwar' capabilities. The US Department of 
Defense now views information as a "realm, a weapon, and a target of 
warfare".97 Information and communication in the 'Industrial Age' view 
becomes a commodity to be weaponised in the same way that previous 
industrial-age technologies were. There is a general sense that 
information and communications technology (ICT) is becoming a 
significant factor in conflicts and that militaries need to adapt and be 
prepared to project state power throughout this new sphere. 
Dominance in 'cyberspace' is equated with dominance in other 
international commons such as space or sea lanes.98 
However, operationalising these capabilities in a conventional conflict 
situation such as the air strikes on Kosovo in 1999 or the first Gulf 
War (1990-1991) has proven very different from implementing them in 
a networked environment. Partly as a consequence of the profound 
integration of civilian systems over the Internet, it is very difficult to 
declare 'cyberspace' a war zone. For example, during the second war 
with Iraq (2003-) military officials had to abandon a planned strike 
against the Iraqi financial and banking network due to the realisation 
that its failure would quite possibly affect European networks with 
97 Quoted in Clay Wilson, 'Information Operations and Cyberwar: Capabilities and 
Related Policy Issues', (Washington: Congressional Research Service, September 14, 
2006), pg. l. 
98 Michael Tanji, 'Buccaneer.com: Infosec Privateering as a Solution to Cyberspace 
Threats', Journal ofCyber Conflict Studies, Vol.I, Iss.l, December 2007. 
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which it is closely integrated.99 In addition, under international law, 
the determination of what constitutes the use of force in the context of 
a cyber-attack remains unclear - one of the key problems highlighted 
in 2007 when Estonia turned unsuccessfully to NATO for help while 
undergoing a massive cyber attackJOO Responding to aggression with 
reciprocal force over the Internet remains highly problematic from a 
legal perspective as counter attacks have to travel through routers 
which may be located in 'neutral' states.101 While ICT has certainly 
been applied to enhance existing warfare technologies, regarding 
information technology as an artefact similar to any other weapon fails 
to acknowledge its distinct nature and the complexity of 
operationalising it. 
Finally, the 'Industrial Age' paradigm for understanding the 
relationship between technology and power in the information age is 
reliant on a static platform for conflict which has not proven to be the 
case in the post 9/11 years. While a material view of power and 
technology may have been useful in understanding the dynamics at 
work in conventional conflicts and the nuclear age, ICT lends itself to 
unconventional conflict characterised by anonymity, geographical 
dislocation, asymmetry, previously less significant actors on par with 
99 Charles R Smith, 'U.S. Information Warriors Wrestle with New Weapons', 
NewsMax.com, March 13, 2003, http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/ 
articles/200:l/3/l2/134 712.shtml. 
100 DW Staff Writer, 'NATO Sees Recent Cyber Attacks on Estonia as Security Issue', 
Deutsche Welle, May 27, 2007, http://www.dw·wm:ld.de 
ldwlarticle/0,214<±,2558579.00.html. For a summary of these issues, see Gregory D. 
Grove, Seymour E. Goodman and Stephen J. Lukasik, 'Cyber-attacks and 
International Law', Survival, Vol.42, No.3, Autumn 2000, pp.89·103. 
101 The US Department of Defense has recommended that a legal review be conducted 
to determine what level of data manipulation constitutes an attack. Wilson, 
'Information Operations and Cyberwar', pg.5. 
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states and the interdependence of industrialised states in a vulnerable 
global network. Just as nuclear technology prompted a shift from wars 
of destruction to a strategy of deterrence, ICT is being understood more 
clearly as a technology of 'disruption' .102 The impact of disruption is at 
the heart of a key paradox of ICT referred to in the Introduction 
Chapter - that states which have been most successful in adopting new 
information age technologies are most vulnerable to disruption.103 This 
has implications for how we understand power in the information age 
as the long-standing assumption that technology only enhances state 
power no longer holds true. 
It is worth noting that there have been technological innovations in the 
past which have prompted a theoretical reassessment of International 
Relations. For example, as noted above, nuclear technology was 
responsible for a maior shift in strategic thinking from wars of 
destruction to strategies of deterrence. However, the industrial nature 
of nuclear power and the necessity of a large state apparatus for 
developing it meant that this particular technological shift did not 
undermine the coherence of the 'Industrial Age' view of technology and 
102 See for example, Chris C. Demchak, 'Wars of Disruption: International 
Competition and Information Technology-Driven Military Organizations', 
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol.24, No. l, April 2003, pp. 75·112 or Timothy 
Shimeall, Phil Williams and Casey Dunlevy, 'Countering Cyber War', NATO Review, 
Vol.49, No.4, Winter 2001, pp.16·18. 
io3 In an example of US vulnerability, for at least a year during the lead up and 
execution of Operation Desert Storm in the Persian Gulf war, a group of Dutch 
hackers probed 34 different American military computer systems, gathering 
information on weapons systems, troop deployments and even battle orders. They 
amassed a significant quantity of sensitive data and then attempted to negotiate a 
sale to the Baathist regime. The Iraqis, taking the offer to be a hoax, did not respond 
but the vulnerability was clearly demonstrated. See John Christensen, 'Bracing for 
Guerrilla Warfare in Cyberspace', CNN Interactive, April 6, 1999. Available online at 
http_://gd itj.QJL<:ll!l.com/TE_GJ:.!i§P.!'.c:\i:il'li!:rn&kfil~WJ.:Yh!l.rt&Irnrl and John Markoff, 'Dutch 
Computer Rogues Infiltrate American Systems with Impunity,' The New York Times, 
April 21, 1991. 
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power and the relationship between the two. Even given the 
theoretical challenges of nuclear technology (the weapon which cannot 
be used), it could be understood from within this existing 'Industrial 
Age' paradigm. It did not challenge the Instrumental view of 
technology. Nor did it undermine a Realist view of power. The notion 
that technology enhances power was reinforced by the emergence of 
nuclear weaponry which, even if not deployed, impacted so 
significantly on international relations. This is not however, proving to 
be the case with information and communications technology. 
Unlike the early part of the twentieth century which was characterised 
by a strong Realist practice and fundamentally industrial technology, 
the latter decades saw a growth in theoretical reassessment of power 
coupled with the emergence of revolutionary information technology. 
The relationship between information technology and 
conceptualisations of political institutions like power and sovereignty 
appear to be distinct from those of industrial technology. By forcing 
new social technologies like the Internet into existing industrial 
technology paradigms, the nuance and complexities of how this 
technology interacts with the political life of states is lost. Not 
surprisingly, theories predominantly concerned with material power 
have not easily synthesized emerging information technology. To date, 
more ideationally inclined theoretical frameworks have generally been 
used to examine the relationship between new technology and power 
and it is to these that this chapter turns next. 
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The Inibrmation Age: Technology and Social Power 
The realpolitik of the new era is cyberpolitik, in which the actors 
are no longer just states, and raw power can be countered or 
fortified by information power.104 
From the beginning of the 1990s, applications for ICT expanded 
exponentially. Simon Rogerson and Terrell Ward Bynum describe 
comput<ir technology as "the most powerful and most flexible 
technology ever devised".105 Access to the Internet and the World Wide 
Web rapidly moved from a small band of academic and military clients 
in the mid 1980s into the public domain. In a very short space of time, 
ICT has become ubiquitous in advanced industrial states and integral 
to the delivery of essential public services including national security. 
Newly industrialised and industrialising states regard ICT as a 
mechanism to 'leapfrog' generations of technological development and 
move more quickly towards modernisation and competitiveness in the 
international system. 106 In addition to the innumerable applications of 
!CT to enhance essentially industrial technology such as computerised 
control systems for factories, the social aspect of ICT has impacted 
significantly on civil, economic and political relations. Coinciding with 
the advent of I CT as a social technology was a theoretical shift in 
101 Rothkopf, 'Cyberpolitik', pg.326. 
100 Simon Rogerson and Terrell Ward Bynum, 'Cyberspace: The Ethical Frontier', Tlie 
London Times, June 9, 1995, 
http:f/www.foneshighexeducation.co.uklstorv.asp?storvCode=98490&sectioncode=26. 
ms China and India are both examples of this. For some commentary on this in the 
context of China see Zhong Xiwei and Yang Xiangdong, 'Science and Technology 
Policy Reform and its Impact on China's National Innovation System', Technology in 
Society, Iss.29, 2007, pp.317·325 and ErnestJ. Wilson III and Adam Segal, 'Trends in 
China's Transition Toward a Knowledge Economy', Asian Survey, Vol.45, Iss.6, 
November/December 2005, pp.886·906. 
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International Relations scholarship to considering factors of power as 
socially constituted rather than primarily material. 
The combination of these factors contributed to the emergence of the 
second dominant paradigm for understanding the relationship between 
power and technology in International Relations - referred to here as 
the 'Information Age' approach. This approach encompasses a lot of the 
theoretical shifts which have arisen to challenge Realism, material 
power and the immutability of the state. In addition, this literature 
often exhibits a Determinist approach to technology - one that regards 
technology as imbued with values (democratisation, freedom of speech 
and transparency of government or conversely, invasive surveillance); 
generally user driven and therefore predominantly responsive to user 
specified goals; and finally, widely anarchical and beyond the 
dominance of the state. Essentially, this is a view characterised by 
change and re-evaluation of power in which ICT is frequently cited as a 
catalyst or even the driving force for those changes. This view engages 
with new technology and generally regards it as breaking down old 
power structures by redefining both the players and the playing field of 
International Relations. However, it does so without engaging 
adequately with technical issues which ultimately leads to utopian or 
dystopian readings - dependent largely upon the perception of which 
values - positive or negative, reside in Internet technology. 
Two broad questions have preoccupied the academic debate addressing 
these issues. First, scholars have worked to understand how 
technological change has impacted on power relations between 
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individuals and the state (or the idea of the state) 107 and second, what 
implications those changes have for conceptual approaches to state 
power. ios As indicated in the Introduction, many studies have 
concentrated on the manner in which social technology has impacted 
on state power by eroding or undermining the institution of 
sovereignty. The general emphasis in these debates is that social 
technology is dissipating power from the state in a variety of ways. 
Prominent among these is the proliferation and organisation of non· 
state actors which compete for power with states and the challenges of 
state control over extra·territorial issues which stem from 
interconnected networked systems.109 Following is a brief introduction 
to theories of social power and an explanation of how these ideas 
combine with a Determinist approach to technology to form this second 
dominant paradigm for understanding the relationship between 
technology and power - the 'Information Age' approach. 
A social view of power is less concerned with tangible resources and 
capabilities and more focused on inter-subjective relations and 
outcomes. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall describe power as 
"the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape 
101 Daniel W. Drezner and Henry Farrell, 'Web of Influence', Foreign Policy, Iss.145, 
November/December 2004, pp.32·40. Anne Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, 
(Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2004). Gordon Smith and Moises 
Nairn, Altered States: Globalization, Sovereignty and Governance, (Ottawa: 
International Development Research Centre, 2000). 
10s Nye, The Paradox of American Power, pg. 76. Aronson, 'Global Networks and Their 
Impact', in Information Technologies and Global Politics, Hachigian, 'The Internet 
and Power in One· Party East Asian States', pp.41·58. 
ios Manuel Castells, 'Toward a Sociology of the Network Society', Contemporary 
Sociology, Vol.29, No.5, Sept 2000, pp.693·699, Lauren Langman, 'From Virtual 
Public Spheres to Global Justice: A Critical Theory of Internetworked Social 
Movements', Sociological Theory, Vol.23, No.I, March 2005, pp.42·74. 
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the capacities of actors to determine their circumstances and fate" .110 A 
dominant concern for theorists of social power is legitimacy. Richard 
Ned Lebow traces this back to the Greek distinction between power 
exercised through coercion (which weakened social bonds) and power 
exercised through persuasion (which strengthened them).111 Through 
an analysis of the US neo·conservative approach to power, Christian 
Reus·Smit concludes that social capital (such as broad consent for 
action) is an integral element of political power and effective influence 
over the decisions of other states relies on social legitimation. 112 
Although a social view of power can be understood independently of 
technology - either old or new - social technology has significant 
relevance for issues of legitimacy, 'soft power' and social aspects of 
power in International Relations. A 24 hour news cycle, unrestricted 
access to satellite footage and the rapid dissemination of information 
and images have intensified awareness of state behaviour and made it 
much more difficult for states to conceal events detrimental to their 
international standing. As demonstrated by the mobile phone 
generated images of torture inside Guantanamo Bay or the release of 
the Wikileaks cables, states have difficulty escaping scrutiny even in 
the most remote and guarded situations. Thus, relations between 
states are heightened by this technology and outcomes are difficult to 
subvert to capabilities in this context. 
Accelerating theoretical debates about power, the Constructivist 
project emerged to challenge orthodox views by arguing that 
110 Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in International Politics', pg.39. 
111 Richard Ned Lebow, 'Power, Persuasion and Justice', Millenium: Journal of 
International Studies, Vol.33, No.3, 2005, pp.551·581. 
112 Reus·Smit, American Power and World Order. 
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inadequate attention had been given to the socially constituted nature 
of political concepts and practices. Alexander Wendt cautioned against 
uncritical adherence to fundamental concepts which had previously 
underwritten the literature.113 The social emphasis of Constructivism 
coupled with the social nature of ICT has combined to produce a range 
of scholarship which re-evaluates the relationship between power and 
technology. 
For some scholars, changing ideas about power and emergmg 
technology combine to bring about a substantially modified system, 
transforming from one comprised simply of states to one comprised of 
multiple and diverse actors. Understanding the role of non-state actors 
in the international system has become increasingly relevant as their 
numbers expand to include globally oriented terrorist and criminal 
organisations, civil interest groups, NGOs, multinational organisations 
and the media - many of which have been heavily reliant upon new 
information and communications technology. 114 Jonathon Aronson 
writes that "the spread of integrated global networks is accelerating ... 
and reshaping the landscape of politics and international relations, 
transforming global commerce, recasting societies and cultures, and 
altering policy formulation and implementation" .115 In this view, states 
are seen to be relinquishing or losing control with obvious implications 
for the relationship between technology and power. 
113 Alexander Wendt, 'Anarchy is What States Make of it: the Social Construction of 
Power Politics', International Organisation, Vol.46, No.2, Spring 1992, pp.391-425. 
114 Non-governmental organisations increased from 5,000 to 27,000 in the 1990s alone. 
See Nye, The Paradox of American Power, pg.60. 
115 Aronson, 'Global Networks and Their Impact', in Information Technologies and 
Global Politics, pg.39. 
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There is also a significant body of legal scholarship addressing issues 
surrounding aggression over the Internet which are fundamental to 
grappling with the challenges posed to state power. As noted above, 
under international law, the determination of what constitutes the use 
of force in the context of a cyberattack remains unclear - one of the 
key problems highlighted by the attacks on Estonia in 2007. 116 
Consequently, responding to aggression with reciprocal force over the 
Internet is highly problematic from a legal perspective. A US 
congressional report published in 2006 notes that reciprocating against 
an attack may lead to "possible accusations of war crimes if offensive 
military cyberweapons severely disrupt critical civilian computer 
systems, or the systems of other non-combatant nations."117 The report 
concludes that the US Department of Defense believes that it lacks 
"sufficient policy and legal analysis for guiding appropriate responses 
to intrusions or attacks on DOD networks."118 Even on a criminal level, 
there are intractable problems. Crimes may be committed in one state 
by actors located in another where that behaviour may not be illegal 
leading to what Internet law scholar Kim Taipale refers to as 
"regulatory arbitrage" making prosecution difficult even if detection is 
achievable.119 
116 For a summary of these issues, see Grove et al, 'Cyber-attacks and International 
Law', pp.89-103. 
117 Wilson, 'Information Operations and Cyberwar', pg. l. 
118 The US Department of Defense has recommended that a legal review be conducted 
to determine what level of data manipulation constitutes an attack. Wilson, 
'Information Operations and Cyberwar', pg.5. 
119 Kim Taipale, New York Law School website, pttp://www.infonnation-
retrieval.info/cybercrime/#Anchor-2240. For a recent case, see the Russian Business 
Network which is a 'bullet·proof web host based in Russia specialising in criminal 
sites including child pornography, phishing scams and identity theft projects. 
However, RBN is not violating Russian law and the criminal sites it hosts generally 
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For actors in the international system for whom legitimacy underpins a 
conceptual understanding of power, these legal issues impact on the 
state's power to respond to aggression. An amorphous concept of 
territory and legal jurisdiction is obviously problematic for 
conventional approaches to state power. Gary Marx points out that 
"the arrival of cyberspace brings the potential for the separation of 
violation and physical space to new heights" .120 John Ruggie suggests 
'unbundling' conventional understandings of territoriality from 
sovereignty and focusing on 'rule' instead.121 
Territory as geographical space has unequivocally become more 
complex with the advent of ICT and the implications of that for 
International Relations theory are yet to be properly understood in 
either theoretical or practical terms. Certainly, there have been some 
attempts to regulate this 'space' through treaties but these are limited 
in their effectiveness given that in a networked environment, 
agreements between two 'nodes' are easily circumvented.122 Legislation 
and state agreements to regulate the Internet are regarded as falling 
within the purview of state power but, (as the case studies 
direct their activities outside Russia. Despite complaints) neither a diplomatic nor a 
legal solution has been reached. Brian Krebs, 'Shadowy Russian Firm Seen as 
Conduit for Cybercrime', The Washington Post, October 13, 2007, pg.A15. 
l20 Gary T. Marx, 'Social Control Across Borders', Crime and Law Enforcement in the 
Global Village, William F. McDonald (ed.), (Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing, 
1997), online paper available at http://web.mit.edu/gt.marx/www/soccont.html. 
121 John Gerard Ruggie, 'Territoriality and beyond: problematizing modernity in 
international relations', International Organisation, Vol.47, No.I, Winter 1993, 
pp.139-174. 
1
'' Probably the most evolved of these is the Council of Europe's Convention on 
Cybercrime (also referred to as the 'Budapest Convention') which is a multilateral 
treaty drafted by the Council of Europe with four observer states: Canada, the United 
States, Japan and South Africa. The full text can be found at 
bttp://www.coe..int/tldclfileslthemes/cybercrime/ default en.asp. 
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demonstrate) there are complex reasons why the US has not moved 
more aggressively to control Internet traffic and these can only be 
understood through deep engagement with the conceptions of power 
driving policy decisions about the Internet. 
Information Age literature tends to pick up on the 'bottom-up' 
processes largely ignored by the nation-state framework, but in doing 
so it disregards the ways in which states can and do exert influence 
over the development of new technology.123 While these studies have 
plenty of value and make a significant contribution, they do contain 
impediments to a richer understanding of how new technology 
interacts with power. Primarily, the lack of engagement with technical 
debates leads to misunderstandings about the autonomous nature of 
new technology. As Sassen points out, this literature frequently fails to 
make informed distinctions between aspects of the technology which 
are the consequence of state decisions and choices and those which are 
beyond the immediate control of states. For although there are some 
intractable technical issues which pose real challenges to state power, 
there are no natural or scientific laws which make it imperative that 
Internet function in the way it does. By failing to make accurate 
distinctions between what states choose and what they have imposed 
upon them, the Information Age view relies upon a largely 
Technologically Determinist approach even as it ascribes agency to the 
end user. These scholars regard the Internet as having its own internal 
logic and promoting a set of norms and values which are imposed upon 
123 Harry M Cleaver Jr, 'The Zapatista effect: The Internet and the Rise of an 
Alternative Political Fabric', Journal of International Affairs, Vol.51, Iss.2, Spring 
1998, pp.621·640. Kevin Latham, 'SMS, Communication, and Citizenship in China's 
Information Society', Critical Asian Studies, Vol.39, Iss.2, June 2007, pp.295-314. 
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the state leaving little room for influence and only the capacity to 
adapt - or not. 
These studies consistently focus on the impact of technology on politics, 
but as Marianne Franklin points out, unless we move from an 
assumption of technology as an "exogenous, causal agent of change", 
we continue to ignore the complex social relationship we have with 
technology and fail to engage with the ways in which we shape and 
influence the very technology which in turn, impacts upon us.124 Of 
particular relevance for this project is Donald l\facKenzic's observation 
that Technological Determinism "focuses our minds on how to adapt to 
technological change, not on how to shape it. It removes a vital aspect 
of how we live from the sphere of public discussion, choice and 
politics." 125 This focus on 'adaptation' has been a dominant feature in 
work which has thus far attempted to understand political change 
including the nature and exercise of power in the context of the 
Internet. 
Both an 'Industrial Age' approach and an 'Information Age' approach 
are able to contribute to understanding the relationship of I CT to 
power in international relations. However, although technology 
infrastructure and the use of ICT applications to enhance industrial 
power are significant, the complexities of state responses to social 
technologies such as the Internet necessitate a broader approach which 
moves beyond 20th century conceptualisations of power in the 
international system, A social view, which places the role of 
i24 Marianne I. Franklin, Post Colonial Politics, the Internet and Everyday Life: 
Pacific Traversals Online, (New York: Routledge, 2004), pg.4. 
125 MacKenzie and Wajcman, The Social Shaping of Technology, pg.5. 
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information, culture, identity and knowledge at the centre of its 
analysis, is able to engage with the more complex and compelling 
issues. Despite this better conceptual fit, the polarising debates within 
this literature about whether ICT enhances or diminishes state power 
are generally lacking in a sound understanding of technical issues and 
therefore fail to make accurate distinctions between the loss of state 
control and the relinquishment of state control. In addition, the 
prevalence of Instrumental or Technologically Determinist views of 
technology limits theoretical development. 
Moving Forward in the Study of Power and New Technology 
This chapter demonstrated how the integration of theories and 
concepts from the Philosophy of Science with theories about power 
from International Relations can provide an enhanced conceptual 
framework for the study of power and new technology in the 
information age. 
Through a brief analysis of the ways in which International Relations 
is currently attempting to deal with questions arising from the 
emergence of new technology, the chapter identified two paradigms 
which dominate the literature. The first, the 'Industrial Age' approach, 
combines Realist power theory with an Instrumental view of 
technology. Through its inability to engage with social elements of 
either power or technology, this approach leaves out so much of 
relevance to states and state power that it cannot provide an effective 
mechanism through which to approach the research question of this 
thesis which is how have conceptions of US power influenced the 
development of the Internet. 
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The second paradigm, the 'Information Age' approach, combines 
elements of Technological Determinism with a social view of power. 
This approach comes closer to providing a means for exploring this 
question through its expanded view of power but many studies 
emerging from this paradigm continue to regard the Internet as having 
its own internal logic and promoting a set of norms and values which 
are imposed upon the state leaving little room for influence and only 
the capacity to adapt - or not. This persistent emphasis on the impact 
of technology and the general failure to engage with technical debates 
leads to dystopian and utopian findings and is unable to address the 
thesis questions about the relationship between power and technology. 
By being aware of the range of approaches to both power and 
technology and also of the ways in which they typically interact, it is 
possible to approach the empirical material from a robust conceptual 
and theoretical foundation. The concepts outlined in this chapter 
provide a means of moving beyond the long held assumptions about 
technology which have dominated International Relations literature 
even much of that literature which has sought to explain power in the 
information age. First, Internet technology cannot be regarded as 
having universal effects - either empowering or disempowering. We 
must closely examine the political context of each case to understand 
how politicians conceptualise power and the Internet and 
Second, technology does not have a predetermined path - either 
benevolent (Instrumentalism) or detrimental (Determinism). 
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Chapter Three: A (Select) Political History of the Internet 
There have been many accounts of the 'history of the Internet' written 
by participants and observers of the development of this technology. 
However, they are almost exclusively concerned with documenting key 
technicians and engineers and attributing their achievements and 
contributions to the code and architecture now in use.126 The political 
forces surrounding those developments are rarely referenced in these 
accounts and given no substantive place in understanding the 
progression of the Internet from a military research project to a global 
network. Key enabling legislature, ownership and management of the 
physical infrastructure of the Internet, the role of the state in Internet 
governance and the influence of governmental perceptions and 
intentions in shaping the technology are largely absent these histories. 
By focusing exclusively on technological 'stepping stones', these 
accounts suggest the kind of 'grand avenue' approach to technology 
described in Chapter Two - that is, that technology evolves in a social 
and political vacuum without reference to the norms and values of the 
society in which it is embedded. In fact, political decisions have played 
an integral role in the development of Internet technology and this 
chapter lays out some of the key moments, actors and policies which 
make up the 'political history of the Internet'. 
12e Some examples include Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, 
Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, Daniel C. Lynch, 
Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts and Stephen Wolff, 'A Brief History of the Internet, Part 
l', On the Internet, The Internet Society, May/June 1997, 
http://www.isoc.org/otifarticles/0597/leiner.html, Tim Berners Lee, Weaving the Web: 
The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web, (New York: 
Harper Business, 2000) and Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing, 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000). 
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In doing so, this chapter performs a number of functions in the thesis. 
By providing some background to the development of Internet 
technology which engages with political ideas about how that 
technology might relate to US power, this chapter explains how 
particular technological issues came to be understood as a problem for 
those conceptions of power. This background to the Internet is 
generally traced back to the establishment of the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) in 1958 which provided essential funding for 
the development of computer networking technology. This 'pre-history' 
is followed by an analysis of the political ideas which began to emerge 
around early incarnations of the Internet in the 1980s. 
The second contribution of this chapter is that it provides an 
opportunity to manage the information more efficiently while at the 
same time, demonstrating the interconnected nature of these case 
studies. In providing this background to the political history of the 
Internet in the US, this chapter not only demonstrates how the case 
studies were generated, it also introduces many of the policies, 
legislation and actors important to the case studies. There is a 
substantial amount of background material for each case study but 
rather than regard this material as isolated according to issues, it is 
important to observe that there is a cohesive narrative which runs 
through the material. By dealing with these issues individually, it is 
possible to lose sight of the interconnections between them. When 
viewed more cohesively, as in this chapter, both change and continuity 
in the material are rendered more apparent. 
This is important to this project because one of the key findings of the 
thesis is that politicians engage with multiple and sometimes 
conflicting conceptions of power when they debate Internet technology. 
This has important implications for how we regard the relationship 
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between Internet technology and state power as it interrupts the long 
held assumption that technology has universal implications for power, 
regardless of social or political context. An analysis of the development 
of Internet technology which is embedded in a social and political 
context demonstrates the relationship between ideas and the social 
shaping of technology. 
Pre-History: ARPAnet 
A sense of the importance of technological superiority is deeply 
embedded in US political views on global power. Adam Segal has 
argued that US global primacy "depends in large part on its ability to 
develop new technologies and industries faster than anyone else" and 
this is a view which can be detected in much of the empirical material 
in this study.127 In 1957, the Soviet launch of the Sputnik satellite sent 
shock waves through the US where scientists were struggling to 
develop the much less ambitious Vanguard satellite. This technological 
coup was regarded by many as a clear signal that the US was falling 
dangerously behind the Soviet Union and could no longer take for 
granted its superiority in science and technology - and, by inference -
its position in the global order. 
There was speculation that the successful launch and orbit of Sputnik 
may be married together with nuclear weapons, but these material 
concerns were compounded by disbelief that the US global dominance 
in technology had come to be under threat.12s This was regarded by 
121 Segal, 'Is America Losing Its Edger. 
128 The news of Sputnik prompted Senator Lyndon Johnson to suggest that the 
Soviets would be "dropping bombs on us from space like kids dropping rocks onto cars 
from freeway overpasses". Betsy Kuhn, The Race for Space: The United States and 
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politicians as a blow to the prestige and leadership status of the US -
social power themes which re-emerge 50 years later in the debates 
about network neutrality as US broadband performance and 
penetration slips behind many other states. Clare Booth Luce referred 
to Sputnik as "an intercontinental outer-space raspberry" to US 
pretensions of assured and sustained technological global pre· 
eminence .129 
In response to the 'Sputnik crisis', the Federal government funded and 
supported a number of initiatives in order to regain a dominant 
position in science and technology. One of these initiatives was the 
establishment of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARP A) in 
1958 which was charged with ensuring that the US regained a leading 
edge in the application of state of the art technology to military 
capability.1ao ARPA identified suitable projects from the research and 
development community and then provided funding and research 
support to those projects. 
The response to Sputnik and the establishment of ARP A typify an 
Instrumental approach to technology. As explained in Chapter Two, 
this is an approach which regards innovation as unquestionably 
the Soviet Union Compete for the New Frontier, (Minneapolis, Twenty· First Century 
Books, 2007), pg.12. 
1
'' This is a widely reported quote. One source is Rob Lyon, '5Qth Anniversary of the 
Sputnik Launch: Soviet science and the advances of the planned economy', Marxism~ 
October 5, 2007. 
130 For an institutional history, see Over the Years, on the DARPA website which is 
available at http://www.dama.mil/bodvloverthevears.html. For commentary, see 
Stuart W. Leslie, The Cold War and American Science: The Military-Industrial· 
Academic Complex at MIT and Stanford, (New York: Columbia University Press: 
1993), pg. 120 or Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of 
Discourse in Cold War America, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1996), pg.260. 
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positive and progressive and looks for solutions to problems of a 
technological nature - in technology. In the context of political debates 
about US power, this approach to technology was combined with a 
Realist approach to power in keeping with the Industrial Age paradigm 
described in Chapter Two. In this view, technology has a direct and 
positive impact on state power and more technology leads in a fairly 
direct manner to enhanced power. This is an approach to questions 
about US power and technology which had been consistently sustained 
in the context of industrial age technology but, as this thesis shows, 
would prove less useful in the information age. 
One of the early ARP A research projects was generated by the 
government's desire to connect large computer systems in order to 
maximise their capabilities. Computers were still extremely expensive 
and they had far more computational capacity than could be fully 
exploited by the small number of people who had access to them. By 
linking these computers together, across time zones, it was hoped that 
their extensive capability could be more fully realised. This, it was 
hoped, would have a positive effect on many other areas of science and 
technology research which might benefit from access to these facilities. 
By the late 1950s, ARP A had already begun to fund and support 
research which would eventually feed into networking protocols both 
from within its own research institute and also through funded 
association with key computer scientists working in academia around 
the us.1a1 
131 Key technologies like packet switching, hypertext and file transfer protocols were 
also being developed simultaneously in laboratories around the world but there was a 
concentration of funding and research within the US administered through this 
military/academic project. 
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As networking research progressed and connecting computers became 
more viable, some specific applications for networking technology were 
conceptualised by these academics and ARPA. Prompted by Cold War 
political concerns, one of these was the establishment of a secure 
communications system which was regarded as necessary to enhance 
the United States' second strike capability in the event of nuclear 
attack.132 
Existing communications systems such as the telephone and the 
telegraph had been built upon a strategically vulnerable architecture. 
Transmissions arrived at a central juncture from which they were 
redirected and then forwarded to the intended recipient. This 
architecture can be visualised as a 'hub and spokes' model. A 'hub and 
spokes' architecture renders the central transmission juncture (or the 
'hub') absolutely essential. Failure at that point would result in 
disruption of the whole system. This vulnerability led to speculation 
that if a nuclear attack were to take place on US soil, the 
administration could be prevented from responding effectively simply 
as a consequence of the failure of the telephone. 
The technology that emerged in response to ARPA's requirements was 
the 'Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol' - or TCP/IP - the 
foundational technology of the Internet developed by Vinton Cerf and 
1s2 There were concerns that in the event of a nuclear attack, existing 
communications systems could be damaged to the point of preventing the President 
authorising a retaliatory strike. Paul Baran, interview with Judy O'Neill on March 5, 
1990 in Menlo Park, California. Transcript published by the Charles Babbage 
Institute, Center for the History of Information Processing at the University of 
Minnesota, Minneapolis. Janet Abbate, Inventing the Internet, (Cambridge: The MIT 
Press, 2000), pp.10·13. 
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Robert Kahn.133 The fundamental design concept of TCP/IP involves 
the replacement of a central transmission juncture (the telephone 
exchange hub) with a number of'routers', each one providing a possible 
pathway for the transmission of messages - or 'packets' of data. This 
architecture can be visualised as a spider's web, with many possible 
pathways and multiple alternate connections. Within this architecture, 
packets are programmed to find the fastest possible route to their 
destination and failure of a router simply results in packets selecting 
an alternative pathway. Key elements of this architectural design and 
the TCP/IP protocols are flexibility and redundancy (no reliance on a 
central hub) as well as openness which was necessary in order to 
facilitate connecting machines with running different and incompatible 
operating systems. 
By the late 1960s, a small number of computers had been networked 
using TCP/IP and the resulting 'ARPAnet', as it was then referred to, 
provided a test bed for further research on networking protocols. 
During the 1970s, ARPAnet was expanded to incorporate some 200 
computers including a number hosted at universities but it remained 
restricted to government and scientific use. 
Throughout this design phase, security of the network and the ability 
to accurately identify those connecting to ARPAnet (factors which 
would have considerable implications for cyber security in later years) 
appear to have been low priorities. This can partly be explained by the 
l3B Note that this is a much abbreviated version of events. There are many excellent 
accounts of the development of Internet technology. For further and more detailed 
information, see, for example, Abbate, Inventing the Internet. Also, there were 
alternatives to TCP/IP. David D. Clark, 'The Design Philosophy of the DARPA 
Internet Protocols', Computer Communication Review, Vol.18, No.4, August 1988, 
pp.106-114. 
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fact that access to this network was originally restricted to a small 
group of researchers working in defense, science and academia, a 
relatively closed and homogeneous community. In addition though, the 
qualities of flexibility, redundancy and openness were consciously 
privileged over other design options. This is an illustration of how 
certain norms, values and expectations shape technology. TCP/IP was 
conceptualised from the beginning as an open and flexible architecture 
which would ultimately provide a rich environment for both innovation 
and collaboration. 134 
This is an example of the relationship between Technological 
Determinism and the Social Construction of Technology. As illustrated 
in Chapter Two, decisions about technology can lead to 'lock-in' 
resulting in the narrowing of options and unintended consequences 
later on. The chapter on Cyber Security demonstrates how this 
preference for flexibility and openness has implications for how we use 
the Internet today and consequences for cyber security. The same 
qualities which made TCP/IP the technology of choice for networking 
computers in the 1970s, are at the core of problems with the 
identification of cyber attacks, the growth of cyber crime and the ways 
in which these feed into politicians concerns about cyber insecurity and 
US power - a concern which would be exacerbated by the arrival of the 
personal computer. 
134 See Vinton Cerfs testimony before Net Neutrality, hearing before the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, February 7, 2006, 
pg.9. 
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1980s: Atari Democ::rats and the Personal Computer 
Initially, there had been relatively little interest from outside the 
research and milital'y communities in taking advantage of networking 
capabilities, but during the 1980s electronic mail (emaiD and bulletin 
boards were developed within this community. These grew rapidly in 
popularity, accompanied by increased interest from researchers in 
connecting to the ARPAnet as networking came to be understood as a 
means to communicate and share data in addition to its original 
function of distl'ibuting the processing power of large mainframes. 
Concunently, the personal computer (PC) market emerged in the 
1980s and also grew quickly. In 1975, there were 40,000 personal 
computers sold in the US. Ten years later in 1985, there were 6.6 
million sold into the US market. 13.5 The relatively low cost of PCs 
compared to large mainframes led to their rapid adoption by the 
commercial sector and this shifted the emphasis of those developing 
networking technology. Rather than focus predominantly on connecting 
a small number of large institutional mainframes, researchers working 
on networking technology turned to the infinitely broader market of 
desktop machines. The expanding demands of the PC market fuelled 
private sector investment in commercial network services as people 
sought to connect their PCs · either locally within their organisation · 
or more widely across a national or global network · in ordel' to allow 
for file sharing, communication and central maintenance. 
Concurrently with the rapid developments in personal computers, a 
new technology·focused political tide was gaining momentum in the US. 
135 Finn· Erik Juliussen, Worldwide PC111arke4 Arlington Heights: eTForecasts, 
http:f/www,etforecasbi.com/pmductslwwpc:mkt.htm. 
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There had emerged a small group of politicians (typically but not 
exclusively Democrats) who increasingly believed that new technology 
would be integral to the future of US power. Branded "Atari Democrats" 
(a reference to the early computer game console) these were typically 
"young liberalfs] trying to push the party toward more involvement 
with high-tech solutions". ms 1984 Presidential candidate, Gary Hart 
self-identified as an Atari Democrat, explaining that he was amongst 
"a small group of us to forecast the transition of the economy from 
industrialized manufacturing to the information age." 137 Another 
prominent Atari Democrat was Senator Albert Gore Jr. who would go 
on to play a major role in the development of the Internet (and Web 
technology) in America as both a Senator and later, as the Vice 
President of the United States. 
From the mid 1980s, Senator Gore consistently argued that developing 
computer technology would be integral to the future of US power. Gore 
wrote of his belief that 'supercomputers' and the networks which 
connected them would "soon prove to be the steam engines of the 
information age". 138 In 1989, Gore introduced the National High 
Performance Computer Technology Bill, (also known as the 'Gore Bill'), 
arguing before Congress that the "nation which most completely 
assimilates high-performance computing into its economy will very 
136 This was a term popularized in the media over the course of the 1980s used to 
describe "a young liberal trying to push the party toward more involvement wit.h 
high-tech solutions"_ Quote from Trudy ·Tynan, 'Dictionaries' Editors Mine a Mother 
Lode-Politics", in Phikdelphia lnquil"er, August 23. 1984, pg.C09. 
137 Gary Hart. quote from an interview with Tucker Carlson and Paul Begala 'Gary 
Hart Pitches for President', CNN, February 28, 2003. 
http://www_cnn.cQ...rn[20!!lW).JJJ;'QLITICS/02/28/cf.opinion.g!Ul!Jlartl. 
138 Albert Gore Jr., 'The Information Superhighways of Tomorrow', Academic 
Computing il1agazine, Vol.4, No.3, November 1989. 
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likely emerge as the dominant intellectual, economic, and teclu1ological 
force in the next century." 139 
This bill is regarded by policy-makers today as a landmark piece of 
legislation which not only had some specific outcomes (to be discussed 
below) but which set a tone for US politics of taking the initiative and 
authority to shape and influence Internet technology specifically to re· 
establish US global leadership in both material and social power 
terms.140 This initiative and the belief in the government's authority 
and responsibility to play a role in the development of Internet 
technology is illustrated most clearly in the case study on Internet 
governance but questions about the authority and legitimacy of 
government policies feature in all case studies. 
There were several key outcomes of the 'Gore Bill'. One of the stated 
objectives of the Bill was for the government to invest in a high speed 
'National Research and Education Network' (NREN) which would 
further ell.-pand access to the existing network infrastructure. Gore's 
speeches about the concept of the NREN provide insight into how 
concepts of power were beginning to change during this period from the 
'""Senator Albert Gore Jr,, speech to Congress introducing the National High-
Performance Computer Technology Bill, (the Gore Bill) on May 18, 1989. Full text 
available at http;//w2.eff.orgl!nfrastructure/O!d/sl067 89 gore hnc.l)ill. The bill 
would eventually be passed in 1991 as The High Pel'formance Computing Act of 1991 
http;/Jwww.thomagovlcgi-bin/quervW?clQ2:20:.!temp/-mdbs1'GH4wS:e3716\}:, For a 
summary of this legislation, see the National Coordination Office for Networking and 
Information Technology Research and Development available online at 
htt.n://www .rut.rd.govicong1~essionalllawslpl 102· 19·'.1.html . 
140 This was confirmed by interviews conducted with senior policy makers including 
John Gibbons, Assistant to President Clinton for Science and Technology and 
Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy between 1993 
and 1998. Also, Frederick Weingarten who worked in a senior capacity at the 
Computer Science Division of the National Science Foundation (NSF). Interviews 
conducted in February 2010. 
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persistent emphasis on military power which dominated the post vVWll 
period, to a broadened view in which economic power and also some 
sense of social power factors play a more prominent role. 
Significantly, Gore appeared to have an approach to technology which 
incorporated some aspects of Social Constructivism in that he 
attributed agency to those who used, developed and governed internet 
technology. In his speech before Congress on May 18, 1989, Gore made 
some fairly standard Instrumental claims, arguing that "electronics are 
to our age what coal and iron were to the Industrial Revolution". 141 
However, Gore made a distinction between natural resources which he 
argued are "the natural endowment of nations" and information 
technology which he regarded as "an endowment which can be created 
wherever there is sufficient talent and determination".142 He regarded 
information technology as a resource or a source of power but one 
which could be generated through human endeavour. Recalling the 
injury of the Sputnik project to American prestige, Gore outlined key 
developments in Germany and Japan and predicted that unless 
America took action to foster and nurture its own 'resources', the 
information age would be led by others. "American technological 
supremacy, which we had thought of as a kind of national attribute, 
will pass."143 
This persistence of the view that innovation, technology and the global 
hierarchy of power are linked, previously articulated around the 
141 Senator Gore, speech to Congress introducing the National High·Performance 
Computer Technology Bill, May 18, 1989. 
m Ibid. 
143 Ibid. 
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'Sputnik crisis' was a dominant theme during these debates and, as 
foreshadowed earlier, attains prominence in the network neutrality 
debates in the 2000s. In the late 1980s though, they signalled an 
important shift in conceptions of US power. The notion of information 
as a form of power was emerging and would become increasingly 
important in ideas of state power and its relationship to new 
technology. It forms a central tenet of the Information Age paradigm 
outlined in Chapter Two, but Gore's ideas provide an early precursor to 
that. 
In addition to the explicit goal of establishing a high speed national 
research network, the introduction of the 'Gore Bill' provided 
justification for increased government spending on new technology not 
directly linked to military power. While Gore believed strongly that a 
national information infrastructure would greatly benefit private 
industry and he envisaged a significant role for the private sector in 
developing the Internet. At the same time, he argued that it was 
necessary for the government to lead the implementation of this 
infrastructure in order to demonstrate to the market and to the US 
public the potential of Internet technology. 
There were two dominant themes which were used to justify this 
expenditure to Congress and to the public. The first was the necessity 
of government to invest in public infrastructure like roads (the 
'highway' metaphor continues to appear in political discourse about the 
Internet today144). The second theme was the post Cold War diversion 
of military spending to new technology · to which President Bush was 
144 These references will feature in Chapter Six: Network Neutrality. 
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opposed.145 In his speech introducing the 'Gore Bill', Gore neatly united 
these themes by making the point that government investment in the 
'information superhighway' would equate to "less than one Stealth 
bomber" - juxtaposing Bush's 'new/old world' view with a new, hopeful, 
innovative and futuristic perspective.146 
It was in this political and technological context that one of the most 
transformative elements of Internet technology emerged. The World 
Wide Web (the Web) was invented by Tim Berners Lee, Robert Cailliau 
and their colleagues who were working at the CERN lab in Switzerland 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.147 There was so much information 
available (even then) on the Internet that navigating through it in a 
text based environment was laborious. Information was presented in a 
linear format· much like on a piece of paper. Berners Lee and Cailliau 
wanted to make it possible to jump from one page to another based on 
an individual and unique line of enquiry rather than an imposed 
format. If one were reading some material which referred to another 
document, ideally, the reader could click on a link which would take 
145 See Bruce Russett, Thomas Hartley and Shoon Murray, 'The End of the Cold War, 
Attitude Change, and the Politics of Defense Spending', PS: Political Science and 
Politics, Vol. 27, No.1, March 1994, pp.17·21. Also see, Professor Larry M. Bartels 
conducted a study of public policy preferences for defense spending in the post Cold 
War years. He found that "the dissolution of the Soviet Union produced marked 
changes in the defense spending preferences of politically informed Americans" and 
political elites but relatively little shift in opinion amongst the politically disengaged. 
Larry M. Bartels, 'The American Public's Defense Spending Preferences in the Post-
Cold War Era', Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 3, Autumn 1994, pp.479-508. 
146 Senator Gore, speech to Congress introducing the National High-Performance 
Computer Technology Bill, May 18, 1989. 
147 Berners Lee is also credited with developing the essential system of globally 
unique identifiers for resources on the Web known as the Uniform Resource Locator 
(URL) and the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) as well as HTML - the HyperText 
Markup Language which formats and publishes documents on the web. For a full 
account, see his book, Weaving the Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny 
of the World Wide Web, (New York: Harper Business, 2000). 
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them to the location of that document (functionality which we take for 
granted today). The development of HyperText Transfer Protocol 
(HTTP) facilitated the easy navigation through documents available on 
the Internet. 'HyperText links' allow users to click on visible links in 
order to navigate to additional information, (rather than typing in the 
address of the desired page). This meant that those with minimal 
computer knowledge or experience were able to much more effectively 
engage with the Internet. 148 Berners Lee released HTTP in 1991 and in 
1993 CERN announced that the Web would be available free of charge. 
The release of the Web proved a catalyst for the rapid increase in 
numbers of people connecting to the Internet. It also prompted another 
important outcome of the 'Gore Bill' the injection of funding for the 
development of Internet software applications. It was this funding 
program which resulted in the development of the hugely successful 
Web browser, Mosaic, which was developed within the National Centre 
for Supercomputer Applications at the University of Illinois by Marc 
Andreesson and Eric Bina.149 
A Web browser is a software application which further facilitates the 
users' interface with information on the Internet. It is an application 
for engaging with HTML and HTTP. Dominant browsers today include 
148 Hypertext refers to using a visual identifier (such as blue, underlined text) to 
indicate that there is more information associated with that text. Hypertext 
technology itself, was not new when Berners Lee applied it to the Internet. Indeed it 
has a long and interesting history of its own but conceptually, it is generally credited 
to two Americans, Ted Nelson and Douglas Englehart. There was considerable 
activity around Hypertext technology throughout the 70s and 80s but it was Berners 
Lee (with Robert Cailliau) who successfully married it to the Internet. A range of 
accounts can be found in James Gilles and Robert Cailliau, How the Web was Born: 
The Story of the World Wide Web, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Berners 
Lee, Weaving the Web and Abbate, Inventing the Internet. 
149 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, pg.217. 
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Apple's Safari, Microsoft's Internet Explorer and Mozilla's Firefox but 
these are relatively new and prior to Mosaic, browsers were 
rudimentary. Although Berners Lee had written a Web browser 
himself, Mosaic was much easier to use, with point and click features 
which allowed for colour graphics to be displayed as part of a web page 
and, importantly, - as a HyperText link. Not only had Mosaic been 
written to operate on most workstations and personal computers, but 
as a consequence of the funding from the 'Gore Bill' which underwrote 
its development, the NCSA gave Mosaic away free of charge.150 Within 
one year of Mosaic's release in 1993, there were 20 million users of the 
web and 95% of them were accessing it through Mosaic.151 
The initial, Instrumental response to Sputnik which was motivated by 
concerns about power and resulted in the establishment of ARPA had 
transformed somewhat over the course of the 1980s. Military power 
concerns had begun to recede as the Cold War wound down with 
economic power emerging as a political point of focus in the US. 
Computers had also changed from large mainframes with very 
restricted access to personal computers which were selling quickly into 
the business, education and private markets. In this context, Gore 
followed up the first National High Performance Computing Act of 
1991 which focused heavily on the National Research and Education 
Network (NREN) as a tool for the research community, with the 
150 Abbate, Inventing the Internet, pg.217. 
151 Milton Mueller, Ruling the Root, (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2002), pg.107. 
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National Information Infrastructure Act of 1993 which placed greater 
emphasis on the general population as users of the network.152 
The expans10n and democratisation of computer use resulted m a 
fundamental shift from regarding the Internet as a tool for elite 
researchers who would hopefully convert information technology into a 
source of US military power to an understanding of the Internet as a 
part of the public infrastructure which might be utilised much more 
broadly. The Atari Democrats regarded it as an opportunity to 
revitalise the US economy as well as re-establish the US as a global 
leader of this important new technology. They also believed that 
computers generally and the Internet more specifically could serve to 
promote important ideas like freedom of information which had come 
to be understood as important for strategic and social power reasons -
particularly in the wake of the Cold War. 
These political perspectives were combined with a Social Constructivist 
approach to technology which empowered politicians to act and pass 
legislation like the 'Gore Bill' with significant implications for the 
development of Internet technology. Interestingly, while Internet 
technology emerged from concerns about power, some of the 
unintended consequences of that technology will be found in the case 
studies to have also undermined US power in a number of ways. 
1s2 For an analysis of this transition, see Ann P. Bishop, 'The National Information 
Infrastructure: Policy Trends and Issues', ERIC Clearinghouse on Information and 
Technology, (Syracuse, NY: ERlC, 1993). 
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1990s: Clinton-Gore Team Brings it all Together 
In the 1990s, the political context for decisions about Internet 
technology was distinct from that of the first phase of Internet 
technology in the 1960s and 1970s. As noted above, the relationship 
between military power and technology was no longer the primary 
drivers. With the Cold War over and America 'victorious', the emphasis 
for many turned from 'guns' to 'butter' and by that measure, America 
appeared less sure of its future as its economy was struggling. From 
the early days of his Presidential campaign, Bill Clinton's catchphrase 
became known as "It's the economy, stupid". This message was 
intended to counter the extensive foreign policy credentials of his 
opponent George H. Bush and redirect the political focus to issues of a 
non-military nature.153 In a major campaign speech at the Wharton 
School of Business at the University of Pennsylvania, Bill Clinton 
argued provocatively that "The American dream is slipping away along 
with the loss of our economic leadership". 154 
Small government was a bipartisan trend now and economic power 
was coming to be regarded as an increasingly significant aspect of 
foreign policy strength. President George H. Bush's foreign policy 
153 This catchphrase began life as a sign in the Clinton campaign headquarters in 
Arkansas. A message crafted by James Carville, political consultant and lead 
strategist on the Clinton campaign. See Matalin, Mary and James Carville with 
Peter Knobler, All's Fair: Love, War, and Running for President, (New York: Random 
House, 1994). Interestingly, this was followed by "And don't forget healthcare" -
throughout the campaign and administration, these two issues were frequently and 
somewhat arbitrarily linked in policy documents about the Internet. For examples, 
see Vice President Al Gore, speech at the National Press Club, Washington, 
December 21, 1993. Also, Vice President Al Gore, speech at Royce Hall, UCLA, Los 
Angeles, California, January 11, 1994. 
l54 Governor William J. Clinton, remarks at the Wharton School of Business, 
University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, April 16, 1992, 
http://www.ibiblio.org/nii/econ·posit.html. 
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doctrine was premised on a 'new world order' which projected a period 
of peace and stability founded upon the predominance of liberalism, 
free markets and the rule of international law but still essentially 
tethered to military strength. The Clinton administration followed up 
by emphasising American global economic leadership based on free 
markets and projection of an enlargement policy which promoted 
democratisation and human rights. 
Clinton's foreign policy and economic policy were to form a close and 
symbiotic (although not always comfortable) relationship as his ideas 
about democratic enlargement through trade, the promotion of human 
rights and globalising and liberating markets combined to form a kind 
of ideological/economic grand strategy. 155 A view of the world as open 
and connected through trade was promoted by the Clinton 
administration as a foreign policy doctrine that reflected a fresh 
approach to the post Cold War international climate, clearly 
articulating democracy and free markets as "America's core values".156 
Like Gore, Clinton was in favour of spending the peace dividend and by 
1992 he was explicit about how it should be applied. "Every dollar we 
take out of military R&D [research and development] in the post Cold 
War era should go to R&D for commercial technologies, until civilian 
155 In September 1993, President Clinton gave a speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly outlining this strategic framework which was reiterated in several 
subsequent speeches by senior officials including the Secretary of State and the 
National Security Advisor. William J. Clinton, 'Remarks to the 48th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly', New York City, September 27th, 1993, Anthony 
Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', speech before the Johns Hopkins 
University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, September 21, 
1993, and Warren Christopher, 'Building Peace in the Middle East', speech at 
Columbia University, September 20, 1993. 
156 Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', September 21, 1993 and 
Warren Christopher, 'Building Peace in the Middle East', September 20, 1993. 
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R&D can match and eventually surpass our Cold War military R&D 
commitment." 157 Clinton articulated a form of international 
competition which decoupled the national interest (and therefore 
power) from military dominance and instead focused on the links 
between productivity and technology. "This is not a Democratic or a 
Republican issue. It's America against the rest of the world. Every 
other advanced nation is governed by a body with a strategy for 
increasing growth". 158 Leaving no ambiguity about who America's 
rivals were, he pointed explicitly to the following examples: "Japan and 
Germany spend half again as much on civilian R&D as we do, and have 
the productivity growth rates to show for it."159 Although they were 
referring to different sources of power, both President Bush and 
President Clinton regarded this as a 'zero-sum' game. Any increase in a 
competitor's power was a loss of their own. 
In addition, there was something of the zeitgeist about Gore's focus on 
new technology as there was a real sense in the early 1990s that 
something revolutionary was underway. Policy documents and 
speeches emanating from the Clinton administration frequently 
referred to the multiple ways in which new technology would "change 
the way we work, live, play". 160 In a speech to the Wharton School of 
Business, Clinton explicitly stated that: 
157 Governor Clinton, remarks at Wharton School of Business, April 16, 1992. 
15s !hid. 
1s9 !hid. 
1ao Two examples of many are President William J. Clinton and Vice President Albert 
Gore Jr., 'Technology for America's Economic Growth, A New Direction to Build 
Economic Strength', Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 22, 1993 and 
President William J. Clinton, State of the Union 1997: The Bold New World of the 
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The wo:l'id has changed dramatically in 1·ecent years, and we 
have to change with it. History has handed us an extraordinmy 
opportunity in the 1990s. The rise of the new economy coincides 
with the triumph of democracy and the end of the Cold War. At 
the moment we most need to marshal] and reorga11ize our 
resources, the greatest collection of high-value talent and assets 
has become available. With the right plan to convert defense 
spending to domestic growth, we can catapult Ame1ica back to 
the !Orefront in world economic leadership. 161 
The 'Atari Democrat' ideas about the relationship between new 
technology and US economic power, exemplified m Gore's 
presentations to Congress, seamlessly linked in to Presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton's approach to global economic affairs when Al 
Gore was selected as Clinton's Vice Presidential running mate in the 
1992 election campaign. Ultimately, Gore's ideas about technology and 
the future of the US economy and power synergised well with Clinton's 
approach. There was a general acknowledgement amongst politicians 
in this set that the world had changed and the US was going to have to 
change with it in order to reap the benefits of the new age and restore 
itself to what many saw as its 'rightful place' as leader of the free world. 
In a time of rapid political and technological change, the Clinton·Gore 
team was able to present a united, forward looking strategy for 
returning the US to global dominance (and leadership) through an 
integrated foreign and domestic policy based on new technology and 
networks - both human and virtual. Many issues which were at least 
21'' Century, delivered to Congress and the nation, Washington, D.C., February 4, 
1997. 
161 Governor Clinton, remarks at Wharton School of Business, April 16, 1992. 
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partially acknowledged as problems for US power during this period 
would be exacerbated by the privatisation and commercialisation of the 
Internet in the mid 1990s. 
Privatisation and Commercialisation of the Internet 
By the mid 1990s, the belief that the Internet should be integrated into 
economic policies in order to enhance US power was well established in 
the Clinton-Gore White House. This led to a set of policies intended to 
manage the transition of the Internet from a federally funded and 
operated network restricted to research and educational use to a 
widely accessible, privately owned network open to commercial activity. 
Despite the expectation that the Internet would enhance US power 
through economic growth, the Internet remained restricted by US law 
to non-commercial activity. 
This aspect of the political history of the Internet is particularly 
significant because, as explored below and in Chapter Five, it 
demonstrates the way in which conceptions of power can and do shape 
technology. In addition, the outcome of the policies discussed here later 
led to the debates and problems which generated the Internet 
governance case study as overwhelming commercial demands on 
existing governance mechanisms threatened to restrict the commercial 
potential of the Internet. 
The privatisation and commercialisation of the Internet are sometimes 
conflated. In fact, the issues are related but separate. Privatisation 
refers to the transition of ownership of the network infrastructure -
the 'backbone' - from the US government to the private sector. 
Commercialisation refers to the decision to allow commercial traffic to 
flow across that network. The relationship between these two issues is 
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based in the reluctance of Congress to allow for commercial gain from a 
tax·payer funded project. 
By the mid 1980s, the Internet infrastructure was fiscally supported 
and administered by the Federal government through the National 
Science Foundation (NSF) though this was regarded by the 
government as an interim measure on the way to full private 
ownership and management. 162 The National High·Performance 
Computing Act of 1990 specified that the National Science Foundation 
support the establishment of a high·speed national network "in a 
manner which fosters and maintains competition and private sector 
investment in high speed data networking" 163 and that the 
involvement of the National Science Foundation "be phased out when 
commercial networks can meet the networking needs of American 
researchers." 164 
Despite the growing belief on the part of politicians like Al Gore in the 
potential contribution of Internet technology to the future of US 
economic power, there remained a firm Congressional reticence to 
permit commercial activity from this ongoing expenditure of tax·payers' 
rn2 For an account of how the funding was organised in 1990, see Brian Kahin, 
'RFC1192 - Commercialization of the Internet, Summary Report', issued as a 
Request for Comments by the Network Working Group, Harvard, November 1990, 
http://www.faqs.org/rfcs/rfc 1192. html . 
163 S.1067, National High·Performance Computing Act of 1990, 101" Congress, 2"• 
Session, as marked up April 3, 1990. Also, the Federal Research Internet 
Coordinating Commit.tee, established to coordinate networking research activities, 
issued a report in 1989 stating that the network would "be implemented and operated 
so that lit] can become commercialized." Federal Research Internet Coordinating 
Committee, Program Plan for the National Research and Education Network, May 23, 
1989, pp.4·5. 
m S.2918, National High·Perfbrmance Computing Act of 1988, lOOth Congress, 2•• 
Session, October 19, 1988. 
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dollars. For this reason, it was anticipated that the commercialisation 
of activity over the Internet would be conditional on first achieving the 
privatisation of the infrastructure. Although the private sector was 
increasingly eager to make use of the Internet, it appeared reluctant to 
invest in the infrastructure - particularly while there was potentially a 
free option available. 
Stimulating private sector investment as well as the development of 
network management capability formed the focus of a number of policy 
initiatives. One of these was the enforcement of the 'Acceptable Use 
Policy' (AUP) drawn up by the National Science Foundation. This 
policy dictated that network traffic should be restricted to "open 
research and education" specifically prohibiting commercial activity 
until such time as the infrastructure was privatised.165 Through this 
'carrot and stick' policy approach, the government sought to stimulate 
necessary private sector investment and indeed, this policy did have 
the intended effect.166 
The National Science Foundation gradually allowed commercial 
operators to establish their own networks which could connect to the 
National Science Foundation 'backbone' but still relied upon their own 
privately funded infrastructure. They also increasingly outsourced to 
the private sector, the Internet services they provided which both 
165 For background on this, see the NSF web site, 'The Internet: Changing the Way 
we Communicate', http://www.nsf.gov/aboutlhistory/nsf0050/internet/internet)1tm. 
166 The National Science Foundation website, 
http://www.nfil,.gov/0<!npa/nsf50lnsfoutreach/htmln@_z,2/p'l.@.s z3/28 pg.htm . Also, 
Barry M. Leiner, Vinton G. Cerf, David D. Clark, Robert E. Kahn, Leonard Kleinrock, 
Daniel C. Lynch, Jon Postel, Larry G. Roberts, Stephen Wolff, 'A Brief History of the 
Internet, Part l', On the Internet, The Internet Society, May/June 1997, 
http://www.isoc.org/oti/ articles/059 7 /!cine r .html . 
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nurtured private sector capability and developed the market for the 
network. Very quickly, Internet service providers (ISPs) grew in 
number and scope until they were regarded as capable of assuming the 
role the NSF had previously filled. In April 1995, the NSF 'backbone' 
was retired and the Internet moved from government t-0 private 
hands.167 The Internet was open for business. 
The Clinton-Gore administration had very purposefully designed and 
implemented policies which would guide Internet technology in the 
direction they felt would most enhance US power. In order to 
circumvent the Congressional restriction on commercial traffic, it was 
necessary to prompt the private sector to invest in and develop a 
privatised information infrastructure. These politicians believed that 
the Internet, once commercialised and privatised had the potential to 
generate economic growth which would shore up US economic power -
they primary focus of their strategy to retain a dominant position in 
the global order. Not only is this an illustration of the ways in which 
government policies can shape and influence the development of 
technology, but the outcome of these policies led to the debates and 
problems which generated the Internet governance case study. 
Following this phase, commercial imperatives combined with the rapid 
escalation in demands on governance mechanisms presented a new 
problem for US power - Internet governance. 
rn; Although it is rarely discussed in these terms, the privatisation and 
commercialisation of the Internet was in large part, a political development not a 
technological one. Some accounts go as far as to suggest that the Internet was 
'wrested' from the grip of American politics by the overwhelming force of the private 
sector. However, as stated above, policy documents from 10 years prior clearly state 
that the intention of the US government was to privatise and commercialise the 
network in order to maximise the potential for contributing to US economic growth 
and improve its international standing. 
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Following commercialisation, the governance of the Internet became 
more complex. There was an exponential increase in domain name 
registrations and as those domain names now carried some commercial 
value, managing the registrations and enforcement of their use took on 
new gravity. Existing arrangements (which are dealt with in more 
detail in Chapter Five) were largely informal - managed by a trusted 
cadre of Internet pioneers - and though these mechanisms had worked 
well for the much smaller non-commercial Internet, they were ill· 
equipped to scale upwards to the extent necessary. Governance was 
perceived in the late 1990s by most stakeholders as a bottleneck, (a 
reverse salient in the conceptual language of this thesis) which again 
threatened to prevent the Internet from fulfilling its commercial 
potential. In 1998, as a response to the growing perception that 
existing Internet governance mechanisms were inadequate the US 
government established the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN). 
The circumstances which led to the establishment of ICANN came 
about as the consequence of inextricably interwoven forces of politics 
and technology.168 While they consulted widely with stakeholders, 169 
the Clinton-Gore administration's previously articulated vision for the 
relationship between new technology like the Internet and US power 
drove the policies which ultimately established ICANN. Indeed, as 
168 The author acknowledges that other prisms could be applied to these same events 
- for example, an economical or cultural prism. This thesis, however, is confined to 
the interplay of politics and technology. 
169 These included key figures in the Internet technology community, business and 
civil liberties organisations amongst others. For a comprehensive list of these 
stakeholders and their interests, see Milton Mueller, Net Neutrality as Global 
Principle for Internet Governance, (Syracuse, NY: Internet Governance Project, 5 
November 2007), pp.166-167. 
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Chapter Five shows, the structure of Internet governance was very 
clearly a product of those ideas - in many ways a continuation of the 
Atari Democrats' vision for how the Internet could best contribute t-0 
US power through the economy. 
Three significant policy papers were released between July 1997 and 
June 1998 all of which are discussed at some length in Chapter Five. 
These were the Fi·amework for Global Electronic Commerce (July 
1997), The Green Paper on Internet Governa11ce (February 1998), and 
The fVhite Paper on Management of Internet names and Addresses, 
(June 1998). Together, these polky papers formally charted a path 
from the existing Internet governance mechanisms tc a future which 
was based on a US private sector led system for the global governance 
of the Internet. ICANN was established as a private, not for profit 
incorporated body subject to the legal jurisdiction of the state of 
California and placed under the purview of the Department of 
Commerce. 
By the latter half of the 1990s, the Internet was a very different entity 
than it had been at the start of that decade. Within a matter of several 
years, it had been privatised, opened to commercial traffic, the Web 
had been invented and the widespread take up of JYfosaic and personal 
computers had made the Internet widely accessible to those without 
substantial computer knowledge, money or expertise. From the mid 
1990s onwards, political engagement with Internet issues in the US 
grew exponentially both in breadth and depth. Regulation and 
oversight of Internet technology and function became fragmented and 
expanded to a number of key politicians, Congressional committees 
and institutions. 
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Connecting Critical Infrastructure to the Internet 
Understanding how Internet technology came to be perceived as not 
only enhancing state power (particularly economic power) but also as a 
mechanism for undermining US power is important to engaging with 
the 'paradox of power' referenced in the Introduction to this thesis. 
Technology often has unintended consequences and this has certainly 
been the case with Internet technology. The widespread integration of 
Internet technology into so many functions of political and economic 
significance in the US was initiated by the drive towards efficiency and 
productivity which could feed into economic growth. While this was 
perceived by politicians as enormously successful, it also introduced a 
range of vulnerabilities which would later feature in debates about 
cyber security and help to generate that case study. The following 
section illustrates how politicians responded to the growing awareness 
that productivity and efficiency were accompanied by some very real 
threats to US power. Essentially, in a very Instrumental way, 
politicians turned to the private sector to resolve problems of national 
security threats. They consistently expressed confidence that the 
market would find a solution to the problem of cyber insecurity thereby 
effectively absolving the government of the responsibility to do so. 
The last quarter of the 20th century saw many advanced industrialised 
states privatise critical infrastructure like water and sewerage, 
electricity supplies, the financial sector, communications and 
transport.170 The United States was no exception and by the new 
millennium, some 85% of US critical infrastructure was in private 
110 'ISE's Participation in the Open Government Initiative', Information Sharing 
Environment, US Government website, http://ww\v.ise.gov/open . 
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hands.171 With privatisation, came an increased discretion on the part 
of those managing the infrastructure over the systems and technology 
which were implemented for the control of these utilities and 
industries. 
Computerised control systems had long been a feature of critical 
infrastructure being used to monitor and adjust the processes of large 
systems including dams, power supply and sewerage. Over the past 
two to three decades, (roughly concurrent with trends to privatisation) 
many of these systems employed to control critical infrastructure 
functions were migrated from proprietary control programs, which 
were software programs written and coded specifically for an industry 
or an organisation, to more generic computer programs known as 
'Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition systems' (SCADA systems). 
This had significant benefits as buying readily available software was 
much more cost effective than paying to have software written 
specifically for a system. SCADA systems typically ran on a Microsoft 
Windows platform - an operating system which, though widespread, is 
notoriously porous and easily penetrated. In addition to the indigenous 
vulnerability of Windows, SCADA systems add another layer of 
standards and uniform coding which increase security problems. 112 
m Agency Response to Cyhel'space Policy Review, before the Committee on Science 
and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation and Subcommittee on 
Research and Science Education, House of Representatives, June 16, 2009, pg.3, 
172 Such standards in coding mean that once a vulnerability is identified in one 
system, it may be applied to other systems which conform to those standards, Just 
two Microsoft examples of thousands: Ryan Naraine, 'Microsoft confirms "detailed" 
Windows 7 exploit', ZDNe~ November 16, 2009, 
http://www.zdnet.comfbloglsecUl'ityimicrosoft·confirms-detailed·windows·7· 
exploiU4938. and Woody Leonhard, 'Microsoft rushes out patch for Windows shortcut 
vulnerability', Infoworld, July 21, 2010, 
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While SCADA systems boosted productivity and efficiency of many 
industries and services by allowing critical infrastructure to be 
controlled centrally and remotely, the combination of private 
ownership and the vulnerabilities of SCAD A systems lead to a range of 
cybersecurity concerns around critical infrastructure protection when 
these systems began to be connected to the Internet. 
SCADA systems connected to the Internet and reliant on a 
standardised operating system like Microsoft Windows made it 
possible for hackers to penetrate the systems and interfere with the 
smooth and safe operation of important infrastructure like damns, 
traffic systems and energy supplies. One early example emerged from 
Australia where a former employee of Hunter Watertech was arrested 
for tampering with the water supply for Maroochy Shire over a period 
of four months.173 At the subsequent trial it was revealed that using 
his laptop, he had gained entry to the SCADA system which controls 
the Shire's water treatment plant and set himself up as 'pumping 
station 4'. After turning off all alarms and giving himself appropriate 
clearance and authority, he altered the sewerage outfall, deliberately 
pouring millions of litres of untreated sewerage into the river. 
Investigations revealed that Boden was in complete control of 300 
SCADA nodes and "could have done anything he liked to the fresh 
water" .174 It was becoming increasing clear that illicit attacks on these 
systems were a very real and viable concern, one not limited to 
http://www.infoworld.com/t/windowslmicrosoft-rusbes·out·patch·windows·shortcut-
vulnerabilitv-114. 
173 AAP, 'Sewage' hacker jailed, WebSecure news site, 8th May 2002 - News.com.au 
http://www.websecure.eom.au/PressRelease.asp?PR_ID=29 
174 Barton Gellman, US finds clues to potential cyber attacks; Dams, Utilities, 911 
Systems called Vulnerable. Jan. 2000 www.siliconvalley.com 
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disgruntled employees or adventurous hackers but with potential for 
global conflict and terrorist acts. 
In 1998, President Clinton issued the Presidential Decision Directive 
63 {PDD·63) which outlined the Administration's approach to critical 
infrastructure protection. 175 PDD·63 makes an explicit statement 
about the Clinton-Gore administration's perception of the relationship 
between US power and the Internet - one which regards conventional 
power factors as reliant upon the same technology which increasingly 
underpins civil functions like commerce, communications and 
education. "The United States possesses both the world's strongest 
military and its largest national economy. Those two aspects of our 
power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They are also 
increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon 
cyber-based information systems."176 
In addition to this relationship between the state's critical information 
infrastructure and its capacity to exercise conventional power, the 
PDD-63 also introduces the notion that global order and specifically US 
primacy may be a catalyst for attacks over the Internet. In this sense, 
the Internet now poses a potential challenge to American power. 
Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether 
nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non· 
traditional ways including attacks within the United States. Our 
economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber 
175President William J. Clinton, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, (Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, May 22, 1998). 
116 Ibid. 
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supported infrastructures and non-traditional attacks on our 
infrastructure and information systems may be capable of 
significantly harming both our military power and our 
economy.177 
In addition to these conceptual claims about US power, the PDD-63 
made two important points which would have implications for the US 
approach to power and cyber security well into the future. First, it 
argued that market incentives should be the first choice for addressing 
problems of cyber security in the context of critical infrastructure 
protection and that regulation should be an option of last resort.178 
Second, it stated that "in order to engage the private sector fully, it is 
preferred that participation by owners and operators in a national 
infrastructure protection system be voluntary."179 These two principles; 
that the market is the best mechanism through which to pursue 
national cyber security and that private sector participation should be 
voluntary form the basis for what came to be regarded as the 
'cornerstone' of US cyber security strategies - the 'public/private 
partnership'. This arrangement is found in the case study on cyber 
security to undermine the government's authority to act, even in the 
face of considerable challenges to material power factors. 
The outcome from the PDD-63 was the National Plan for Information 
Systems Protection released in 2000. Titled 'Defending America's 
Cyberspace', it was described in the executive summary as "the first 
177 President Clinton, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, May 22, 1998. 
11s Ibid. 
'"Ibid. 
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attempt by any nation to develop a plan to defend its cyberspace".180 In 
the introduction, President Clinton reiterates his belief in the 
'publidprivate partnership', again eschewing the path of regulation or 
Congressional mandate in favour of'consultation' with industry. 
Richard Clarke, who was at that time the National Coordinator for 
Security, Infrastructure Protection, and Counter Terrorism, writes in 
the Plan that while the military was making progress to secure its 
networks, and the US government could order Federal networks to be 
secured, they could not and should not dictate solutions for the private 
sector · which is where significant risk lay. 181 As a consequence of this 
conflicted approach - that substantial national risk lies in unsecured 
privately owned cyber infrastructure and yet the government did not 
claim a mandate to ensure that infrastructure was secured - resulted 
in Clarke's acknowledgement that the iVational Plan fo1· Information 
Systems Protection did not stipulate what would be done to secure and 
defend private networks. Rather, it suggested a "common framework 
for action". 182 These ideas, of the government having a limited mandate 
and the private sector essentially being assigned some responsibility 
for national security would continue to feature heavily in cyber security 
policy making of the future. 
In the National Plan for information Systems Protection, President 
Clinton also established a clear but didactic relationship between cyber 
security and civil liberties, reassuring the American people that 
Hill President William J. Clint.on, Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan fo1· 
Information Systems Protection, (Washington D.C.: The White House, 2000), pg.vi. 
m Ibid. 
1s2 Ibid. 
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enhanced cyber security "cannot and will not come at the expense of 
our civil liberties. We must never undermine the very freedoms we are 
seeking to protect." 183 This expands over following years to include 
human rights and in the chapter on cyber security, the protection and 
promotion of these norms and values proves to be a more influential 
force than the protection of material power factors. 
Political Responses to the Threat of Disruption 
As explained in Chapter Two, perceptions about technology matter. 
How actors in a position to influence technology regard it as either 
promoting or challenging their interests (however those may be 
defined) will guide the ways in which they seek to affect future 
development of that technology. Just as the absence of a bicycle chain 
guard posed no problem until women in long skirts began riding, 
changes in political perceptions of threats to US power generated a 
shift in approaches to Internet technology. The growing awareness 
discussed in the previous section of the vulnerabilities associated with 
critical infrastructure systems connected to the Internet combined over 
the late 1990s and early 2000s with a new perception of 'disruption' as 
a threat to security and US power. Initially perceived as a means to 
enhance military power, then as a means to enhance economic power, 
the Internet now came to be regarded as a source of vulnerability - a 
mechanism through which US power could be undermined in a number 
of important ways. 
Several important developments combined to formulate this shift in 
perceptions about Internet technology and its relationship to US power 
183 President Clinton, Defending America's Cyberspace, pg.iii. 
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- particularly ¥tith regard to cyber security concerns and these 
stimulated a range of legislative and policy responses. The threat of 
destruction which had underpinned conventional approaches to global 
conflict was being reconceptualised in the context of Internet 
technology as the threat of disruption. Problems like the 'Y2K bug', and 
events like the September 11 attacks and the 2007 cyber attacks on 
Estonia combined to generate new ideas about how Internet technology 
related to US power. 
One of the first major developments to instigate this change in threat 
perceptions was the looming public anxiety about what was widely 
referred to as the 'Y2K bug'. Concurrently over the latter half of the 
1990s, while Internet governance and critical infrastructure protection 
were emerging in political debates, a public anxiety arose about how 
computer systems which were developed in the early decades of 
computer programming would deal with the date change from 1999 to 
2000. There was a genuine fear that programs not originally designed 
to accommodate the numeric change in the first digit from a 'one' to a 
'two' would fail, causing widespread disruption of both public and 
private infrastructure which now relied upon these systems. Opinions 
differed on whether this was a valid cause for concern or whether it 
was a construct of the industry which stood to benefit through the vast 
expenditure on compliance programs. Nevertheless, the implications 
were potentially so significant that governments felt compelled to act 
and a massive Y2K compliance program was implemented in many 
industrialised states including the US where legislation was passed 
which required both public and private sector compliance with 
standards set to ensure that the date change on January 1, 2000 did 
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not disrupt systems which the public relied upon. 184 Business and 
government globally spent years (and millions or billions of dollars) 
ensuring that their systems were Y2K compliant and certainly - on 
January 1, 2000 - it seemed all the hard work and expense had paid off 
as systems remained intact and carried on as they had the previous 
day. 
The Y2K bug served to focus attention on just how reliant the US had 
become on the smooth and reliable function of its information 
infrastructure but it also illustrated again the way political decisions 
can and do shape technology, in this case legislating compliance with 
standards forced the private sector to meet a level of system resilience 
or risk prosecution. The Y2K compliance program is sometimes 
referred to by politicians as an exemplar of the legitimacy of 
government intervention in the private sector's management of 
networks. 185 Although the Y2K legislation was widely supported, m 
other similar cases (cyber security and network neutrality) calls for 
government intervention generate debates about the merits of 
"
4 H.R. 775: The Y2K Dispute Resolution Act was signed into law by President 
Clinton on July 20, 1999. In addition, there was a House Resolution: H.R. 775) to 
establish certain procedures for civil actions brought for damages relating to the 
failure of any device or system to process or otherwise deal with the transition from 
the year 1999 to the year 2000, and for other purposes. This was agreed to on May 11, 
1999. 
iss Mr. Jack Brock, Director, Government wide and Defense Information Systems, 
Accounting and Information Management Division, U.S. General Accounting Office, 
testimony at Cyber Attack: Is the Government Safe?, hearing before the Committee 
on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, March 2, 2000, pg.23. Also, see the 
executive summary to Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for 
Information Systems Protection, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2000), pg.iv. 
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adhering to the liberal value of limited government as opposed to the 
benefits of a 'strong, central hand' in shaping Internet technology.1ss 
This raises questions about the government's authority to shape 
technology even in cases where it can be seen to be of vital national 
interest and have implications for enhancing or undermining power. 
Themes of authority and legitimacy were found to be important in all 
three case studies and form the basis of one of the key findings of this 
thesis. That is that regarding an aspect of Internet technology as 
relevant to US power did not always lead directly to a sense of 
authority to influence and shape the technology. Without this sense of 
authority, politicians regarded some policy options as lacking in 
legitimacy even though they would potentially minimise serious 
challenges to some US power factors. One of the conclusions of this 
thesis is that there is a relationship between this sense of authority 
and a Social Construction of Technology approach and this will be 
developed in the case studies. The Y2K bug and Internet governance 
are two examples in which politicians advocated a strong role for the 
government and followed it through with policies. This was not the 
case with other issues specifically those associated with a 
Technological Determinist or Instrumental approach to technology. 
These fears of a 'disruptive' attack were realised on September 11. 
Obviously, there was a devastating physical element to the attacks but 
there were also some enduring factors which fed into this general sense 
IM Although standards are generally regarded normatively as 'a good thing', there is 
a counter argument. Scott Borg, of the US think tank, The Cyber Consequences Unit, 
argues that standards can also be a source of insecurity. "Standards can have the 
effect of creating vulnerability, rather tha11 mitigating it." Scott Borg, interviewed in 
February 2010. 
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that the US was vulnerable in a new and ill-defined way. The impact of 
an attack on the 'homeland' was profound for a nation protected by 
oceans and friendly states. Pearl Harbour, of course, had also left a 
deep scar but Americans retained a deep sense of physical security 
upon their own shores. The jolt of the September 11 attacks awakened 
in Americans a sense that they were not as safe at home as they had 
assumed and this led to speculation that the protection of geopolitics 
did not have the same utility it once did. 
A second reason why the September 11 attacks fed into this perception 
of disruption as a threat was due to the significant cost of suspending 
some critical functions like the stock exchange and air travel following 
the attacks. 187 The following December, the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a hearing into the 
response of the technology sector in times of crisis in order to ascertain 
what went right and what went wrong in the wake of the planes 
hitting the World Trade Center towers. The Committee expressed deep 
concerns about the impact on New York City's telecommunications 
which were "flattened by the blow"IBB leading to rescue workers at the 
site running hand-written messages and instructions from command 
and control sites around Manhattan to rescue workers inside the 
wreckage. 189 
l87 For a summary, see 'Stockmarkets Rudderless: With markets in America closed, 
the rest of the world drifted', TheEconomis~ September 13, 2001, 
http://www.econon1:ist.com/node/78079G?fsrc::::rss. 
188 Senator Ron Wyden, Chairman Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, 
Response of the Technology Sector in Times of Crisis, hearing before the Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, US Senate, December 5, 2001, pg.l. 
189 This communication failure is tragically ironic, given that some of the original 
developmental research for the internet took place within the context of a program 
aimed at establishing a secure communications system capable of withstanding a 
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Fears about American resilience to a critical infrastructure attack were 
also exacerbated by the failure of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) to respond effectively to Hurricane Katrina. mo The 
final report from a bipartisan committee investigation into this 
disaster found that "the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina show we are still an analogue government in a digital age. We 
must recognize that we are woefully incapable of storing, moving, and 
accessing information especially in times of crisis." mi The same 
report links Katrina to the September 11 attacks finding that 
"whatever improvements have been made to our capacity to respond to 
natural or man· made disasters, four and half years after 9/11, we are 
still not fully prepared." rn2 
The failure of the response to Hurricane Katrina is frequently referred 
to by politicians in the context of debates about cyber security -
particularly with reference to an attack on critical infrastructure. 
Hurricane Katrina required a large, coordinated response, it was a 
chaotic and disorienting environment to work in and key services and 
nuclear attack. Senator Ron Wyden, Chairman Subcommittee on Science, Technology 
and Space, Response of the Technology Sector in Times of Crisis, hearing before t.he 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, US Senate, December 5, 2001, 
pg.20. 
190 
"We saw in the recent hurricane ... that the Federal Government was unprepared 
to respond to a large natural disaster ... Ai:e we prepared for a cyber attack on our 
control systems?" Rep. Bill Pascrell at the hearing SCADA Systems and the Terrorist 
Threat: Protecting the Nation's Critical Control Systems hearing before the 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Economic Security, 
Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity with the Subcommittee on Emergency 
Preparedness, Science and Technology, House of Representatives, October 18th, 2005, 
pg.54. 
191 Executive Summary of A Failure of initiative: The Final Report of the Select 
Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Kat.rina, (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, February 15, 2006), 
pg.1, http://\vw>.v.@oaccess.gov/katrinareportJexecsun1ma rv.ndf, 
rnz Executive Summary of A Failure of Initiative, pg.1. 
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infrastructure were not restored in a timely manner. All of these 
factors resonate with the scenario of a cyber attack on critical 
infrastructure and feed into concerns about how the state would 
respond in such a case. In a Congressional hearing into cyber security 
a few months after Katrina, there was a strongly expressed sentiment 
on the part of Committee members that America was unprepared for a 
large scale cyber attack. "We saw in ... Hurricane Katrina that the 
Federal Government was unprepared to respond to a large natural 
disaster... Are we prepared for a cyber attack on our control 
systems?" 193 
The rapid growth in online crime, which escalated over the 2000s, 
coupled with the realisation that much of the critical infrastructure of 
the state was vulnerable to Internet attacks led to a growing unease 
amongst those politicians tasked with oversight of the Internet. It was 
becoming increasingly apparent that the Internet was not only a 
means through which attacks could take place on the physical 
infrastructure; it was actually a critical resource itself, which also must 
be protected.194 Over the course of the 2000s, as American reliance on 
the smooth functioning of the Internet increased, political concepts of 
'critical infrastructure protection' (CIP) expanded to incorporate 
information and 'critical information infrastructure protection' (CIIP) 
193 Rep. Bill Pascrell, SCADA Systems and the Terrorist Threat, pg.54. 
194 'Information Technology' in Lewis M. Branscomb and Richard D. Klausner, 
Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in Countering 
Terrorism, report from the Committee on Science and Technology for Countering 
Terrorism, National Research Council, (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of 
Sciences, 2002), pg.135. 
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steadily gained traction as a policy IBsue and a cybersecurity 
concern. 195 
In response to many of the concerns highlighted by the hearings 
discussed above, the Bush administration released the 2003 National 
Strategy to Secure Cyberspace.196 Despite the new threat perceptions 
which had evolved during his presidency, this document expressed 
continuity with the Clinton·Gore emphasis on the public/private 
partnership as the primary mechanism through which the US would 
pursue cyber security. 197 The notion that Internet technology now 
posed a number of challenges to key elements of US power, but that 
these should be addressed by the private sector in a voluntary 
arrangement was a view which would become increasingly entrenched 
in US cyber security policy making in future years. It is a view deeply 
rooted in an insistence on the part of policy makers that a distinction 
can be maintained not only between public and private space on the 
Internet, but also between crime, terror and warfare. In essence, as 
cyber security threats develop, US politicians find themselves caught 
in a policy paradox - the federal government is understood to be 
responsible for national security and yet in the context of cyber 
security they perceived that they lack the authority to act. "Our 
195 In a 2000 Congressional hearing, Senator Conrad Burns observed that "we now 
live in a world where there are malicious criminals who can briog large parts of our 
Nation's critical information infrastructure to a grinding halt." Senator Conrad Burns, 
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications, Internet 1:?ecurit)' bearing 
before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on 
Communications, US Senate, March 8, 2000, pg.2. 
196 President George W. Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, February 2003). 
197 "The cornerstone of America's cyberspace security strategy is and will remain a 
public·p»ivate partnership." President Bush, National Strategy to Secu1·e Cyher8pace, 
pg.iii. 
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traditions of federalism and limited government reqmre that 
organizations outside the federal government take the lead in many of 
these efforts." 198 
Later that same year, President Bush released Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-1J on 'Critical Infrastructure 
Identification, Prioritization and Protection' in which the Internet is 
identified as essential to many important services. 199 This directive 
was in part a response to the September 11 attacks as it frames the 
threat almost exclusively in terms of a terrorist attack. Its purpose was 
to establish a national policy for Federal departments and agencies to 
"identify and prioritize United States critical infrastructure and key 
resources and to protect them from terrorist attacks" both in the 
physical and cyber spheres. The newly created Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) was mandated to produce an integrated 
'National Plan for Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Protection' 
by the end of 2004. Instead, it issued an interim report in February 
2005 which was an underdeveloped and generic document which made 
no significant contribution to either the debates or the practice of 
critical infrastructure protection.200 
The completed plan was published in 2006 and this was more 
comprehensive generally and also with regard to the information 
infrastructure. In the Introduction, it states that protecting the critical 
198 President Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.14. 
199 President George W. Bush, Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization 
and Protection: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, (Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, December 17, 2003). 
200 Tom Ridge, Secretary of Homeland Security, Interim National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, February 
2005). See Section Five for a summary of expectations of the private sector. 
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infrastructure of the United States is "essential to the Nation's security, 
public health and safety, economic vitality, and way oflife" and that an 
attack on this infrastructure could produce "catastrophic losses in 
terms of human casualties, property destruction, and economic effects, 
as well as profound damage to public morale and confidence".201 Yet, as 
did previous policy documents, this plan is built on the assumption 
that the public/private partnership remains the most appropriate 
mechanism through which to pursue this. 202 
By April 2007, concerns about a critical infrastructure attack over the 
Internet were obviously already well established in US political circles. 
In this context, a diplomatic stoush with Russia led to Estonian critical 
infrastructure coming under a massive and sustained cyber attack. 
Involving over a million computers around the world, primary targets 
were the websites of the Estonian President and Parliament, three of 
the country's six news services, two of its largest banks and several 
communications firms. 203 Estonia's Defence Minister Jaak Aaviksoo 
declared a national security situation which could "effectively be 
compared to when your ports are shut to the sea". 204 After three weeks 
of sustained attacks, Estonia was forced to isolate itself from Internet 
201 Michael Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security, National Infrastructure 
Protection Plan, (Washington, D.C.: Department of Homeland Security, February 
2006), pg.7. 
202 Chertoff, National Infrastructure Pmteetion Plan, pg.26. 
'°' DW Staff Writer, 'NATO Probes Cyber Attacks on Estonia', Deutsche Welle, May 
18, 2007, httjl://www.dw·world.deidw/article/O 254275\!.,.QO.html?maca=en·rss·en·all· 
lQ'.ULCT.!f and Ian Traynor, 'Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable Est-0nia', 
Guardian Unlimited, May 17 2007, 
http://www.guard.ian.co. uk/russia/ article/O .. 2081438 00 .html. 
204 'Cyber Warfare - Beyond Estonia-Russia, The Rise of China's 5th Dimension Cyber 
Army', ACTA Briefing, mi2g, May 30, 2007, 
http://www.mi2g.comlcgi!mi2g!frameset.php?pageid;:http%3.Allwww.mi2g.com/cgilmi 
2glpress/'.j00507.php. 
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traffic beyond its borders in order to restore its systems and the 
attacks subsequently died off. NATO then convened a meeting of 
foreign ministers to discuss a more appropriate response to the 
problem of cyber aggression. 
This was the first public assertion of a state to state cyber attack 
(though the actual origins of the attack remain unclear) and it 
inevitably prompted debate and speculation in the US about the 
consequences for America if such an attack were successfully launched 
there. This type of attack, which targeted critical infrastructure, 
transport and communication systems had been a recurring theme in 
both political and popular forecasts about cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructure protection in America and can be understood as the 'Die 
Hard 4' attack.205 This attack scenario has dominated Congressional 
discussions on cyber security for decades and been the subject of 
numerous hearings and policy documents. For years, many debates 
about cyber-terror or cyber-war were stymied by the lack of a tangible 
public act - an 'electronic Pearl Harbour' as it had come to be known. 
There were various theories about why, given the enormous 
vulnerability of the US on the Internet, had there not been a more 
substantial attack. Events in Estonia shifted the paradigm from the 
stuff of fiction and Hollywood to a very real issue for International 
Relations and state power. It was now clear that states were 
vulnerable to cyber attacks impossible to attribute to the perpetrator. 
Belligerent states could cripple the infrastructure of a rival state and 
maintain 'plausible deniability' while they did it. This upsets 
20s The fourth instalment of this Hollywood franchise movie starring Bruce Willis 
features a disgruntled employee who sets out (successfully) to demonstrate the 
vulnerabilities in American cyber security. 
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conventions of state to state aggression which are based on 
understanding the identity of the parties involved. 
This incident reinforced the paradigm for 'disruption' of ICT as a form 
of state vulnerability in the US political consciousness. This paradigm 
continued to develop over the ensuing years as 'wars of disruption' 
rather than 'destruction' came to be understood in academic and policy 
circles as characterising future conflict, thereby adding weight to 
concerns about cyber security. At this point, the Internet was seen less 
as a conduit for the economic growth and more as an integral platform 
for the effective delivery of civil, military, political, social and economic 
functions in the US. Disruption signalled another key shift in approach 
to the relationship between US power and Internet technology from a 
source of power to a vulnerability and challenge to power. 
Critical Changes to Telecommunications Law 
One of the less discussed aspects of the relationship between state 
power and Internet technology is the impact of an expanded group of 
stakeholders on government policy. Few (if any) technologies prompt as 
wide and divergent a set of claims from individuals, commerce, interest 
groups, the international community and the public sector as Internet 
technology does. For states like the US where the Internet is 
integrated into so many aspects of public and private life, managing 
expectations and balancing stakeholder requirements has complicated 
the relationship between state power and technology. Certainly other 
examples such as nuclear technology provoke a set of debates and 
questions about how that technology should be used and developed in 
the context of state power. However, the implications of those policy 
choices affect most people in an oblique manner rather than a having 
direct, discernable impact upon everyday interactions. 
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One example of the impact of a broad range of stakeholders with an 
interest in technology policy is illustrated by the necessity of amending 
communications law to adapt to new information and communications 
technologies. Debates around this type of legislative overhaul throw a 
light on the perceptions of politicians about how such technology fits 
into a larger view of the national interest. They also draw in debates 
about which values, norms and interests should be privileged in 
policies which shape and influence the technology and how these 
factors relate to state power. In the US, these debates revolve around 
the issue of network neutrality and generate the third case study in 
this thesis. 
While much of the US political attention and energy was siphoned off 
to the pressing problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, telecommunications 
law was under review in the US. Stakeholders with an interest in the 
Internet had expanded both in numbers and in influence as so many 
functions of the state came to rely upon the 'information infrastructure'. 
Private companies, the military, individuals, civil and human rights 
groups, the education sector and of course, the government all had an 
interest in and an opinion on how the Internet should develop and be 
managed. Understanding and attempting to reconcile these sometimes 
competing interests while maintaining a view of what was best for the 
national interest occupied many Congressional hearings. Adapting 
legislation designed to deal predominantly with fixed line telephones to 
the emerging rigours of advanced telecommunications proved complex 
and difficult. 
There were two important developments which moved communications 
law into the spotlight in America. The first was a shift in online 
revenue streams which fundamentally impacted on previous economic 
models for Internet related commerce. Previously, large private sector 
1461Page 
Chapter Three Political History o(the Internet 
telecommunications firms had paid for the necessary infrastructure 
such as exchanges and the laying of cables. They then leased these 
back to the public, private and government sector for a fee. However, 
during the 'dotcom' boom, content and service providers like Google, 
Yahoo and E·bay emerged as business enterprises which used that 
infrastructure to generate massive returns for very low relative 
investment. 206 The telecommunications firms who owned the 
infrastructure soon began to argue that they had a right to a share of 
these profits - a contention which has been fiercely rejected by not only 
the dotcoms but by a large sector of the Internet community who 
believe in the principle of 'network neutrality', the principle that 
information travels across the network unexamined and without 
interference. 
The second development which prompted debate over communications 
law was the advent of 'streaming media' necessary for playing live, 
multi·user video games, viewing video files and using Voice over 
Internet Protocol (VoIP) to make phone calls over the Internet 
including services like Skype.201 Data travelling across the Internet is 
broken down into small 'packets', moved across the network through 
the fastest possible route and then reassembled upon arrival at the 
destination address. With simple data like text files, delays have less 
20s This is explained in detail in the Network Neutrality chapter but some examples 
include Ebay, Google and Yahoo. These companies had very low overheads compared 
to the owners of telecommunications infrastructure and yet they were able to 
generate massive returns. 
201 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) refers to the transmission of voice 
communications over the Internet.. Perhaps the most well· known proprietary VoIP 
application is SKYPE, but VoIP is increasingly penetrating traditional phone 
markets. For an overview of recent developments, refer to the White Paper entitled 
'Voice Over Internet Protocol' on the International Engineering Consortium website 
at http;//w\V\V .ie~uline/tutoria ls/int tele/index.a-sp 
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impact because although transmission may be slowed during peak 
traffic periods, documents eventually arrive fully assembled. However, 
with streaming media, delays in packet delivery result in the video or 
voice call being disrupted - sometimes even unintelligible. These 
services then, not only use considerably more bandwidth than ordinary 
data transmission but they are reliant on an uninterrupted flow of data. 
In order to provide this, network operators sometimes have to 'manage' 
the data flows, privileging streaming media packets over ordinary data 
packets so as to ensure some quality of service to their customers. 
However, this practice leaves open the potential for misuse and this 
has been at the core of the debates about network neutrality.zos 
A key player in these debates and in the renovation of communications 
law has been the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) - an 
independent government agency responsible for regulating the 
telecommunications sector in the US. zo9 In 2002, in an early attempt to 
address some of the complex issues which arose from the privatisation 
and commercialisation of the Internet in the mid 1990s, the FCC made 
what would later be regarded as a landmark decision for the future of 
the Internet. It relegated Internet communications from Title II of the 
1934 Communications Act which govern common carriage telephone 
communications to the less stringent Title I regulations which govern 
20s Network neutrality in its simplest form means that data travels over the Internet 
without being interrogated, privileged or intentionally degraded. There is more to the 
debate about what exactly network neutrality is but these are taken up later in the 
case study chapter. 
200 The FCC was established by the Communications Act of 1934. It is directed by five 
Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate for five year 
terms. In addition, the President designates one of the Commissioners to serve as 
Chairperson. Only three Commissioners may be members of the same political party. 
None of them can have a financial interest in any Commission-related business. For 
more information, see the FCC website at http://fcc.gov/aboutus.html. 
1481Page 
Chapter Three Political History of the lntemet 
interstate information services.210 Common carrier regulations impose 
rigorous access and anti·discrimination requirements which do not 
apply to information services like Internet access. As a consequence, 
this ruling is regarded by many as the policy genesis of the 'network 
neutrality' debate which is explored in more detail in Chapter Six. The 
2002 FCC ruling effectively de·regulated Internet broadband service 
supply, thus opening the door for private operators to discriminate 
against data.211 
The FCC ruling was highly controversial - even at the time it was 
taken - with one of the five Commissioners issuing a dissenting 
statement as part of the ruling document. Michael J. Copps argued 
strongly against the ruling on the grounds that the decision placed 
broadband services outside of 'any viable and predictable regulatory 
framework'. 212 He refers explicitly to the failure of the ruling to 
stipulate open access requirements which would force owners of the 
210 The 2002 ruling applied to cable services but in 2005 this was extended to DSL 
services. For the complete ruling. see FCC 02·77, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, in the :Matter oflnquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities I Internet Over Cable Declaratory Order 
Proceeding /Appropriate Regulato1y J'reatment for Broadband Access to the I11ternet 
Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket 00· 185, J\,farch 15, 2002, www.foe.gov. 
211 In the 2006 Senate hearing into network neutrality, Senat-0r Byron Dorgan 
identified the FCC ruling as the fundamental cause of the political debate. "If [the 
FCC] had made the decision this was a telecommunications service, the common· 
carrier rules would apply and , .. the issue of neutrality and content and so on would 
not be before us." Senator Byron Dorgan, Net Neutrality, hearing before the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, February 7, 2006, pg.35. In 
addition, see Angie A. Welborn and Charles B. Goldfarb. 'Defining Cable Broadb>md 
Internet Access Service: Background and Analysis of the Supreme Court's Brand X 
Decision', (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, December 22, 2005). 
212 Michael J. Copps, Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps' in the 
FCC 02-77, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking. in the Matter of 
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other 
Facilities I Internet Over Cable Declaratory Order Proceeding I Appropriate 
Re{f'ulatory 1i'eatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Ji'acflities, 
GN Docket 00·185, March 15, 2002, pp73·75, www.fcc.gov. 
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infrastructure to make it available to competing Internet service 
providers (ISPs). Without these open access requirements, the small 
number of telco and cable providers in the US would be able to 
minimize competition and dominate the market - often in monopoly or 
duopoly situations. 213 
Michael K. Powell, the FCC chairman at the time of the ruling, also 
included a statement. In it, he argued that the FCC was bound by law 
to interpret the existing statute - rather than use its discretion to 
determine the appropriate definition according to its preferred 
regulatory approach.214 He also made the point that the FCC should by 
no means be considered 'neutered' in this respect. "Congress invested 
the Commission with ample authority under Title 1. .. to guard against 
public interest harms and anti ·competitive results." 215 Whether this 
authority would prove adequate or whether the pre-existing regulatory 
framework should be reinstated (or a new one implemented) would 
form the basis of one of the key platforms of the network neutrality 
policy debates over the following years. 
213 An independent study into broadband performance in OECD countries recently 
found that open access policies have been integral in the most successful states and 
that the lack of them in the US (initiated by the ruling discussed here) have been 
instrumental in America's poor performance. The study was commissioned but not 
funded by the FCC. Yochai Benkler, Next Generation Connectivity: A review of 
broadband Internet transitions and policy fi:om around the world, (Harvard 
University: The Berkman Centre for Internet and Society, 2010). 
214 Michael K. Powell, 'Statement of Chairman Michael K. Powell' in the FCC 02·77, 
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, in the Matter of Inquizy 
Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities I 
Internet Over Cable Declaratory Order Proceeding I Appropriate Regulatory 
Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket 00· 
185, March 15, 2002, pg70, www.fcc.gov. 
215 Ibid. 
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In 2006, a major bill aimed at a comprehensive overhaul of the 
Communications Act of 1934 was introduced to the Senate. The 
Communications, Consumer's Choice and Broadband Deployment Act 
of 2006 was not passed into law but it generated serious debate about 
how the Internet was to be ordered and structtued in the future. The 
Act was the subject of two Senate Hearings before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science and Transportation - the second of which (held on 
May 25, 2006) was dedicated solely to the net neutrality issue. The 
Congressional record shows that when the Bill was later debated in the 
Senate on June 28, 2006 net neutrality again dominated the speeches 
almost to the exclusion of any other communications issues addressed 
by the bill. These hearings and debates form a substantial part of the 
empirical material for the network neutrality case study. 
Network neutrality has become a highly contested political issue over 
the past 8-10 years and is now understood to have the potential for 
comprehensive and long·lasting effects on America's Internet 
experience and infrastructure. Perceptions held by American 
politicians about how these issues should best be managed in order to 
enhance US power are driven and divided by competing conceptions of 
'freedom' on the Internet, the role of innovation in promoting and 
sustaining state power and the legitimacy of governmental 
intervention in the way the Internet is used and managed. 
The Obama Administration 
In 2009, Barack Obama was inaugurated as the 44th President of the 
United States. His campaign had positioned him as much more in 
touch with modern communications technology than his predecessor. 
He refused to give up his Blackberry maintaining that he could not 
function personally or professionally without an Internet connection. 
Chapter Three Political History of the Internet 
He had also run a very successful social networking fund-raiser during 
his campaign which not only raised money but also raised his profile as 
a politician who understood the Internet and would be able to provide 
some leadership on the complex problems the state faced. 
Over the preceding few years, a series of intense cyber attacks had 
emanated from China. In 2003, an incident referred to by the Pentagon 
as 'Titan Rain' came to light. Over a matter of months, attacks which 
appeared to originate from southern China accessed and extracted a 
huge amount of valuable and sometimes classified information from 
Defense computers. 216 In addition, a number of states including 
Germany, India, the UK and South Korea publicly denounced China 
for either aiding or abetting cyber attacks upon their state functions.217 
The role of the Internet in US strategic competition with China 
featured in a 2008 report for the incoming 44th President which stated 
2ia Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Titan Rain - How Chinese Hackers Targeted Whitehall', 
The Guardian, September 5, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.co. uk/technology/20071 sep/04/news.internet, Brian M. Mazanec, 
'The Art of (Cyber) War', The Journal of International Security Affairs, No.16, Spring 
2009. 
217 Kate Connolly, 'Germany accuses China of industrial espionage', The Guardian, 
July 22, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uklworld/2009/jul/22/germany·china-
inclustrial-espionage, Dave Leppard, 'China Bugs and Burgles Britain', The Sunday 
Times, January 31, 2010, 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tollnews/uk/crime/article7009749.ece, Liam Tung, 
'China Accused of Cyberattacks on New Zealand', CNet News, September 13, 2007, 
http ://news.cnet.com/Chi na-aQ.cused -of-cyberattacks-on-N ew-Zealand/2100-7 848 3-
6207678. html. Also LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, 
CuiTent and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, 
prepared statement at a hearing before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 
March 10, 2009, pg.60. 
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that "America's failure to protect cyberspace is one of the most urgent 
national security problems facing the new administration."21s 
Within months of taking office, Obama called fo1· a 90 day review of 
cyber security issues. In May 2009, the outcome of that study was 
published as the CybeTspace Policy Review. It argued that "the 
continued exploitation of information networks and the compromise of 
sensitive data, especially by nations, leave the United States 
vulnerable to the loss of economic competitiveness and the loss of the 
militaiy's technological advantages." 219 In contrast to the Bush 
administration which had strategically focussed on the Internet 
primarily as a source of domestic vulnerability due to the reliance upon 
it of critical infrastructure, the Obama administration made an explicit 
link between cyber security, the economy and American hard power. 
In the 2010 1Vational Secunly StTategy, President Obama declared 
cyberspace a 'strategic national asset' - essentially acknowledging 
unequivocally that although the Internet has been an engine of 
economic growth and innovation, US power can also be undermined by 
the Internet. President Obama argues in the 2010 National Sec11Tity 
StTategy that America must "enhance our resilience - the ability to 
adapt to changing conditions and prepare for, withstand, and rapidly 
recover from disruption" brought about by a cyber attack. 220 Even 
21S James Lewis, Securing Cyberspace for tbe 44th Presidency, Commission on 
Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, December 2008), pg.lL 
zrn Melissa Hathaway, C;ybe1'Spaee Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient 
information and Communications infrastructure, (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, May 2009), pg. L 
220 President Barack Obama, United States National Securit;y Strategy, (Washington 
D.C.: The White House, 2010), pg.18. 
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more explicitly, he argues that "Our prosperity serves as a wellspring 
for our power. It pays for our military, underwrites our diplomacy and 
development efforts, and serves as a leading source of our influence in 
the world." 221 Finally, cybersecurity is linked to global leadership: "the 
United States - the nation that invented the Internet, that launched 
an information revolution, that transformed the world - will do what 
we did in the 20th century and lead once more in the 21st." 222 
In addition to President Obama's vision for the relationship between 
US power and the Internet, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton also 
introduced some innovative new policy. '21 8' Century Statecraft' is 
Clinton's interpretation of the manner in which US power should be 
exercised abroad and understood at home.223 This doctrine articulates 
a new view of US power which is closely integrated with Internet 
technology. Clinton's speeches and policy documents are framed in 
Social Constructivist terms which express both the authority and 
responsibility of the US government to shape Internet technology in 
such a way as to promote this new view of power. 
The emphasis of 21'' Century Statecraft is on 'people to people' 
diplomacy in recognition of the view that diplomatic outcomes are no 
longer defined solely by what elites prefer but also by what the general 
population strives for. A key element of this approach is the 
understanding that the wider population can be motivated or 
221 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, pg.9. 
222 President Barack Obama, 'Remarks by the President On Securing Our Nation's 
Cyber Infrastructure', Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, May 29, 2009, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ruess office/Remarks·hy-the·Presidentcon·Securing-
Q.llJ::N;i_tjgns·J,cyberJD.ITll.§JJ:!!CtJJT&l. 
223 Hillary Clinton, '21'' Century Statecraft', State Department web site, 
http ://www.state.gov/statecraft/index.h tm 
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stimulated to force change at an elite level and this is linked to the 
projection of US powe1'. Clinton has argued that "to advance American 
interests and values and to lead other nations in solving shared 
problems in the 21st century, we must rely on our diplomats and civilian 
experts as the first face of American power". 224 This is referred to by the 
State Department as 'civilian power' and it forms the bedrock of 2l8t 
Century Statecraft. 
21" Century Statecraft is promoted as a response to the information 
age. In a speech at the Newseum in January, 2010, Clinton argued 
that the spread of information networks is "forming a new nervous 
system for our planet".225 21•t Century Statecraft, she argues, is the US 
response to this 'nervous system' in which traditional foreign policy 
t-0ols can be complemented "with newly innovated and adapted 
instruments of statecraft that fully leverage the networks, technologies, 
and demographics of our interconnected world."226 
A fundamental element of 21st Century Statecraft is 1nternet freedom' 
which is the protection of human rights online - specifically freedom of 
information and freedom of expression. Discussing this in a speech at 
the Newseum in January 2010, Clinton acknowledged 'the great irony' 
of the information age which President Obama had articulated. After 
extolling the many advantages which Internet freedom offers to the 
projection of US power, Clinton also remarks that "these technologies 
224 Hilla1-y Clinton, The Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review: Leading 
Through Civilian Power, (Washington, D.c.: The State Department, 2010), 
http://www.stat.e.gov.lii=nentslorganizationll53142.pdf. 
225 Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', The Newseum, Washington, D.C,, 
,January 21, 2010. 
''
6 Hillary Clinton, '21" Century Statecraft', State Department web site, 
http :/lwww .state.gov/statecraft/index. htm 
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are not an unmitigated blessing". 221 She goes on to observe that the 
same technologies which promote human rights also allow al Qaeda to 
operate globally. 
In November 2010, Internet freedom faced a major challenge that 
highlighted its highly normative and value-based footings. The 
Wikileaks website began to release some of the hundreds of thousands 
of classified diplomatic cables which had been stolen from an 
unsecured computer in a military camp in Iraq. Clinton's response to 
this was unequivocal. She argued that the leak was not only an attack 
on America's foreign policy interests but also "an attack on the 
international community - the alliances and partnerships, the 
conversations and negotiations that safeguard global security and 
advance economic prosperity."228 When challenged over how she could 
reconcile this with the US stance on Internet freedom, Clinton argued 
that freedom of information did not include stolen information. 
Essentially, Internet freedom is a view which maintains that freedom 
to information is only appropriate for those with similarly aligned 
normative ideas about how it should be used. With 21st Century 
Statecraft, the Obama-Clinton administration appears to be ushering 
in a new era of US determination to shape the global Internet 
environment in such a way as to best protect and promote US power. 
221 Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', January 21, 2010. 
22s Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks to the Press on the Release of Confidential Documents', 
Press Release, November 29, 2010, State Department web site, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/ rm/2010111115207 8.h tm. 
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Chapter Four: Cyber Security 
In May 2009, President Obama declared cyber security to be "one of the 
most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a 
nation."229 One of his first acts in office was to call for a national cyber 
security review in order to assess how the US had arrived at a point of 
such vulnerability and what could be done to address this problem. 
President Obama concluded from the findings of the review that it was 
"clear that we're not as prepared as we should be, as a government or 
as a country." 230 The following year, in his first National Security 
Strategy, the President nominated the digital infrastructure "a 
strategic national asset" and argued that protecting it was now a 
national security priority.2s1 
The information age 'power paradox' discussed in the Introduction to 
this thesis is particularly stark in the context of debates about cyber 
security. Those states which have most successfully adopted and 
exploited the opportunities afforded by the Internet are also most 
vulnerable to the range of threats which accompany it.232 President 
Obama acknowledged this in 2009 when he referred to "the great irony 
220 President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
230 Ibid. 
231 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy pg.27. 
"'This is distinct from the 'security dilemma'. The security dilemma suggests that if 
states acquire a surfeit of military capabilities, their peers will be compelled to follow 
suit. In this paradox, the states which have most comprehensively engaged with 
Internet technology do not prompt their peers to do so - although the economic 
benefits may attract them. Rather, those states which have not been able to develop 
Internet technology have also not become dependent upon an insecure system. This is 
the paradox. If the Internet suffered a major disruption, it might have almost no 
impact on many third world states whereas it would have major consequences for the 
us. 
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of our Information Age - the very technologies that empower us to 
create and to build also empower those who would disrupt and 
destroy. And this paradox - seen and unseen - is something that we 
experience every day." 233 President Clinton had made clear the 
relationship between emerging cyber threats and US power eleven 
years earlier in his Presidential Decision Directive-63where he argued 
that "[t]he United States possesses both the world's strongest military 
and its largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are 
mutually reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant 
upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information 
systems."234 
How can a state with so many resources and capabilities, which has 
been so attuned to the threat of cyber insecurity for so long, and which 
has a long history of deriving power from technology remain so exposed 
to these threats? How is it that the US has been unable to overcome 
the 'paradox of power' in the information age? The argument running 
through this thesis is that an analysis of the way conceptions of power 
influence and shape technology can provide insight into puzzles such 
as this one. This case study produces some surprising findings which 
go some way to answering these questions. 
Security and power is not, of course, the same thing. Indeed, this is a 
key debate in International Relations literature, particularly amongst 
Realist scholars. Some Realists (Hans Morgenthau and John 
233 President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
234 President William J. Clinton, The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection: Presidential Decision Directive 63, (Washington, D.C.: The 
White House, May 22, 1998), pg.1. 
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lVfearsheimer) regard states as power-maximising.235 States seek power, 
they argue, because it is the most reliable means to ensure survival. 
Other Realists like Kenneth Vv altz invert this assumption and argue 
that states are actually security·maximising.236 In this view, power is 
simply a means to an end - it is useful for ensuring security but 
security remains the primary goal of states. The distinction raises 
questions about whether power should be regarded as absolute or 
relative. Do states seek power absolutely or do they seek to acquire just 
enough relative to other states in order to ensure their own security? 
In the following analysis, the concerns expressed by politicians lean 
toward the latter view. Cyber security is opening up a new field of 
global conflict - one on which the US does not retain the same relative 
power that it has had in terms of military capacity. Some small actors 
including terrorist groups and less developed states which were 
previously regarded as possessing little power, become relatively 
powerful in cyber space. Absolute power in this context seems to have 
less meaning than it did in the more straightforward context of 
industrial technology. The US is already regarded as in possession of 
an unprecedented proportion of power and yet, it appears that it is not 
sufficient to ensure security in this realm. Either small actors are 
disproportionately powerful in cyberspace, or a security-maximising 
view has more currency here than a power-maximising view. In fact, 
this chapter reveals that politicians do pursue a security maximising 
approach to state survival in cyber space but perhaps surprisingly, 
235 Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace and 
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Polities. 
236 Waltz, Theory of International Politics. 
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they do so through the pursuit of social power rather than material 
power. 
The conceptual approach employed here rejects the notion that the 
technology itself determines such outcomes. While it is true that 
important Internet protocols were developed with little consideration 
for security, this is only a partial explanation for the persistence of 
cyber insecurity in the US. The Social Construction of Technology 
reminds us that although technology does impact on society, society in 
turn shapes and influences the development of technology. So why 
have US politicians not been more effective in formulating solutions to 
a problem they have regarded as so pressing? 
US politicians have been aware of cyber security as a national 
vulnerability almost since the Internet's inception though it took on 
added significance following the commercialisation of the Internet in 
the mid 1990s. Cyber security has been the subject of numerous 
Congressional hearings, reports, legislative action, Presidential 
directives and debates, many of which were detailed in Chapter 
Three.237 As early as 1995, the General Accounting Office reported to 
Congress that ensuring security on the 'information superhighway' (as 
the Internet was then referred to) would pose a major challenge in the 
future.238 The following year, the same office issued a report on the 
rising threat of attacks pointing to the rapidly increasing number of 
people with access to the Internet as a source of elevated exposure for 
237 These will feature throughout this chapter and are therefore not detailed here. 
238 Joel C. Willemssen, 'Information Superhighway: An Overview of Technology 
Challenges', (Washington, D.C.: US General Accounting Office, January 1995), pp.18· 
23. 
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the Department of Defense systems.239 It also found that this exposure 
posed a "serious threat to national security" as it allowed strategic 
competitors with less conventional material power to gain an 
advantage at a low cost.240 The report predicted that "this will become 
an increasingly attractive way for terrorists or adversaries to wage 
attacks". 211 
Fifteen years later, these projections remain salient if not even more 
pressing. President Bush pointed out in 2003 that "the healthy 
functioning of cyberspace is essential to our economy and our national 
security". 212 The Internet has opened a door for a new wave of criminal 
behavior, anonymous state belligerence, terrorist attacks, and 
significant economic expense. Control of critical infrastructure, the 
banking system and stock exchange, trade and commerce, 
communications, access to essential information - all of these functions 
and many more are now conducted using systems connected to the 
Internet and consequently, exposed to risk of attack The advantages of 
efficiency and enhanced productivity which Internet connectivity 
affords have to be weighed against the increased security risks. 
Melissa Hathaway, the Obama administration's cyber security advisor 
recently observed that "during the last decade and a half the United 
States has been seduced by phenomenal business and economic growth 
enabled by the effectiveness and efficiency of high performance global 
z39 At this stage, there were 40 million people accessing the Internet. By ,June 2010, 
there were 6.8 billion. See Internet World Stats, 
http://www.Jnternetv;.rorldstats.con1/stats.ht1n. 
240 Jack L. Brock, 'Information Security: Computer Attacks at Department of Defense 
Pose Increasing Risks', (Washington D.C.: US General Accounting Office, llfay 1996), 
pg.4. 
241 Brock, 'Information Security', pg.4. 
242 President George W. Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.1. 
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networked environments."243 President Obama has acknowledged that 
"we've failed to invest in the security of our digital infrastructure"244 
and cyber security has been referred to as the "soft underbelly" of 
America by Representative Daniel Lundgren, Chairman of the 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology.245 
This chapter reveals that politicians engage with two different 
conceptions of power in the context of cyber security debates. When 
articulating how cyber insecurity poses a problem for US power, they 
employ a material view of power which references the impact of the 
Internet on the economy, the likely outcome of global conflict and 
geopolitics. In a sense, this reflects conventional approaches to security 
and power - an old recipe with the added ingredient of Internet 
technology. 
The solution to these problems has been almost exclusively regarded as 
grounded in the 'public/private partnership'. This is a normative 
arrangement (as opposed to an institutionalised or formalised 
agreement) whereby politicians expect the private sector to lead the 
way in cyber security technology and practice in order to protect this 
important aspect of state power. This resonates with an Instrumental 
view of technology which looks for the solution to technological 
problems in technology itself and relies on market forces to produce 
them. An analysis of this arrangement reveals that despite the 
m Melissa E. Hathaway, 'Strategic Advantage: vVhy America Should Care about 
Cybersecurity', Diseussion Paper, (Cambridge: Belfer Center for Science and 
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, 2-009), pg.13. 
244 President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
245 Representative Daniel Lundgren, SCADA Systems and the 'l'errorist Threat: 
Protecting the Nations Critical Control Systems, hearing on October 18, 2005, pg.50. 
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importance of cyber security for US material power, politicians believe 
that they lack both the capability and authority to more proactively 
shape technology in this regard. 
This chapter also reveals that politicians regard cyber security in 
terms of the way it relates to social factors of power. Here they 
emphasise the importance of promoting norms and values such as 
privacy, freedom of speech and access to information - both 
domestically and internationally. Politicians argue in these debates 
that adherence to these 'universal' values has been a fundamental 
source of US power in the past and will continue to be in the future. In 
contrast to the material conception of power which is combined with an 
Instrumentalist approach to technology, this social conception of power 
is accompanied by a Social Constructivist approach to technology. This 
approach lends agency and authority to politicians allowing them to 
assume responsibility for the direction of the technology. In this view, 
politicians regard themselves (and the society they represent) as 
empowered and enabled to shape and influence cyber security in such a 
way that it reflects the ideas, norms and values which they regard as 
most important to US power. 
It is this second conception of power which has most significantly 
shaped cyber security technology in the US. Indeed, the policies which 
emerge from this conception effectively undermine the earlier, material 
conception of power and Internet technology. While there have been 
attempts by politicians to reconcile the two approaches, they are 
fundamentally at odds and this has really only been acknowledged 
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recently by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who suggests that at best, 
the US must aim for a balance between material and social factors. 246 
There are a number of arguments which emerge from these findings. 
The first has implications for how we approach the 'paradox of power' 
in the information age. This chapter finds that although politicians 
demonstrate an acute awareness of the threats which cyber insecurity 
poses to US material power, they have been unwilling to undermine 
those social factors of power which they believe have been fundamental 
to the state's success. This analysis finds that politicians consider both 
material and social factors of power in the context of cyber insecurity 
and that they privilege those which they regard as most likely to 
sustain US power in the future - and these are social. Cyber insecurity 
is to some degree then, the consequence of conscious choice - or at least, 
a reasoned calculation. 
The second argument is that the approach to technology with which 
politicians engage has implications for the degree to which conceptions 
of power influence decisions about technology. In the context of framing 
the problem of cyber insecurity - in which politicians adopt a material 
view of power and an Instrumental approach to technology -
Instrumentalism has two concurrent effects on the way these 
politicians regard their role and agency. It both absolves them of 
responsibility and it diminishes their authority. If technology develops 
naturally along the 'best' path, then we must adapt to it, rather than 
246 Her views will be elaborated on in the chapter but see this speech for a specific 
reference to this point. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Internet Rights 
and Wrongs: Choices & Challenges in a Networked World', remarks delivered at 
George Washington University, Washington, DC on February 15, 2011, 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/20111021156619. htm. 
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seek to change or reinterpret it. This approach to technology is 
reflected in the stasis of cyber security debates which have been unable 
to envisage a more proactive path to ameliorate the threats of cyber 
insecurity to US material power. 
In contrast, when politicians decide on cyber security policy, they do so 
through a social power framework and a Social Constructivist 
approach to technology. They openly discuss the technology as 
reflecting and projecting American values. Here they perceive it as 
their responsibility to ensure that Internet technology continues to 
develop in such a way as to protect and project those values. This 
approach to technology imbues politicians with authority as they 
regard it as both possible and necessary that the technology develops 
in such a way as to continue to reinforce the norms and values which 
they believe best promote US power. 
This second argument is particularly important as it will re-emerge in 
each of the case studies and contributes to the conclusion of the thesis. 
In each case, the way in which politicians approach technology has 
implications for the degree to which their conceptions of power shape 
and influence the technology - more specifically, it has implications for 
how they perceive their autho1ity to make decisions which shape 
technology. This was an unexpected finding for this study and it is not 
possible to draw a clear conclusion from this research about the exact 
nature of the causal relationship between approaches to technology, 
conceptions of power and authority. That is, it is not clear whether 
politicians adopt a particular approach to technology based on their 
perception of their authority to act or whether their approach to 
technology causes them to perceive their authority in a certain way. In 
other words, do politicians feel disempowered to take certain policy 
decisions and so adopt a Determinist or Instrumental approach to 
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technology? Or does their Social Constructivist approach to technology 
lead to a sense of authority? A separate study would be required to 
determine the exact nature of the causal relationship here but this 
study finds that there exists a relationship between these factors. 
The chapter begins with a technical brief - as does every case study in 
this thesis. This section is designed to introduce some of the key 
technological factors which influence the issues under examination. In 
this case study, the technical brief explains why networked computers 
are insecure and how the Internet complicates conventional security 
measures. In addition, this section will provide a brief explanation of 
how America came to be so reliant upon an uninterrupted flow of 
traffic over the Internet. This entails a brief discussion of the business 
practices and government policies promoting the privatisation of public 
infrastructure which have increased national vulnerability to cyber 
threats. Finally, this section will provide some background on what 
exactly a 'cyber attack' might entail. 
The chapter moves on to an analysis of how US politicians perceive 
cyber security as linked to power in the context of international 
relations. This section draws upon both International Relations 
theories of power and concepts from the Philosophy of Technology in 
order to engage with how politicians regard the 'problem' of cyber 
insecurity. It reveals that politicians debate these issues 
predominantly within a material power discourse which focuses on 
power as capabilities. They regard three key factors as the loci of cyber 
security vulnerabilities. First, they consider the impact on the economy 
- not only the potential for economic loss (which is substantial) but the 
broader implications of this for financing conventional military hard 
power. Second, politicians regard cyber security as linked to US power 
through the potential for the Internet to be deployed as a 'weapon' by a 
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wide range of actors from terrorists to strategic competitors like China. 
Finally, politicians express concerns about how cyber security can 
undermine other factors of material power like geopolitics and how all 
of the above factors are perceived to impact on national security. 
This is followed by an analysis of the ways in which politicians have 
sought to address material problems of cyber insecurity. As noted 
above, the most significant policy solution has been the 'public/private 
partnership' which has been referred to as the 'cornerstone' of US cyber 
security policy by successive US presidents. Its endurance as a policy 
approach and its relevance make the public/private partnership an 
excellent mechanism through which to access the conceptions of power 
which shape the technology. 
The final section of this chapter looks at the social conception of power 
which politicians express through cyber security debates. In this view, 
politicians seek to adhere to values and norms which they believe have 
formed the foundation of American success in the past and will again 
in the future. In his first National Security Strategy, President Obama 
argued that "if we compromise our values in pursuit of security, we will 
undermine both; if we fortify them, we will sustain a key source of our 
strength and leadership in the world--0ne that sets us apart from oux 
enemies and our potential competitors."247 This conception of power 
links cyber security to foreign policy on human rights. Increasingly, 
access to the Internet is being defined by international institutions, as 
well as many governments, as a 'basic human right' and this has 
implications for how politicians view anonymity and censorship - two 
247 President Barack Obama, United States National Security Strategy, (Washington, 
D.C.: The White House, May 2010), pg.10. 
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elements of cyber security. The social conception of power also engages 
with some of these same issues but in a domestic context. Here, 
politicians debate the role of civil rights in cyber security policy with 
reference to values of privacy, individual rights and freedom of 
information. This view of US power as emerging from norms and 
values provides a framework for the social power conception. 
The conclusion of this chapter summarises the findings referenced in 
previous pages about how competing conceptions of power have 
influenced the development of the Internet in the context of cyber 
security. It also draws out the implications of these findings for 
understanding the relationship between power and new technology in 
the information age. It is evident in this case study that there exists a 
schism between how politicians regard cyber security as related to US 
power (in material terms) and how they seek to influence it (through a 
social power framework). Ultimately, it is the determination of 
politicians to adhere to ideas, norms and values which most profoundly 
impacts on cyber security technology. 
Cyber Security: Technology and Concepts 
Cyber security is a broad and indiscriminate term. It is used 
interchangeably to refer to both the security of the Internet 
infrastructure and security from attacks over the Internet. From a 
'technology as artefact' approach (discussed in more detail in Chapter 
Two), cyber security might refer to the protection or vulnerability of 
the root server machines which contain the Domain Name System (see 
Chapter Five on Internet Governance). It might refer to the cabling 
and wires through which individual computers connect to the Internet 
or the submarine cables which connect one continent to another. US 
politicians do regard this physical infrastructure as a factor in cyber 
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security. Over the course of the 2000s, as American reliance on the 
smooth functioning of the Internet increased, political concepts of 
'critical infrastructure protection' (CIP) which used to refer to factors 
like the electricity grid, expanded to incorporate info1·matio11. Thus, 
'critical information infrastructure protection' (CIIP) steadily gained 
traction as a policy issue and a cyber security concern. 248 
An alternative definition of technology is one which incorporates how 
individuals or social groups interact with and use the physical artefact. 
What we do with the artefact is, in this definition, a constitutive 
element of technology. In this approach, cyber security is not only the 
protection of 'critical information infrastructure', but also encompasses 
the practice of launching attacks over the Internet. These attacks 
might be carried out on critical information infrastructure, they might 
be targeted at completely unrelated critical infrastructure which 
happens to be connected to the Internet, or they might be attacks on 
systems which run over the Internet like banking and 
communications.249 This definition of cyber security encompasses the 
physical artefact, the virtual artefacts like software and web protocols, 
but also human engagement with all of these as well as the practices 
which result. 
US politicians adopt a holistic approach to cyber security in the context 
of US power. During Congressional debates about cyber security, the 
issues range from the physical security of US and global Internet 
infrastructure to the wide spectrum of practices which politicians 
21s An early example can be found in 'Information Technology' in Jl;faking the Nation 
Safe1; pg.1S5. 
249 There are many other elements to this view of cyber security but this thesis 
retains a focus on those which are of primary concern for US politicians. 
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regard as a threat to US power. These include criminal behaviour 
which undermines US economic power or the state's power to enforce 
the law. They also include terrorist threats and threats from other 
states either directly on the Internet or over the Internet. As this study 
is concerned with how conceptions of US power influence the 
development of Internet technology, it is these perceptions held by US 
politicians which are essential to the interpretation of the material and 
for this reason, a broad definition of cyber security is necessarily 
employed here. 
Technical Brief 
Prior to the development of the Internet, cyber security was an issue 
but on an infinitely smaller scale. Stand alone computer systems were 
always vulnerable to damage and intrusion - malicious or otherwise 
but prior to networking, one had to be physically in front of a computer 
in order to interact with it. As detailed in Chapter Three, the 
technology to connect one computer to another developed in the 1960s 
and over the ensuing decades became rapidly integrated into the 
commercial sector. With computers networked together, it was no 
longer necessary to carry a device like a floppy disk from one machine 
to another in order to share (or steal) data - files could simply be 
transferred across the network. These computer networks were 
typically confined to an organisation or institution. Although security 
breaches were more problematic as a consequence of remote access, 
these were closed networks with access restricted to authorised 
personnel only and activity monitored by a system administrator who 
worked for that organisation. Therefore, while security breaches 
occurred more easily over these networks than they had on stand· alone 
machines, there was a limited pool of people who had access and 
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consequently, the attribution of theft or damage was much easier than 
it is now. 
The introduction of the Internet amplified network security problems 
exponentially. One of the key principles of the Internet is that it is 
built upon an open architecture. This means that the software 
protocols upon which it was c,onstructed were intentionally designed so 
that anyone could contribute and 'innovate without permission'. Unlike 
more conventional software platforms, nobody 'owns' the Internet code 
or can prevent individuals or groups from pursuing innovative 
solutions to perceived needs or problems. This openness is at once a 
strength and a point of vulnerability for the Internet. The same 
architecture which allowed Larry Page and Sergey Brin to develop and 
give away the Google search engine transforming the way we access 
information, also permits the theft of data, the sabotage of systems and 
the exchange of illegal goods and services · and all with a high degree 
of anonymity. Security was a low priority during the early development 
years and it has been technologically difficult to reverse engineer more 
secure features into Internet and web protocols. 
Connecting systems to the Internet which were previously isolated or 
maintained on closed networks has meant that unauthorised access is 
infinitely easier. Once a security vulnerability is identified in the 
coding of a software program or operating system Oike Microsoft 
Windows, for example), it can be exploited remotely on hundreds, 
thousands or even millions of machines. 
A range of malicious software or 'malware' has evolved over the life of 
the Internet. Viruses may be the most widely understood. These are 
essentially small software programs written intentionally to penetrate 
a system and cause it to malfunction in some way. They are often 
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written to be self-replicating and travel quickly through mechanisms 
like email attachments and address books. A Trojan Horse is a 
particular type of malware which appears benign and is embedded in a 
system providing cover for a future attack. It can be a way of re· 
entering a system or it can contain malware which will be activated at 
a later date. Robot networks or 'botnets' are a more recent development 
which install a piece of coding on individual computers which allows 
them to be co·opted into illicit activity which requires a large number 
of machines. These were used in the attacks on the Estonian 
infrastructure in 2007 which involved millions of computers around the 
world which simultaneously requested information from those critical 
sites. Most of the owners of machines which are part of a botnet have 
no knowledge that they are contributing to this criminal activity. 
Cyber Insecurity as a Problem for US Power 
These technical security vulnerabilities are compounded by the 
problems of attribution and this will be more fully developed as the 
chapter progresses. It has always been (and remains) very difficult to 
track movements over the Internet. The sheer volume of traffic means 
that keeping data logs is simply not feasible unless they are very 
narrowly defined. Also, information travels across the Internet in 
unpredictable ways - constantly searching out the fastest route. When 
an attack takes place over the Internet, the perpetrator (with any 
sophistication) will hop from location to location and because these 
hops are very quickly covered up, the origin of the attack becomes very 
difficult to determine. A report to Congress explained that difficulties 
of attribution mean that "a terrorist group could possibly be set up by 
others to appear as the guilty cyber attacker in order to draw attention 
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away from the actual attacker who may be located elsewhere."250 Thus, 
with limited capability to identify who is responsible for illegal 
behaviour, state controlled mechanisms such as deterrence, retaliation 
and punishment prove less effective. The problem of attribution 
produces a number of 'knock·on' implications for cyber security policy 
and practice which also feed into the political calculations discussed in 
this chapter. One of these is the legal implications of responding to 
attacks. 
Conventions of a legal system rely upon punishment acting as a 
deterrent to undesirable behaviour and this framework is seriously 
undermined by the inability of law enforcement to identify 
perpetrators. Responding to aggression with reciprocal force over the 
Internet is therefore problematic for law enforcement pursuing cyber 
criminals - both those committing conventional crimes but using the 
Internet to do so and also those who commit Internet related crime. It 
also has implications for global conflict and international relations. 
First, as explained above, tracing data movements over the Internet is 
extremely time sensitive. It requires a rapid response and the 
immediate cooperation of authorities in the host country or countries -
not always possible across borders without an aligned legal framework. 
A Congressional report concluded that the US Department of Defense 
believes that it lacks "sufficient policy and legal analysis for guiding 
appropriate responses to intrusions or attacks on DOD networks."251 
200 Clay Wilson, 'Computer Attack and Cyber Terrorism: Vulnerabilities and Policy 
Issues for Congress', (Washington, D.C,: Congressional Research Service, October 17, 
2003), pg.15. 
251 The US Department of Defense has recommended that a legal review be conducted 
to determine what level of data manipulation constitutes an attack. Wilson, 
'Information Operations and Cyberwar', pg,5, 
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Under international law, the determination of what constitutes the use 
of force in the context of a cyberattack remains unclear - one of the 
key problems highlighted by the attacks on Estonia in 2007.252 In this 
case, although NATO conceded that Estonia was suffering a cyber 
attack, the NATO charter lacked sufficient clarity to permit collective 
action.253 
In addition to these difficulties associated with attribution, the fact 
that so much civilian infrastructure relies upon the Internet generates 
concerns about the potential for reciprocal military action to have 
unintended civilian consequences. For example, if a state launched a 
cyber attack which interrupted Internet access in another state, they 
may successfully repel an ongoing attack but they may also 
inadvertently interfere with civilian systems such as transport or 
energy which could potentially lead to a loss of life. The Congressional 
report referenced above goes as far as to speculate that reciprocating 
against an attack may lead to "possible accusations of war crimes if 
252 For a summary of these issues, see Grove et al, 'Cyber-attacks and International 
Law', pp.89-103. 
253 Article Vofthe NATO treaty - the tripwire for collective defense - does not define 
cyber-attacks as military action. Ian Traynor, 'Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar 
to disable Estonia', The Guardian, May 17, 2007, 
http://www.guardian.eo.uk/russia/m:ticle/0,,2081438,00.html. For more on this issue, 
see Anne Applebaum, 'For Estonia and NATO, A New Kind of War', The Washington 
Post, May 22, 2007, pg.A15, http://www.washingt.onpost.com/wp-
dvn/content/article/2007 /05/2llAR2007052l01'136.html. Also, 'Estonia urges firm EU, 
NATO response to new form of warfare: cyber-attacks', The Sydney Morning Herald, 
May 16, 2007, http://www.smh.eom.au/news/Technology/F~st.onia·urfills-firm·EU-. 
NAT.Q.·re§QOQ§t·to.:ntw·f\:JEm ·of-wJJ.1:farni:.Yl>J?.rntt.~i;ks(]Q_Q7 /Q§ll §./J17.i\ll_(!Q.:f.J)J 4 HJ;i_Lm1 
and 'Estonia hit by Moscow cyber war', BBC News, May 17, 2007, 
http:/ I news. bbc.co. uk/2/h i/europe/6665145, strn. 
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offensive military cyber-weapons severely disrupt cl'itical civilian 
computer systems, or the systems of other non-combatant nations."254 
These legal impediments to addressing cyber security vulnerabilities -
both in a civilian and military context - amplify the challenges to US 
power by limiting the range of responses. These mechanisms of law 
enforcement, punishment and deterrence are constrained for states 
which adhere to this juridical framework nationally and 
internationally. 
What is a Cyber Attack? 
In September 2010, it was widely reported that a worm known as 
'Stuxnet' had damaged an Iranian nuclear centl'ifuge. 255 There was 
speculation that the level of sophistication indicated nation state 
involvement in the development and deployment of Stuxnet. If so, this 
would be an example of the type of cyber attack about which US 
politicians have been concerned for the past 15 years.256 As discussed 
in Chapter Three, an attack on critical systems connected to the 
Internet or vulnerable to malware spread through the Internet is a 
dominant theme in debates about US power and cyber security. Why 
and how this emerged as a cyber attack scenario can be explained 
254 Wilson, 'Information Operations and Cyberwar', pg. l. 
255 Peter Beaumont, 'Stuxnet worm heralds new era of global cyberwar', The 
Guardian, September 30, 2010, 
http://www.gua.rdian.co.11J;Jtechnologv/2010/sep1301stuxnet·worm·new·era·global: 
cyberwar, Larry Seltzer, 'Who's Behind Stuxnet? The Americans? The Israelis?', 
Security Watch blog, PC Magazine, September 26, 2010, 
http://blogs.pcmag:.comlsecuritvwatchl2010/09iwhos behind stuxnet the americ.php. 
256 Although it has not been proven, there has been fairly widespread speculation that 
the attack was the result of American/Israeli collaboration. See the articles in the 
previous footnote. 
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through the widespread privatisation of critical infrastructure and the 
concurrent adoption of Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition' 
systems (SCADA systems). 
An attack on critical infrastructure remams one of the dominant 
themes of debates about cyber insecurity in the US. As explained in 
Chapter Three, from the late 1990s, the security problems outlined 
above were compounded by the connection of SCADA systems to the 
Internet. 257 One no longer needed physical access to the facility m 
order to tamper with the computerised control systems. As long as 
network security remained a problem, intruders would theoretically be 
able to carry out attacks on computer systems from remote corners of 
the globe. In a Congressional hearing into SCADA vulnerabilities, 
Representative Bill Pascal stated that "we know that vulnerabilities 
within these systems are abundant, and we know that the threat of a 
terrorist attack against these systems is real".258 Over the course of the 
past five years, this type of attack has emerged not only as a terrorist 
threat but also in the context of state to state conflict as was 
257 One source boasts a 100 percent success rate in penetrating and infiltrating 
SCADA systems. Joshua Green, 'The Myth of Cyherterrorism: There are many ways 
terrorists can kill you--computers aren't one of them', Washington Monthly, 
November 2002, http://www.washingtonmonthly.com}features/2001/021 I.green.html . 
Another source reveals that penetrating a SCADA system which is running a 
Microsoft operating system takes less than two minutes. Hacker interview, Cyher 
War!, PBS Frontline television program aired on 24 April, 2003. Written and directed 
by Michael Kirk, 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/hacker.html. 
More recent examples include Jeremy Kirk, 'SCADA Vulnerabilities Prompt US 
Government Warning', PCWorld, Mar 24, 2011, 
http:/ h:vwvv. pc\vorld.co1n/businesscenter/ article/22297 6/scada vulnerabilities pro1n.p t 
us government warnil)g.btml, and Kim Zetter, 'Attack Code for SCADA 
Vulnerabilities Released Online', Wired, March 22, 2011, 
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/08/scadt;\ -vulnerabilities/. 
258 Representative Bill Pascrell, prepared statement at SCADA Systems and the 
Terrorist Threat: Protecting the Nation's Critical Control Systems, hearing on 
October 18, 2005, pg.3. 
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demonstrated in Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008. This type of 
attack which targets critical infrastructure is referred to colloquially as 
a 'Die Hard 4' attack or a 'Firesale' attack - after the Hollywood film 
which is based on such a threat scenario.259 
Although this scenarrn still garners significant attention in political 
debates about US cybersecurity, a new threat concept has recently 
been gaining momentum - the notion that America is already under 
attack and has been for some time. This scenario is based on a 
conception of the economy as a target. The assertion that cyber war 
may not follow the 'Die Hard 4' script but rather may entail a war of 
attrition through economic espionage has been asserted by James 
Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).260 
Lewis has pointed out that America reportedly loses $1 trillion per 
year in systematic intellectual property and data theft.2s1 Accurately 
identifying those behind these thefts is extremely problematic but 
allegations of steady infiltrations from American strategic competitors 
Russia and China have fuelled concerns about cyber attacks which do 
not fit the preconceived pattern of overt disruption and destruction of 
services, property and ultimately, lives.262 While it is not clear that this 
259 Some credit this early article with first articulating such an attack. John Carlin, 
'A Farewell to Arms', Wired, May 1997, 
P,ttp :/i\V\VW. \Vired.com/\virediarchivej5, 05/netizen.htn1L 
2Go James Lewis, testimony at Cybersecurity: Next Steps to Protect Critical 
Infrastructure, hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science and 
Transportation, US Senate, February 23, 2010, pp.12·17. 
2s1 This projection is based on a survey by Purdue's Center for Education and 
Research in Information Assurance and Security. Nick Akerman et al, 'Unsecured 
gconomies: Protecting Vital Information', (Santa Clara: McAfee, January 2009), 
http://rJl_sourM§.mcafee.comlmntentlKAU.n.secnredEcon\1miesReport. 
262 For China, see some of tbe following examples. Josh Rogin, 'China's expansion of 
economic espionage boils over', Foreign Policy, January 14, 2010, 
http://thecable.foreignpolicy.comiQosts/20JQ/Qlil :3/china s expaQsion of economic es 
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is indeed a state based attack, it raises concerns that there is more 
strategy behind this relentless financial drain than the theft itself. 
This emerging concern will be taken up in more detail later in the 
chapter where it feeds into broader concerns about the impact of cyber 
security on US economic power. 
The Evolution of Cyber Security as a 'Problem' for Power 
As foreshadowed in the introduction to this chapter, politicians regard 
cyber insecurity predominantly as a problem for US power in the 
context of three factors of material power; the likely outcome of global 
conflict, the impact on US economic power and the endurance of 
geopolitics as a factor of US power. 
Periodically, the executive branch of the US government prepares a 
National Security Strategy (NSS) for Congress which identifies key 
security concerns and outlines how the administration intends to 
address them. Cyber security had been a component of these 
documents since 1998 however, in 2009 President Obama ordered the 
first National Cyber Security Review (NCSR) - an indication of how 
pion age boils over, Brian Grow and Mark Hosenball, 'In cyberspy vs. cyberspy, 
China has the edge', Reuters, April 14, 2011, 
http://www. reuters.comlarticle/20 11104/ l 4/us·chin a ·usa ·cyberespionage · 
idUSTRE73D242201 Hl414?pageNumber=l, Pat Choate, Director of The 
Manufacturing Policy Project, testimony at Communist Chinese Cyber-Attacks, 
Cyber-Espionage and Theft of American Technology, hearing before the Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee Oversight & Investigations, House of 
Representatives, April 15, 2011, 
http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/l 12/Cho0415 l l.pdf. Some examples 
which include Russia are Ellen Messmer, 'Cyber Espionage: A Growing Threat to 
Business', PCWorld, January 22, 2008, 
http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenterlarticle/ 1414 7 4/cyber espionage a growiug__t 
h.refil_tJLDJJ5.ille.ss.l!t.TJ11 and Fran9ois Paget, 'Cybercrime and Hacktivism', (Santa 
Clara: McAfee Labs, 2010), http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/white·papers/wp-
cybercrin1e·hactivism.pdf. 
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seriously these concerns had come to be regarded. An analysis of 
successive NSS documents provides an overview of how ideas about 
national security, US power and new technology evolved and it also 
provides a background to the analysis of how specific threats 
translated to a problem for US power. 
The Natio11al Security St1·ategy documents of the Clinton 
administration reflected an adjustment in the perception of post Cold 
War threats to the United States. They also began to refer to computer 
technology as relevant to US power but through most of the 1990s, this 
was restricted to state investments in innovation and the relationship 
between new technology and the economy.263 By 1998 following the 
commercialisation of the Internet, an explicit link emerges in the NSS 
which lists "Transnational Threats" immediately below "Regional or 
State-Centered Threats". In describing these, the NSS specifically 
points to cyber attacks: 
Threats to the 11ational information infz·ast1·ucture, ranging from 
cybercrime to a strategic i11formatio11 attack on the United 
States via the global infbrmation network, present a dangerous 
new threat to our natio11al security. ffe must also guard against 
threats to our other critical national infrastructures-such as 
electxical power and transportation-which increasi11gly could 
take the rorm of a cyberattack ill addition to physical attack or 
263 President William J. Clinton, United States National Secul'ity Stl'atecy, 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1998), pg.19, 
http://wV<rvv.au.af.mil/aulawclawcgatelnss/nss·95.pdf. 
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sabotage, and could originate from terrorist or criminal groups 
as well as hostile states.264 
This statement demonstrates the comprehensive approach to cyber 
security defined earlier in this chapter. It is an early acknowledgement 
that cyber security encompasses both attacks on the Internet 
infrastructure as well as attacks using the Internet to damage other 
infrastructure. 265 
The 1998 NSS also lists foreign intelligence collection usmg the 
"national information infrastructure" (as the Internet was then 
referred to) as a threat "more diverse, complex and difficult to counter 
than ever before".266 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) chief George 
Tenet told the Armed Services Committee in 2000 that cyber security 
was "one of the most complex issues I've put on the table". He went on 
to make the point that information warfare, in the assessment of the 
CIA, had the potential to be a "major force multiplier". 267 Tenet 
outlined four key reasons why this was the case. First, it enables a 
single entity to have a significant and serious impact - a point of 
difference from weaponised technologies of the past. Second, it is a 
weapon that 'comes ashore' and can affect the homeland. Third, 
information warfare gives a force projection capability to those who 
264 President Clinton, United States National Security Strategy, pg.6. 
265 Significantly, the NSS refers only to vulnerabilities in cyber security with no 
mention of offensive capabilities - a pattern maintained in future NSS documents. 
Offensive cyber capabilities are classified and for this reason, they do not form a part 
of this analysis. 
266 President Clinton, United States National Security Strategy, pg.6. 
267 George J. Tenet, Director of Central Intelligence, testimony at The Worldwide 
Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, hearing before the 
Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 3, 2000, pg.8, 
http://armed·services.senate.gov/hearingsl20001c000203.htm. 
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have never had it before, and it can be used as an asymmetric response. 
Finally, Tenet projected that information warfare would be a basic 
capability of modern militaries and intelligence services around the 
world in the near future. 2ss 
This militarized view of the Internet which interprets security threats 
or vulnerabilities as having implications for power featured in the 2002 
NSS. Although specific references to cyber security are notably absent 
in both of the George \V. Bush administration NSS documents, the 
2002 NSS foreshadows the potential for 'modern technology' to compete 
with conventional US military power. 
Enemies in the past needed great armies and great industrial 
capabilities to endanger Ame1'ica. Now, shadowy netwo11f:s of 
individuals can bring great chaos and suffering to our shores for 
Jess than it costs to purchase a single tank. Terron:<Jts are 
organized to penetrate open societies and to turn the powe1· of 
modern technologies against us.269 
These themes of asymmetry and the use of modern technology to 
'attack' the US which emerged from the 911 attacks (as detailed in 
Chapter Three) began to permeate debates about cyber security as well. 
The 2006 NSS was almost bereft of any mention of cyber security 
except to acknowledge it as a "disruptive challenge" from state and 
non-state actors who may employ technologies (including the Internet) 
""'Tenet, The Worldwide Threat in 2000, hearing on February 3, 2000, pg.8. 
269 President George W. Bush, United States National Security Strategy, 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002), pg.8. 
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m new ways to counter "military advantages the United States 
currently enjoys". 210 
In contrast, the Obama administration's first NSS in 2010 elevated 
cyber security to a "strategic national asset" and declared that 
protecting it was now a "national security priority." 211 President 
Obama also reinforced the longstanding view that technology enhances 
power by arguing that "we must see American innovation as a 
foundation of American power."272 
This continued approach to Internet technology more generally and 
cyber security specifically as linked to material power provides a 
background to the following analysis of some of the factors which 
politicians who are closely engaged with these issues debate most; the 
role of cyber security in future global conflicts, its impact on the US 
economy and the way in which it redefines geopolitics. 
Cyber Security and Global ConJlict 
Asymmetric power 
The asymmetric nature of global order has shaped politicians' view of 
cyber security as it relates to US power. Cyber security (or more 
accurately, those tools such as worms and malware introduced in the 
technical brief which threaten cyber security) is regarded as a material 
factor - a weapon which may be deployed by less resourced opponents 
210 President George W. Bush, United States National Security Strategy, 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2006), pg.44. 
211 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, pg.27. 
212 Ibid, introductory pages. 
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and used to move global conflict from the playing field on which the US 
is able to dominate on to one on which it is 'asymmetrically vulnerable'. 
A link between post Cold War American military preponderance, 
asymmetric actors and cyber vulnerabilities was one of the early 
conceptions of how cyber security might relate to US power. This 
stemmed in part from the understanding that with the demise of the 
USSR, the US had more material power than any other state or group 
of states by such a margin that it would be unlikely to face a challenge 
on the military field. With this threat mitigated, there was speculation 
in the US that adversaries may seek other means of competition. 
President Clinton spoke to this in the 1998 Presidential Decision 
Directive when he argued that "because of our military strength, future 
enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us 
in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States."273 
A 2003 Congressional report found that "many Pentagon officials 
reportedly believe that future adversaries may be unwilling t-0 array 
conventional forces against U.S. troops, and instead may resort to 
'asymmetric warfare', where a less powerful opponent uses other 
strategies to offset and negate U.S. technological superiority."274 
This view was not limited to cyber security concerns; it was an 
observation about US power more generally. However, the low cost, 
potentially high impact and anonymity of cyber attacks made them 
appear particularly well suited to adversaries engaging in asymmetric 
conflict with the US. CIA chief George Tenet told the Armed Services 
273 President Clinton, 'The Clinton Administration·s Policy on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection', May 22. 1998. 
m Wilson, 'Computer Attack and Cyber Tertorism', pg. l. 
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Committee that America's power was so preponderant that its enemies 
would be looking to alternative fields of combat where they might gain 
a strategic advantage and that cyber security was one such domain. 275 
This opinion was echoed by FBI senior official, Michael Vatis in 
testimony before a 2000 Senate hearing into Internet security. He 
testified that states which were unable to match the American military 
with conventional or 'kinetic' weapons, may regard Internet attacks as 
a way to "hit what they perceive as America's Achilles heel - our 
growing dependence on information technology in Government and 
commercial operations."276 
A related consequence for American power is voiced by Defense 
Director of Intelligence Michael Maples at a 2009 hearing before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. Maples points out that not only 
does cyber security offer an asymmetric advantage to states unable to 
compete with conventional and preponderant American military power, 
but that cyber attacks are of special concern because they undermine 
"the pronounced military advantages that the United States has 
traditionally derived from information networks." 277 In the 2010 
National Security Strategy, President Obama argued explicitly that 
"the threats to our people, our homeland, and our interests have 
shifted dramatically in the last 20 years ... In addition to facing enemies 
on traditional battlefields, the United States must now be prepared for 
275 Tenet, The Worldwide Threat in 2000, hearing on February 3, 2000, pg.8. 
276 Michael A. Va tis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Infrastructure Protection Programs, prepared statement for Internet 
Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.26. 
211 LTG Michael D. Maples, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, prepared 
statement for Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the 
United States, hearing on March 10, 2009, pg.38. 
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asymmetric threats, such as those that target our reliance on space 
and cyberspace."278 
This link between material power and cyber insecurity is not limited to 
the conditions of asymmetry in global conflict. As speculation has 
grown about the emergence of China as a strategic competitor, 
politicians have broadened their perception of the threat to consider 
how cyber security might feature in more conventional state to state 
conflict. 
China 
The discourse on China's rise dates back to the mid 1990s and stems 
from speculation that China's considerable economic growth might be 
channelled into conventional military strength. 219 The perception 
amongst politicians that the US may face a new challenge to 
maintaining the established global order (or regional order in East 
Asia) provides a backdrop, as asymmetry also did, for how they 
perceive the threat to US power from cyber security vulnerabilities. In 
this context, concerns arise about the potential for China to develop 
information warfare strategy, doctrine and capability. The publication 
in 1999 of a Chinese document entitled Unrestricted Warfare, (English 
278 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, pg.17. 
2w Some early examples which signal the emergence of a substantial body of work in 
contemporary International Relations scholarship include William H. Overholt, 
China: The Next Economic Superpower, (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1993), and 
Nicholas D. Kristof, 'The Rise of China', Foi·eign Affairs, Vol.72, No.5, 1993, pp.59·74. 
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translation) fuelled speculation that China was developing new and 
innovative ways to elevate its position as a strategic competitor.2so 
Since that time, China has been implicated in many cyber attacks on 
the United States. In 2003, an incident referred to by the Pentagon as 
'Titan Rain' came to light in which a substantial amount of valuable 
and sometimes classified information was extracted from Department 
of Defense online systems.281 These attacks were traced to computers 
in the south of China although the Chinese authorities denied any 
knowledge of the operation. In June 2007, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense was forced to take its information systems offline in order to 
defend against a serious attack which was also attributed to computers 
within China.282 In April 2009, reports surfaced that the Pentagon's 
$300 billion Joint Strike Fighter project had been penetrated and 
"several terabytes of data related to design and electronics systems" 
had been downloaded. 283 Although attribution was not possible, the 
Wall Street Journal quoted former US officials as claiming that the 
attacks appeared to have originated in China. 284 A 2009 report to 
Congress by the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review 
280 Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, (Beijing: PLA Literature 
and Arts Publishing House, February 1999). The English translation is available on 
the US Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website at 
http://www.fas.org/nukelguidelchinaldoctrinelunreswl.htm. 
281 Nathan Thornburgh, 'The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies', Time Magazine, 
August 29, 2005, http://www.time.com/timelmagazinelarticle/0.9171, 1098961,00.html 
and James Lewis, 'Computer Espionage, Titan Rain and China', published online by 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 14, 2005, 
http://csis.org/publication/computer·espionage·titan~.rain-and-china. 
282 Demetri Sevastopulo, 'Chinese hacked into Pentagon', Financial Times, September 
3, 2007, http://www.ft.comlcmsls/019dba9ba2-5a3b-1 lclc-9bcd-0000779fii2ac. html. 
2s2 Siobhan Gorman, August Cole, and Yochi Dreazen, 'Computer Spies Breach 
Fighter-Jet Project', Wall Street Journal, April 21, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB 12402749102983740 I .html. 
2s4 Ibid. 
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Commission stated explicitly that a "large body of both circumstantial 
and forensic evidence strongly indicates Chinese state involvement" in 
a range of serious Internet attacks against the United States.285 
\Vhile China's rise and the intensity of attacks originating from within 
its borders have resulted in special attention from politicians, it is not 
the only state understood to be building cyber capabilities - that is 
developing the tools for penetrating and damaging systems as well as 
preparing doctrine and strategies for implementing them in a conflict 
situation. Cyber security is increasingly perceived as a likely 
component of future conflicts. The Senate Committee on Armed 
Services heard testimony from the CIA in 2000 that there was evidence 
that "several key states are aggressively working to develop their IW 
[information warfare] capabilities and to incorporate these new tools 
into their war-fighting doctrine". 286 This was reiterated later that 
same year by a top FBI official at a hearing into Internet security. "The 
prospect of 'information warfare' by foreign militaries against our 
critical infrastructures is perhaps the greatest potential cyber threat to 
our national security. We know that several foreign nations are 
developing information warfare doctrine, programs, and capabilities for 
use against the United States or other nations." 287 By 2009, the 
intelligence community was more explicit about the source of the 
threat. Director of National Intelligence, Dennis Blair reveals that ''We 
assess that a number of nations, including Russia and China, have the 
ZB.o Carolyn Bartholemew, Chair of the U.S. - China Economic and Security Review 
Commission, 'Report to Congress', November 2009, pg. 167, 
http://www. uscc.guv/ann ual reporli2009109report chapters.php. 
200 Tenet, The Wo,.Jdwide Threat in 2000, hearing on February 3, 2000, pg.8. 
287 Michael A. Vatis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Infrastructure Protection Programs, prepared statement for I11ternet 
Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.26. 
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technical capabilities to target and disrupt elements of the U.S. 
information infrastructure and for intelligence collection."288 
Congress has been repeatedly briefed by top intelligence and military 
officials of the threat America faces from a nation state deployment of 
cyber weapons. At a hearing in 2000, CIA Director George Tenet 
reported that America's security would increasingly depend on the 
unimpeded and secure flow of information. "Any foreign adversary that 
develops the ability to interrupt that flow or shut it down will have the 
potential to weaken us dramatically or even render us helpless." 2s9 
This is perceived as a problem for US power not only because of the 
damage which may be can".ied out through a cyber attack, but also 
because the difficulties of attribution mean that an attack could be 
used to entrap other actors in conflict. Thus Michael Vatis argued that 
the possibility exists that "nation-states not directly involved in 
American retaliatory action could launch cyber attacks against U.S. 
systems under the guise of another country that is the focus of the war 
on terrorism. This is of particular concern as it is possible to disguise 
the origins of information attacks with relative ease."290 Ultimately, 
the view expressed by President Obama that "our technological 
advantage is a key to America's military dominance" serves to 
2ss Dennis C. Blair, Director, ::'>iational Intelligence. prepared statement for Cun·ent 
and Future Worldwide 1'hreats to the National Security of the United States, hearing 
on March 10, 2009, pg.37. 
2B9 Tenet, The Worldwide Threat in 2000, hearing on February 3, 2000, pg.8. 
290 Michael Vatis, 'Cyber Attacks during the War on Terrorism: A Predictive Analysis', 
(Dartmouth: Institute for Security Technology Studies, September 22, 2001), pg.13. 
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highlight the concerns of politicians when they consider the challenges 
that cyber security poses to US military power.291 
The Cost of Oyber Insecurity 
In Chapter Three, it was made clear that almost from its inception the 
Internet has been regarded by politicians as having enormous potential 
for the growth of US economic power. Politicians consistently refer to 
the Internet as the "backbone of the U.S. economy".292 In an analysis of 
how politicians regard cyber security as a problem for US power, 
economic factors featm·e significantly. Indeed, in a 2009 speech entitled 
Securing Our Nation's C.vber Infrastructure, President Obama stated 
definitively that "America's economic prosperity in the 21st century 
will depend on cybersecurity". 293 
There are a number of ways in which politicians perceive cyber 
security to be linked to the economy and to have the capacity to 
undermine US economic power. One of the most frequently cited is that 
the US economy is now so heavily dependent on the Internet that a 
consumer driven loss of confidence could have substantial impact on 
m President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure", May 29, 2009. 
292 Senator Daniel Akaka referred to the Internet as the "backbone of the U.S. 
economy" in a statement at Securi11g Cyberspace: Efforts to Protect National 
Information Infrastructures Continue to Face Challenges, hearing before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on 
Federal Financial Management, Government Information, and International Security 
Subcommittee, United States Senate, July 19, 2005, pg.5. In a similar context, 
Representative 'I'om Davis calls the Internet the "central backbone of our global 
economy" in his statement at Computer Securitv: Cyher Attacks: War without 
Borders, hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives, July 26, 2000, pg.6, 
zsa President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
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trade. E-commerce (trade which is carried out over the Internet) in the 
United States has been estimated at $132 billion in retail sales for 
2008. 294 Consequently, there is a strong belief that anything which 
jeopardises the security of online transactions is dangerous not only 
for the potential revenue loss of the particular transaction, but because 
of the broader implications of consumer trust and market confidence 
which are essential to continued growth rates.295 If consumers do not 
believe that it is safe to conduct financial transactions over the 
Internet, e-commerce could retract with a consequential negative 
impact on the US economy and power.296 
One of the early alerts to the potential for Internet insecurity to 
negatively impact on consumer confidence came in February 2000 in 
the form of a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack on several 
booming commercial sites including Ebay and Amazon.297 Although the 
attacks resulted in little material harm, both targets were nascent 
consumer retail sites which were leading the trend for increasing 
online transactions. A month after the attacks, the Senate Committee 
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation held a hearing on Internet 
294 President Obama, 'Remarks by the President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
295 For statistics and other data on e~commerce from this time, see Rita Tehan, 
'Internet and e-Commerce Statistics: What They Mean and Where to Find them on 
the Web', (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, October 24, 2000), 
http://ncseonline.org/nlelcrsreports/sciencelst-:36.cfm. For more on the links between 
e·Commerce and consumer confidence metrics, see Glenn J. McLaughlin, 'Electronic 
Commerce: An Introduction', (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
April 1, 2002), http://foc.state.gov/documents/ornanizationll2056.pdf. 
296 Brian Cashel!, William D. Jackson, Mark Jickling, and Baird Webel, 'The 
Economic Impact ofCyber-Attacks', (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research 
Service, April 1, 2004). 
297 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks involve bombarding a site with data 
- usually in the form of requests - which overwhelms the site and causes it to shut 
down. 
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security to attempt to ascertain the extent of the problem. Senator 
Conrad Burns made the point that "real damage was done, especially 
to Internet users' confidence." 298 Indeed, the fear generated was 
sufficient to cause a significant sell·off in technology stocks. Senator 
Burns regarded the attacks as particularly alaxming, "as they were 
specifically designed to disrupt electronic commerce." 299 These 
sentiments were echoed by William Reinsch, a senior official from the 
Department of Commerce. "If we are to reap the benefits of the 
information age, we need to take action to maintain public confidence 
in a secure business environment that ensures both our national 
security and the growth of our economy."3oo 
In addition to undermining consumer confidence in online transactions, 
politicians also regard cyber security as potentially undermining US 
economic power through the billions of dollars of wealth which have 
been extracted from the United States in the form of commercial and 
military information obtained illicitly. In this more recently developed 
view, damage to the economy is not a byproduct of cyber attacks but 
rather the economy is the taz-get of attacks. Industry estimates have 
put the global theft of public and private intellectual property and data 
at as high as US $1 trillion.sot At a Senate hearing into US cyber 
298 Senator Conrad Burns, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Communications, 
Internet Security' hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.I. 
'""Ibid. 
soo William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce, Bureau of Export Administration, 
US Department of Commerce, prepared statement for Internet Security, hearing on 
March 8, 2000, pg.16. 
301 'l'hese are the latest figures at the time of writing. Projection based on survey hy 
Purdue's Center for Education and Research in Information Assurance and Security. 
Nick Akerman et al, 'Unsecured Economies: Protecting Vital Information', (Santa 
Clara: McAfee, 2009). The report can be accessed online at 
htm:t/www.cerias.purdue.edu/1>§setalpd£imfe unsee emn Rt mt fol online 012109.p 
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security vulnerabilities, Eugene Spafford, Executive Director, Purdue 
University Center for Education and Research in Information 
Assurance and Security (CERIAS), testified that "the Nation is under 
attack, and it is a hostile attack, it is a continuing attack. It has been 
going on for years, and we have largely been ignoring it."302 He goes on 
to testify that the commercial losses alone, by best estimates, are in the 
tens of billions of dollars per year. "To put that in context, imagine a 
Hurricane Katrina-style event occurring every year and being 
ignored." 303 
Politicians regard these costs as having implications for economic 
power both through the potential of cyber attacks to undermine 
consumer confidence and thereby threaten trade and also through the 
direct extraction of wealth through data theft. However, they also 
relate this to another aspect of material power - the state's capacity to 
fund military capability. President Clinton pointed out in the 1998 
Presidential Decision Directive that "our economy is increasingly 
reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures and 
non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems 
may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and 
our economy." 304 President Obama also recently argued that "our 
df. For commentary see Elinor Mills, 'Study: Cybercrime cost firms $1 trillion 
globally', CNet News, January 28, 2009, htt.p://news.cnet.com/8301-1009 3·10lf>2246· 
8:3.html. 
302 Eugene H. Spafford, Executive Director, Purdue University Center for Education 
and Research in Information Assurance and Security (CERIAS), testimony at 
Cybersecurity: Assessing our Vulnerabilities and Developing an Effective Response, 
hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United 
States Senate, March 19, 2009, pg. 28. 
303 Ibid. 
ao4 President Clinton, 'The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical Infrastructure 
Protection', May 22, 1998. 
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prosperity serves as a wellspring for our power. It pays for our military, 
underwrites our diplomacy and development efforts, and serves as a 
leading source of our influence in the world." 305 Therefore, cyber 
security is regarded as a problem not only because it undermines 
economic power but because this has implications for military power as 
well. 300 
In the context of the economy, cyber insecurity raises concerns about 
US power in three important ways. First, security breaches threaten to 
undermine consumer confidence in online trading - an important 
element of the US economy. Second, the direct theft of intellectual 
property in both commercial and state sectors is proving expensive. 
Commercially, it diminishes profits and reduces the economic base. 
The theft of military and science developments means that money 
invested in these projects by the state is appropriated by others at little 
cost which impacts on US competiveness. Finally, these negative 
effects on the US economy impact on the state's capacity to invest in 
conventional military power thus producing a second order threat to 
material power. 
Shaping Geopolitics 
One final way in which politicians link cyber security to US power is 
through its impact on conceptions of geopolitics. This issue is taken up 
by broader debates about the effects of globalisation but elicits some 
specific concerns about power in the context of cyber security. vvnile 
some scholars like Stanley Brunn have suggested that the 'new 
sos President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, pg.9. 
sos President Obama is also clearly referring to social power factors such as diplomacy 
here and these will be discussed at length later in this chapter. 
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geopolitics' of the Internet supersedes the old as time and space take 
on different dimensions, others like Ronald Deibert, Tim Wu and Jack 
Goldsmith have argued that the Internet adheres more closely than we 
might think to established power structures determined by state 
borders and geography.307 Significantly for this study, however, is the 
perception of US politicians that the concept of state sovereignty 
within determined physical borders may indeed be undergoing some 
renovation. Concerns about reconceptualising the geopolitics of the 
Internet are one of the key ways in which US politicians link US power 
to cyber security as they perceive the geopolitics of the Internet to be 
distinct from the physical geopolitics which has for so long played a 
role in strategic decision making and power calculations. 
When politicians express concern about the Federal government's 
capacity to protect the nation against a cyber attack, the issue of the 
geopolitics of the Internet frequently arises. At a hearing in 2000, 
Senator Robert Bennett produced a 'map' of the Internet pointing out 
to his colleagues that there were no oceans on it. 308 He made the point 
that "when you start talking about either national security threats or 
307 Stanley D. Brunn, 'Towards an understanding of the geopolitics of cyberspace: 
Learning, re-learning and un·learning', Geopolitics, Vol.5, Iss.3, 2000, pp.144-149, 
Ronald Deibert, 'The Geopolitics oflnternet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty and 
Cyberspace', in Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics, Andrew Chadwick, (ed.), 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 323-336 and Jack Goldsmith and Tim Wu, Who 
Controls the Internet? Illusions of a Borderless World, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2006). 
308 Senator Robert Bennett chaired the Y2K Committee established to address the 
potential disruption of the global date change on computers from 1999 to 2000. It is 
regarded in US political circles as having been a successful intervention of an 
Internet security threat and is often held up as an example of what government can 
do. Partly as a consequence of the success of that operation, Senator Bennett is a 
highly respected voice in government approaches to cyber security. See the executive 
summary of Defending America's Cyberspace: National Plan for Information Systems 
Protection, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2000), pg.vi. 
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commerce in a world in which there are no oceans and no continents, 
you realize that we are not talking about a new tool to use in commerce 
or a new weapon to use in war. 'vVe are talking about a whole new place. 
We are talking about a whole new universe that is different from any 
that we have structured our Government to defend or our economy to 
market in the past."309 Indeed, the concept of a 'Digital Pearl Harbour' 
enters the policy lexicon around this time linking virtual threats to the 
trauma of the \¥orld \Var Two attacks on American soi1.a10 
A deep sense of unease about this new geopolitical configuration was 
exacerbated by the homeland attacks on September 11, 2001. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, apart from the physical devastation of the 
attacks, there was also a reaction to the attack taking place on 
American soil. The realisation that oceans and friendly states no longer 
provided an adequate buffer from hostile attack prompted a re· 
evaluation of the US geopolitical situation. This was articulated in the 
2003 National St1wtegy to Secure Cyberspace where President Bush 
observed that in the last century, "geographic isolation helped protect 
sos Senator Robert Bennett, comments in the hearing Cyber Attacks: The National 
Protection Plan and its Privacy Implications, before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information, United 
States Senate, February 1, 2000, pp.33·34. Also, "We know that a cyber attack cannot 
be intercepted at the border ... since there are no borders in the cyber world", 
Representative Jennifer Dunn, prepared statement at The Invisible Battlegmund, 
hearing before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, House of Representatives, 
September 16, 2003, pg.4. 
''°Technology journalist &ott Berinator traces the use of this term back to 1991 
when it wa.s u.sed by D. James Bidws, the presjdent of a computer security firm. 
However, the term had become common amongst policy makers by the late 1990s. 
See Scott Berinato 'The Future of Security', Computerworld, December 30, 2003, 
http://www.computerworld.comis/article!printl88646/The future of secmitv. 
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the United States from a direct physical invasion. In cyberspace 
national boundaries have little meaning."311 
These perceptions of the transformation of a material factor of US 
power raise questions about the permanence of power · a concept 
discussed at length by Hans Morgenthau in Politics Among Nations. 
Morgenthau cautions against assuming the permanence of any factor 
of power which he argues is a 'typical error of evaluation' in power 
computations. 312 For Morgenthau, this assumption of permanency 
ignores the dynamic nature of most elements of power. He argues that 
"everyday changes, however small and imperceptible at first ... add an 
ounce of strength to this side and take a grain of might away from the 
other."313 This sense of impermanence is most frequently articulated 
when politicians discuss geopolitics in the context of cyber security -
not just as a material factor of power which is diminished or 
undermined- but one which has undergone qualitative change. 
In summary then, when politicians discuss the problem of cyber 
insecurity in the context of US power, they focus on the ways in which 
it threatens to undermine US power to prevail in global conflict, US 
economic power and the continuation of geopolitics as a factor that 
enhances US power. These are conventional security concerns which 
have been reinterpreted in the context of the Internet technology. 
Interestingly, they have consistently adopted an unconventional 
approach to addressing these problems. Over successive 
m President Bush, 'National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace', pg."7. 
312 Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations, pp.160-163. 
a13 Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations, pg.158. 
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administrations from President Clinton to President Obama, 
politicians have sought to mitigate the threats which cyber insecurity 
poses to US material power and national security through the 
promotion of the 'public/private partnership'. As the following section 
shows, this is an Instrumental approach to technology associated with 
a deeply embedded sense that the government lacks the authority to 
pursue national cyber security and that somehow, the private sector 
possesses the motivation to do it for them. 
The Public/Private Partnership: Cornerstone of US Cyber Security 
Strategy 
In 2003, the Bush administration's National Strategy to SecuTe 
CybeTspace, referred to the 'public/private partnership' as "the 
cornerstone of America's cyberspace security strategy."314 President 
Clinton had used similar terminology in his 1998 Presidential Decision 
DiTective aimed at reducing the US vulnerability to cyber security. The 
public/private partnership also formed the central plank of the 2000 
National Plan foT InfoTmation Systems PTotection, 3l5 the 2003 
Homeland SecuTity Presidential Directive 7, 316 the 2005 InteTim 
National InfrastroctuTe PTotection Plan, 317 and the 2009 National 
314 President George W. Bush, National &rategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.iii. In 
addition, President Clinton foreshadows this in the 1998 National Security Strategy. 
"Protecting our critical infrastructure requires new partnerships between 
government and industry." President Clinton, United States National Security 
Strategy, 1998, pg.iv. 
315 President Clinton, Defending America's Cyberspace,. 
am President Bush, 'Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection'. 
317 llidge, Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan. 
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Infrastructure Protectio11 Plan.318 In the face of suggestions that the 
market driven approach to national cyber security had failed, 
President Obama's 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review found that the 
publidprivate partnership must 'evolve' but it remained central to the 
administration's strategy. 319 
A central finding of this analysis is that politicians regard themselves 
and the government more broadly as without agency in this respect. 
That is, they recognise and worry about the extent of the problems of 
cyber insecurity but nevertheless believe that they are without the 
capacity or the authority to resolve these problems. It is important to 
note here that this is distinct from a circumstance in which the 
government may opt to leave a problem to be resolved by market forces. 
The analysis finds that politicians involved in these debates explicitly 
state that they (and the government more broadly) have neither the 
authority nor the capability to deal with cyber insecurity. Through the 
public/private partnership, they shift the responsibility for these 
problems onto the private sector which remains unwilling to extend to 
what amounts to providing national security or law enforcement 
services. 
This is a unique approach to national security issues which threaten to 
undermine state power and it is one that seems out of step with 
318 Chertoff, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, 
3'9'J'he suggestion that this has been an unsuccessful strategy for dealing with cyber 
insecurity has been voie<?d by both James Lewis and Melissa Hathaway. These views 
will be elaborated on (and fully referenced) later in this chapter. The statement about 
the future evolution ofthe public/private partnership can be found here. President 
Barack Obama, 'Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and Communications 
Infrastructure', Cyberspace Policy Review, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 
29, 2009), pg.iv, 
htto://www whitehgu~e.govlassets/documents!Cvberspace Policy Review final.pdf. 
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previously noted junctures of technology and US power. Certainly, the 
Sputnik crisis initiated a strong and authoritative government 
response as did the early years of Internet technology. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, while the Clinton·Gore administration intended that 
the Internet should be privately owned and operated, those politicians 
were clear about the role the government must play in order to shape 
Internet technology accordingly. Given the proactive policies that 
emerged to guide Internet technology in order to promote US economic 
power, it appears counter-intuitive that with regard to the pressing 
security concerns outlined above, the government would retreat to a 
passive policy position leaving national cyber security reliant on the 
private sector. 
What exactly is this 'cornerstone' of US cyber security, how is it 
expected to work and what impediments does it encounter? The 
publidprivate partnership concept emerges from the fact that 85% of 
US critical infrastructure (commonly perceived of as a cyber target) is 
in private hands.a20 As a consequence of this relationship between the 
private sector and the public interest, politicians are of the opinion that 
they must engage the private sector through some sort of working 
framework in order to formulate an effective cyber security strategy. 
The framework which they have normatively promoted since the early 
years of the Internet's commercialisation, has been a 'partnership'. 
Somewhat surprisingly, given its centrality in successive cyber security 
policies, exactly what this 'partnership' entails has always been 
a20 Agency Response to Cybersp,1ce Policy Review, hearing before the Committee on 
Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation and 
Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, House of Representatives, June 
16, 2009, pg.3. 
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unclear. It implies some sense of shared responsibility for critical 
infrastructure and national security without explicitly stating 'for what' 
or 'to whom'. The partnership is generally referred to in policy 
documents using normative, value based language rather than clear 
statements outlining legal authority, responsibility and rights. 
President Clinton's Presidential Decision Dfrective 63 states that 
addressing problems with cyber security will require a closely 
coordinated effort of both the government and the private sector which 
must be "genuine, mutual and cooperative."321 In the National Strategy 
to Secure Cyberspace, President Bush takes a similarly ambiguous and 
normative approach. The Strategy states that "every American who 
can contribute to securing part of cyberspace is encouraged to do so" 
and to this end, the federal government "invites the creation of and 
participation in, public-private partnerships". 322 
Although politicians subscribe to the notion that there exists (or should 
exist) a deeply entrenched norm of cooperation between the 
government and private sector this has not proven to be the case. The 
expectation that the private sector will, of its own accord and driven by 
market forces, provide effective solutions to cyber insecurity (and 
therefore challenges to US power) assumes that the private and public 
sector share the same goals. In fact, both parties in this 'partnership' 
have interpreted their own role in promoting cyber security- as well as 
that of their partner through the lens of differing agendas. 
321 President William J. Clinton, 'The Clinton Administration's Policy on Critical 
Infrastructure Protection'. In Defending America's Cyberspace, he further suggests 
that the government and private sector must work together in "a partnership unlike 
any we have seen before". President Clinton, Defending Americ.~'s Cyberspace, pg.iii. 
"''President Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.xiii. 
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GoverD.DJent Vi'ew 
The dominant view amongst politicians engaged with these issues has 
been that the government has a very limited role to play in assuring 
the state's cyber security and that innovation and advances in the 
technology and practice of cyber security should arise from the private 
sector. This stems from two assumptions which are sometimes 
conflated: the first is that the government has limited capabilityto deal 
with cyber insecurity and the second is that it has limited authority 
and should not 'interfere' in the private sector. States may often find 
they lack the capability to project or protect power and politicians have 
to deal with this. However, the notion that the government lacks the 
authority - or indeed, the responsibility - for national cyber security is 
difficult to reconcile with the Realist view of power which was evident 
in debates about the problems this poses for US power. In either a 
power-maximising or security-maximising view, the very survival of 
the state depends on security and 'out·sourcing' national security in 
this way is a unique approach. 
It is useful to note here that while many functions of national security 
can be carried out by the private sector, for example the private 
security firms which now operate in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, 
this is very different to the public/private partnership in the context of 
tJ'ber security. Privately contracted soldiers simply replace salaried 
soldiers in a state run conflict. The private sector is not expected to 
conduct the war, they simply provide personnel. There is a disjuncture 
in the way politicians usually regard their role in managing and project 
power and how they respond to this particular challenge. There is also 
a disjuncture in how they articulate power when discussing the 
problem and how they seem to remove it from the solution. 
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The Bush administration's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace 
argued that in the US "traditions of federalism and limited government 
require that organizations outside the federal government take the 
lead" in cyber security. 323 This interpretation of the government's 
limited authority is combined here with an assumption of its limited 
capability. "The federal government could not - and, indeed, should not 
- secure the computer networks of privately owned banks, energy 
companies, transportation firms, and other parts of the private 
sector."324 This resonates with earlier statements by President Clinton 
who also argued in Defending America's Cyberspace that Congress 
neither "could nor should dictate solutions to the private sector". 325 
While politicians believe that they do not have the authority to drive 
the development of cyber security technology, they also repeatedly 
express the opinion that "in general, the private sector is best equipped 
and structured to respond to an evolving cyber threat."326 At a 2000 
Congressional hearing, Attorney General Eric Holder argued that 
decision makers in the US "believe strongly that the private sector 
should take the lead in protecting private computer networks." 327 This 
belief that the government has neither the authority nor the capability 
to deal with cyber security persists even when acknowledging the 
importance of cyber security to US power. In the same document in 
323 President Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.xiii. 
324 Ibid, pg.11. 
325 President Clinton, Defending America's Cyberspace, pg.iii. This was also evident 
in the previously cited PDD-63 which states that Congress should "seek to avoid 
outcomes that increase government regulation". 
326 President National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.ix. 
327 Eric Holder Jr., Deputy Attorney General, US Department of Justice, prepared 
statement for Internet Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.12. 
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which President Clinton declared that the government neither could 
nor should interfere in the cyber security of privately owned critical 
infrastructure, he argued that "America's strength [by which one might 
read 'power'] rests on its privately owned and operated critical 
infrastructures". 328 At a 2000 hearing into cyber security, a senior 
official from the FBI testified that, "the prospect of 'information 
warfare' by foreign militaries against our critical infrastructures is 
perhaps the greatest potential cyber threat to our national security". 
He went on to describe 'America's Achilles heel' as "our growing 
dependence on information technology in Government and commercial 
operations" 329. Despite these warning, he later argued that cyber 
security is "clearly the role of the private sector. The Government has 
neither the responsibility nor the expertise to act as the private sector's 
system administration." 330 
In this view, cyber security is critical to US power and yet the 
government has neither the authority nor the capability to deal with it. 
This is problematic for Realist understandings of security and power. 
Whether the state is indeed security·maximising or power-maximising, 
in the context of this issue which is perceived as critical for both 
security and power, the state appears to have no agency. Instead, it 
relies upon the private sector to generate advances in technology and 
practice in order to deliver national security and protect state power. 
szs President Clinton, Defendin{f America's Cyberspace, pg.iii. This was also evident 
in the previously cited PDD·63 which states that Congress should "seek to avoid 
outcomes that increase government regulation11 • 
329 Michael A. Va tis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
National Infrastructure Protection Programs, prepared statement for Internet 
Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.26. 
sw Ibid, pg.24. 
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Private Sector View 
As stated earlier, this approach to the public/private partnership is 
based on an assumption that both parties share a common goal of 
national security and state power. However, not only has the private 
sector expressed no willingness to fund national security, industry 
representatives have made it clear that they do not wish to assume 
responsibility for it either. During a 2005 hearing into cyber security 
issues, Alan Paller of the SANS Institute, a major private sector 
computer security firm, highlighted these two main impediments to 
shifting responsibility for security back onto the private sector. First, 
he argued, the expense of ensuring cyber security to a national security 
level would be significant and second, the litigious nature of American 
society means that industry would be very resistant to accepting 
liability for the security of their products or systems.331 
The question of private sector security investment was further 
articulated by Sam Varnado of the Sandia National Laboratory who 
pointed out to a Congressional hearing that industry believed that they 
need only increase security enough to protect against the low-level 
threat such as "background noise, individual hackers, and possibly 
hacktivists". 332 He argued that "it is industry's contention that 
government should protect against the larger threats - organized crime, 
33! Mr. Alan Paller, the SANS Institute, SCADA Systems and the Terrorist threat: 
Protecting the Nation's Critical Control Systems, hearing on October 18, 2005, pg.62. 
ss2 Sam Varnado, written response to questions from Representative Bennie G. 
Thompson, at SCADA Systems and the Terrorist threat: Protecting the Nation's 
Critical Control Systems, hearing on October 18, 2005, pg.95. 
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terrorists, and nation-state threats - either through law-enforcement 
or national defense."333 
Representative Jim Turner had speculated on this during a hearing in 
2000. He commented that based on the testimony he had heard, the 
private sector would eventually argue that there was a point beyond 
which they would not spend the necessary money to meet national 
security needs. sa4 Richard Clarke, former special advisor for 
cybersecurity during the Bush administration has more recently 
reinforced this point, axguing that while the private sector will 
undertake security measures on a cost/benefit basis, it is not willing to 
fund or administer national security. 335 
There exists a fundamental disjuncture between what politicians 
ell.-pect and hope the private sector will contribute to the public/private 
partnership and what the private sector regards as their responsibility. 
Deputy Attorney General Eric Holder's logic that the private sector 
should take responsibility and the state should step in only as law 
enforcement relies on a distinction between 'crime' and 'national 
security' and 'war'. aas This distinction is one of the highly problematic 
aspects of cybersecurity for international relations. Perceptions about 
the nature of an act of violence conventionally depend on the identity 
and intentions of the actor and in this context, problems of attribution 
333 Varnado, SCADA Systems and the Te1Torist threat: Protecting the Nation's 
Critical Control Systems, hearing on October 18, 2005, pg.95. 
334 Representative Jim Turner, comments at Computer Security: Cyber Attacks · War 
without Borde1'S, hearing on July 26, 2000, pg, 163, 
335 Richard Clarke, 'War from Cyberspace', The National lnterost, Iss.104, 
November/December 2009, pp.31 ·36. 
""Eric Holder Jr., Deputy Attorney General, US Department of Justice, prepared 
statement for Internet Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg. 7. 
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make that very difficult. Even in the instances when attacks are able 
to be tracked back to source machines, determining whether the 
individuals involved were working independently of any state 
apparatus is difficult or impossible and plausible deniability still 
remains an option to states in most cases. This means that a 
distinction between acts of crime, terrorism and war is very difficult 
and this is an important but unacknowledged factor in the difficulties 
that US politicians face in realising some kind of cyber security 
'partnership' between the public and private sectors. 
Assessing the Effectiveness of the Public/Pzi.vate Partnership 
Despite the persistence of the public/private partnership as politicians' 
preferred solution to the problems for US power brought about by cyber 
insecurity, there is little to suggest that it has been regarded as a 
successful strategy. The perception that cyber insecurity has not been 
adequately addressed has been a consistent theme running through 
hearings and research reports since the late 1990s. Joel Willemssen, a 
Congressional researcher, testified at a 2001 hearing that "our most 
recent analysis ... of reports published since July 1999, showed that 
Federal computer systems continued to be riddled with weaknesses 
that put critical operations and assets at risk." 337 In 2003, the House 
Committee on Government Reform held a hearing entitled Cyber 
Security: The Challenges facing our Nation in Critical Infrastructure 
Protection in which the issues of conventional critical infrastructure 
337 This is discussed during the hearing in the context of the Presidential Decision 
Directive issued by President Clinton in 1998. PDD-63 ruled that federal agencies 
were to achieve "reliable, interconnected, and secure information system 
infrastructure". However, as Willemssen testified "weaknesses continued to be 
reported in each of the 24 agencies covered by our review". Joel Willems sen, 
testimony at How Safe is our Critical infrastructure?, hearing before the 
Governmental Affairs Committee, United States Senate, September 12, 2001, pg.4. 
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were assessed simultaneously with cyber critical infrastructure.338 In 
the assessment of the performance of federal agencies, Representative 
Clay makes the point that despite the fact that Congress had "steadily 
turned up the heat" on cyber security issues, recent reports indicated 
that the situation was consistently worse than expected. 339 
In a 2008 hearing into the global security assessment, concern was 
expressed by Representative Rick Larson that even though an official 
from the Office of National Intelligence testified to the hearing that the 
risk from cyber security was assessed as high, the budget 
appropriations did not reflect that. 340 By 2009, Senator Reckerfeller 
assessed the past decade of policy making as poor. "Mike McConnell, 
under President Bush, and Admiral Blair, under President Obama, 
both said that the number-one security threat to the United States of 
America was cybersecurity, or cyberterror, however you want to phrase 
it. I regard it as a profoundly and deeply troubling problem to which we 
are not paying much attention."341 
338 Cyber Security: The Challenges facing our Nation in Critical Infrastructure 
Protection, hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on 
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and the Census, House 
of Representatives, April 8, 2003. 
339 "Just last November, this committee issued a report on computer security where 
only 3 agencies got grades of C or above and 14 agencies failed." Representative W.M. 
Lacy Clay, comments during Cyber Security: The Challenges facing our Nation in 
Critical Infrastructure Protection, hearing on April 8, 2003 .. pg. 7. 
"" Representative Rick Larson. comments during Global Security Assessment. 
hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 
February 13, 2008, pg.10. For the risk assessment by the Office of National 
Intelligence, see Dr. Thomas Fingar. testimony at the same hearing on pg.4. 
SH Senator John Rockerfeller. Chairman. Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, opening statement at Cybersecurity: Assessing- our Vulnerabilities 
and Developing an Effective Response, hearing on March 19, 2009, pg.I. 
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This has implications for the 'paradox of power' discussed in the thesis 
introduction. Richard Clarke has recently argued that America's ability 
to "defend its vital systems from cyber attack ranks among the world's 
worst." 342 He goes on to point out the relative advantages of some 
states including China which has "implemented plans allowing them to 
shut the limited number of portals that connect their cyberspace to the 
outside world." Other nations like North Korea, he argues, have such 
limited cyber dependence that there is almost nothing to defend 
whereas "America's connectivity to the rest of the world is unlimited 
and controlled by no plan or agency." 343 President Obama's cyber 
security advisor Melissa Hathaway agrees with Clarke. She wrote in a 
2009 discussion paper that "our reliance on the conveniences of remote 
access and the ability of our networked control systems to reduce costs 
and manpower needs have led to weaknesses that are being exploited 
by our opponents on multiple boards."344 She has also stated that the 
failure over the past 15 years of cyber security policy to mitigate the 
threat means that "the United States and our allies have become 
asymmetrically vulnerable because we have more to lose than our 
adversaries. Our vulnerabilities have increased year after year."345 Not 
only does cyber security policy appear to be ineffective in the US, other 
342 Richard Clarke, 'War in Cyberspace', The National Interest, Iss.104, 
November/December 2009, pg.34. 
343 Clarke, 'War in Cyberspace' pg.34. This sentiment has been expressed by 
politicians as well and is a recurring frustration in Congressional hearings into cyber 
security. For example, "It is very obvious Congress is not set up for [dealing with 
cyber security]. I mean, you can't find a single bellybutton for cyberspace." 
Representative Joe Sestak, comments at Global Security Assessment, hearing on 
February 13, 2008, pg.27. 
344 Hathaway, 'Strategic Advantage', pg.13. 
345 Ibid. 
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states do not face the same threat which further increases their 
relative advantage. 
After 15 years of promoting the publidprivate partnership while cyber 
insecurity continued to worsen, there have been some recent signs that 
political approaches to problems with cyber security in the United 
States are shifting - at least to the point of acknowledging some of 
these disjunctures. One recent development has been the Obama 
administration's explicit statement that the publidprivate partnership 
has not been an effective means for addressing cybersecurity issues 
(hence its need to 'evolve'). This sentiment was foreshadowed in a CSIS 
commission report 'Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency', 
which substantially influenced the Obama administration's Cyberspace 
Policy Review. In a 2009 Senate hearing, CSIS director James Lewis 
testifies that "the United States has used a market·led approach to 
cybersecurity for more than a decade. It has failed us."346 The CSIS 
commission report concluded that market forces (the contribution of 
the private sector to the public/private partnership) alone would not 
provide adequate national security. It also makes the observation that 
the US government has been timid on the question of regulation and 
routinely deferred to business interests over the issue of national 
security in this policy area.3,1; 
In a maior departure from previous thinking, the government's 
Cyberspace Policy Review also clearly articulates a sense of authority 
for the US federal government in dealing with cyber security. "It is the 
346 Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and Public Policy Program, Center 
for Strategic and International Studies, Cyhersecuiity: Assessing our Vulnerabilities 
and Developing an Effective Response, hearing on March 19, 2009, pg. 9. 
"'Ibid. 
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fundamental responsibility of our government to address strategic 
vulnerabilities in cyberspace."348 This is underlined by the key issue of 
apportioning responsibility and liability. "The common defense of 
privately-owned critical infrastructures from armed attack or from 
physical intrusion or sabotage by foreign military forces or 
international terrorists is a core responsibility of the Federal 
government."349 Although the review acknowledges that there remains 
some ambiguity over the extent to which the government is responsible 
for cyber as well as physical attacks, it also clearly states that the 
"Federal government cannot entirely delegate or abrogate its role in 
securing the Nation from a cyber incident or accident."350 Significantly, 
the review signals an awareness that in order for America to continue 
to use the Internet to enhance its power, it will have to recalibrate the 
balance between the 'public/private partnership' and accept greater 
responsibility for shaping the relationship between the Internet and 
state power. "Our continued leadership and prosperity in the global 
economy may well hinge on our national commitment to act as leaders 
m bringing information assurance to the global information 
environment we have helped to create."351 
This shift to a more proactive approach to cyber insecurity resonates 
with a Social Constructivist approach to technology and may well 
signal some important changes in US cyber security policy. If so, they 
348 Hathaway, Cyberspace Policy Review, pg.iii 
349 Ibid, pg.28. 
350 Hathaway, Cyberspace Policy Review, pg.iv. 
351 Senator Daniel Akaka, Cyber Attack.· Is the Government Safe?, hearing before the 
Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, March 2, 2000, pg.6. 
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will post date this thesis but it could be a critical focal point for future 
analysis. 
\Vhile the public/private partnership is essentially an expression of 
politicians perceived lack of authority or lack of responsibility to 
protect and project material power, this is not the case when they 
engage with a more social conception of power. Here, they articulate a 
very clear sense of both authority and responsibility to promote the 
norms and values which they believe underpin US power and it is this 
conception of power which has most influenced the path of cyber 
security technology. 
The Role of Norms and VaJues in Cyber Security Policy 
fVe uphold our most cherished values not on~y because doing so 
is rigl1t, but because it strengthens our country and keeps us 
safe. Time and again, our values have been ow· best national 
secun'ty asset-in war and peace, in times of ease, and in eras of 
upheaval Fidelity to our •·alues is the reason why the Um.ted 
States of America grew from a small stri11g of colonies under the 
writ of an empire to the st,rongest nation in the world. 352 
Hans Morgenthau wrote that 'national character' relates to national 
power as a shaping force which enables or disqualifies certain foreign 
policy choices. 353 He uses the example of American (and British) 
aversion to compulsory national service and large standing armies 
coupled with anti·militarism which Morgenthau argues can be 
352 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, 2010, pg.35. 
353 Morgenthau, Politics Amongst Nations, pg.138·140. 
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understood as a 'handicap' in measures of national power. "Frequently 
the military strength actually at their disposal will not be 
commensurate with the political commitments that their concern for 
the national interest imposes upon them." 354 He further notes that 
"the observer of the international scene who attempts to assess the 
relative strength of different nations must take national character into 
account, however difficult it may be to assess correctly so elusive and 
intangible a factor."355 This concept proves helpful in understanding 
how a social conception of power influences the way in which US 
politicians approach solutions to cyber security threats. 
In the following pages, a sense of how politicians understand the US 
'national character' emerges. President Obama's argument that 
'fidelity to values' has been the foundation of power is a sentiment 
echoed by politicians in debates about cyber security policies. He also 
said, in the same document that "our struggle to stay true to our values 
and Constitution has always been a lodestar, both to the American 
people and to those who share our aspiration for human dignity."356 
Certainly in the debates of this section, these ideas dominate 
particularly when politicians are confronted with the kind of 
complexity and conflict which addressing cyber security vulnerabilities 
entail. When in doubt as to how they should act, politicians frequently 
articulate the view that they should adhere to the norms and values 
which they believe have led to US power in the past. 
354 Ibid. 
355 Ibid, pg.139. 
356 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, 2010, pg.10. 
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The following pages will provide an analysis of how these ideas play 
out in two major debates. The first is the promotion of human rights in 
foreign policy which has substantially influenced the direction of cyber 
security technology. This deals with the key conflict of attribution -
that while human rights concerns promote the protection of anonymity 
on the Internet in order to protect vulnerable people, anonymity also 
facilitates illegal and anti·social behaviour which potentially 
undermines US material power. The second example takes up some of 
the same concepts in a domestic setting. 
The Internet as a Human Hight: Foreign policy and cyber security 
A recent poll conducted for BBC World Service interviewed almost 
28,000 adults across 26 countries and found that four out of five regard 
Internet access as a basic human right. 357 This concept of linking 
Internet access to human rights has been evolving steadily over the 
past 15 years and has its roots in the UN Declaration of Human Rights. 
Article 19 states that everyone has the right to "seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers".858 In states where human rights violations take place, this 
can equate to the ability of political dissidents to mask their online 
identity in order to avoid persecution or prosecution for voicing 
opinions which run counter to those in power. 
357 For the findings of this study, see the BBC summary. 'Four in Five Regard 
Internet Access as a Fundamental Right: Global Poll', 
http:/Jnews.bbc&o.ukl2/shared/bsplhiipdf.slQ8 03 10 BBC Intemet poll.pd£. 
358 Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', January 21, 2010. For the original text of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights visit the UN website at 
http :/fwww. un,orglenfdocumentslmlhr/inrle>cshtml#a2 J. 
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The difficulty of attribution over the Internet is not only a problem for 
cyber insecurity; it is also a safeguard for global civil society. The same 
qualities of the Internet which afford anonymity to anti-social actors 
engaging in theft, espionage or disruptive behavior also provide cover 
for political activists in non-democratic states who wish to voice their 
ideas and collaborate with other like-minded citizens. It can also mean 
that someone may post illegal material and never be traced or that 
state or corporate espionage can be undertaken in the guise of an 
individual untraceable on the Internet. The same technology which 
protected Iranian dissidents using Twitter also protects al Qaeda 
operatives who use the Internet for planning and communication. 
Anonymity on the Internet allows people to protect their privacy from 
criminals and also from the scrutiny of their own or foreign authorities. 
In the context of human rights, better attribution has potentially dire 
consequences for those who chose to speak out against their 
governments or to seek access to information restricted by their 
government. The US approach has been to promote the rights of 
individuals to express their opinions online and to access information 
which their governments may seek to block. President Clinton's foreign 
policy was built around the core ideas of democratic enlargement 
through trade, the promotion of human rights and globalising and 
liberating markets. 359 A view of the world as open and connected 
359 In September 1993, President Clinton gave a speech to the United Nations 
General Assembly outlining this strategic framework which was reiterated in several 
subsequent speeches by senior officials including the Secretary of State and the 
National Security Advisor. William J. Clinton, 'Remarks to the 48th Session of the 
United Nations General Assembly', September 27th, 1993. Also, National Security 
Advisor Anthony Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', speech before the Johns 
Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC, 
September 21, 1993, and Secretary of State Warren Christopher, 'Building Peace in 
the Middle East', speech at Columbia University, September 20, 1993. 
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through trade was promoted by the administration reflecting a fresh 
approach to the post·Cold 'War international climate and articulating 
these ideas as not only "America's core values" but values with 
universal appeal. 360 In the early years of the Internet, prior to its 
widespread take up around the world, the Clinton·Gore administration 
focussed predominantly on the domestic promise of a fully developed 
and implemented information infrastructure.361 By 1999, the concept of 
promoting human rights abroad and the relevance of the Internet in 
that pursuit united in the National Security Strategy which listed 
information and communications technology as key to mitigating 
human rights abuses and promoting the free flow of information. 362 
Although neither the promotion of human rights nor Internet 
technology occupied quite the same place of importance in the Bush 
administration's foreign policy, the concept that access to the Internet 
was a human right continued to develop. The 2006 1Vatior1al Security 
Strategy did pick up on the previous Clinton era view that the 
promotion of human rights abroad was in the interests of the US. 
"Championing freedom advances our interests because the survival of 
liberty at home increasingly depends on the success of liberty 
abroad." 363 Throughout the Bush years, a numbe1· of bills were 
introduced (though not passed) designed to combat state sponsored 
360 Lake, 'From Containment to Enlargement', September 21, 1993, and Christopher, 
'Building Peace in the Middle East', September 20, 1993. 
361 Vice President Al Gore's speeches provide a very coherent example of the 
expectations which the administration had for the Internet in a domestic context. See 
Al C.rore, 'Remarks at the National Press Club', December 21, 1993 and also 'Remarks 
at UCLA', January 11, 1994. 
362 President William J. Clinton, United States National Security Stratef!Y, 
(Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1999), pg.26. 
ass President Bush, United States National Security Strategy, 2006, pg.3. 
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censorship and monitoring of Internet use. The Global Internet 
Freedom Bill, expressed the view that the United States should 
"denounce governments that restrict, censor, ban, and block access to 
information on the Internet" and "deploy technologies aimed at 
defeating state-directed Internet censorship and the persecution of 
those who use the Internet."364 US government efforts to defeat the 
blocking of Internet access included funding to provide counter-
censorship software to Chinese Internet users and later under the 
Obama administration, the issuance of similar software to target states 
including Iran, Sudan and Cuba. This, it was argued, would enable 
citizens of these states to "exercise their most basic rights" by using the 
Internet to communicate with each other and with the outside world.365 
As mentioned in Chapter Three, under the Obama administration, 
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton developed '21st Century Statecraft' 
which is essentially an effort to broaden diplomacy from a sole focus on 
government to government to the potential for "government-to-people, 
people-to-government, and maybe even people-to-people". 366 It relies on 
the belief that US interests are best pursued not solely through 
364 This bill was introduced to the 107th Congress as HR 5524. It was reintroduced as 
HR 48 in 2003. In addition there was a Senate version in the 107th Congress 
numbered S 3093, co· sponsored by Senator Ron Wyden and Senator Jon Kyl. 
365 On the Bush administration provision of counter-censorship software to Chinese 
citizens, see Thomas Lum, 'Internet Development and Information Control in the 
People's Republic of China', (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 
February 10, 2006), http://www.fas.org/sgplcrs/rowIBL33167.pdf. For the Obama 
administration's export of general licenses, see Merle David Kellerhals Jr., 'U.S. 
Treasury Opens Internet Exports to Iran, Sudan, Cuba', America.gov, March 12, 2010, 
http://\vww.a1neri.ca.gov/st/democracyhr-
english/2010/March/20100312160 l 16dmslahrellek0. 7673914.html. 
366 Micah L. Sifry, 'Hillary Clinton Launches "21st Century Statecraft" Initiative by 
State Department', techPresident, May 13, 2009. This article is based on an interview 
with Alec Ross, senior adviser to the Secretary of State for innovation, 
http://techpresident.com/blog·entrylhillarv·clinton·Iaunches·21st·century-statecraft· 
initiative-state-department. 
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material power but also through the promotion of US values and 
Clinton regards social networking technology as a key mechanism for 
the spread of these ideas. 367 In early 2010, senior State Department 
official Michael Posner argued that "it's very hard to change countries 
from outside. Countries change from within... So this [Internet 
freedom] is really a vital piece of what we're trying to do when we talk 
about linking human rights, democracy, and development."368 
This approach is built upon an understanding of the universal nature 
of specific values including freedom of speech and freedom to access 
information. Posner further argued for "one standard of freedom, one 
standard of free expression that applies across the board to every 
government, to every country. Everybody ought to be entitled to the 
same access to information."369 The State Department website clearly 
outlines that the "United States believes that 'certain core principles,' 
such as the freedom of expression as outlined in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, apply to everyone around the world."370 
®'This is a point of contention in debates about the wisdom of privileging of values 
over interests which remains unresolved in the literature., Anne-Marie SlaughtRr 
calls tfas an 'overworked dichotomy' and argues that interests and values are often 
too simplistically defined - a view which l"esonates with the findings of this thesis. 
See Anne-Marie Slaughter, 'Interests vs. Values? Misunderstanding Obama's Libya 
Strategy', New fork Review of Books, March 30, 201 L Available online at 
http://www.nvbooks.com/blogsinnblog/20 l lf mal'f 301interests·val11es-obamas· libya-
stra tegv/. 
'"" :Vfichael Posner, Assistant Secretary for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 
'State Department Officials Brief Reporters on Internet Freedom: Officials describe 
links between Internet freedom, human rights', State Department briefing, January 
23, 2010, Washington, D.C. Available online at htm://www.america.gov/stitexttrans· 
english/201 O/J an uaryf_20I0012312485\iSBleba h C 1. 35 7 234e·02. html. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Stephen Kaufman, 'Unrestricted, Secure Internet Access Critical, United States 
Says, America.gov, January 14, 2010. Available online at 
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21st Century Statecraft links the Internet to human rights in two ways. 
First, it perpetuates the approach developed over the previous decade 
that access to the Internet should be regarded as a human right. In 
this context, Clinton repeatedly links the Internet to the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and indeed this is a key component of her 
concept of 'Internet Freedom'.371 Clinton then expands this to define 
the Internet as a new 'site' of human rights abuses which is derived 
from what she dubs the "freedom to connect" - like the freedom of 
assembly, only in cyberspace.372 "I talked about how we must find ways 
to make human rights a reality. Today, we find an urgent need to 
protect these freedoms on the digital frontiers of the 21st century."373 
Hillary Clinton's Senior Advisor for Innovation, Alec Ross recently 
explained that "we're elevating Internet freedom from a piece of foreign 
policy arcana to something that's more central to our statecraft" 
because in this administration's view, Internet freedom "really lives at 
the convergence of security issues, human rights issues, and economic 
issues." 374 
The difficulties of attribution in this context then, act as a safeguard to 
protect vulnerable identities and promote human rights of access to 
information and the capacity to voice an opinion. This poses a dilemma 
http://www.america.gov/st/democracyhr· 
english/2010/J anuary/20 l 001 l4l 72447esnamfuak0.239G814. html 
an Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', January 21, 2010. 
372 Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', January 21, 2010. 
"'Ibid. 
374 Alec Ross, Senior Advisor for Innovation to Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, 
'State Department Officials Brief Reporters on Internet Freedom: Officials describe 
links between Internet freedom, human rights', State Department briefing, January 
23, 2010, Washington, D.C., http://www.america.gov/stltexttrans· 
english/201 OIJ anuarv/20l0012312·1856SBle bah Cl. :>5 7234e-02.html. 
2181Page 
Chopter Four Cyber Security 
for politicians engaged with cyber security policy. 'While better 
attribution appears to be an essential element of addressing the 
material power vulnerabilities discussed earlier in this chapter, the 
ability to hide one's identity is critical to the preservation of human 
rights on and over the Internet. The promotion of norms against 
government restrictions on the Internet coupled with the distribution 
of technology to circumvent these practices when they do occur rely on 
a positive view of anonymity on the Internet as it relates to US power. 
Privacy vs Security: The role of civil liberties 
In contrast to the 2006 National Security Strategy which stated that 
the promotion of US values abroad would support the continuation of 
US values at home ("Championing freedom advances our interests 
because the survival of liberty at home increasingly depends on the 
success of liberty abroad."375), the 2010 11/ational Security Strategy 
takes the reverse view. American values in this document must be 
upheld at home because the very act of doing so translates to a source 
of US national power abroad. "Fidelity to our values is the reason why 
the United States of America grew from a small string of colonies 
under the writ of an empire to the strongest nation in the world ... 
America must demonstrate through words and deeds the resilience of 
our values and Constitution."376 
This approach to US power provides a framework for understanding 
how the issues of cyber security outlined in the previous section on 
human rights also apply to civil liberties in the United States. Privacy 
375 President Bush. United States National Secmity Strategy, 2006, pg.3. 
376 President Obama, United States National Security Stmtegy, 2010, pg.35. 
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and security have been conceptually linked from the very early years of 
the Internet. A 1994 report from the National Research Council 
presciently argued that it was "imperative to develop at the outset a 
security architecture that will lay the foundation for protections of 
privacy, security, and intellectual property rights." 377 As an 
understanding of the implications of attribution evolved, it became 
clear that 'privacy' was not necessarily compatible with 'security and 
intellectual property rights'. A 1995 Government Accountability Office 
report identified several services which it argued would be essential for 
network security in the future. They included: "identification and 
authentication - the ability to verify a user's identity and a message's 
authenticity," and "non·repudiation - the ability to prevent senders 
from denying they have sent messages and receivers from denying they 
have received messages".378 Based on the section which explained the 
material power considerations of cyber security, it is clear how these 
policies, if implemented, might have reshaped cyber security 
technology. However, they could not be reconciled with the values and 
norms associated with civil liberties such as privacy, freedom of 
information and rights of the individual and an alternative approach 
was adopted. 
In 2000, the US government produced the first national plan for the 
protection of the information infrastructure - Defending America's 
Cyberspace. In it, President Clinton asserts his commitment to civil 
liberties, reassuring the American people that enhanced cyber security 
"cannot and will not come at the expense of our civil liberties. We must 
377 Leonard Kleinrock et al, 'Realizing the Information Future', (Washington, D.C.: 
National Academy Press, 1994), pg.5. 
378 Willemssen, 'Information Superhighway', pg.20. 
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never undermine the very freedoms we are seeking to protect."379 The 
implementation of this into policy is demonstrated in Program 10 of 
the Plan which states that "incorporated in every other program and is 
making what we do in the protection of critical cyber systems conform 
to Constitutional and other legal rights."38o This duality of security and 
privacy is acknowledged throughout the Plan, but ultimately it argues 
that "while safeguarding our critical infrastructures is vital, protecting 
our civil liberties is paramount."381 
This inter-relationship between security and privacy continues to 
evolve in the context of hearings into cyber security. In 2000, Michael 
Vatis testified at an Internet security hearing that FBI information 
gathering activities were conducted m strict adherence to 
constitutional and statutory requirements regarding personal privacy. 
His testimony is typical of the strongly worded belief in these 
institutions and norms. "These rules are founded first and foremost on 
the protection of privacy inherent in our constitutional system. Respect 
for privacy is thus a fundamental guidepost in all of our activities."382 
In the 2003 National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, President Bush 
attempts to reunite secm·ity and privacy on the same side of the policy 
arena by arguing that "the abuse of cyberspace infringes on our privacy 
and our liberty. It is incumbent on the federal government to avoid 
such abuse and infringement. Cybersecurity and personal privacy need 
s1s President Bush, Defending Americas Cyberspace, pg.iii. 
sw Ibid, pg.v. 
381 President Bush, Defending Americas Cyberspace, pg.xxxvi. 
382 Michael A. Vatis, Deputy Assistant Director, Federal Bureau ofinvestigation, 
Internet Security, hearing on March 8, 2000, pg.32. 
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not be opposing goals."383 However, despite a certain public tolerance 
for national security prerogatives following September 11, the privacy 
imperative was not easily erased from Internet security debates. In a 
2003 Congressional hearing, Representative Clay evoked an ideational 
approach to US power when he argued that "If we sacrifice the 
fundamental principles of our society in the name of security, we have 
won neither security nor freedom." 384 In this view, values lead to power 
- not capabilities. 
]\fore recently, m a speech announcing the appointment of a 
Cybersecurity Coordinator to the National Security staff, President 
Obama explained that "to ensure that policies keep faith with our 
fundamental values, this office will also include an official with a 
portfolio specifically dedicated to safeguarding the privacy and civil 
liberties of the American people." :385 The following year, the 2010 
National Security Strategy stated that "our digital infrastructure, 
therefore, is a strategic national asset, and protecting it - while 
safeguarding privacy and civil liberties - is a national security 
priority."386 
This overview of the role of civil liberties in debates about cyber 
security solutions demonstrates that although there were policy 
proposals in the mid 1990s which argued for the identification and 
authentication of Internet users, this approach failed to take hold in 
'"President Bush, National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, pg.14. 
384 Representative W.M. Lacy Clay, comments during Cyber Secl11ity: The Challenges 
facing our Nation in Critical lnfrastructure Protection, hearing on April 8, 2003, pg.8. 
385 President Obama, 'Remarks by tbe President on Securing Our Nation's Cyber 
Infrastructure', May 29, 2009. 
386 President Obama, United States National Security Strategy, 2010, pg.27. 
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US politics. Even though those proposals directly address the problems 
which cyber secuxity is perceived to pose for US power, politicians have 
continuously privileged values and norms in the belief that these 
underpin US power more significantly in this context than material 
capabilities do. 
Hillary Clinton has exhibited a deep understanding of the inter-
relationship between a problem grounded in material power and 
solutions derived from an ideational power framework. Rather than 
ignore or play down these apparent contradictions as has happened in 
the past, Clinton acknowledges them. She argues that "liberty and 
security, transparency and confidentiality, freedom of expression and 
tolerance - these all make up the foundation of a free, open, and secure 
society as well as a free, open, and secure Internet where universal 
human rights are respected, and which provides a space for greater 
progress and prosperity over the long run." 387 Ultimately, Clinton 
observes that the US will have to struggle to balance ideational and 
material power concerns and that in a sense, this will be a key feature 
of US power in the information age. 388 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the way in which conceptions of US power 
have shaped and influenced cyber security. The research revealed that 
rather than a single conception of power, there have been two 
387 Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 'Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices & 
Challenges in a Networked World", remarks delivered at George Washington 
University, Washington, DC on February 15, 2011, 
ht.tp ://wWYif .state.gov/secretarvlpn/2011/02/156619.!-itm. 
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competing conceptions of power which drive debates about cyber 
security technology in the US. A material view of power dominates 
discussions about how cyber insecurity threatens to undermine US 
power. The impact on outcomes of conflict, the economy and geopolitics 
were found to be the three most significant concerns. The policy 
response to these problems has been the publidprivate partnership in 
which politicians have expected the private sector to deliver solutions 
to cyber insecurity. The conception of power has been coupled with an 
Instrumental approach to technology which undermines the agency 
and authority of social actors - in this case, politicians. Politicians have 
consistently e:iqlressed the view that the government has neither the 
authority nor the capability to address what they regard as significant 
threats to US national security and power. 
Rather than privilege these material power concerns when formulating 
policies guiding cyber security technology, politicians have instead 
sought to promote a set of norms and values which they also associate 
with US power. They have regarded the protection of anonymity in the 
context of human rights and the protection of privacy in the context of 
civil liberties as essential to the sustenance of US power. Significantly, 
this conception of power is associated with a Social Constructivist 
approach to technology which imbues a sense of authority and 
responsibility. Politicians regard their actions to steer cyber security 
technology in this direction as legitimate and necessary and it is this 
conception of power which has been most influential in shaping cyber 
security technology. 
The case study leads to a number of findings and implications for 
understanding the relationship between power and new technology. 
One of the key findings of this case study has been that a conception of 
power based on values and norms can over-ride material concerns even 
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m the face of very serious risks. Politicians have regarded policies 
which undermine deeply embedded norms and values as a greater 
threat to US power than they have those which undermine material 
capabilities. Speeches and policy statements which elevate the role of 
values and norms can sometimes be regarded as rhetoric · particularly 
in the context of security concerns. However, in this case study, 
politicians' determination to adhere to a social view of power when 
engaging with solutions to a problem they frame in material terms is 
all the more significant in the face of the perception that the US 
remains dangerously exposed to cyber security threats. 
This illustrates the role of cl10ice which states exercise when dealing 
with these issues. This foreshadows one of the conclusions of this 
thesis; that the Internet does not have universally applicable effects on 
state power. Certainly the effects of the Internet can be observed on 
material and social factors of power. However, without understanding 
the choices which politicians make · first, about which factors they 
regard as most significant, and second, about how they shape 
technology in order to promote those factors, it is not possible to reach 
meaningful conclusions about the relationship between this new 
technology and state power in international relations. 
The second key finding of this case study is that the philosophical 
approach to teclmology with which politicians engage has implications 
for how they perceive their authority and agency to shape and 
influence technology. 'Vhen they articulate the ways in which cyber 
insecurity challenges US power and when they discuss the 
public/private partnership as a solution to those challenges, politicians 
engage with an approach to teclmology which is predominantly 
Instrumental. This approach regards problems which arise from 
technology as best addressed by more technology. It also expects those 
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solutions to emerge from market forces which continue to drive 
innovation in the 'best' direction without intervention from government. 
This correlates with the views expressed by politicians that they have 
neither the authority nor the capability to shape or influence this 
aspect of technology. In contrast, when discussing the social power 
factors of cyber security, politicians readily claim authority and indeed, 
responsibility for influencing the development of this technology in 
such a way as to best promote those aspects of US power. They believe 
that they can and should shape technology according to their 
conception of power and in fact, they do so by insisting on the 
preservation of anonymity and privacy over the benefits which more 
accurate attribution offers. 
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Chapter Five: Internet Governance 
Internet governance was initially perceived as a narrowly defined 
technical function of little interest other than to those tasked with 
managing it. However, it soon came to be recognised as an important 
form of power exercised globally. Through the mechanisms of Internet 
governance, decisions are made about how the Internet is used, how it 
grows and how it is controlled. Processes are institutionalised which 
determine who participates in governance, which voices are privileged 
and how decision makers are held accountable. These processes and 
decisions affect economies, impact on national identity formation, and 
undermine sovereignty in a number of important ways. Indeed, they 
have deeply political implications. 
By the mid 1990s, Internet governance had emerged as a problem - or 
'reverse salient'. A.n exponential increase in those connecting to the 
Internet put existing, governance mechanisms under considerable 
strain and it was proving difficult to obtain new names and addresses 
quickly or to resolve disputes about conflicted names in a timely 
manner. Politicians were concerned that this 'bottleneck' was 
preventing the Internet from fulfilling its commercial potential by 
inhibiting growth and expansion. This, it was believed, would have 
negative implications for US economic power - the focus of so much 
expectation in the 1990s. 
In 1998, the US Department of Commerce responded to this reverse 
salient by establishing a private, not-for-profit corporation to 
administer Internet governance. The Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICA.l\l'N) was awarded full control of Internet 
governance not only in the US but globally. In doing so, the US 
government was able to set the agenda, define the parameters of 
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debate and establish their own objectives and interests as the primary 
function of !CANN. In short, they established hegemonic control over 
Internet governance which profoundly shaped the way the Internet 
works today. Indeed, hegemony - defined here as not only a 
preponderance of power but the ability to set the agenda and shape the 
preferences of others is one of the key concepts to emerge from the 
analysis in this chapter.389 ICANN's agenda and its oversight by the 
US Department of Commerce ensured that Internet governance 
evolved in such a way as to shape the Internet int-0 an environment 
designed to promote commerce and enhance US power. 
The coordination of such a huge computer network was without 
precedent and while there has been no debate about the necessity of a 
stable mechanism for carrying out this function, exactly how this 
should happen and who should control key governance functions has 
become a globally significant issue which is increasingly contentious 
for economic, commercial and political reasons. These debates will be 
located within the broader literature on global governance in order to 
connect the case study to some of the perennial questions about 
governance, authority and power but also to highlight some of the ways 
in which !CANN differs from other global governance bodies. ICANN's 
distinctive structure as private sector body which formulates important 
policies for a global system generates a range of impediments to 
effective governance including important accountability measures. 
These, it will be shown, have implications for legitimacy both of 
"'"Robert Jervis, 'International Primacy: Is the Game Worth the Candle?', 
International Security, Vol.17, No.4, Spring 1993, pg.53, Christopher Layne, 
'Impotent Power? Re-examining the Nature of America's Hegemonic Power', The 
National Interest, September/October 2006, pg.46. 
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!CANN itself and of US oversight of Internet governance. Those 
implications for legitimacy in turn have implications for US power. 
Legitimacy is another important concept which features in this case 
study - particularly as it relates to hegemony. Stephen Walt has 
observed that hegemony raises concerns because others realise that the 
hegemon's power could threaten their own interests.390 As the political 
nature of Internet governance came to be more widely understood, 
questions arose about whose interests were being promoted through 
the established mechanisms for Internet governance and whether the 
US should continue to exercise control over key decisions about the 
technology. Both ICANN and the US government experienced 
independent but related challenges to their legitimacy. ICANN faced 
these challenges as a consequence of its own internal governance 
processes which were regarded to be lacking in transparency and 
accountability - issues which l'vfilton Mueller argues emerge partly due 
to its unorthodox structure.391 The US government faced challenges to 
its legitimacy as the hegemonic power due to the realisation by other 
state actors that it exercised unilateral ccntrol over a system upon 
which most of the world now heavily relied. However, at the same time, 
it had beccme apparent to US politicians that control ofICAJ."-J'N was an 
important source of power. They had been able to shape Internet 
governance in such a way as to promote their agenda of economic 
growth which was specifically intended to enhance US power. In order 
to prevent other norms or interests derailing that trajectory, retaining 
390 Stephen M. Walt, 'Taming American Power', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No.5, 
September/October 2005, pg.107. 
ss1 Milton Mueller, 'I CANN, Inc.: Accountability and Participation in the Governance 
of Critical Internet Resources', Internet Governance Project, November 16, 2009, 
http://int<>rnetgovemance.org/pcWICANNinc.pdf. 
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control of ICANN or at least, preventing any other state or 
institution from gaining control - was regarded as important to the 
pursuit of US power. As a consequence, while facing increasing 
pressure to distribute governance of the Internet, politicians became 
less inclined to release control and more concerned about how sharing 
control might undermine US material power. In addition to the 
Internet serving as a 'source' of economic growth and consequently, US 
power, the continued control over the DNS came to be regarded as an 
expression of US power over a global resource. 
Through the tension produced by this struggle for power and 
legitimacy, the US government embarked upon a series of negotiated 
concessions with the international community in order to relinquish 
enough control over Internet governance to maintain international 
support - which they regarded as essential to the continued promotion 
of a commercial agenda - without undermining their explicitly stated 
material power objectives. Their perception that they must balance the 
demands of both material and social factors that continued control 
over Internet governance relies on some degree of legitimacy - echoes 
broader debates in International Relations about the relationship 
between power and legitimacy.392 Ultimately, the evolution of Internet 
governance is a story of the interact.ion of hegemonic power and 
legitimacy and these two themes drive the narrative of this chapter. 
There are three import.ant findings to highlight in this case study. First, 
in the years immediately preceding the establishment of !CANN, 
m Stephen M. Walt, Taming American Power: The Global Response to U.S. PrimacJ; 
(New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 2005), Josef ,Joffe, [Jberpower: The imperial 
Te111ptation of America, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006), Nye, 'l'he 
Paradox of American Power, Reus-Smit, American Power and World Ordu. 
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changes in the international order combined with advances in 
information and communications technology to create a political shift 
in approaches to US power - particularly within the Clinton-Gore 
administration. Ideas which emerged from this linked the Internet to 
US economic power in such a way as to impact significantly on the 
structures subsequently put into place to govern an increasingly global 
Internet. These ideas have had a lasting impact and continue to shape 
Internet governance today. The second finding is that when Internet 
governance came to be recognised as a reverse salient or problem, US 
politicians combined this material view of power with a Social 
Constructivist approach to technology. These two elements together 
formed a framework which not only clearly articulated the way in 
which the technology should develop but lent authority and agency to 
the politicians making these decisions. The third important finding is 
that when this arrangement encountered legitimacy challenges, US 
politicians responded through a social conception of power. 
The chapter begins with an introduction to Internet governance from 
both a technical and a conceptual perspective. The technical section 
explains key terms and concepts which will recur throughout the 
chapter and are integral to understanding Internet governance. This 
is intentionally brief so as to avoid re-writing the technological history 
which has been covered so abundantly in other studies but substantial 
enough to promote a better understanding of the depth and breadth of 
the challenges of Internet governance. The conceptual section of this 
introduction to Internet governance locates the issue in broader 
debates about global governance and power. Here it becomes clear that 
ICANN is a unique case due to its hybrid structure which is distinct 
from state governments, inter-governmental or non-governmental 
organisations and conventional private sector bodies which typically 
occupy debates about global governance. This unique structure 
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emerges as an important factor later in the chapter during the 
discussion on legitimacy challenges to ICA.1\IN which are significantly 
enhanced by a lack of accountability - a key element of governance. 
Following this introduction to Internet governance the chapter looks at 
the evolution of the set of ideas which have framed this issue in US 
political debates. There was a synergistic confluence of events - both 
technical and political - which combined over the course of the 1980s 
and late 1990s to shape politicians' approach to Internet governance. 
In addition t-0 outlining these factors, this section draws out the 
relevance of politicians establishing the commercial sector as the 
'relevant social group' in Internet governance considerations. The 
relevant social group a methodological tool borrowed from the Social 
Construction of Technology which allows for the identification of the 
actor or actors whose requirements and expectations are privileged in 
decisions about how technology should develop. It is understood that 
this has a substantial impact on how technology evolves as it guides 
decision making. 
The next maJor section of this chapter analyses how politicians 
(unselfconsciously) combined this conception of power with a Social 
Constructivist approach to technology in their efforts to influence and 
shape the establishment of ICANN. By the late 1990s, there was a 
growing perception amongst US politicians that the existing, somewhat 
informal Internet governance structure was inadequate to facilitate the 
commercial opportunities that they envisaged for it. This was regarded 
by them as critical given the important role they believed that new 
technology generally and the Internet specifically, could play in 
restoring US power to a globally dominant position. This section 
demonstrates the dynamics of a 'reverse salient' and its usefulness as a 
conceptual device for this thesis. It also reveals how approaches to 
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technology can unite with conceptions of power to contribute to policy 
outcomes. 
The chapter moves on to explain the role of legitimacy in Internet 
governance. Plagued by accusations of illegitimacy brought about by a 
perceived lack of transparency and accountability, procedural 
ambiguity and an expanding mandate, ICANN continues to operate 
under the purview of the US Department of Commerce. US politicians 
express growing concern that poor governance practices which 
undermine ICANNs legitimacy could threaten the status quo which 
has been established to preference US objectives. Indeed, politicians 
link legitimacy to the US ability to "fend off interference from the UN 
and from governments". 393 Their response is to take steps to shore up 
legitimacy- both for ICANN and US oversight and they do so through 
a series of contractual concessions which will be covered in this section. 
This chapter concludes by drawing out some implications of these 
findings for our understanding of the relationship between power and 
new technology. These fall into two categories; the first is the relevance 
of broader tensions between power and legitimacy in the cont,ext of 
Internet governance and the second is the importance of understanding 
the relationship between conceptions of power and approaches to 
technology. 
393 Steve De!Bianco. Vice President for Public Policy, Association for Competition 
Technology, on behalf ofNetChoice Coalit.ion, ICAJvN Internet Governance: Is It 
Wo1'.king?, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of 
Representatives, September 21, 2006, pg. 33. 
2331 p 3 g 0 
Chapter Five Internet Governance 
Internet Governance: Technology and Concepts 
In order to understand the issues at play in this chapter, it is necessary 
to have a basic understanding of the 'Domain Name System' (the DNS) 
which is the main focus of ICA.1.'JN's governance. The following 
paragraphs offer a very basic introduction to this technology which will 
help to contextualise the rest of the chapter. This will be followed by 
locating the issue within concepts of governance both to link it to 
broader debates and to define the ways in which ICA."JN is unique. 
Technical Brief 
To manage a computer network and to ensure that packets of 
information are routed to the destination they ai>e intended for, each 
connected machine must be allocated a unique identifier or 'address'. 
In the context of the Internet, these identifiers are referred to as 
Internet Protocol addresses - or IP addresses. As IP numbers are long 
and not easily recalled, they are coupled with 'domain names'. This 
allows the user to simply type in www.icann.org rather than 
"192.0.34.163" - the actual IP address. In addition to managing the 
allocation of IP addresses so as to avoid conflicting numbers, these 
domain names and IP addresses must be constantly recorded and 
updated in a central database and made readily available to global 
traffic on the Internet to facilitate the rapid and accurate transfer of 
information. These details are retained in a kind of 'phone book' file 
stored on 13 computers known as 'root servers', located all over the 
world. The system as a whole is referred to as the Domain Name 
System (DNS). 
Ensuring that these names and addresses remain umque, that old 
numbers no longer in use are surrendered and that new addresses are 
issued in an orderly manner is a significant aspect of Internet 
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governance. If this function is not carefully managed, two entities could 
be assigned the same address creating a clash, or the Internet could 
run out of addresses more quickly if surrendered addresses were not 
able to be reassigned. Assuming that they have been issued in an 
orderly manner, administering and resolving the names and numbers 
on an ongoing basis (referred to as 'universal resolvability') becomes a 
key element of the security and stability of the Internet. Universal 
resolvability means that every computer connected to the Internet has 
access to the same information about which address relates to which 
number. "Without this, directing packets of information to the correct 
destination is impossible. Indeed, the DNS is absolutely critical to the 
operability of the vast number of services which have come to rely on 
the Internet. 
For many years while the network was restricted to the science and 
military communities, the DNS was managed by a single individual -
Jon Postel, a computer scientist from the University of Southern 
California. After the commercialisation of the Internet in 1992, the US 
government contracted the management of the DNS out to a private 
firm Network Solutions. However, with the extraordinary expansion 
of the Internet, the task of managing the DNS rapidly escalated both in 
scope and in relative importance, outgrowing the somewhat informal 
governance mechanisms which were in place. Furthermore, as the 
Internet community broadened to include businesses, individuals, 
NGOs - all across international boundaries - these governance 
functions came to be understood as not simply technical, but highly 
political as well due to their implications for sovereignty, state 
economies and cultural distinctions. These developments (discussed in 
more detail later in this chapter) led to the establishment in 1998 of 
the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (!CANN) · 
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a private, not for profit organisation which was awarded full 
responsibility and control over the DNS by the US government. 
Conceptual Approach to Governance and the Internet 
In addition to these technical details, there are some important 
conceptual factors which feed into this case study. As governance is the 
mechanism through which authority and power is exercised in this 
case study - and over which legitimacy is challenged it is useful to 
locate these debates in the context of broader literature about global 
governance . 
. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall have nominated global 
governance "one of the defining characteristics of the current 
international moment" and certainly, it has implications for a wide 
range of transnational concerns including the environment, economies, 
communications and trade. 394 Thomas Weiss regards debates about 
global governance as emerging from a growing realization amongst 
International Relations scholars in the 1970s and 1980s that both a 
Realist state based approach as well as liberahnstitutionalist theories 
focused on interdependence were failing to adequately incorporate the 
"vast increase, in both numbers and influence, of non·state actors and 
the implications of technology in an age of globalization".395 In addition 
to this quantitative increase in actors on the world stage, scholars like 
Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg argue that there has been a 
'"Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance' in Power in 
Global Governance, Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, fods) (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2005), pg. 1. 
395 Thomas G. Weiss, 'Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: 
Conceptual and Actual Challenges', :Third World QuarterlyVol.21, No.5, October 
2000, pg. 796. 
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quantitative shift as well. They suggest that a "plethora of forms of 
social organization and political decision·making exist that are neither 
directed toward the state nor emanate from it." 396 Perhaps not 
surprisingly, given the broad range of concerns briefly outlined here, 
definitions of global governance vary, but James Rosenau takes a 
broad view which is useful in the context of this study. He regards 
global governance as "systems of rule at all levels of human activity-
from the family to the international organization-in which the pursuit 
of goals through the exercise of control has transnational 
repercussions."397 
The Internet prompted speculation about how global governance might 
translate to cyberspace. As early as 1998, Robert Keohane and Joseph 
Nye observed that "rules will be necessary to govern cyberspace, not 
only protecting lawful users from criminals but ensuring intellectual 
property rights". 398 The normative assumption that intellectual 
property rights (as a commercial concern) should he central to Internet 
governance has been deeply embedded in US debates around this issue 
from the beginning and rarely challenged in academic or policy debates. 
Keohane and Nye further argued that "classic issues of politics · who 
governs and on what terms · are as relevant to cyberspace as to the 
real world".399 This was a view encapsulated in the 'Tunis Agenda for 
Action', one of the final outcomes of the UN sponsored World Summit 
'"" Klaus Dingwerth and Philipp Pattberg, 'Global Governance as a Perspective on 
World Politics', Global Governance, Vol.12, No. l, January - March 2006, pg.191. 
397 James N. Rosenau, 'Governance in the Tvventy·first Century', Global Governance, 
Vol.l, No.l, Winter 1995, pg.13. 
398 Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', pg.82. 
399 Ibid, pp.82·83. 
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on the Information Society in 2005.400 This document defines Internet 
governance as "the development and application by governments, the 
private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared 
principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes 
that shape the evolution and use of the Internet."401 This definition 
resonates with basic regime theory but it also implies an affinity with 
the Social Constructivist approach to technology m that it 
acknowledges the role of social groups in shaping technology. It links 
global governance back to perennial questions for the study of power in 
both the virtual and physical environment. 
Barnett and Duvall link governance to power not only through 
questions like 'who governs?', but significantly for this case, 'how are 
institutions designed to check the potential abuse of power?'·102 In their 
view, "the rules, structures, and institutions that guide, regulate, and 
control social life" are fundamental elements of power. 403 In the case of 
ICANN, these questions lead to some provocative answers. In fact, one 
of the defining debates about ICANN is that as an institution, it has 
been designed without measuxes to check the potential abuse of power 
and this will be explored in more depth in the section on ICANN and 
US Power. 
Lit€rature on global governance provides a framework for what might 
be expected of I CANN and its functions. It also helps to illustrate how 
4c-0 TunisAtrenda for the l11formation Society World Summit on the Information 
Society, held in Tunis, Tunisia, Publication dated November 15, 2005, 
http ://www ,itu,intlwsisldocs21tunisloff~v l, pdf, 
4-01 Ibid. 
<02 Barnett and Duvall, 'Power in Global Governance' pg. 2. 
<os Ibid. 
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ICANN does not meet those expectations. !CANN, it will be explained, 
is a unique organization due in part to its unusual structure and also 
due to its mixed mandate of governing a globally significant resource 
upon which many state functions rely while at the same time, 
operating a commereial enterprise. 
From Guns to Butter: A New Conception of US Power 
A Social Construction of Technology approach urges the close 
examination of changing priorities for any technology, for it is at these 
junctures of change when long held assumptions are sometimes 
challenged and reassessed that the ways in which social groups shape 
technology can become most apparent. 404 Relating changing priorities 
to technological developments also allows for the analysis of where 
those priorities emanate from, whose priorities are being addressed 
and how those priorities shape technology. Chapter Three discussed 
how changes in conceptions of US power from primarily military to 
President Clinton's emphasis on the importance of economic growth led 
to a shift in priorities for Internet technology. In President George H. 
Bush's approach to power, the Internet had little if any relevance, 
however in the Clinton·Gore view, it became an important element of 
future economic growth and consequently, US power. 
The Clinton-Gore conception of US power as dependent on economic 
g·rowth (and also projected through economic engagement) repurposed 
the Internet from a military/science project (as it was perceived during 
the Cold \Var and by President Bush) to a potential mechanism for the 
growth of US power. This led to a shift in priorities about how the 
<o4 Mackenzie, Knowing Machines, pg.6. 
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technology should be managed and in which direction it should be 
encouraged to develop. First, in order to maximise its commercial 
potential, it was desirable that the Internet move from an elite tool to 
be broadly available. This was evident in the discourse of the National 
Information InfraBtructure and the bills which arose from it. As 
discussed in Chapter Three, there was a marked transition from the 
first High PerfDimance Computing Act of 1991 which focused on the 
National Research and Education Network (NREN) a network 
primary targeted at researchers - to the National Information 
lnfraBtructure Act of 1993 (HR 1757) which placed greater emphasis on 
the general population as users of the network. 405 The Internet was 
regarded by the Clinton-Gore administration as an essential element of 
the national infrastructure like roads and electricity and it was 
discussed usmg that terminology 
superhighway'. 41IB 
as the 'information 
A second outcome of the shift in priorities of the Clinton·Gore 
administration was the privatisation and commerdalisation of the 
Internet. Although it is rarely discussed in these terms, the 
privatisation and commercialisation of the Internet was in large part a 
political development - not a technological one. As also detailed in 
Chapter Three, policy documents clearly state that the intention of the 
US government was to privatise and commercialise the network in 
ws For an analysis of this transition, see Bishop, 'The National Information 
Infrastructure'. 
•os Senator Gore, speech to Congress introducing the National High·Performance 
Computer Technology Bill, May 18, 1989. 
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order to maximise its potential for contributing to US economic growth 
and thus improve the state's international standing.407 
A third outcome of this period was that these factors all combined to 
contribute to an exponential increase in the registration of domain 
names and numbers putting existing mechanisms for Internet 
governance under considerable strain. By the mid 1990s, and in the 
context of the Clinton-Gore ambitions for Internet technology, Internet 
governance had come to be perceived as a problem or 'reverse salient'. 
Existing mechanisms were perceived as preventing the Internet from 
fulfilling its commercial potential by proving inadequate to deal with 
the extraordinary growth and expansion of the 1990s. 
In summary then, as the Cold War wound down, eventually concluding 
with the fall of the Soviet Union, there was an attendant shift in 
dominant ideas about both US power and Internet technology. 
Politically, ideas about American power and new technology which had 
been steadily gaining traction within some quarters of US politics, 
found firm ground with the election of the Clinton-Gore administration. 
ffitimately, foreign policy, economic policy and technology policy would 
converge in the early 1990s to emphasise the importance of global 
social, political and economic networks to American power.408 At the 
same time, Internet technology which was rapidly evolving and 
'"' This was confirmed as a consistently desirable outcome in government circles by 
Frederick Weingarten who worked for many years in the Office of Technology 
Assessment. Author interview in August 2008, Washington, D.C. 
'" "From beyond nations, economic and technological forces all over the globe are 
compelling the world towards integration. These forces are fuelling a welcome 
explosion of entrepreneurship and political liberalization." President Clinton, 
'Remarks to the 4Sth Session of the United Nations General Assembly', September 27, 
1993. 
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changing was reprioritised by US politicians from a military/science 
project to having potential to contribute to the US economy. The 
network was privatised and opened to commercial traffic, the World 
\.Vide Web was invented and there was rapid movement of both 
commercial enterprise and private access to the Internet. 
Internet Governance as a Problem for Power 
Establishing who should govern the Internet and how might have been 
a question left to the technical community had it not been for the 
expectations of the Clinton·Gore administration that the Internet 
would play a role in rejuvenating US power. At heart, the 'problem' of 
Internet governance for US politicians was its capacity to undermine 
commercial confidence in the network The dot.com boom of the 1990s 
had already substantially reinforced those ideas about the relationship 
between new technology, the economy and US power. During this 
period, small single person or small partnership companies which 
provided an innovative web service generated unprecedented levels of 
wealth with very low overheads.409 
There is an assumption in much of the literature and most of policy 
documents that the Internet has a 'natural' or normative relationship 
with commerce. However in studies like this one which seek to 
understand how actors shape technology, it is important to remain 
aware that technology does not have a pre·determined path. Rather, it 
reflects the expectations, norms and values which actors with the 
power to do so lay upon it. Given that the Clinton-Gore administration 
409 Some examples include E·bay and Google. These will be discussed in more depth 
in Chapter Six: Network Neutrality. 
2421 Page 
Chapter Ave Internet Governance 
now regarded the Internet as integrally linked to US economic power, 
resolving the problem of managing the DNS was perceived as an issue 
with some political gravity. An early policy paper justifying US 
government intervention in Internet governance argued that "many 
businesses and consumers are still wary of conducting extensive 
business over the Internet because of the lack of a predictable legal 
environment governing transactions." 410 The DNS needed to be stable 
and secure so as to provide a reliable operating environment for private 
enterprise. The Internet, and particularly Internet governance, is 
oriented primarily towards commerce because that was the vision 
which the Clinton-Gore administration had for the technology and the 
policies which they developed were devised to shape the technology 
into that purpose. 
'W'hen decisions are made about technology, they are made with 
reference to the needs, expectations or desires of a particular actor or 
group of actors. Decisions about how technology should evolve or be 
incorporated into society do not have universal appeal. They generally 
privilege some while disadvantaging others. Identifying this nuance in 
how decisions about technology are made, provides insight into how 
those in power exercise their power and interpret the most desirable 
outcomes for technology. The following pages explain how Internet 
governance came to be perceived of as a 'problem' by US politicians and 
how they identified the commercial sect-Or as the 'relevant social group' 
for whom they were devising solutions to that problem. That is, they 
410 President William J, Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore Jr .. The Framework 
for Global Electronic Comme1'Ce, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1997), 
_Q.t.tp:/fclinton.4.nara.govlW:~fJ'New/Commerce/ 
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perceived that privileging the interests of the commercial sector was 
the best way to promote their agenda of enhancing US power. 
In the latter half of the 1990s, political decisions about the Internet 
(including privatisation and commercialisation) combined with 
technological developments such as the invention of the World \Vide 
Web and the Mosaic browser led to an explosion in registrations of IP 
names and numbers as the user base for the Internet grew from 
predominantly research and military users to include government 
departments, businesses of all sizes and individuals. The graph below 
illustrates this dramatic growth over a two year period. 
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Quite apart from the exponential increase in users due to the 
popularity of the web, there was also an underlying technical function 
which placed a strain on the DNS by increasing the demand for domain 
names. Tim Berners Lee and his colleagues designed the web to use a 
'Uniform Resource Locator' (URL) t-0 identify resources on the web, 
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including documents, images, downloadable files and services. As its 
starting point, the URL uses the domain name which encouraged the 
registration of new domain names in order to shorten URLs. 411 Rather 
than have one's biography page located at the address 
"http:/fips.cap.anu.edu.au/ir/studies/phd/carr.php", it is preferable in 
many cases (particularly in a commercial context) to simply register 
the domain name '\vww.madelinecarr.com". The URL quickly became 
part of the image of a product or person online and as this preference 
for more direct addresses became the norm, domain names and 
numbers were in much greater demand. 
An early Internet pioneer and computer scientist at the University of 
Southern California, Jon Postel had recorded and released IP 
addresses under the auspices of the Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority {IAi"\l'A). 412 Initially, these were contained in a paper 
notebook but as the task grew, Postel migrated the data to a text file. 
In the early years, while there was a relatively small number of people 
and organisations who required IP addresses, this system worked well 
but even prior to the post-commercialisation explosion in requests for 
IP addresses in the mid 1990s, it became clear that the Internet had 
outgrown these governance arrangements and that the task had 
outgrown the capacity of a single individual. 
In 1992, the US government (through the National Science 
Foundation) contracted a private firm, Network Solutions, to manage 
the .com, .org and .net domains. This was not a long term solution to 
411 A deeper understanding of this technical function is not necessary to this paper, 
but those interested should refer to Milton Mueller, Ruling the Roo~ pg.108 for a 
clear and concise explanation. 
412 Berners Lee, Weaving the Web, pg.127. 
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Internet governance as Network Solution's privileged position and 
ability to generate substantial revenue through domain name 
registrations led to dissatisfaction amongst their competitors while 
their inability to deal quickly and effectively with the onslaught of new 
copyright disputes led to dissatisfaction amongst their clients. 413 
By the late 1990s, it had become clear that Internet governance was 
failing to meet the needs of the commercial sector. By doing so, it was 
also inhibiting the economic growth and consequent increase in US 
power which politicians believed would follow. In framing the reverse 
salient in this way, it followed that when they debated possible 
solutions to this problem, they privileged the needs and expectations of 
the commercial sector. In Social Construction of Technology terms, 
they had determined that the commercial sector was the 'relevant 
social group'. In the case of Internet governance, the relevant social 
group might alternatively have been identified as global or domestic 
civil society, the Department of Defense which funded so much of the 
research or state governments. Had any of these been identified as the 
relevant social group, Internet governance may have evolved very 
differently. 
ICANN and Hegemony as the Solution 
In the post Cold War period, broader conceptions of US power in the 
context of unipolarity had refocussed attention on questions about the 
413 There are many comprehensive histories of the early days of Internet governance 
covering the contributions of ,Jon Postel and Network Solutions. For more detail, see 
Barry M. Leiner et al, 'A Brief History of the Internet', Abbate, lnvenling the 
Internet, Mueller, Ruling the Root. 
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nature of hegemonic power, some of which were replicated in the 
microcosm of Internet governance. International Relations scholar 
Robert Jarvis writes that in addition to the "usual and crude measures 
of powe11', a preponderance of power can result in a state's capacity to 
"establish, or at least strongly influence, 'the rules of the game' ... the 
intellectual frameworks employed by many states, and the standards 
by which behaviour is judged to be legitimate."414 
In a 1998 journal article, Keohane and Nye argue against a 
Technologically Determinist view which regards information 
technology as a levelling influence, empowering small states and 
disempowering large, powerful states. They point out this technology 
can also reinforce existing power structures because "first movers are 
often the creators of the standards and architecture of information 
systems."415 They were referring specifically to the use of the English 
language in domain names but. the same principle applies to the way in 
which the US took unilateral control of Internet governance and 
embedded it in an institutional framework which was designed to 
address their objectives and interests. In doing so, the US exercised a 
form of hegemonic power which allowed it to steer Internet governance 
in such a way as to specifically address the US defined agenda of 
economic growth. By assuming authority to manage Internet 
governance, these politicians were able to establish the 'rules of the 
game', the agenda and the terms of reference and these would have a 
lasting effect on the technology. 
414 Jervis, 'International Primacy', pg.53. 
415 Keohane and Nye, 'Power and Interdependence in the Information Age', pg.88. 
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An analysis of relevant policy papers which preceded the establishment 
of I CANN demonstrates how politicians conceived of the solution to the 
problem which inadequate Internet governance posed for the future of 
US economic power in a cohesive and targeted way from early on. They 
had clear objectives and they purposely set about establishing and 
institutionalising a mechanism for Internet governance which would 
best address those objectives. 
Three significant policy papers were released by the US government 
between July 1997 and June 1998. These were the Frt1mework for 
Global Electronic Commerce (July 1997), The Green Paper on Internet 
Governance (February 1998), and The White Paper on ]ifanagement of 
Internet names az1d Addresses, (June 1998). Together, these policy 
papers articulated the approach of the Clinton administration to the 
future of new technology and the policy vision for its potential 
contribution to US power. In addition, they formally charted a path 
from the existing Internet governance mechanisms to a future which 
was based on the establishment ofICANN. 
Framework for Global Electronic Co11l11lerce 
The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce (GEC) was issued by 
the Clinton administration in July, 1997. Largely authored by Ira 
Magaziner, Clinton's 'technology czar', the GEC articulated the 
Administration's "vision for the emergence of the Global Information 
Infrastructure (GII) as a vibrant global marketplace" with a particular 
focus on the Internet which the paper refers to as a revolutionary force 
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in the commercial sector. 416 The GEC proposed five principles for 
Internet governance: 
• the private sector should lead development of mechanisms to 
facilitate the successful operation of the Internet; 
• governments should avoid undue restrictions and regulation; 
• governmental involvement should be limited to supporting and 
enforcing a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal 
environment for commerce; 
• governments should recognise the umque qualities of the 
Internet and not assume that existing regulatory schemes are 
appropriate for new technology; and, 
• electronic commerce over the Internet should be facilitated on a 
global basis. 
The GEC was specifically addressing electronic commerce, so it is not 
surprising that the principles express belief in the value of the private 
sector and market forces, minimal government regulation and the 
power of global trade. However, taken in context with the policy 
documents which followed, it is an early indication of the privileging of 
the commercial sector which would form the basis of Internet 
governance. The GEC explicitly states that "widespread competition 
and inci·eased consumer choice should be the defining features of the 
new digital marketplace" and it specifies that problems with Internet 
governance had led "businesses and consumers to be cautious". 417 
416 President Clinton and Vice President Gore, The Framework for Global Electronic 
Commerce. 
•11 Ibid. 
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\Vhile this policy document suggested that any government influence 
should be light handed and flexible so as not to 'impede' the natural 
growth of the Internet and the US economy, it also stressed that the 
Internet was in need of some 'shaping' by the government. 
"Governments can have a profound effect on the growth of commerce 
on the Internet. By their actions, they can facilitate electronic trade or 
inhibit it." 418 These policy proposals laid the groundwork for the 
following 'Green Paper' on Internet governance. 
The Green Paper 
In the US, a 'Green Paper' represents an opportunity for the 
government to gauge and compile the opinions of stakeholders on an 
issue prior to settling on policy. Although it was widely acknowledged 
that Internet governance had to evolve in order to address the 
increased demand for names and numbers, there was significant 
contention amongst the technical and business sectors about how this 
should happen. 419 In 1998, the National Telecommunications and 
Information Administration (NTIA), an agency of the Department of 
Commerce published a Green Paper under the title "Improvement of 
Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses: Proposed 
Rule". 420 It articulated the strong beliefs within the Clinton·Gore 
administration about the commercial potential of new technology, the 
41s President Clinton and Vice President Gore, The Framework for Global .Blectronic 
lommerce. 
""This discord was referred to in the Green Paper. "Recognizing that no solution will 
win universal support, the U.S. government seeks as much consensus as possible 
before acting." 'Improvement of Technical Management oflnternet Names and 
Addresses: Proposed Rule', Federal Register, Vol.63, No.34, February 20, 1998, 
pg.8827. 
420 Ibid, pp.8826·33. 
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benefits of global trade, the need for legitimacy and the benefits of 
private sector solutions. In the Green Paper, these all point towards 
the establishment of a private entity which appears independent but 
comes within the purview of US control. The problems and solutions 
expressed in this policy document are very much in line with the 
principles expressed in the GEC - that the private sector should take 
the lead in Internet governance with government playing an important 
but limited role, that the scope needed to be recognised as global and 
that the focus was to be commerce. 
Articulated in the Green Paper were government's reasons for 
implementing changes to the structures of existing Internet 
governance. They included: 
• the "widespread dissatisfaction about the absence of competition 
in domain name registration", 
• the growing numbers of Internet users who reside outside the 
US and "want a larger voice in Internet coordination 
• the understanding that as domain names and numbers acquired 
commercial value, they could not be managed by an entity which 
was "not formally accountable to the Internet community", and; 
• "As the Internet becomes commercial, it becomes inappropriate 
for U.S. research agencies to participate in and fund these 
functions". 421 
These same themes recur in the four principles articulated for the 
proposed governance system: stability, competition, private bottom-up 
m For a complete list, see 'Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names 
and Addresses: Proposed Rule', pg.8827. 
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coordination and representation. These, the Green Paper states, were 
derived from stakeholder consultation and were designed to 
accommodate an uncertain future. 422 
Stability: "The introduction of a new system should not disrupt current 
operations, or create competing root systems". 423 
Competition: "The Internet succeeds in great measure because it is a 
decentralized system that encourages innovation and maximises 
individual freedom. Where possible, market mechanisms that support 
competition and consumer choice should drive the technical 
management of the Internet because they will promote innovation, 
preserve diversity, and enhance user choice and satisfaction."424 
Private, Bottom-up Coordination: "A private coordinating process is 
likely to be more flexible than government and to move rapidly enough 
to meet the changing needs of the Internet and of Internet users." 425 
Representation: Technical management of the Internet should reflect 
the diversity of its users and their needs. .Mechanisms should be 
established to ensure international input in decision making. In 
keeping with these principles, we divide the name and number 
functions into two groups, those that can be moved to a competitive 
system and those that should be coordinated. We then suggest the 
creation of a representative, not-for-profit corporation to manage the 
422 'Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses: 
pg.8827. 
423 Ibid. 
424 Ibid. 
425 Ibid. 
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coordinated functions according to widely accepted objective 
criteria." 426 
Of these, stability and competition were the two principles most fully 
realised through the establishment of !CANN. They are also the two 
most aligned with the Clinton-Gore vision for the Internet as a 
mechanism for enhancing US economic power. The flexibility of private 
coordination was realised but !CANN responded not to the "changing 
needs of the Internet and Internet users" - they were far too diverse to 
be considered as a cohesive unit. Rather, ICANN responded to the 
agenda within which it had been created, a fact which will become 
apparent as the chapter progresses through an analysis of some of the 
problems !CANN later encountered. In addition, representation was 
never pursued through the establishment of I CANN. On the contrary, 
it has been a point of considerable contention and this will also be 
discussed at more length later in the chapter. 
The White Paper 
The Green Paper generated over 650 (submitted) responses. In :May 
1998, the subsequent \Vhite Paper was released by the National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) 
responding to feedback and detailing the policy which would frame the 
establishment of !CANN. 427 The four principles articulated in the 
Green Paper, (stability, competition, private bottom-up coordination, 
425 'Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses: 
pg.8827. 
427 'Management of Internet Names and Addresses', National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration, US Department of Commerce, May 6, 1998, 
http:flwww.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/d.omainname/6 5 98dns.htm. 
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and representation) were sustained with 'stability' providing the 
justification for a continued role for the US Government. 
Although the V.'bite Paper did modify some elements of the Green 
Paper in response to the feedback received from the public, it did not 
deviate from the government's view on what the new governing body 
should be, how it should operate and most importantly, which goals 
and norms it should promote and institutionalise. Indeed, the written 
justifications for not amending the White Paper further made it clear 
that only modifications which did not deviate from the intended policy 
were considered. 428 
In September, 1998 following these policy proposals and consultation 
with stakeholders, ICANN was established as a private, not for profit 
incorporated body subject to the jurisdiction of the state of California 
and placed under the purview of the Department of Commerce. Placing 
Internet governance under the purview of the Department of 
Commerce effectively set the parameters for future debates by moving 
commercial interests to the fore ahead of competing agendas such as 
security or national sovereignty. By institutionalising the existing 
informal governance arrangements (which had been carried out 
predominantly by people based in the US), the government ensured a 
level of future control over the development of the Internet. Despite the 
fact that the Internet was already a global network with no clear locus 
of 'ownership', the US government would retain the capability to 
further shape Internet governance through this relationship. 
428 'Management of Internet Names and Addresses', US Department of Commerce, 
May6, 1998. 
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These policy processes, culminating in the formation of ICANN as a 
global Internet governance body, demonstrate how the conception of 
power outlined in the previous section has shaped technology. A 
material conception of power which linked Internet governance to US 
economic growth was combined with a Social Constructivist approach 
to technology in order to very effectively define the parameters of 
debate and guide the outcome to address the goals articulated by these 
politicians. A single·minded emphasis on commercial prerogatives like 
competition and private sector solutions over those of technological 
determinants (like alternative protocols), political norms uor example 
addressing breaches of sovereignty) or security concerns (cyber crime 
and terrorism) has profoundly shaped not only ICANN but global 
Internet governance. 
Essentially, the fact that !CANN is administered by the Department of 
Commerce has a determining impact on setting ICANN's agenda as 
this subset of US politicians is the group assessing its conduct and to a 
large extent, affecting the vote on its future. Although the Department 
of Commerce policy was initially to be hands off and move I CANN to a 
fully independent arrangement as soon as possible, this has been 
countered by a very evident reluctance to relinquish control of an 
instrument so important to the US economy, 429 
'""While the Department continues to serve as the steward of critical elements of 
the domain name system during the transition to private sector management, 
ICA.'i'N iB the private sector organization responsible for its day-to-day management." 
Nancy J. Victory, testimony at ICAl'iflv Go.-ernance, hearing before the Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and 
Space, United States Senate, June 12, 2002, pg 5. 
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ICANN and US Power: Legitimacy vs Hegemony 
Samuel Huntington has argued that states pursue primacy "in order to 
be able to insure their security, promote their interests, and shape the 
international environment in ways that will reflect their interests and 
values."<30 The previous pages have demonstrated how US politicians 
have exercised power effectively to shape global Internet governance so 
that it reflects their interests and values. However, almost 
immediately following the establishment of ICANN both the 
organisation itself and the US government began to encounter 
legitimacy challenges to their respective roles in global Internet 
governance. These are often conflated in literature on Internet 
governance and although they are relat,ed, in terms of the implications 
for power, they are distinct. 
The legitimacy challenge to the US government stems from the 
growing awareness that Internet governance has not only a technical 
function but economic, political and cultural implications. Some states, 
groups and individuals argue that a global system of such significance 
should be governed through a multilateral and truly representative 
body not one dominated by the US Department of Commerce. This 
proposal directly threatens US power by proposing to divest the US of 
its hegemonic control of Internet governance. Without this, actors with 
interests not necessarily aligned to those of the US could be in a 
position to alter the course of Internet governance so that it no longer 
privileged the needs and expectations of the commercial sector -
thereby working in harmony with politicians conceptions of power. 
4.lO Samuel P. Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', Inteniational 
Security, Vol.17, No.4, Spring 1993, pg.70. 
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This more direct threat to US power will be discussed at more length 
later in this chapter. 
ICA..l\TN's legitimacy challenges are a consequence of multiple factors -
primarily to do with its structure and internal governance processes 
but also due to the general awareness that Internet governance entails 
important policy making which goes beyond the purely technical 
functions initially envisaged. A brief overview of these provides the 
background to debates about international concerns over the 
legitimacy of ICA.."JN as a global governance body and how these 
concerns relate to US power. 
How !CANN works - or doesn't 
The previous sections have detailed how a particular conception of US 
power which linked the Internet to economic growth culminated in the 
establishment of !CANN. Its unique structure as a private sector 
policy-making institution also reflects the late 20th century American 
belief in private sector ownership of public infrastructure and an anti-
regulatory norm which was prevalent in the Internet community. John 
Palfrey has observed that I CANN is an amalgamation of three distinct 
institutional models. 431 First, it was established as a private 
corporation which is run from the top down by a board of directors. At 
the same time, it is understood to be an open space for the development 
of bottom-up consensus about policy. Finally, ICANN is regarded as 
akin to a governmental regulatory body, which should offer 
representation to affected stakeholder groups in a legislative process 
431 John G. Palfrey, 'The end of the experiment: How ICANN'S foray into global 
Internet democracy failed', Harvard Journal of Law & Technology, Vol.17. No.2, 
Spring 2004, pp.410-473. 
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for the development of public policies. Palfrey regards ICANN's 
structure as "a compromise in the worst sense of the word". 432 He 
suggests that the attempt to blend the best parts these three models 
has resulted in "a structure that does not carry the legitimacy or 
authority or effectiveness of any of its component parts."433 
Situated between these divergent approaches, ICAl"\JN has been 
plagued with problems almost from its inception as it has struggled to 
reconcile the role of a global governance body with the demands of the 
commercialised aspects ofDNS management. The US led privatisation 
of gTLDs has meant that each top level domain represents a 
commercial opportunity as domain names and numbers are then on· 
sold to individuals or businesses which need them. 434 These sets of 
domain names are allocated by !CANN to registrars - private firms 
which manage and sell them. In its first year, in response to a shortage 
of names and numbers, I CANN administered a kind of 'bidding' system 
for the selection and allocation of seven new gTLDs. Registrars were 
invited to submit proposals but there were widespread complaints from 
unsuccessful applicants about the lack of transparency in the selection 
criteria, the very high non·refundable application fees (USD 50,000) 
and the lack of a satisfactory appeals process. However, these 
arrangements continued to be negotiated bilaterally between ICANN 
and each commercial entity with the contents of the contracts 
remaining private. 
'"'Ibid, pp.425·426. 
433 Palfrey, 'The end of the experiment', pg.425. 
"'For example, Disneyland would want to buy Disneyland.com but if a new gTLD 
were released for .travel - they would also want to buy that. Conversely, some 
organisations cannot obtain their preferred domain name as it may already be owned 
by someone else. In this instance, new gTLDs offer the opportunity for the name they 
need. 
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Dissatisfaction with the process of this first allocation of new gTLDs, 
led to a Congressional hearing in early 2001 before the House 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet.435 Entitled Is 
ICAN.llf's 1Vew Generation for Internet Domain 1Vame Selection Process 
Thwarting Competition, the hearing addressed the gTLD allocation 
specifically as well as the emerging concerns about ICANN governance 
more broadly. Politicians at the hearing articulated concerns that 
ICANN was "anti·competitive and lacking in fairness, transparency, 
and accountability."436 These problems, it was revealed, were in part a 
consequence of the fact that the I CANN board is appointed rather than 
elected, the board meetings are closed and the minutes are not 
published. 
Internet governance scholar Milton Mueller has written extensively on 
these issues and he has detailed the insular way in which ICANN 
board members are appointed.437 A Nominating Committee (NomCom) 
appoints all but a few board members and Mueller notes that the 
NomCom vets candidates in secret and selects board members on the 
basis of these private deliberations. In a circular arrangement, some of 
the Nominating Committee themselves are appointed by the ICANN 
board. Despite a number of advisory groups (the 'At Large Advisory 
Committee', the 'Government Advisory Committee', the 'Supporting 
Organisations'), the IC&'!N board is not obliged to adopt any of the 
435 There are features of ICANN's structure which have changed over time and not all 
of the following details were in place at the time of this hearing. However, to avoid a 
full history ofICANN which is ancillary to this analysis, only key points are 
highlighted here. For a thorough analysis of ICANN's structure, see Mueller, 'ICANN, 
Inc.'. 
436 Representative John D. Dingell, comments at I CANN Internet Governance: Is It 
Working?, hearing on September 21, 2006, pg.3 
m Mueller, 'ICANN, Inc.'. 
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recommendations or policy proposals which are put forward by these 
groups. During the 2001 hearing, Representative Edward J\farkey 
expressed serious concern at the lack of transparency in !CANN 
governance when he suggested that "events at the Vatican are 
shrouded in less mystery than how ICAl'\JN chooses top-level 
domains." 438 
Problems ofAccountability 
A corollary to a lack of transparency is the difficulty in establishing 
accountability. Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane define accountability 
as the implication "that some actors have the right to hold other actors 
to a set of standards, to judge whether they have fulfilled their 
responsibilities in light of these standards, and to impose sanctions if 
they determine that these responsibilities have not been met". 439They 
further argue that "if governance above the level of the nation-state is 
to be legitimate in a democratic era, mechanisms for appropriate 
accountability need to be institutionalized":l40 The unique structure of 
ICANN means that it does not conform to this conception of 
accountability which normally applies to a private corporation, a public 
institution or a global governance body. 
Mueller has suggested that ICANN uses extensive public participation 
to generate legitimacy while avoiding accountability - a 'learned 
438 Representative Edward Markey, comments at ls ICANN's new generation of 
Internet domain name selection process thwarting competition?, hearing before the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the 
Internet, House of Representatives, February 8, 2001, pg.5. 
439 Ruth W. Grant and Robert 0. Keohane, 'Accountability and Abuses of Power in 
World Politics', American Political Science Review, Vol.99, No.l, February 2005, 
pg.29. 
''"Ibid. 
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behaviour' which he regards as a response to "the political and 
organizational tensions inherent in ICANN's DNA." 4<IIC.fu'JN holds 
four major, open meetings each year in locations all over the world. 
These meetings are open to any member of the public who wishes to 
attend and they provide an opportunity to directly question the I CANN 
board members on issues of concern in an open forum. \Vhile I CANN is 
at liberty to incorporate any of the input which it receives through 
these or other channels or reject all of it, this emphasis on public 
participation helps to generate a form of legitimacy without 
accountability. Public participation in this context, Mueller argues, can 
"displace accountability rather than improve it".442 
Concerns about accountability feature significantly in hearings into 
!CANN as expressed by Representative Markey. "To whom are the 
!CANN board members accountable, to the Internet community, to the 
Department of Commerce? Is the Department of Commerce performing 
adequate oversight? Is it simply an eyewitness to history?"443 Gnlike 
other private sector bodies, ICANN does not have shareholders or 
members to which it must answer. As pointed out above, its own board 
is appointed by individuals who themselves, are appointed by the 
ICANN board. Significantly, there is also no competition in the 
marketplace for ICANN. IC.fu'JN has a monopoly on Internet 
governance. These concerns about ICiil'\IN's lack of accountability are a 
key component of challenges to its legitimacy. Another important 
element is its unanticipated and unintended capacity for policy·making. 
441 Mueller, 'ICANN, Inc.'. 
442 Ibid. 
••a Representative Edward Markey, comments at Is ICANN's new generation of 
Internet domain name selection process thwarting competition?, hearing on February 
8, 2001, pg 5. 
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ICANN's Policy Agenda 
Vllhen ICANN was established in 1998, it was on the understanding 
that it would undertake necessary technical oversight and 
management of the root - a function which seemed relatively apolitical 
at that time. However, as the use of the Internet spread both in scope 
and size, it became increasingly apparent that the distinction between 
technical decisions about the Internet and politics and policy making is 
at best grey and at worst, artificial. Mitchell Kapor, the founder of 
Lotus software has stated unambiguously that "architecture is politics" 
- in other words, the way technological systems like the Internet are 
constructed and managed - governance - is inherently political. 444 A 
Social Construction of Technology approach would argue that it was 
ever thus, but more significant to this study is the growing realisation 
amongst US politicians of this relationship. While (as this chapter 
argues) there were politically driven ideas about the relationship of US 
power to the Internet which motivated and guided the process of 
establishing ICANN, the understanding of broader political 
implications emerged only over time as the use of and dependence upon 
the Internet spread. 
The political implications of managing the DNS became apparent over 
the early years of ICANN's existence and were unsettling not only for 
the private sector or the international community but for US 
politicians as well. Those politicians involved in ICANN's oversight 
were soon confronted by a new understanding of the organisation as a 
non-governmental body, setting policy in what is regarded as a critical 
444 Mitchell Kapor, founder of Lotus Software, 'Architecture is Politics (and Politics is 
Architecture)', Mitch Kapor's Blog, April 23, 2006, http://blog.kapor.com/?p=29. 
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sphere of US power and governance of a global resource. Edward 
Markey observed during a 2006 hearing into ICANN governance that 
"many have lamented that ICANN appears to set policy when it was 
simply set up to do rather narrow technical issues." 445 The following 
quote by John Dingell is more explicit: 
Some suggest that !CANN has morphed from a 
nongovernmental, technical standards-settii1g organization to a 
full-fledged policymaking body. If that is true, there is cause for 
serious concern. I CANN was not given authority to assume that 
function, and it appears to be accountable to no 011e, except 
perhaps God Almighty, for its actions. 446 
These concerns arose from the realisation that what had initially been 
regarded as a narrow technical function which the US government 
directed towards commerce, also had deeply political implications. As 
well as the generic Top Level Domains (gTLDs), the globalisation of the 
Internet led to the establishment of a further two character country 
code top level domain or ccTLD Cau, .uk, .jp). 417 From a technical 
perspective, these are unremarkable and are uncontentious. However, 
from a political perspective the names and numbers give rise to 
concerns about sovereignty and autonomy. Originally drawn from the 
ISO 3166 list published by the International Organisation of 
Standardization (ISO) which allocates two character codes to all 
'"Representative Edward Markey, ICAN/lf Internet Governance: Is It Working?, 
hearing on September 21, 2006, pg.8. 
«•John Dingell Is !CAN.N's New Generation of Internet Domain Name Selection 
Process Thwarting Competition?, hearing on February 8, 2001, pg.8. 
447 For example, in the address for the Australian National University 
www.gnu.edu.au, edu is the gTLD and au is the ccTLD. 
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recognised states, the ccTLDs have to be amended periodically 
following civil war or newly independent states such as happened after 
the Bosnian conflict. ICANN, then, is essentially in the position to 
'create' a state's own cyberspace by allocating it a ccTLD. 
In addition to issues of diplomatic recognition, the exclusive use of the 
latin alphabet in gTLDs and ccTLDs has also been the subject of 
debate amid increasingly widespread calls for the inclusion of alternate 
scripts such as Arabic and lVfandarin.448 These ccTLDs (and the gTLDs 
which come under them) are increasingly regarded as the domain of 
individual states and as such, a reflection of national identity. 
Predictably, this has resulted in an expectation that when navigating 
the Internet - at least to domestic or local sites, users should be able to 
do so in their own script and language. At the June 2009 ICANN 
meeting in Sydney, a Chinese delegate also pointed out that for a gTLD, 
three characters is one too many to make sense in Mandarin and even 
if alternative scripts were adopted, China would have to be allowed to 
register gTLDs of two characters - a configuration not permitted under 
the current protocoL 449 
\Vhile some US politicians appear resigned to the merging of technical, 
co=ercial and political in ICllNN, others like Senator Conrad Burns 
strongly resist it. "Simply put, ICANN was never meant to be a super 
44•Following years of engineering to alter the architecture of the •lames and number 
system, this was approved for four states on April 22, 2010. 'ICA!'IN Gives Final 
Approval for Four Countries to Use Non·Latin Languages iu Internet Address 
Names: Egypt, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, UAE clear final hurdle', I CANN 
Press Release, http:/ /www.irnnn.org/eninews/re\~a$es/release-22apr lO·en.pdf . 
"'Author observation while attending this meeting. Thank you to my colleague Jia 
Guan for explaining the language issue to me. Many l\1andarin words are comprised 
of two characters and adding a third to comply with the current protocols on g'rLDs 
would lead to confusion and ambiguity of meaning. 
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national regulatory body." 450 Ultimately, regardless of one's position on 
whether or how ICANN should be spanning the technical/political 
divide, the same conclusion is reached; that it does" and this has global 
implications. 
Despite the fact that the US is the only state with any direct oversight 
of !CANN, even US politicians questions how much control they have 
over Internet governance. When Rep. Edward Markey asks rhetorically 
whether the Department of Commerce is providing adequate oversight 
of ICANN or is "simply an eyewitness to history"451, he articulates a 
concern issued by many of his colleagues. This sense of 'history in the 
making' is a feature of US political debates about ICANN. In the 
hearings, there was a general awareness that in the establishment of 
ICANN, something had been set in motion, possibly without due 
consideration of future implications. Representative Charles Pickering 
draws a direct parallel between the establishment of ICANN and the 
Constitution of the United States. "Many I believe did not realize that, 
in essence, by setting up IC&'<'N ... [what we were] doing was 
fundamentally the Constitution of the Internet, just as our Founders 
set up the decision making process of a representative democracy."452 
The expected outcome, when !CANN was established in 1998, was 
(perhaps optimistically) that it would both garner international 
legitimacy and continue to promote US interests. The previous pages 
450 Senator Conrad Burns, comments at !CANN Governance, bearing on June 12, 
2002, pg.4. 
451 Representative Edward Markey, Is JCANllf's New Generation of Internet Domain 
Name Selection Process Thwarting Competition?, hearing on February 8, 2001, pg.5. 
'"Representative Charles Pickering, Is ICA1VN's New Generation of Internet Domain 
Name Selection Process Thwarting Competition 9, hearing on February 8, 200 l, pg.92. 
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have outlined how !CANN has been confronted by challenges to its 
legitimacy, both for reasons of poor internal governance (particularly a 
lack of accountability) and also because it is now acknowledged that in 
addition to technical functions, ICA."'JN is actually in a position to 
make important policy decisions. It is these policy making implications 
which are most unnerving for politicians as they threaten to 
compromise the established agenda which was put in place by the US 
hegemonic control over Internet governance. 
In some ways, ICA."'JN's legitimacy problems have served to strengthen 
the case for US oversight as (in the absence of alternate forms of 
accountability as discussed above) this remains the strongest form of 
accountability in a relatively unconstrained organization. Certainly, 
US politicians a.re reluctant to grant ICANN full independence but also 
many in the commercial sector have raised questions about where they 
would turn for mediation if the US Department of Commerce no longer 
exercised oversight. In an unexpected manner, ICANN's failure to 
achieve international legitimacy generates support for continued US 
hegemony in Internet governance oversight. 
However, in addition to these problems oflegitimacy which !CANN has 
encountered, the US government has also faced challenges to the 
legitimacy of its continued oversight ofICANN. This raises a separate 
set of issues about power which is not perceived to have any hidden or 
obvious benefits. 
US Oversight Faces a Crisis of Legitimacy 
One of the primary findings of this case study is that in continuing to 
exert some level of dominion over Internet governance, US politicians 
perceive that the lJS has had to balance a need for political legitimacy 
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with a desire to retain control. The following section will demonstrate 
how, as understandings of Internet governance evolved from a 
dominantly technical concern to become politicised, accusations of US 
hegemonic control have led to problems of political legitimacy and calls 
from the international community for greater representation. The 
ensuing debates have pitted very fundamental beliefs about national 
interest held by US politicians against the perceived costs and benefits 
of international cooperation. In these debates, explicit comments on US 
power have been articulated by committee members in Congressional 
hearings. The hearing transcripts reflect an acknowledgment by 
committee members that in order to retain control of I CANN, a degree 
of legitimacy amongst the international community is either necessary, 
or at least desirable. In 2006, Congressman John Dingell argued that 
"Our constituents ... need to know that this Nation, because of the way 
we are managing these things, is not losing the support of the 
international community, a matter of concern to me." 4.53 
Given the previously described emphasis on the relationship between 
US economic power and the Internet, politicians argue that Internet 
governance must continue to operate under some form of US 
stewardship for two reasons. First, the failure of I CANN to implement 
a widely accepted and respected corporate governance structure has 
undermined its legitimacy and brought into question its readiness to 
act independently of US government oversight. Second, given that the 
US government does not regard ICANN as adequately established to 
be wholly independent of some form of governmental oversight, the 
alternatives are decidedly unappealing. 
"'Rep. John D. Dingell, ICAN.llf I11te1'11et Gover11a11ce: Is It Working'?, hearing on 
September 21, 2006, pg. 4 
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However, since 1998, there have been increasing calls from some in the 
international community for the US to either make I CANN completely 
independent or to move Internet governance to a more conventional 
global body such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
of the United Nations (UN). 454 vv'hile the US has made incremental 
concessions in response to demands to loosen its grip (to be detailed in 
the following pages), there has been no support for the notion of 
moving Internet governance to the UN. 
It was initially intended that I CANN would come under some control of 
the Department of Commerce only initially and once it was fully 
functioning it would become independent of government oversight. 
Although an exact time frame was not specified, this transition was 
anticipated as likely to take place within a few years. 455 More than 
twelve years later, ICANN continues to be subject to US government 
control and perhaps not surprisingly, this has become a source of 
contention. 
In response to pressures on the US government to relinquish control of 
IC1\,"JN, they neither agreed to move Internet governance to an 
international body nor did they overtly assert any right to control it. 
Rather, they adopted an approach of 'historic authority' and took a 
series of steps to try to shore up their power in this sphere by 
enhancing their legitimacy. In 2005, the US National 
454 David Meyer, 'Europe Calls on US to Let Go ofICAl\~~, ZDNet Ul(, June 19, 2009, 
http://www~;,!riet.eo.uk/newslnet\!'._orkipg/2009106119/europe·calls:gn·us·to·let·go·of­
ii;<>..!ln· 396GJ:!1Q;!I. 
455 'Improvement of Technical Management of Internet Names and Addresses: 
Proposed Rule', pp.8826·33, 
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Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) issued a 
set of principles on the DNS. The first principle reads as follows: 
Given the Internet's importance to the worlds economy, it is 
essential that the undel"lying DNS of the !11ternet remain stable 
and secure. As .such, the United States is committed to taking 
no action that would have the potential to adversely impact the 
effective and efficient operation of the DNS and will therefore 
maintain its historic role in authorizing changes or modifications 
to the authoritative ivot zone file. 456 
This principle of 'historic authority' reflected the approach taken to 
date and served as a framework for future amendments to the US-
ICANN relationship. 
11fove to the UN - or not 
Despite the politicisation of Internet governance, any calls for the 
transfer ofICANN or its functions to an international body like the UN 
have been strongly resisted by US politicians. They repeatedly express 
that they regard the Internet as far too critical to the US economy and 
(increasingly) to its security to risk the network's destabilisation or 
indeed - the introduction of interests not aligned to their own. 
Representative Cliff Stearns summed up the status quo approach when 
he argued in a 2006 hearing that he was "not interested in making 
changes that would in any way endanger what has proven to be one of 
455 'U.S. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System', US 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration website, 
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntia)Jgmeldomainname/USDNSprinciples 06302005.htm. 
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the most powerful tools in history for empowering American commerce 
and the American consumers."457 
Proposals to involve the UN in Internet governance elicit quite 
adamant responses from tJS politicians involved in !CANN oversight 
possibly reflecting broader anti·UN sentiment which had gained 
traction in some US political circles - particularly after the failure of 
the Bush administration to obtain Security Council approval for the 
invasion of Iraq and President Bush's subsequent statement that "we 
really don't need anybody's permission" to go to war. 458 This general 
disaffection for the UN was illustrated in another ICANN hearing in 
2006. During that week, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's had 
likened President George Bush to the devil in a speech in front of the 
UN General Assembly. 459 Representative John Shimkus referred to 
this in the ICAi.""JN hearing when he remarked that "with what has 
gone on at the U.N. the last couple of days, the last thing we would 
want is any movement in an international community. Could you 
"'Representative Cliff Stearns, comments at ICANN Iaternet Govern11ace: Is It 
Working?, hearing on September 21, 2006, pg.6. Also see the statement by 
Representative John Shimkus in the same hearing pg.9. 
'""US President George W. Bush as quoted in 'Bush: We will go to war against Iraq 
without UN', The Independent, March 7, 2003, 
http:J/v..·>.vv1jndependent.co.uk/news/wo:rld/politics/bush·\ve·vvill~go·to·war~;:uJAirtst­
iraa-without·un·7 46011,html. 
459 Rep. Shimkus is referring here to Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez's 
controversial comments in the UN General Assembly on the previous day in which he 
said that "The devil came here yesterday, and it smells of sulphur still today." Widely 
reported but see CNN for an account at 
htt.p:f!edition.cnn.com/2006/WQRI,D/americasl09/20/chavez.unlindex.html 
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imagine the farce and the jokes that would create of the \Vorld \Veb 
and the Domain Names System?"460 
Rep. Fred Upton summarised in a 2006 hearing: "Although some have 
complained about the lack of transparency of ICANN, moving its 
function to the U.N. is no way to fix the problem. In fact, it will likely 
make it worse." 461 Rep. Cliff Stearns argues that "Heavy-handed 
government involvement, particularly by supra-national institutions 
like the United Nations, I think, would spell disaster for a system that 
is thriving around the world." 462 He explicitly states that he "will 
oppose any efforts for a number of reasons to put it under the U.N. 
jurisdiction." 463 
While US politicians express no support for the transfer of Internet 
governance to an international body like the UN and while they 
generally resist relinquishing Department of Commerce oversight, the 
allegations of illegitimate control over the global DNS have resulted in 
a number of incremental concessions in an attempt to find a balance 
between international consensus and continued US power to control 
the Internet. These concessions have taken the form of periodically 
renegotiated contracts between the Department of Commerce and 
I CANN. 
400 Representative John Shimkus, comments at !CANN Internet Governance: ls It 
Working?, hearing on Sept<>mber 21, 2006, pg.9. 
461 Representative Fred Upton, comments at lCAlvN Internet Governance: ls It 
Working?, hearing on September 21, 2006, pg.2. 
462 Stearns, !CANN Internet Governance: ls It Working?, hearing on September 21, 
2006, pg.5. 
463 Ibid. 
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Concessions to Discontent 
Misgivings about !CANN independence based on issues of corporate 
governance (transparency, process, accountability) coupled with 
concerns about leaving a power vacuum have contributed to a lack of 
US political will to move Internet governance to a more independent or 
international structure. However, there are also complications internal 
to ICANN's mandate which arise from the US conception of Internet 
governance as a commercial function which gives pause to US 
politicians considering the prospect of fully relinquishing control over 
Internet governance. 
The original Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between ICANN 
and the Department of Commerce was amended six times between 
1998 and 2003. 464 These amendments were intended to address the 
concerns of the growing community of people who expressed concerns 
about !CANN - either because they wanted !CANN to be more 
independent of the US or (conversely) because they felt it required 
additional oversight due to its own internal flaws. In 2006, the MOU 
was replaced with a 'Joint Project Agreement' (JP A) 465 which was 
widely heralded as a step towards greater independence from the US 
government though the Internet Governance Project (IGP) - an 
independent group of analysts - called it a "cosmetic response" to 
public feedback about ICANN's lack of transparency, representation 
46 4 For full details on these amendments, see the I CANN website at 
httnJiww._w .irn!l!l,!lrniKn/gj;ll.fI.fillaKi;s;2m&11tl!J1tm. 
465 For the original document, see the I CANN website at 
http://www.icann.org/enlgeneral/JPA-29sep06.pdf. 
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and accountability. 466 The IGP's Milton Mueller wrote that the 
transition from the MOU to the JPA was in fact, "old wine in new 
bottles" since ICANN still received policy guidance from the 
Department of Commerce and still reported to it. 467 The JP A lasted for 
three years and in 2009 it was replaced by yet another agreement the 
Affirmation of Commitments (AOC) in September 2009. 468 
As with the end of the MOU, the transition of the JPA to the AOC was 
widely reported as !CANN 'gaining its independence' ~ including by 
ICANN itself which referred to the transition as a "dramatic step" 
toward full management of the DNS. 469 However, while the new 
agreement introduced a broader level of review and oversight, the US 
government has not relinquished control of Internet governance. 
ICANN internal reporting now goes to a review board (the selection of 
board members remains contentious) as well as to the Department of 
Commerce. 470 
466 Milton Mueller, 'ICA.l\N's New ::\foU: Old Wine in a New Bottle', Internet 
Governance Pmject Blog, September 30, 2006, 
http ://bJogJ nt<'rnetgoverna nce.orglblqg/ archives/2006/9/:30]3:>40162.html. 
467 Ibid. 
468 Rod Beckstrom, ICANN President, 'Affirmation of Commitment.s - What does it 
Mean?', September 30, 2009, ICANN website, 
httn:/hNWY/jcann.org/eniannouncements/announ_cement~30sep09"en.htm. 
469 'New Agreement Means Greater Independence in ]Managing the Internet's System 
ofUniqt1e Identifiers', !CANN Website, 29 September 2006, 
http://\VWW.icann.org/eniannouncements/anno4.11Cemen t· 29sep06. ht.in. 
David Meyer, '!CANN Gains Independence from the US', ZDNet UK, September 30, 
2009, http://vnn;:,.i;..<!.!:t<tl.co.uklnew~itc\ltworfil11g:{g009lfillJ.:iQfo;ann·g1liJ.l§:ind.ependenQ!l:. 
from ·thwus· '.:19780 lfill.L. 
4W Beckstrom, 'Affirmation of Commitments - What does it Mean?'. 
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Conclusion 
The Clinton-Gore administration articulated a particular view of the 
role they expected the Internet to play in enhancing US power. They 
regarded it as an engine for economic growth which would ensure 
continued dominance in the international system. Langdon Winner (a 
prominent Philosophy of Technology theorist) commented on this 
narrow focus in a journal article in 1993. He likened the Clinton 
administration's vision of the future of the 'National Information 
Infrastructure' to a "national money pump" into which teclmology is 
poured at one end, mixed with some additional ingredients like 
education of the work force and incentives for business and out the 
other end comes economic growth (an through this, economic power). 
Winner argued that a more appropriate metaphor would be one of 
fabric - the fabric of society into which we weave additional threads of 
infrastructure. As these threads are introduced, the fabric is changed 
and this reweaving results in "a reshaping of some of the roles, rules, 
relationships, and institutions that make up our ways of living 
together."471 
This metaphor of interwoven threads allows for an enhanced 
understanding of change which has been so important in this case 
study. Donald Mackenzie reminds us that the adoption of technology 
can also change it. Those who use it, improve, exploit, adapt and shape 
technology. 472 In this process, priorities about how technology should 
471 Langdon Winner, 'How Technology Reweaves the Fabric of Society'. The Chronicle 
of Higher Education, Vol.39, No.48, August 4, 1993, pg.Bl. 
412 Mackenzie, Knowing }t,.fachines, pg.5. 
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develop, in what ways and to serve which purposes as well as the 
means by which success is measured, may change. 
The first section of this chapter explained how a new conception of US 
power - one premised upon economic strength rather than simply 
military dominance - formed a framework for a new prioritisation of 
Internet technology. In this new conception, the Internet was regarded 
by a key set of US politicians (initially the Atari Democrats and later 
the Clinton·Gore administration) as a potential source of economic 
growth which, if managed correctly, would contribute considerably to 
US power. These politicians articulated a clear set of guidelines 
including a strong emphasis on stability of the network and private 
sector competition for the distribution of domain names and numbers. 
These norms were carried through successive policy documents and 
expressed repeatedly in speeches detailing this approach. Ultimately, 
those norms resulted in the issue of Internet governance being placed 
under the purview of the Department of Commerce - a step which 
would define the parameters of future debate. 
By the mid to late 1990s, a reverse salient began to emerge. Internet 
governance was becoming understood as a 'problem' in that it was 
potentially preventing the Internet from performing in the way these 
politicians envisaged it should that is, in support of US economic 
power. Politicians through this period regarded the growing 
inadequacies of existing Internet governance structures as an 
impediment to the commercial growth they so strongly believed would 
eventuate given the right conditions. A lack of commercial confidence 
in the process for dealing with copyright issues as well as a shortage of 
available names and numbers was believed to be stifling economic 
growth in related industries. For these politicians, setting up a new 
structure which could deal with growth and continue to shape the 
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Internet in their vision without raising concerns about US hegemonic 
control of the network, was the policy goaL This was institutionalised 
in the establishment ofICANN. 
This chapter then deals with the ongoing operation of ICANN during 
which the issues which pre·occupy politicians have to do with the 
nature of ICANN's operations and its capacity to undermine US 
legitimacy through unpopular governance - thus potentially leading to 
a further loss of control for the US government. US politicians believed 
that retaining control of the Internet through ICANN was desirable 
partly because of their growing understanding of its impact on the 
national interest but also because they believed that American norms 
and values formed the foundation of the Internet's success and that 
they are also the key to its future. Transparency, free markets, 
freedom of individuals, access t-0 information and due process are 
repeatedly referred to as integral to these politicians' vision of the 
Internet. They enact policies which they believe will promote these 
elements and this becomes an example of the way that technology can 
be understood as an expression of norms and values. 
Finally, this study of Internet governance and ICANN highlights 
persistent concerns about the balance between the need or desire for 
international legitimacy and the cost in terms of the national interest. 
America's continued challenge of exercising its power in a state of 
primacy or hegemony is directly reflected in the problem of !CANN. 
International cooperation in the management of I CANN is regarded by 
US politicians as a trade off against the national interest and as the 
national interest is increasingly linked to the smooth functioning of the 
Internet, the effective exercise of American power to retain control of it 
becomes a more and more significant issue. 
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This study of Internet governance addresses the thesis questions in a 
number of explicit ways. In an effort to understand how conceptions of 
US power have influenced the development of Internet technology, the 
issue of Internet governance clearly demonstrates that the Clinton· 
Gore administration's view of US power as linked to economic growth 
impacted on Internet technology in a number of direct ways. It 
established the commercial sector as the relevant social group by 
placing Internet governance under the purview of the Department of 
Commerce. It led to the establishment of a unique organii\ation which 
was neither a public regulator nor a wholly independent private 
organisation. While this organisation faltered in meeting political 
expectations by eliciting allegations of illegitimacy, the US government 
had become convinced not only of the economic importance of the 
Internet but of its own control over the DNS as an additional source of 
power. Given this new conception of the relationship between US 
power and Internet governance, politicians no longer wished to 
relinquish control of ICANN and embarked upon a number of 
amendments to the agreement between ICANN and the Department of 
Commerce which sought to find a balance between calls for its 
independence and the US political desire for control. 
The implications of these factors for understanding the relationship 
between new technology and power in International Relations are 
threefold. The first implication is that a broad approach to the 
definition of power is most useful here. In this case study, there are 
two clear articulations of power which US politicians refer to: economic 
power and social power in the context of hegemony and legitimacy. The 
second implication is that it is necessary to examine closely what 
objectives states have for technology and how exactly they envisage it 
relating to their power. States make certain choices about technology 
which emerge from a set of expectations and priorities which can be 
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formulated externally to that technology. vVithout understanding how 
states expect technology to relate to their power, technological 
development can appear to take on a life of its own forcing states to 
constantly adapt. The third implications is that technology like the 
Internet which is fundamentally about relationships between 
computers, routers, and the people who operate them has a social 
element which emphasises social aspects of power. Primacy may be 
just as desirable as it is in the context of military capability but 
legitimacy is an important force. 
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Chapter Six: Network Neutrality 
Network Neutrality refers to the principle of an agnostic network -
that is, one which does not discriminate against the content which 
travels across it or the applications or hardware which engage with 
and connect to it. The understanding that the network itself is 'dumb' 
and the packets of data which travel across it will not be interrogated 
during transmission is considered by many to be fundamental to the 
original architectural conception of the Internet and integral to privacy, 
equality of access and freedom of information. 473 In the past, there has 
been minimal interference in the order in which data packets are 
delivered but a number of compelling developments have emerged to 
challenge this 'hands off practice. These developments prompt political 
debates about how the Internet should function, how the power to 
control information should be distributed and the implications of these 
decisions for US power. 
In common with the previous two case studies, network neutrality is 
regarded by politicians as having implications for both material and 
social factors of US power. Network neutrality is a politically divisive 
issue but politicians from both sides of this debate agree on some key 
points. They all regard network neutrality as having implications for 
how the Internet can best continue to enhance US economic power 
although they differ fundamentally on which policies are most likely to 
achieve this. Those politicians in favour of network neutrality argue 
473 There are strong technical arguments against this which will be discussed later in 
this chapter. For example, built into the IP header was the field code for 
prioritisation. Initially, this took the form of the 'Type of Service' field superseded in 
1998 by the Diffserv field in IPV4 and IPV6 headers. For a brief history of this, read 
section 22 in the Request for Comments (RFC) 3168, Internet Engineers Task Force, 
September 2001, http://tools.ietf.org/htmllrfc31G8#page·58. 
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that the huge economic benefits delivered through Internet growth in 
the past were largely a com1equence of the principles of network 
neutrality. These principles, they argue, promote material power 
through innovation which stimulates economic growth and social 
power by establishing the US as 'leaders' in Internet technology and by 
promoting 'freedom' which they regard as a norm that underpins US 
power more broadly. This is a view which regards US power as 
emerging from a set of norms, values and principles much in the way 
discussed in the social power conception in Chapter Four. 
Those politicians opposed to network neutrality believe that recent 
changes to Internet technology and to the way we use the technology 
place greater demands on the network which can only be effectively 
managed if certain principles of network neutrality are relaxed or 
dispensed with. These politicians fear that network neutrality will 
prove an impediment to future economic growth by limiting fiscal 
incentives for further private sector investment in the Internet 
infrastructure which is already regarded as steadily declining in 
international competitiveness. 
Politicians on both sides of this debate regard network neutrality as a 
critical issue which, if mismanaged, threatens to undermine US 
material power through lost economic opportunity but also due to 
social power factors like leadership in much the same way the 'Sputnik 
crisis' did. 
The findings of this case study are unique in a number of ways from 
the first two case studies. Before outlining these distinctions, it is 
useful here to reiterate how the case studies were generated and what 
was found in the previous two cases. 
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The methodological tool employed to generate case studies in this 
project is the 'reverse salient' - a tool borrowed from the Social 
Construction of Technology. Preliminary research found that there 
were a number of key concerns for politicians with regard to Internet 
technology. Some issues dominated political debates and were 
consistently raised in Congressional hearings, policy documents and 
speech transcripts. Of these, a smaller number had implications for US 
power. These were identified in two ways; first by the perception of 
politicians that the issue had power implications and second, by an 
assessment of the technology itself. Some technological issues have 
quite obvious implications for power in international relations while 
others are more obscure or still evolving. Network neutrality is 
consistently referred to by politicians as having significant relationship 
to US power through a mix of material and social factors. In addition, 
it is an issue acknowledged by the technical community to have very 
serious implications for how the Internet develops. This becomes 
evident in the chapter through the hearing testimony of some of the 
world's most influential and widely regarded technical figures 
including Lawrence Lessig, Tim Berners Lee and Vinton Cerf who all 
argue forcefully in favour of network neutrality. The combination of 
these factors then, that politicians articulate an important link 
between network neutrality and US power as well as the assessment of 
it as a key technical factor in Internet development resulted in network 
neutrality being selected as the third case study for this thesis. 
The original hypothesis articulated in the Introduction to this thesis 
suggested that conceptions of power shape and influence Internet 
technology. In the previous two case studies, this hypothesis has been 
upheld but in concert with a second important, though unanticipated 
finding. In hoth case studies, politicians have engaged with multiple 
conceptualisations of power and the one which has been most 
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influential on Internet technology has been the conceptualisation 
associated with a Social Constructivist approach to technology. In the 
context of cyber security this was a social conception of power which 
privileged norms and values of human rights and civil liberties. In the 
Internet governance case, a material conception of power was most 
influential and again - it was associated with a Social Constructivist 
approach to technology. Based on the original hypothesis and findings 
from the first two case studies, I expected to find multiple conceptions 
of power around the issue of network neutrality with the more 
influential being associated with a Social Constructivist approach to 
technology. 
In fact, although the research fur this case also revealed multiple 
conceptualisations of power - none of them can be regarded as 
significantly shaping or influencing this aspect of Internet technology. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, one key decision taken by the Federal 
Communications Commission in 2002 fundamentally reshaped the 
network neutrality landscape. Since then, politicians opposed to 
network neutrality have needed only to maintain the status quo while 
those politicians in favour of network neutrality have been unable or 
unwilling to claim the necessary authority to shape the Internet in this 
way. 
This is a point of continuity which runs through all the case studies. 
The empirical research has revealed that conceptions of power are 
influential in shaping technology only when associated with a Social 
Constructivist approach to technology. None of the conceptions of 
power in the network neutrality case were associated with a Social 
Constructivist approach to technology and in none of them did 
politicians demonstrate a clear sense of authority. Rather, they drew 
on external sources of authority. 
282fPage 
Chapter Six Network Neutrafity 
In seeking to understand why this case study produced a unique 
finding (conceptions of power were not found to influence the 
technology) we may consider three distinctions between this case study 
and the previous two. 
First, this case deals with issues outside the parameters of 
conventional debates about state power. Security and governance are 
both issues which are clearly linked to power in International 
Relations literature and in political discourse. Politicians have a 
framework for understanding security threats to the state and how 
those threats interact with US power. In the Cyber Security chapter 
these included economic power, the ability to prevail in global conflict 
and geopolitics. Governance of the Internet broke more new ground in 
that it dealt with an organisation without precedent. !CANN was set 
up in a completely unique manner to existing (or following) governance 
bodies. It was established to govern a global technical function which, 
as it turns out, has deeply political implications. Still, principles of 
governance are obviously familiar territory for politicians and have 
provided a framework for conceptualising power in this case study. 
Certainly, interpreting these issues of security and governance in the 
context of Internet technology has been a significant challenge, but the 
debates begin from a familiar framework. 
Network neutrality, in contrast, is a case which is driven by 
telecommunications regulation. It is not an issue which politicians 
have conventionally identified as relating to state power. As with the 
other cases, technology has generated problems for US power but in 
this case, those problems do not fit within an existing framework for 
discussing power. It would seem that the further we move from 
conventional power frameworks, the more difficult it becomes to clearly 
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articulate and pursue a conception of power through decisions about 
technology. 
Without a familiar power framework within which to interpret the 
implications of Internet technology for US power, anti network 
neutrality politicians revert to a status quo position. That is, if they are 
unsure of the future, rather than try to shape it, they opt to 'stay out of 
the way', and let market forces take over to shape the technology. In an 
Instrumental view, they believe that this ultimately result in the 'best' 
path for Internet technology as long as it is left alone to evolve 
'naturally'. 
Pro network neutrality politicians take a different view. In a 
Determinist approach, they regard the Internet as possessing a set of 
norms and values which have led to the growth in US economic power 
and they believe that unless those norms and values are protected, the 
US will experience a decline in power. This is essentially the same 
argument as their political opponents put forward. In this view, the 
Internet has a path which it is destined to follow. Pro and anti network 
neutrality politicians differ only on whether their responsibility is to 
avoid getting in the way or to make sure that the technology does 
adhere to this path. 
The second way in which this case study is distinct from the first two is 
that network neutrality has been a divisive debate in US politics. In 
both the cyber security case and the Internet governance case, the 
competing conceptions of power were broadly shared. Politicians 
regarded both conceptions as important but they privileged one over 
the other or tried to balance the two. ·with regard to network neutrality, 
there exist sharp political divisions which result in pro and anti 
network neutrality camps. Part of the analysis of this case study 
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entails working through the similarities and differences of these two 
groups with regard to their conceptions of US power and how it relates 
to network neutrality. 
The third distinct feature of network neutrality as a case study in this 
thesis is that it is a relatively new issue. Both cyber security and 
Internet governance have been regarded as closely related to US power 
since the mid 1990s. They date back to the commercialisation of the 
Internet and consequently, we have access to almost two decades of 
empirical material to study. In fact, although these debates have 
evolved over time, clear conceptions of power were articulated by 
politicians right from the beginning in the context of issues raised in 
the first two case studies. In contrast, the first Congressional hearing 
into network neutrality was not held until 2006. The combination of 
the issues falling outside the parameters of an established framework 
for discussing power, the divisive nature of the debates and the short 
timeframe seem to contribute to what Marianne Franklin refers to as 
attempts to "reconcile competing visions of internet futures vvith 
contested versions of the internet's brief past". 474 Perhaps not all that 
surprisingly, network neutrality has not been an easy issue either for 
politicians or scholars. 
Despite the fact that the case study does not demonstrate the influence 
of conceptions of power on technology, it produces some useful findings 
about the relationship between power and Internet technology in this 
context. First, we can observe how politicians draw on alternative 
sources of authority in order to try and support their agenda. Instead 
m .Marianne I. Franklin, 'Digital Dilemmas: Transnational Politics in the Twenty· 
First Century', The Brawn Journal of World Affriirs, Vol.16, No.2, Spring 2010, pg.80. 
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of drawing on their own sense of authority to shape the Internet into 
what they believe will best promote US power, politicians on both sides 
of this debate defer to external sources of authority. Pro network 
neutrality politicians draw on sources of legitimacy which emanate 
from the technology itself - either based on the views of Internet 
pioneers like Vinton Cerf and Tim Berners Lee, or grounded in the 
architecture of the Internet which they argue was built upon principles 
of net neutrality and therefore prescribes certain norms and values 
such as equity, freedom of access, and a non-hierarchical structure. 
This approach has elements of Technological Determinism in it as it 
regards technology both as 'path determined' and also as possessing 
some values of its own. 
Those politicians opposed to network neutrality draw on 'market forces' 
as their source of authority. Through a liberal understanding of limited 
government, they claim that they have no mandate to interfere with 
the market forces until such time as it is proven to fail. Their view of 
technology leans towards Instrumentalism which regards technology 
as value neutral and best driven by commercial imperatives for 
innovation. 
The second finding is that innovation emerges here as an integral 
element of US power in much the same manner as it was perceived in 
the Sputnik crisis. That is, innovation is regarded not only as the 
means to develop advanced technology which will be translated into a 
power advantage (material power), but it is deeply understood as 
reflecting US prestige and leadership (social power). 
The third important finding is that while politicians on both sides of 
the network neutrality debate regard protecting 'freedom' on the 
Internet as essential to promoting US power, the differ significantly in 
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how they interpret 'freedom'. While 'Internet freedom' has been 
demonstrated to be a driving concept in the context of cyber security 
policy, network neutrality debates reveal conflict and contention in 
how politicians regard freedom as it relates to US power. As Senator 
Barbara Boxer astutely observed in a 2006 hearing, "freedom is an 
issue here [but] it depends on how you look at what freedom is."475 Pro 
network neutrality politicians regard it as 'freedom of access', 'freedom 
of information' and 'freedom to innovate' and they believe that these 
freedoms best promote US power - economically and socially. Anti 
network neutrality politicians believe that the most essential freedom 
is freedom from government interference - that it has been a source of 
US power in the past and must continue to be protected in the 
information age. 
Network Neutrality: Technology and Concepts 
Technical Brief 
There are a number of technical issues which are necessary to 
understand in order to engage with debates about network neutrality. 
These include 'bandwidth', 'streaming media', 'Voice over Internet 
Protocol (VoIP)' and 'network management'. 
Bandwidth 
Bandwidth m the context of the Internet refers to the amount of 
information which can be transmitted over a connection. This impacts 
on how quickly an Internet connection works. A useful analogy is water 
running through a hose. If the bandwidth is low (or the hose narrow), 
475 Senator Barbara Boxer, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.44. 
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the information has to trickle through more slowly than if it were 
coming through a fast or 'broadband' connection. Wlrile waiting for 
information to download on the Internet was acceptable in the early 
years, there is an expectation now that we will be able to access 
information as quickly as if it were stored on our computer's hard disk. 
Broadband speed is one of the key markers of Internet functionality 
that is used to rate services and the demand for faster and faster 
connections has been a consistent market driver in Internet 
technology.476 
Streaming lkledia 
One of the most significant recent technological developments which 
moved network neutrality into the spotlight was the advent of 
streaming media necessary for viewing video files and playing live, 
multi·user video games. Previously, one might download a video file to 
the hard disk of a computer and then play it from there. In this 
situation, the data is local and the computer need only reference its 
own hard disk in order to keep the video flowing. However, when the 
video file is actually being played across the Internet, (as it is with 
YouTube), it is referred to as 'streaming media' and this introduces a 
special set of problems. As explained in the previous chapter, ordinary 
data travelling across the Internet is broken down into small 'packets', 
moved independently through the fastest possible route and then 
reassembled upon arrival at the destination address. With simple data 
like text files, delays have less impact because although transmission 
""Most communications paths consist of a succession of links, each with its own 
bandwidth. If one of these is much slower than the rest, it is said to be a bandwidth 
bottleneck. This often happens over the 'last mile' from the Internet service provider 
(ISP) to the end user - particularly in a domestic environment. 
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may be slowed during peak traffic periods, documents eventually 
arrive fully assembled. Streaming media relies upon an uninterrupted 
flow because it is being transmitted live in real time. \Vith streaming 
media, delays in packet delivery can result in the video or audio being 
disrupted - sometimes even unintelligible. Streaming media has 
substantially increased demands on bandwidth. Increasingly, Internet 
users expect streaming media to operate smoothly over their Internet 
connection and this places demands on commercial network operators 
to ensure that it does. 
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 
One application of streaming media which is of particular relevance to 
this study is that of Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP).477 This is the 
protocol which allows for telephone calls to be made over the Internet 
through applications like Skype. VoIP is streaming media because the 
conversation takes place live (as with any phone call) and if there is not 
an adequate bandwidth, the voice call breaks up and can become 
unintelligible. This particular application will feature significantly in 
this chapter because it potentially undermines the conventional 
business model of some telecommunications corporations which own 
Internet infrastructure in the US. These firms argue that without the 
revenue generated by phone calls, their profits are not adequate to 
build out the necessary infrastructure. In the US, where the state 
477 Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) refers to the transmission of voice 
communications over the Internet. Perhaps the most well-known proprietary VoIP 
application is Skype, but VoIP is increasingly penetrating traditional phone markets, 
For an overview ofrecent developme.nts, refer to the White Paper entitled 'Voice Over 
Internet Protocof on the International Engineering Consortium website at 
filtp://wy;rw.iec.org/onlifil.:ltutorials/int tele£index.asp 
289!?age 
Chapter Six Network Neutrality 
relies on the private sector to provide this, these problems have 
implications for state infrastructure. 
Network Management 
Network Management is an outcome of the prevrnus three technical 
factors. Advances in streaming media including VoIP have placed 
greater demands on bandwidth. Consumer expectations of streaming 
media working properly (fluidly and without interruption) have led to 
an increase in network management practices in order to enhance the 
'Quality of Service' (QoS). This involves prioritising certain data 
packets over others so that packets associated with streaming media 
arrive promptly at their destination rather than in a jerky, disrupted 
fashion. With no network management, streaming media may work 
perfectly - particularly if other demands on the network are low at 
that time. However, during peak periods, streaming media may not 
perform well without some network management which ensures the 
packets arrive sequentially and consecutively. This practice of network 
management is one of the key areas of contention in network 
neutrality debates. Some object to any prioritisation of data packets at 
all and regard packet discrimination is an antithesis to the open and 
agnostic nature of the Internet. 478 Others regard it as increasingly 
necessary arguing that there has always been the technical capacity for 
prioritising packets and network management is increasingly 
necessary to accommodate the uptake of streaming media. 
478 Net neutrality remains a strong norm in the technical community. Internet 
scholar Lawrence Lessig argues that "as scholars and network theorists have 
extensively documented, the innovation and explosive growth of the Internet is 
directly linked to its particular architectural design." Lawrence Lessig, Stanford Law 
School, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.54. 
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Concepts of Network Neutrality 
The above factors broadly define the technical nature of network 
neutrality. In addition, there are a number of approaches to network 
neutrality which place emphasis on certain factors. Net neutrality is a 
complex concept, not only in a technical sense but because it refers to a 
pri11ciple rather than a concrete factor - the principle that the Internet 
should be 'neutral' with respect to the delivery of information. 
Furthermore, it is a principle consisting of a number of different 
components not all of which have the same relevance or importance 
to those who debate the issue. Net neutrality is addressed within many 
disciplines including law, economics, political economy, technology, 
telecommunications analysis and sociology. Three main themes emerge 
in definitions of network neutrality. These are outlined below but will 
be expanded upon in the follo~ving section which more comprehensively 
details the technological context for understanding the US political 
debate on net neutrality. 
Prioritisation of bandwidth: This theme argues that application 
providers (for example Google, Amazon, Ebay and I·tunes) should not 
have to pay network operators (ATT, Verizon etc) for delivering their 
services to customers. Some net neutrality proponents further argue 
that network operators should not be permitted to p1ivilege data 
delivery according to who is sending it. 
Universal access: This refers to the principle that there should be no 
prevention of access to any lawful website or application - either by the 
network operators or the government. 
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Vertical Integration: Access providers should not be permitted to 
expand into content provision. 479 "the market power of current 
broadband ISP incumbents (telecommunications and cable) will result 
in anticompetitive and monopolistic actions that will damage 
customers, application providers, and innovators." 480 
Network neutrality is about how the power to control information on 
the Internet and access to the Internet is distributed. vVhile politicians 
recognise the implications of who possesses that power, they are 
essential divided on whether to maintain a status quo which allocates 
that power to the market in a kind of laissez faire approach similar to 
the public/private partnership in the cyber security chapter or whether 
this technology requires a new approach to the control of technology. 
Essentially, this comes down to a decision about how much control and 
how much power should be allocated to the large telecommunications 
firms that act as network operators. 
Telecommunications firms such as argue for the right to control 
Internet traffic for three reasons. First, they suggest that large 
profitable firms like Google are getting a 'free ride' on their 
infrastructure (explain how 'controlling' would prevent this - by 
controlling· do you mean charging for access?). Second, there is a lack of 
financial incentive for building out the US infrastructure and they 
argue that additional revenue streams are necessary for adequate Wall 
Street confidence. Finally, increased demands on bandwidth from video 
streaming and VoIP mean that in order for the telecommunications 
479 Martin Cave and Pietro Crocioni, "Does Europe Need Network Neutrality Rules?'', 
International Journal of Communication, Vol. 1, 2007, pg.670. 
<SO Gerald R Faulhaber, "Network Neutrality: The Debate Evolves", International 
Journal of Communication, Vol. 1, 2007, pg.683. 
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sector to ensure continuity of service to their customers, they must be 
allowed to 'manage' the network traffic. At times, this may include 
putting some traffic in the 'slow lane' in order to process other data. 
This idea of a 'two·lane' highway is at the heart of the debate about 
network neutrality. Politicians who favour a market led approach 
regard two lanes as providing a choice to those who can pay. Those 
politicians who favour network neutrality regard this as essentially 
undermining the norms and values which have made the Internet so 
successful and in turn, promoted US power so effectively. These 
include openness, a level playing field, flexibility - all of which these 
politicians argue are essential for innovation - something which they 
link directly to US power. 
Changes to tbe 'Business' of tbe Internet 
In the early years of the commercial Internet, there were two broad 
revenue streams: one was associated with advertising existing 
businesses and the other was related to building and leasing the 
additional infrastructure which had become necessary. ·with regard to 
the infrastructure, telecommunications firms and cable operators 
initially offered Internet access over their existing infrastructure. As 
consumer demands grew both quantitatively and qualitatively for 
Internet connections, so did the telecommunications sector's plans for 
additional infrastructure including faster methods of delivery such as 
wireless and digital subscriber lines (DSL)4s1. In this business model, 
481 Digital subscriber lines or DSL is a high speed Internet service which uses 
existing copper telephone cables but is independent of a subscriber's normal 
telephone line. This meant that customers could connect to the Internet at a faster 
rate and also use their phone at the same time as opposed to earlier methods which 
required a modem to completely monopolise one's phone line. 
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the network operators (telecommunication firms and cable operators) 
invested in the necessary infrastructure and then leased it out to 
individuals, government and commercial operators. Each user paid for 
their own access and use in the same manner as they paid for other 
utilities like electricity or telephone calls. If they exceeded their 
stipulated data limit, they may be charged an additional 'download' fee 
but the commercial exchange was between the network operators and 
those wishing to connect to the Internet. Whether those customers 
were connecting to develop their own commercial website or whether 
they were connecting in order to access websites posted by others was 
immaterial. It was the access to the Internet which one paid for and 
there were no costs associated with the number of visitors to one's 
website. 
The second broad revenue stream associated with the early commercial 
years of the Internet was the means of advertising existing businesses. 
At this time, online business activity was regarded merely as an 
adjunct or supplement to an existing commercial enterprise. Referred 
to as the 'brochure' phase, websites in this period were used as an 
alternative means of providing a point of contact, offering an 
explanation of products and/or services offered and later, with the 
advent of e·commerce, an opportunity to remotely purchase those 
products and services. The Internet in this incarnation was equated to 
other advertising platforms like television, print media and radio. 
In the mid to late 1990s, it became evident that there was money to be 
made through the provision of stand-alone services offered over the 
Internet - wholly unrelated to existing, physical businesses. Broadly 
referred to as 'Web 2.0', this was a time during which search engines 
like Google and Yahoo as well as the online auction service Ebay 
demonstrated that websites could be more than just supplements for 
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conventional businesses. They were capable of generating huge 
commercial returns in and of themselves. Subsequently, the 
commercial opportunities of the Internet which had previously been 
perceived of as limited to existing business on the one hand and new 
demands for infrastructure (cable, DSL, broadband) and associated 
services on the other - expanded to include a third group - service and 
content providers. Indeed, the 'dot·com' era was characterised by tiny 
start·up companies (often the product of one or two bright young 
minds) returning huge profits with comparatively little investment and 
minimal physical overheads. 482 It was these extraordinary profits 
which reinforced existing political views that the Internet was 
integrally linked to US power through its impact on the economy. 
The previous chapter on Internet governance demonstrated the 
repercussions of this business shift on the Internet protocol names and 
numbers which very abruptly acquired substantial commercial worth 
where none had previously existed. In the context of network 
neutrality, this shift had a similarly disruptive influence. In the wake 
of the dot.com boom, network operators became increasingly 
dissatisfied with supplying the means of transmission for content and 
service providers without sharing in the considerable profits the 
service providers were making. The commercial sphere of 
infrastructure provision and network operations was far less profitable 
in comparison. It became apparent that it would be fiscally 
advantageous for network operators if there were a financial 
relationship between infrastructure and content. Increasingly, these 
4s2 Google was founded by Larry Page and Sergey Brin while they were students at 
Stanford University. Two more Stanford graduates, Jerry Yang and David Filo 
launched Yahoo! In 1994 and Ebay was formed in 1995 by computer programmer, 
Pierre Omidyar as part of a larger personal site. 
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firms began to diversify their operations to include content 
provision. 483 
This in itself was not problematic but there were two concerns which 
arose from this development of the business model for network 
operators. First, they soon proposed a new financial arrangement 
which they regarded as more equitably distributing the huge profits 
generated by Web 2.0 Internet activity. Network operators wanted to 
be able to charge the owners of websites - specifically Internet service 
and content providers - a fee for each user who accessed their site or 
used their services. Under this model, the individual user would pay 
for their own access to the Internet as was already the case, but in 
addition companies like Google, MSN, Facebook and YouTube would 
also have to pay a fee for each individual who accessed their websites. 
In 2005, CEO of AT&T Ed Whitacre gave an interview to Business 
Week in which he explicitly addressed this stating that "what they 
[Internet businesses including Google, MSN and Vonage] would like to 
do is use my pipes free, but I ain't going to let them do that because we 
have spent this capital and we have to have a return on it."484 In a 
somewhat more measured approach, Verizon CEO Ivan Seidenberg 
said in an interview the following year that "We have to make sure 
4ll3 The diversification of telcos to become content providers themselves has happened 
either by producing their own material or - more often - sewing up exclusive deals 
with established content providers. For example, Verizon's V Cast which exclusively 
broadcasts ESPN sports coverage in mobile furmat. 
http ://products. vz\v .co1nfindex.aspx?id ;::;yideo 
"'Patricia O'Connell, 'Online Extra: At SBC, It's All About Scale and &ope', 
Business Week, November 7, 2005, 
http://www.businessweek.com/@!icn84h*1UQu7KtOwgAlmag~zinelcontent/05 45/bfil!Ii. 
8092.htm. 
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that they [service providers] don't sit on our network and chew up 
bandwidth ... \Ve need to pay for the pipe."485 
This proposal concerns those in favour of network neutrality because it 
sets up the 'two lane highway' where those who can pay have access to 
the fast lane and others are relegated to the slow lane. Proponents of 
network neutrality believe that giving network operators such power 
(particularly in a semi·monopolistic business environment like the US) 
could lead to anti-competitive behaviour whereby small, innovative 
companies which have previously used the net as a means of accessing 
the marketplace and driving development, could be shut out due to 
excessive fees imposed upon their traffic. If, for example, Verizon were 
to charge Google an 'access fee', they would certainly pay it. However, 
they may not have been in a position to pay it when they first started 
and other new start-ups may be prevented from reaching a customer 
base by prohibitive fees. The next 'Google' may never reach the 
marketplace. This failure to nurture innovation which has been 
regarded as so important for economic power as well as leadership and 
prestige, is very worrying for those politicians who take a pro network 
neutrality view. 
The second reason why proponents of network neutrality are concerned 
by moves by network operators to integrate content provision is 
because they anticipate that this will lead to the network operators 
discriminating against competing content. In a market with plenty of 
'" Paul Kapustka, 'Verizon Says Google, JVIicrosoft Should Pay For Internet Apps', 
Information Week, Jan. 5, 2006, 
h tti>~//\.yww .infOrma tion\veek. con1/news/Internet/J:;>busin.ess/ show Artif;;Ie. lhtm l? article I 
!2.=JJ5801il\'i.:!.ll:o.fil!S!J:llext"'We%.Wh1n'.e%Z.Qtg%.20111ake3:Q.20sur~%.ZQt1L'lt%2Qj:hev%ZQi,\ 
on(Yrr27'~'.J20Bit%20on%20ouro/020network?~Oand%20ehew01ri20up%20bandytidth . 
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choice for consumers, this would be of less concern but many sectors of 
the US market, Internet connectivity is dominated by a small number 
of firms. Those firms, if they were able to discriminate against content 
would have the power to control what information is available on the 
Internet to their subscribers. One of the key ways in which network 
operators can and have done this, is through network management. 
They have argued that in order to keep their network running well, 
they have had to demote some information in order t-0 privilege other 
information. 
This is obviously a concern for both consumers and the commercial 
sector trying to reach them over the Internet. However, it has 
additional political implications because of the way in which it 
challenges norms and values which politicians associate with US power 
- particularly freedom. 
Network Neutrality Comes to Congress 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, a major revision to US 
telecommunications law took place in 1996 when Congress passed 
changes to the 1934 Commumcations Act. This update to the 
legislation was intended to facilitate competition in local phone 
services in the wake of the historic break·up of the AT&T telephone 
monopoly.486 Following this, the Federal Communications Commission 
took the important step of relegating Internet communications from 
Title II of the Communications Act which govern common carriage 
telephone communications to the less stringent Title I regulations 
486 Robert W. Crandall, ()ompetition and Chaos U.S Telecommunications since the 
1996 Telecom Act; (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005). 
2981Page 
Chapter Six Network NeutrDlity 
which govern interstate information services. 487 This step essentially 
removed a layer of regulation from the telecommunications firms which 
own and operate networks in the US and a series of conflicts arose 
from this action. 
11'1adison River 
In early 2005, Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) provider Vonage 
Holdings accused network operator Madison River Communications of 
'port·blocking' VoIP traffic (like Skype) through its Internet service 
provider (ISP). Essentially, Madison River was using its ability to 
control traffic over its infrastructure to prevent the transmission of 
data associated with VoIP calls made through Vonage's service. This 
was regarded as anti·competitive given that Madison River's core 
business at the time was the provision of fixed line voice services as a 
common carrier (conventional telephone lines) - a service in 
competition with, and considerably threatened by, new VoIP services 
which allow long distance phone calls to be made free or at negligible 
cost. As Lawrence Lessig pointed out in his analysis of this case, VoIP 
"not only explodes demand for broadband but effectively renders 
obsolete its major competitor, plain old telephone service". 488 
This was exactly the kind of behaviour which had been foreshadowed 
by those like Michael Copps who were opposed to the FCC Title 1 
487 The 2002 ruling applied tn cable services but in 2005 this was extended to DSL 
services. For the complete ruling, see FCC 02·77, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemalting, in the .~fatter of Inquiry Concerning High·Speed Access to the 
Internet Over Cahle and Other Facilities I Internet Over Cable Declaratory Order 
Proceeding I Appropri,•te Regulatoiy Treatment for Broadband Access to the Internet 
Over Cable Facilities, GN Docket 00·185, March 15, 2002, l'!JYlY~fi&@Y. 
<ss La\.vrence Lessig, Voice·Over-IP's Unlikely Hero', Wired, May 13, 2005, 
http://www.wired.com/wiredlarchive/13.05/view.httl)l?pg=4. 
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ruling in 2002. The FCC fined Madison River although there were 
some residual questions about its legal authority to do so. 489 Madison 
River paid the fine and the case was widely reported as a tentative win 
for net neutrality while at the same time, serving to highlight the very 
real possibilities for network operators to be tempted to 'manage' 
Internet traffic in a way which privileged their own interests. 490 
Within months of the Madison River complaint being resolved, the 
FCC issued a policy statement which contained the following four 
principles of 'Internet freedom' in order to "encourage broadband 
deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected 
nature of the public Internet": 
• consumers are entitled to access the lawful Internet content of 
their choice. 
• consumers are entitled to run applications and use services of 
their choice, subject to the needs of law enforcement. 
489 In response to the complaint by Vonage, the FCC entered into a 'consent decree' 
with Madison River in which Madison River agxeed to make a "voluntacy payment" of 
$15,000 and refrain from interfering with VoIP traffic in the future. Although the 
consent dec1·ee expressly stipulated that it did not constitute a "legal finding 
regarding any c-0mpliance or noncompliance with the requil'ements of the Act and the 
Commission's orders and rules", it also stipulated that Madison River waived any 
rights to an appeal or review of the matter in the future. For the full text of the 
consent decree see FCC Consent Decree with .~1adison River, File No. EB·05· Ili"O 110, 
March 3, 2005, www.fcc.govleb/Orders/2005/DA-05·543A2.html. For a critical 
analysis, see l:''red Goldstein, 'Rolling, rolling, mlling on the (Madison) Rivex', 
lonary.com, October 2005, http://www.iQUJln'.com/ion·voipblock.htmL 
400 Declan McCullagh, •relco agrees to stop blocking VoIP calls', CNet.news, l\farch 3, 
2005, http:llnews.cnet.comrrelcQ·agrees·to·ston·blocking·VoIP-call'll.2100·7.352 3· 
5598633,html, Paul Kapustka, 'FCC Fines N.C. Provider $15K For Blocking Vonage', 
Information Week; March 3, 2005, 
http :11www:Jnforl!l<ltiQ!l_lVe©.J>,i;gmlnew11L~lmi;r,'}J:ti~l<hih!JJ..Jli£lrti;;!e IQ=60405234, 
Stephen Lawson, 'Vonage CEO Slams VoIP Blocking', PCWorld, March 9, 2005, 
http://l;{_y;w.pcworld.comiar.ticlell!99191vonage reo slams voip blocking.html, 
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• consumers are entitled to connect their choice of legal devices 
that do not harm the network. 
• consumers are entitled to competition among network providers, 
application and service providers, and content providers, 491 
The final paragraph of this policy statement asserted that the FCC 
would incorporate these principles into its future policies. However, 
this was footnoted with a line which read "The principles we adopt are 
subject to reasonable network management". 492 This caveat would 
prove instrumental in the second very public challenge to the FCC's 
authority. 
Comcast 
In 2007, complaints began to emerge about network operator Comcast 
Corp selectively blocking BitTorrent traffic - a peer-to·peer (P2P) file 
sharing application. P2P applications like BitTorrent are used for 
exchanging large files - often video. As video files consume huge 
amounts of bandwidth relative to ordinary data files, heavy P2P traffic 
can impact negatively on the network's performance.·>93 This raises the 
issue of quality of service (QoS) discussed earlier in this chapter. QoS 
was increasingly becoming a consideration for network operators 
seeking to provide consistently fast service in the face of the huge 
growth of data flowing through the network. In order to achieve a 
491 FCC Policy Statement FCC 05-151, September 23, 2005, 
];lttp :fiflallfoss. fee. goviedocs public/ attach ma tch!FCQ.:!)_5-15lA1.pdf. 
492 Ibid. 
493 vllhile it is certainly used legitimately, BitTorrent is also a tool of choice for those 
seeking to download tv shows and movies illegally. This sometimes emerges in 
debates about this case and can impact on perceptions about the importance of the 
Comcast case as illegal behavionr ofBitTorrent users is conflated with the issue of 
selectively blocking traffic. 
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standard of QoS, network operators argued that they needed the 
flexibility to undertake some 'management' of the data. However, just 
as Madison River was a telephone service provider found to be blocking 
competitive VoIP services, Comcast was a cable television provider 
blocking the download of video files. Consequently, allegations of anti· 
competitive behavior arose again in this case. 
After receiving a filed complaint, the FCC launched an investigation 
and found Comcast's practices exceeded what could reasonably be 
viewed as 'necessary network managemenf.494 Comcast was not fined, 
but the FCC ordered them to cease blocking and to publicly reveal their 
network management strategies. Comcast denied any wrongdoing 
maintaining that their network management practices were both legal 
and necessary. More significantly though, they challenged the FCC's 
authority to enforce the four Internet principles without them being 
linked to a statute. The case went to the US Court of Appeals and in 
April 2010 the court found in favour of Comcast, ruling that the FCC 
lacked the authority to force Internet service providers to keep their 
networks open to all forms of content. 495 
49< 'In the Matters of Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against 
Comcast Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to· Peer Applications Broadband 
Industry Practices Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading 
an Internet Application Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not 
Meet an Exception for 'Reasonable Network Management", Memorandum Opinion 
and Order, File No. EB·OS·IH·l518, US Federal Communications Commission, 
August 1, 2008. The full text of the FCC order can be found at 
h!ipjjhraw1foss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/FCC-08-I 83A 1.pdf. 
495 Cecilia Kang, 'Comt rules for Comcruit over FCC in net neutrality case', 
Washington Post, April 7, 2010, llt!,Q'L/www.washi1igtoupost.com/wp· 
dynfcontentlar.ti&le/~OHl/04i06/AR20.I0!)40600742.htm!. For some earlier coverage on 
this case, see John Eggerton, 'Comcast: FCC's BitTorrent Decision Violated Fair 
Noti!::e': Cable giant challenges commission's judgment on peer-to·peer traffic in D.C. 
federal appeals court', Broadcasting & Cable, October 27, 2009, 
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Material Power: Innovation and the State of the Net 
\\>'hen politicians engage with a material conception of power in the 
context of network neutrality, there are two key issues which dominate 
the debates. The first is the degrading state of US information 
infrastructure which lags behind many other states and has failed to 
improve over the past decade. The poor state of the broadband 
performance is regarded as a problem for sustaining US economic 
competitiveness and economic growth - regarded as important factors 
in US economic power. There is an assumption in the US that 
investment in this infrastructure must come from the private sector 
and the network owners use this expectation to apply pressure to 
politicians to oppose network neutrality. Poor broadband performance 
also has some important implications for social power which will be 
taken up in the next section. 
The second issue which features in material power conceptions in the 
context of network neutrality is innovation. Innovation is closely 
associated with US material power in this case study both as a source 
of power and as a means through which to generate power. Innovation 
also intersects with a social conception of power which, again, will be 
taken up below. 
htJ11'L/;yww.broadcastingcable.com/orticle/S6654(L 
{&incast FCC s BitTorrent Decision Violated Fgir Noti&!LrLJm 
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The State of the Internet in the US 
There are a range of measures used to determine the state of a 
country's Internet 'health'.~6 Although there is some contention about 
the methodology and findings of studies which attempt this analysis, 
overall in terms of speed, penetration and price US Internet services 
have been rated significantly below the top of the scale for some time 
now. One recent study of 72 countries by the Said Business School at 
Oxford University ranked the US 15th in terms of 'Broadband 
Leadership', tied with Slovenia, Latvia, France and Canada. 
Broadband leadership, they argue is closely linked to innovation 
economies. 497 
A Senate report published in 2007 stated that according to statistics 
kept by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) since 2001, the United States had slipped from fourth to 
fifteenth place in per capita broadband use. 498 The same report also 
referred to another metric known as the Digital Opportunity Index, 
which measures (amongst other things) the cost of connectivity relative 
to per capita income. In this metric, the United States ranked twenty· 
49s These can be quite contentious as some variables favour one state or set of st.ates 
over others for reasons like demography and geography. Measuring broadband 
penetration by a per capita rating for example introduces a bias against larger 
households as broadband is most often taken up by a household, not an individual. In 
addition, what defines 'broadband speed' changes as higher speeds become expected 
and lower speeds are no longer considered 'broadband'. For a good overview of how 
some of these statistics are applied, see Yochai Benkler, Next Generation 
Con.nectivity:A review of broadband lntewet transitions and policy from around the 
world, <Cambridge: The Berkman Centre for Internet and Sodety, Feb 8, 2010). 
497 
'Third annual broadband study shows global broadband quality improves by 24% 
in one year'. Cisco Website, available online at 
http:f/newsroom.cisco.comldlls/201 Olp rod.~ 101710 .html. 
498 OECD Broadband Statistics to December 2006, OECD web site, April 2007, 
http://www.oecd.org/documentli/0.2340.en 2649 34223 38446855 1 1 1 LOO.html. 
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first. 199 More recently, an independent and comprehensive report 
published in Februacy 2010 which compared broadband in half of the 
OECD countries found that "the United States is a middle·of-the·pack 
performer on most first generation broadband measures, but a weak 
performer on prices for high and next-generation speeds" . .soo 
Anxiety about the US falling behind other states in broadband 
measures is a key feature of network neutrality debates. The 
revelation of poor rankings led to the conclusion in a Senate report that 
"although the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency developed the Internet and provided the Nation with a 
platform for leading the world in Internet technology, the next 
generation of Internet applications may not be developed here without 
the right policies". soi It goes on to state that nations with more 
substantial broadband infrastructures "may be home to the next wave 
of digital research and development because they could be better 
positioned to reap the economic benefits of the broadband era."&02 
Internet infrastructure is not intrinsically linked to network neutrality 
this is a problem for the US because its infrastructure is privately 
owned and operated. For states that invest public funds in the 
infrastructure, network neutrality debates deal with separate issues. 
499 Senate Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on 
S.1492: Broadband Data Improvement Act, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2007), pp.1·2. 
500 Benkler, Next Generation Connectivity, (Cambridge: The Berkman Centre for 
Internet and Society, Feb 8, 2010), pg.12. 
soi Senate Report of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on 
S.1492: Broadband Data Improvement Act, (Washington: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 2007), pg.2. 
502 Ibid. 
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As explained in Chapter Three, the privatisation of the Internet was 
politically considered necessai'}' in the US in order to allow for 
commercial activity. It was regarded as inappropriate for the private 
sector to profit from a tax payer funded network. At this time, the 
Internet was regarded by politicians as specifically a mechanism for 
economic growth. However, by the time network neutrality emerged as 
a problem for US power, the Internet had become a part of the critical 
infrastructure of the state. In some states, this transition has led to an 
expectation that the government will contribute funds toward 
improving the information infrastructure. The Internet is now 
regarded as integral to so many aspects of cultural, educational, 
commercial and political life of the state that expectations of the 
private sector funding necessary improvements to the infrastructure 
are waning and public money is used instead.503 However, in the US 
this has not been the case and there remains an assumption that 
telecommunications infrastructure should be built, owned and operated 
by the private sector. 
This contrasts to the previous two decades when US politicians were 
prepared to publicly fund the development of Internet technology but 
in the context of network neutrality this is never seriously discussed or 
debated. In several hearings, reference is made to states which have 
injected public funds into their Internet infrastructure and which now 
exceed the US in Internet metric ratings. At a 2006 hearing into 
network neutrality, Vinton Cerf (one of the scientists credited with 
inventing the Internet) testified that "promoting an open and 
accessible Internet is critical ... to our Nation's competitiveness - in 
303 For one example, see the Australian National Broadband Network which is 
expected to cost $43 billion. htt.iz:l/www.nbnco.eom.au/. 
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places like Japan, Korea, Singapore, and the United Kingdom, higher-
bandwidth and neutral broadband platforms are unleashing waves of 
innovation that threaten to leave the U.S. further and further 
behind".504 This is most often met with the response that although that 
approach has been successful in other states, it is not appropriate for 
the US. Senator John Ensign argues that although "many other 
countries are taking a different approach than the United States; we're 
more of a free·market country. And I think that we should be that 
way."505 
In this political context where politicians fear the US is losing its 
competitive edge and thereby jeopardising its power, expectations of 
the private sector providing critical infrastructure are high and the 
debate is focussed on what sort of fiscal incentives are necessary or 
warranted in order to promote investment.506 The telecommunications 
sector argues vigorously against network neutrality, charging that if 
legislated it will deter further investment in an already substandard 
US infrastructure. Faced with such poor performance internationally, 
US politicians have been forced to give real weight to these arguments. 
As with the public/private partnership in the cyber security chapter, 
the government is reliant on the private sector to deliver a solution to 
this problem for US power. 
504 Vinton Cerf, Vice President/Ch1efinternet Evangelist, Google, Inc., Net Neutrality, 
hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.9. 
505 John Ensign, US Senator from Nevada, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 
2006, pg.4, 
5os "You do deserve a return on your investment, is the bottom line, if you're going to 
build out these networks. Otherwise, if we can't give them a return on their 
investment, Wall Street is not going to loan them the money to do this." John Ensign, 
US Senator from Nevada, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg,5. 
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1J11lovation and US Power 
We want to continue to see [the Internet] be a source of 
innovation and a strength for our economy. 007 
As documented extensively in the previous two case studies, the 
economy features in debates about Internet technology as an important 
indicator of US power. Politicians link cyber insecurity to US economic 
power through the loss of intellectual property and stolen classified 
data, the cost of defending against cyber attacks, the danger that 
insecm'ity over the Internet will undermine consumer confidence m 
online transactions and the potential for all of these factors to 
negatively impact not only directly on US economic power but also on 
the state's capacity to fond more conventional military power. In the 
chapter on Internet governance, the post Cold War shift in conceptions 
of US power from an emphasis on military might to economic strength 
framed the debates on how best to manage the demands of Internet 
governance. Politicians expressed a strong belief in a commercially 
managed Domain Name System which could expand US markets to 
enhance US economic power. In the context of network neutrality, 
politicians continue to express the belief that US power is integrally 
linked to the Internet through the economy but many of these debates 
centre on the relationship of i1111ova ti on to US economic power. 
There is a convention in US politics of linking innovation particularly 
technological innovation ~ to state power as well as to the state's 
position in the global order. Adam Segal writes that "[t]he United 
507 Representative Debbie Wasserman Shultz, Net Neutrality and .Free Speech on the 
Internet, hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, Task Force on Competition 
Policy and Antitrust Laws, House of Representatives, March 11, 2008, pg.85. 
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States' global primacy depends in large part on its ability to develop 
new technologies and industries faster than anyone else. For the last 
five decades, U.S. scientific innovation and technological 
entrepreneurship have ensured the country's economic prosperity and 
military power." 5-08 President Obama has argued that this history 
provides a compelling precedent for contemporary technology policy. 
"The United States led the world's economies in the 20th century 
because we led the world in innovation. Today, the competition is 
keener; the challenge is tougher; and that is why innovation is more 
important than ever.''509 
\Vhile there is little digression from this assumption that innovation is 
linked to US power, there are contending views about how innovation 
is best promoted and these views relate to conceptions of power. Some 
politicians take the view that innovation needs to be guided and 
sometimes encouraged by government initiatives while others believe 
that regulation and governmental involvement tend to stifle innovation 
more than they enhance it. In the first view, innovation is regarded as 
a potential source of power similar to natural resources. It can result in 
increased state power, if directed to do so by appropriate government 
policies. In the latter view, innovation is power - particularly when 
wed to a market led economy. As President Bush has expressed 
"America's economy leads the world because our system of private 
508 Segal, 'Is America Losing Its Edge?. 
509 President Obama, A Strategy lbr American Innovation, pg.I. 
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enterprise rewards innovation."510 In this view, the government needs 
to 'stay out of the way'.5ll 
These two approaches to innovation as it relates t-0 US power more 
broadly are reflected in the debates on network neutrality. In his 
opening statement to a 2006 hearing on network neutrality, Committee 
Chair Ted Stevens described net neutrality as 'one of the most difficult, 
but most important' issues before the Committee.512 He goes on to state 
that changes to the nation's telecommunication laws will determine 
two things - first, whether the private sector can generate adequate 
revenue to justify the considerable investment needed in network 
infrastructure and second, whether the Internet remains "a free 
marketplace of ideas with no gatekeeper".513 Pro network neutrality 
politicians fear that without legislative reform to enshrine network 
neutrality principles in communications law, innovation on the 
Internet which has been so important to the US economy will be stifled 
by privileging large organisations which can pay for speed and access 
over the Internet while smaller organisations or individuals may find 
themselves on the "gravel road" as Senator Byron Dorgan refers to the 
slow lane on the Internet.514 Anti net neutrality politicians on the other 
hand, fear that network neutrality will eliminate important economic 
510 President Bush, A New Genenition of American Innovation. 
m There are many examples of this view. For one, see Senator ,Jim DeMint, speech 
entitled 'The Federal Unbundling Commission?' December 17, 2007. Transcript 
available on Senator DeMint's website at 
http://demint.senate.gov/publiclindex.cfm?FuseAction=Pre~sReleases.Detai!&PressHe 
lease id=ee010c53·9<:144·9034·d948~ 
al 65ffi2ee9b l &1\12e=Press% 20Relea§e&Month.= ,lj!& Y ear=200'i'. . 
512 Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg. l 
513 lbid. 
514 Senator Byron Dorgan, speech on introducing the S.215 "Internet Freedom 
Preservation Act"} January 91 2007. 
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incentives for large telecommunications firms to build out the state's 
ailing information infrastructure by preventing them from exploiting 
new revenue streams and garnering a portion of the profits of those 
companies which operate over the network. 
Although network neutrality itself did not feature in Congressional 
debates prior to the Bush administration, the approach of the Clinton-
Gore administration more generally to government promotion of 
innovative t"chnology was made clear in the chapter on Internet 
governance. Vice President Gore expressed a proactive approach many 
times stating that although the government's intention was that the 
Internet should become the domain of the private sector, government 
did have a role to play in establishing and promoting the technology.515 
This approach is consistent with that of President Obama who has also 
expressed an understanding of innovation as a resource "the key to 
meeting some of the greatest challenges facing our nation and the 
world". 5 rn He has anticipated innovation playing a pivotal role in 
protecting freedom, global competitiveness, a resilient economy, and 
the attainment of essential national goals.517 Because of this, he has 
argued that "a strategy is clearly needed to direct our government's 
funding and regulatory decisions in order to capture the innovation 
opportunity." 5l8 
President Obama declared during his presidential campaign that if 
elected, he would support network neutrality. Once in office, the 
515Senator Gore, speech to Congress introducing the National High·Perfurmance 
Computer Technology Act, May 18, 1989. 
"" President Obama. A Strategy for American Innovation, pg.4. 
"'Ibid. 
m Ibid. 
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Obama administration released a major policy document outlining the 
administration's approach to innovation - including in the context of 
network neutrality. In the Strategy for American Innovation, the 
President argued that network neutrality was essential, in large part 
because the US economy was increasingly dependent on the Internet. 
The President stressed the importance of telecommunications networks 
which were "open to all lawful uses by all users" arguing that "that's 
the way the Internet has always worked, and we want it to stay that 
way not because we treasure our past, but because we care about our 
economic future."519 President Obama draws explicitly on the Clinton-
Gore technology initiatives of the early 1990s to illustrate his point 
arguing that innovation in the Internet technology sector was "initially 
catalyzed and continuously supported by government investment" and 
as a consequence, has made key contributions to the US economy. 
"Some experts estimate that the Internet adds as much as $2 trillion to 
annual GDP, over $6,500 per person." 520 FCC Chairman Julius 
Genachowski has further pointed out that the US information and 
communications technology sector represents one sixth of the US 
economy.521 
Pro network neutrality politicians believe there is significant danger 
associated with allowing network operators to have too much power 
over the flow of information. This, they argue, will lead to anti-
competitive behaviour which will stifle innovation. "The small start-
ups and the scores of others that began tiny and dreamed big were able 
519 President Obama, A Strategy iGr American Innovation, pg.14. 
''°Ibid, pg.5. 
021 Julius Genachowski, 'Connecting the Nation: A National Broadband Plan', 
remarks delivered at the Clinton Presidential Library on November 24, 2009. 
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to succeed because every user has had equal access to all the websites" 
argued Senator Ron Wyden in a 2006 hearing. "So, I'm going to 
introduce legislation to try to keep it that way, and the legislation is 
essentially built on the idea that all information ought to be made 
available on the same terms, so that no 'bit' is better than another 
one."522 
In 2005, Nancy Pelosi linked this issue to social power when she 
observed that the "dynamic and virtuous cycle of innovation is what 
secured our status as world leader, and that status has remained 
unchallenged - until now."523 The importance of this 'leadership' status 
is another key theme that drives network neutrality debates in the US, 
Social Power: Leadership, Prestige and Freedom 
As was found in both of the other case studies, a social conception of 
power plays a role in network neutrality debates. In this context, 
politicians focus on two aspects. The first is a strong belief in the 
relationship between US 'leadership' and power, Politicians express a 
deep anxiety about any other state leading the world in Internet 
technology, indeed they express a strong sense that it is the US 
'destiny' to lead, The debates here resonate strongly with the debates 
outlined in Chapter Three which emerged after the Sputnik crisis, 
The second social power factor which plays a role here is competing 
conceptions of 'freedom'. As was the case in the cyber security case 
study, politicians in this case study argue that promoting freedom is 
522 Senator Ron Wyden, Net Neutl"ality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.6. 
523 Nancy Pelosi, remarks on the release of the 'Innovation Agenda' by the House 
Democrats, November 15, 2005, http://pelosi.house.gov/. 
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essential to the future of the Internet and to US power. They disagree 
quite seriously on what 'freedom' means in this context and this opens 
up a whole range of questions about what US politicians mean when 
they talk about the role of these norms and values with relation to US 
power. 
Leadership and Prestige 
In addition to the assumption that the private sector should be solely 
responsible for US information infrastructure, there is also a somewhat 
conflicting assumption that the US should 'lead' the rest of the world in 
Internet technology. In much the same way that the Sputnik crisis 
shone a light on the failure of US science and technology research to 
dominate globally, the poor performance of US broadband is also 
regarded as undermining US leadership. 'VVhile other states like South 
Korea, Denmark and Sweden achieve much more impressive results, 
politicians fear that US leadership in dictating how the Internet should 
develop cannot be assured. 
This conception of power can be understood through Robert Gilpin's 
work on 'prestige' which he describes as "the reputation for power". A 
hegemonic capacity to control Internet technology has been found in 
both the previous case studies to be important to US politicians and 
they express concern that the US position of 'special responsibility', 
authority and leadership on Internet issues, which has been developed 
in the last two case studies, could be undermined by their failure to 
lead in terms of the implementation of technology. Technological 
leadership has material power implications but it is also regarded in a 
social power context in the US as it has implications for US leadership 
and promotion of liberal values such as freedom of speech which are 
playing an increasing role in US foreign policy. 
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In general, there is consensus amongst US politicians that network 
neutrality is one of the issues which will determine whether the US 
continues to play a leading role in global innovation or whether it falls 
behind. Senator Edward Kennedy has argued that "we must continue 
to do all we can to stay on track with the pace of other industrialized 
countries in this new era of technology. If we are not careful, we will 
wake up one day soon to find that America has been left behind while 
other countries leap ahead with higher bandwidth and neutral 
broadband platforms."524 Similar comments came from Senator Byron 
Dorgan who argued that "how this issue is resolved could determine 
whether our Nation continues to be a world leader in the area of 
innovation and technology."525 
In these debates, there is a sense that not only does the US have a 
'special responsibility' to lead the world in Internet technology, it has a 
kind of 'manifest destiny'. In her opening statement before a hearing 
into the digital future of the US, Representative Anna Eshoo laments 
the fact that "no longer is the country that created the Internet and the 
most connected nation in a leadership position, and Americans 
shouldn't settle for 12th or 15'h or 20th. That is not who and what we 
are.''526 For President Bush, this 'destiny' emerges directly from the 
commercial sector. In his 2004 Technology Agenda, the President 
524 Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Reconsidering our l"'on1munications Law: Ensuring 
Competition and Innovation, hearing transcript, June 14, 2006. (Washington, D.C.: 
US Government Printing Office, 2009), pg.2. 
525 Senator Byron Dorgan, Statements on Introduced Billi and Joint Resolutions, US 
Senate, May 19, 2006, _h.ttp://thomas.loc.govlcgi: 
binlguery/F?rl09:1:Jtempl-rl09Svr2mv:e28283:. 
526 Rep. Anna Eshoo, opening statement at The Digital Future of the United States, 
hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce. Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, House of Representatives, April 24, 2007, 
pg.347. 
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argued that "[a]s the birthplace of the Internet, and home to the 
world's most important information technology companies, the United 
States is well positioned to continue its leadership in technical 
innovations for years to come. This report highlights steps the 
President is taking to ensure that America realizes this promise ."527 
President Obama addresses these issues head on in the Strategy for 
American Innovation where he acknowledges that the "United States 
once led the world in broadband deployment, but now that leadership 
is in question. Wireless networks in many countries abroad are faster 
and more advanced than our own."528 He goes on to report that only 46 
percent of adults in rural households have broadband access, with the 
figures at only 67 percent for non-rural adults. Despite these statistics, 
the President maintains that "America should lead the world in 
broadband adoption and Internet access."529 Indeed, this is articulated 
as a key goal for the Strategy for American Innovation.530 President 
Obama outlines his vision of America's future as on in which the nation 
leads the world "in the technologies, innovation and discoveries that 
will shape the 21'tcentury." 531 
Certainly, the US has a lot of ground to make up in order to be 
anywhere near the top of the field in terms of Internet infrastructure. 
Presumably, any state would prefer to be as close to the top of the 
527 President George W. Bush, Promoting Innovation and Competitiveness: President 
Bush's Technology Agenda, (Washington, D.C.: The \Vhlte House, 2004), pg.l, 
http://www.gcrio.org/OnLnDoc/pdfltechnology agenda.pdf. 
528 President Obama, A St1·ategy for American Innovation, pg.2. 
529 Ibid, pg.13. 
sso Ibid, pg. l. 
ss1 Ibid, pgA. 
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rankings as possible for many of the same reasons as these politicians 
have expressed. However, there is something uniquely American about 
this anxiety over maintaining a position of global leadership in 
Internet technology which is about more than commercial 
competitiveness. It has strong links to a sense of national identity and 
national character. Even more significantly, though, just as was the 
case during the Sputnik crisis, US politicians equate 'leadership' with 
power and global order. 
Freedom 
As was the case in the cyber security chapter, the promotion of norms 
and values, and the relationship of those norms and values to US 
power, is a key feature of the network neutrality debates. In this case, 
there is one value which dominates. Freedom features so substantially 
in debates about net neutrality that it appears in the name of several 
bills which have been introduced to both the Senate and the House of 
including the 'Internet Freedom and Non-discrimination Act', the 
'Internet Freedom Preservation Act'.532 Some politicians have even 
used the terms interchangeably, as Senator Byron Dorgan did when he 
argued that "Internet freedom, known as net neutrality, is one of the 
most important issues facing us as the telecommunications landscape 
continues to change". 533 Competing conceptions of 'Internet freedom' 
532 The following are all network neutrality bills. H.R.5994 ·Internet Freedom a.nd 
Nondiscrimination Act of2008, bttp:l/www.opencongress.org/bill/l 1 O·h5994/show, 
H.R.5353 ·Internet Freedom Prnservation Act of 2008, 
http://www.opencongress.org/bill/11Q:h5353/show. H.R4784 ·Internet Freedom Act 
of2010. http://www.opencongress.org1bi!l/l ll ·h4784ishow, S.215 ·Internet Freedom 
Preservation Act, http://www.oponcongress.oi:g/bill/110·s2151show, H.R.5994 
Internet Freedom and Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 
b.lcl;Q)/www .opencongress.orglbill/l l O· h5994/show, 
us• Senator Byron Dorgan, Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, US 
Senate, May 19, 2006. 
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and its relevance to US power have been at the core of network 
neutrality debates since the early 2000s. 
In this study, 'freedom' has emerged as an important component of how 
US politicians regard the relationship between power and the Internet. 
Freedom of information, freedom of access and freedom of expression 
ai-e important components of cyber security policy and 'Internet 
freedom' is a central plank of the Obama·Clinton administration's 
foreign policy stance. Clearly, it is a concept which we need to 
understand well and this case study provides an excellent opportunity 
to unpack it. 
US politicians refer to freedom as a source of US power in network 
neutrality debates. As found in the cyber security case study, 
politicians express the belief that adhering to certain values when 
deciding policy and formulating legislation has led directly to the 
enhancement of US power in the past and will continue to do so in the 
future. Freedom becomes a policy touchstone in net neutrality debates, 
a point of navigation for politicians confused about the best path 
forward. \Vhile they agree on this point, US politicians are actually 
divided on what exactly 'freedom' in this context entails. 
One of the more prevalent public debates about the Internet of the past 
ten years in the US has been the widespread opposition to censorship 
on the Internet. The target for these debates in the political sphere has 
most often been China (and more recently, !\fiddle Eastern states) 
where government censorship and surveillance is perceived by US 
politicians (and others) as authoritarian and an antithesis to 'Internet 
values' of openness, free access to legal information, the unimpeded 
exchange of ideas and global connections between individuals. The US 
has been vocal in its promotion of the Internet as a mechanism for 
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spreading freedom and democracy and consequently, it has actively 
objected to censorship and surveillance on the Internet. The Global 
Internet Freedom Act of 2006 was introduced to promote the 
development and deployment of technologies which could prevent 
Internet 'jamming' or blocking of censored sites. 534 In addition, the 
Global Online Freedom Act was aimed at protecting US businesses 
from coercion by repressive regimes to cooperate in censorship. 535 
In a sense, this foreign policy stance is in danger of being undermined 
by the absence of net neutrality safeguards in America. Delegating 
power for the control of information crossing over the Internet is an 
antithesis for this conception of Internet freedom, irrespective of 
whether that control is delegated to the state or to corporations. As 
discussed above, one of the dangers of not legislating for network 
neutrality is the capacity for telecommunications companies to block 
data which either directly competes with their own core business or 
fails to pay a levy. Legislating to ensure that US citizens can access 
any legal information and download data from any legal site they wish 
to without permission from their service provider is a core issue of 
network neutrality. 
Mueller links network neutrality to the outcomes of the UN World 
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) held in Tunis in 2005. The 
agreement emerging from this meeting included a commitment to the 
534 H.R.4 741 Global Internet Freedom Act, http://www.ppencongx~ss.QJ:ll!'.ltil!Ll09· 
lt4741/show. 
535 Jbid. 
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development by states of globally applicable public policy principles.536 
Mueller points out that network neutrality principles not only 
encompass the rights of individuals to access any and all legal content, 
services and applications free from interference or moderation by 
service providers (or governments), they also serve to protect service 
providers from liability for the transmission of illegal or offensive 
material. 537 He concludes that "because Internet connectivity does not 
conform to national borders, net neutrality is really a globally 
applicable principle that can guide Internet governance". (Author's 
emphasis.)538 
Willle some politicians regard this freedom as integral to the future of 
the Internet in America, others do not. Amongst other politicians, the 
potential for this kind of private sector censorship in the US does not 
appear to set off the same alarm bells that censorship in other states 
like China does. There seems to be a distinction drawn between 
government censorship and p1ivate sector censorship which, in a free 
market with plenty of competition, may not pose a problem but in the 
US market which is dominated by monopoly and duopoly service 
providers, it has serious implications. 539 
536 Mueller, 'Net Neutrality as a Global Principle fur Intel'net Governance', November 
5, 2007. The full text of the Tunis Agenda foi· the Information Society is available 
online at hlm://www.itu.int!wsisldoc92/tunis/off/6revLhtmJ. 
537 This issue has been the subject of a recent high court challenge in Australia and 
will be discussed at more length later in this chapter. 
538 Mueller, 'Net Neutrality as a Global Principle for Internet Governance', November 
5, 2007. 
539 These figures vary but none are encouraging. Rep. John Conyers, chairman of the 
Task Force on Competition Policy and Anti-Trust Laws quotes 96% of residential 
markets for high speed Internet access are controlled by either monopolies or 
duopolies. Prepared statement of John Conyers, Jr., Representative from l'vlichigan at 
a Congressional hearing before the Task Force on Competition Policy and Anti·Trust 
320 IP a g e 
Chapter Six Network Neutrality 
One way of walking through the dominant political approaches to 
freedom in the context of network neutrality is to organise them 
around their approach to the role of the Internet service provider (ISP). 
The ISP is regarded as the central point through which fi·eedom is 
mediated in these debates as it is the juncture at which information 
travelling across the Internet can be examined, privileged, 
discriminated against or blocked. 
Pm Net Neutrality View of the ISP 
Those politicians in favour of network neutrality believe strongly that 
the ISP must be a neutral and impartial conduit for data. Many 
(though certainly not all) agree that network maintenance should be 
permitted where necessary as long as it is carried out without 
discrimination - that is, it is not used as a cover for privileging data for 
financial gain as was suggested in both of the cases documented earlier 
in this chapter. However, they strongly object to ISPs charging at both 
ends of the data flow - once for the user to connect and download data 
and again for the provider to have their data made accessible on a fast 
track. They also object to the ISP using its discretion to make certain 
websites or data unavailable through blocking. The fear of pro net 
neutrality politicians is that without adequate regulation, the ISP 
becomes a 'gatekeeper', able to control the flow of data across the 
Internet in order to privilege their own interests - commercial, political, 
social or religious. This, they argue, is an antithesis to 'Internet 
freedom' and an impediment to future innovation and growth. Senator 
Daniel Inouye argues that "the Internet has become a robust engine for 
Laws, Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, March 11, 2008, 
(Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2009), pg.4. 
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market innovation, economic growth, social discourse, and the free flow 
of ideas ... The marketplace has picked winners and losers, and not a 
central gatekeeper."540 
Proponents of net neutrality then, argue that the ISP should be 
disempowered in order to preserve an environment of innovation and 
creativity which allows small businesses or even individuals to promote 
the growth of the Internet economy. This is, in effect, an expression of 
both the way they perceive the reverse salient (the stifling of 
innovation) and their perception of the relevant social group 
(individuals and small, innovative firms with potential to grow). These 
factors together comprise a particular view of 'freedom on the Internet'. 
Senator Byron Dorgan argues for this conception of freedom m the 
context of ensuring that small innovators are not relegated to the 
'gravel road' of the Internet by big business. 541 He states very 
emphatically that "I'm sympathetic to the notion of investments in 
network; however, I'm not sympathetic to that issue, relative to 
destroying what I think is basic uninhibited freedom on the Internet -
freedom of content, freedom of choice." 542 In this approach then, 
'freedom on the Internet' can be unde1·stood in the broader sense of 
freedom of information and freedom of access. 
s40 Daniel Inouye, Speech in support of S.2917, Senate, May 19, 2006. Almost the 
same comment is made by Olympia Snowe. "The Internet became a robust engine of 
economic development by enabling anyone with a good idea to connect to consumers 
and compete on a level playing field for consumers' business, Anyone can send an e· 
mail or set up a Web site at little or no cost, and the marketplace has picked winners 
and losers, rather than an arbitrary gatekeeper." Senator Olympia Snowe, 
Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, US Senate, May 19, 2006, 
http ://thomas.loc. govlcgi ·binlq11erviF"r l 09: l :,/tem1.1.l~r109Svr2mv :eza_~j!', 
'
41 Senator Byron Dorgan, speech on introducing S.215Internet Freedom 
Pre.9ervation Act, January 9, 2007. 
m Senator Dorgan, President/CEO, Comptel, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 
2006. pg.34·35. 
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Anti Net Neutrali~v View of the ISP 
Anti net neutrality politicians regard the ISPs very differently - they 
perceive the ISP not as a 'gatekeeper' but as a 'responsible stakeholder'. 
In their view, the ISP is perfectly situated to be able to shape the 
Internet in a number of positive ways. These include helping the state 
to deal with intractable online crimes like piracy and the theft of 
intellectual property - in effect, acting in a law enforcement capacity 
as was discussed in the Security chapter under the public/private 
partnership. 543 In addition, the ISP is often linked to a role in 
upholding 'family values' by keeping offensive material off line and 
inaccessible to children. 544 Finally, the ISP is seen as essential to 
maintaining overall quality of service of the network by dealing with 
'bandwidth hogs'. Although some politicians opposed to net neutrality 
acknowledge that there exists some capacity and motive for ISPs to 
engage in anti competitive behaviour, they generally argue that if and 
when this happens, the market should first be allowed to correct it. 
Only if it fails to do so effectively, should government then step in. 
This is most often expressed as a liberal belief in limited government. 
As with the issue of private sector censorship which US politicians 
543 This issue has recently played out in the Australian high court through a case in 
which a consortium of Hollywood film studios sued iiNet, an Australian Internet 
service provider, for not preventing the flow of pirated films. The court twice found 
that, iiNet could not be held responsible for the packets of data it transmitted. Asher 
Moses, 'iiNet Slays Hollywood in Landmark Piracy Case', Sydney ,~forning Herald, 
February 4, 2010, http://www.smh.com,au/techno]Qgyli;§chnology-newslii,net·slays· 
h.ollvwwd ·in· land mark·piracv·case-20100204-ndwrJ1tml. 
644 Protecting children from offensive material online as well as protect,ing them from 
interaction with anti·social actors is of considerable concern for US politicians. It is 
an issue which has generated a significant number of Congressional hearings, It has 
no immediate relationship to state power and for this reason was not considered as a 
case study for this project but it does permeate many debates about the Internet in 
the US. 
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seem to regard as distinct from government censorship, so too do they 
make a distinction between limiting access to the network by public or 
private means. "Now, internal organizations may want to limit what 
their employees are saying, but ultimately we don't want the United 
Nations or anybody governing the Internet. It should be the private 
sector and individuals. The only real role of the government is the 
domain·name registry ... Other than that, leave it free."545 In the anti 
network neutrality approach, 'freedom on the Internet' can be 
understood as 'freedom from government interference'. 
The diagram below is a graphical representation of how these 
competing views of 'freedom on the Internet' play out in political 
debates about network neutrality. 
M5 Senator George Allen, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.70. 
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Freedom means no 
control over legal 
content, hardware or 
applications. Limit the 
ISP's power in order to 
keep the Internet fair and 
keep the economy 
growing 
Network Neutrality 
Freedom means the 
government stays out of 
the way. Do not regulate 
the Internet. Instead, let 
the private sector find the 
'right' solution. 
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The analysis of these competing conceptions of freedom in the context 
of network neutrality reveals another layer of complexity m 
understanding power in these debates. Norms and values play an 
important role here but the case clearly demonstrates that we need to 
look closely at interpretations of these norms and values, including the 
policy implications in order to be able to comment on their relationship 
to power in the information age. The debate about freedom reveals two 
positions about US power and the Internet. The pro network neutrality 
view regards the internet in a Determinist way as possessing a set of 
'freedoms' which must be protected in order for the Internet to continue 
to deliver the benefits to US power that it has in the past. The anti 
network neutrality view regards the internet in an Instrumental view 
as able to enhance US power only if 'freedom from government 
interference' is ensured so that the technology can continue to develop 
along market lines which will inevitably deliver the 'best' outcome. 
Significantly, though, neither of these views is accompanied by a sense 
of authority. 
Network Neutrality and Deferred Authority 
An examination of how politicians construct their authority to act 
completes the analysis of these two competing conceptions of how US 
power relates to network neutrality and how these two groups of 
politicians have sought to shape that technology. In the previous two 
case studies the research revealed politicians' perceptions about their 
authority to shape and influence Internet technology as closely 
associated with their philosophical approach to technology. In the 
chapter on cyber security, it was found that while politicians expressed 
very serious concerns about how cyber insecurity impacts on US 
material power, this conception of power is associated with a 
Determinist/Instrurnental approach to technology which does not 
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promote a sense of responsibility or authority for these politicians to 
act. Rather, the social conception of power which emphasised the 
importance of norms and values was associated with a Social 
Constructivist approach to technology and it was the combination of 
these two views which has most influenced the development of cyber 
security technology. In the case of Internet governance, politicians 
expressed the belief that the government had a role to play in shaping 
this aspect of Internet technology so as to promote US economic power 
and this view was accompanied by a Social Constructivist approach to 
technology - again, resulting in a sense of authority which drove 
debates and ultimately influenc,ed Internet governance vel'Y 
significantly. 
In this case study, although politicians continue to express the belief 
that the Internet is essential to US power through both material and 
social factors, they do not express a sense of legitimacy to make 
decisions which might shape Internet technology. Instead, relevant 
policy approaches are mediated through alternative and external 
sources of legitimacy. Pro network neutrality politicians draw upon the 
technology itself as a source of authority. They refer to both the 
architecture of the Internet and the key engineers who devised it as 
their source of authority. This approach is informed by Technological 
Determinism which regards technology as imbued with a set of values 
- in the case of network neutrality these are understood to include 
freedom, equality and transparency. It is also an approach which has 
been found in the past two case studies to be associated with a 
diminished sense of authority and responsibility - a finding which is 
also upheld in this case study. 
The anti network neutrality politicians refer directly to market forces 
as their source of legitimacy. They make a normative argument that 
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government should not take a role in shaping technology unless it is 
demonstrated that the market is unable to perform that function. This 
approach is a blend of liberal ideas of limited government and an 
Instrumental approach to technology. Instrumentalism is an approach 
which regards technology as value neutral and driven by commercial 
innovation. It also emphasises the capacity of technology to solve any 
problems it creates which anti network neutrality politicians draw on 
as the solution to any potential problems which might emerge from the 
power to control information being located in network providers. An 
Instrumental approach to technology is also associated with a 
diminished sense of authority and responsibility but anti network 
neutrality politicians need only maintain the status quo - a position 
which does not demand the same active engagement which the pro 
network neutrality position does. 
Anti net neutrality: Let the Market Decide 
The important regulatory shift which took place in 2002, when the 
FCC relegated Internet communications from Title II of the 
Communications Act to Title I was not a decision broadly debated in 
politics. As demonstrated earlier in this chapter, its significance was 
apparent to the board of the FCC and those within the industry but 
network neutrality had not yet become an issue for debate in Congress. 
Once it had, the objective of the anti net neutrality group became 
simply to prevent that decision being reversed and to prevent the 
passage of legislation which would further empower the FCC to enforce 
the four 'Internet freedoms' they articulated following the initial 
Comcast case. 
To a large extent, this group of politicians argues not to shape or 
influence technology in order to address their conception of US power. 
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Rather, they argue that their greatest responsibility is to 'stay out of 
the way' and to let the market shape technology - a form of market 
determinism. These references to the market as the appropriate 
mechanism through which network neutrality should be decided are 
common in anti network neutrality speeches and position papers. In 
an open letter to Congress, Jim DeMint and Sam Brownback write that 
"Opposing the heavy hand of regulation that network neutrality 
represents is critical if we are to maintain the Internet as an open, 
evolving, and market· based tool."546 In other words, if the government 
would only stand clear, Internet technology (in the hands of the 
market) will independently evolve along a 'natural' or pre·determined 
path which - given the newness and unpredictability of the technology 
- none may be able to foresee and therefore, appropriately influence. 
Senator Conrad Burns argues that "my concern is that if we legislate 
prematurely in this area, we will not let these different approaches 
play out in the marketplace."547 
In contrast to the previous case study, these politicians draw on 
external sources of legitimacy rather than their own authority as 
elected public officials who might shape the technology - or the market 
for the technology ~ in order to pursue the enhancement of US power. 
This approach resonates not only with a liberal, market based 
approach to state power but with an Instrumental approach to 
technology. This was foreshadowed in Chapter Two which made 
reference to Vig's interpretation of Instrumentalism as one in which 
"individuals should be free to pursue their own interests without 
"" Sam Brownback and Jim De:Mint, Open Letter to Congress, 'Don't be Duped by 
Advocates of Network Neutrality', May 16, 2006. 
547 Senator Conrad Burns, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.3. 
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interference from the state". 548 The empirical research for this case 
study reveals a persistent notion on behalf of anti network neutrality 
politicians that Internet technology should be developed without 
reference to normative expectations about how society will engage with 
it but rather in the framework of market drivers which are understood 
here as equating to a moral force. 
Pro Net Neutrality: The Authority of Technology 
The pro network neutrality position is somewhat more complex as 
these politicians are not simply protecting the status quo - rather they 
are seeking to change it. However, as with their opponents, these 
politicians also refrain from the claims of legitimacy for action which 
were common in the previous case study. Rather, they draw upon the 
legitimacy which they believe is vested in Internet technology itself. 
They do this in two ways. First, they frequently refer to a set of 
principles which they argue are endemic to Internet technology - the 
principles of network neutrality. Second, they cal1 on the technical 
community of Internet pioneers - those scientists and engineers who 
worked on Internet technology in its infancy and who continue to be 
highly regarded in their field · as a kind of 'higher' authority for their 
claims. This approach reflects elements of Technological Determinism. 
Not only do these politicians seem to be implying that the technology 
has a determined path, but it is imbued with values such as equality, 
openness and, as previously discussed, freedom. 
Congressional hearings on matters concerning the Internet often invite 
testimony from a number of Internet luminaries. Regular technical 
548 Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', p.13. 
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witnesses include Vinton Cerf (one of the engineers who worked closely 
on developing the Internet protocols), Tim Berners Lee who is credited 
(alongside a number of colleagues) with inventing the ·world Wide vVeb 
(the Web) and Lawrence Lessig, a Harvard based specialist in Internet 
law. In introducing testimony from the technical community at a 2006 
hearing, Senator Barbara Boxer proposes that "the voices that brought 
us this great revolution, I think we should really hear them, because I 
think at this stage we don't want to do anything to stifle them."549 
Indeed, these witnesses generally testify strongly in favour of network 
neutrality principles. In his testimony before the 2006 hearing, Vinton 
Cerf expressed the gravity of the network neutrality debate by placing 
it in a historical context. "There were key decisions made by the 
executive branch and by the legislative branch... that helped to 
commercialize the Internet. Your decisions coming up in this debate 
are equally important."550 Later on he stated that "nothing less than 
the future of the Internet is at stake in these discussions"551 and he 
further warned that if network neutrality is not legislated, "we risk 
losing the Internet as a catalyst for consumer choice, for economic 
growth, for technological innovation, and for global competitiveness."M2 
"It is in our collective best interest for the United States to have the 
best broadband capabilities in the world, bar none. The prospects for 
continued American ingenuity and entrepreneurship deserve nothing 
less."5.53 In another hearing the following year, Tim Berners Lee told 
'"Senator Barbara Boxer, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.44. 
'""Vinton Cerf, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg. 7. 
551 Ibid. 
552 Ibid, pg.8. 
00s Ibid, pg.14. 
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the Committee that "the \Veb is together technology and society ... while 
I will do my bit as an engineer, it is very, very important that you as 
members of the committee should do your bit as legislators."554 
Beyond the general comments above, witnesses from the technical 
community often reinforce the position that Internet technology is 
imbued with a set of principles, norms and values which should also be 
embodied in policy decisions about it. As was the case in the !CANN 
study, there is an acknowledgement of the direct links between 
architecture and policy in this debate. The 'bottom up' and 'end to end' 
structures have been regarded as fundamental to the success of the 
Internet since commercialisation and many continue to believe that 
preserving these is imperative to ensuring future growth. 
Pro network neutrality politicians articulate this view, ("the open 
architecture of this medium is central to our understanding of the 
Internet and a fundamental attribute of its success"555), but they very 
often rely on the testimony of the technical community to lend weight 
to their position. This testimony forms a key element of the pro 
network neutrality position. Lawrence Lessig has testified that "the 
innovation and explosive growth of the Internet is directly linked to its 
particular architectural design. If this Committee wants to preserve 
that growth and innovation, it should take steps to protect this 
fundamental design."55a Vinton Cerf also argued that "by abandoning 
554 Tim Berners Lee, The Digital Future of the United States, hearing on March l, 
2007, pg.31. 
''' Representative Chris Cannon, Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and 
Nondiscriminatory Access, hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, Task 
Force on Telecom and Antitrust, House of Representatives, April 25, 2006, pg. 7. 
'"" Lawrence Lessig, Stanford Law School, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 
2006, pp.54·55. 
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the principles that helped foster user choice and innovation, the United 
States risks falling further behind in the global economy." 557 Cerf 
refers to a relationship between policy and the Internet architecture: 
"This principle - that users pick winners and losers in the Internet 
marketplace, not carriers - is an architectural and policy choice critical 
to innovation online."558 He further argues that "allowing broadband 
carriers to control what people see and do online would fundamentally 
undermine the principles that have made the Internet such a 
success.'~ 559 
Lawrence Lessig has argued strongly for the protection of the 
Internet's 'end to end' design. In a hearing in 2006, he urged the 
Committee to keep in view what he regards as a fundamental fact 
about the Internet: "as scholars and network theorists have extensively 
documented, the innovation and explosive growth of the Internet is 
directly linked to its particular architectural design". 560 Lessig further 
argues that "if this Committee wants to preserve that growth and 
innovation, it should take steps to protect this fundamental design."561 
These statements in and of themselves are not particularly revealing. 
They are the testimony of witnesses who care deeply about network 
neutrality and believe that it is the best way forward. However, the 
hearing transcripts reveal that politicians hold a deep reverence for 
these voices and indeed, they appear to regard their views as carrying 
557 Vinton Cerf, Net Neutrality, hearing on February 7, 2006, pg.13. 
"""Ibid, pg.10. 
sso Ibid, pg.9. 
sco Lawrence Lessig, Stanford Law School, Net Neutl'ality, hearing on February 7, 
2006, pg.54. 
5(\1 Ibid. 
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more weight than their own political perspectives do. Pro network 
neutrality politicians consistently refer to these people as ultimately 
authoritative. Comments such as "I think it is a great idea to have our 
committee go to the father of the Web and hear what he has to say 
before we get too much deeper into these issues"562 and "who better to 
inform us about how we should approach the task of understanding the 
\Vorld \Vide Web and its future than its inventor''o63 are representative 
of sentiments expressed by politicians m these hearings. This 
testimony is more than a supplement to political views or an 
opportunity to hear from those working in the technology. Rather, it is 
drawn upon as a source oflegitimacy. 
A telling exchange in one hearing demonstrates the authority which 
pro network neutrality politicians vest in the opinions of the technical 
community. Chairman Markey makes a comment to Tim Berners Lee 
that if he had charged from the outset for the work he has done on the 
World \Vide Web, he would be a very rich man. Berners Lee interjects 
with the reply that he firmly believes that if he had charged per click, 
the web would never have been taken up. Chairman Markey replies 
that "it is very important for the committee to hear that sentence 
uttered." 564 In fact, it is not only important that the sentiment is 
uttered, but that it is uttered by Tim Berners Lee rather than 
Chairman Markey himself. As the Chair of the US Subcommittee on 
562 Rep. Mike Doyle, The Digital Future of the United States, hearing on March 1, 
2007. pg.6. 
563 Rep. Edward Markey, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, The Digital Future of the United States, 
hearing on March 1, 2007, pg.2. 
564 Exchange between Chairman Edward Markey and Tim Berners Lee, The Digital 
Future of the United States, hearing on March 1, 2007, pp.30·31. 
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Telecommunications and the Internet, Mr. Markey holds this opinion 
but he uses Berners Lee to invest it with legitimacy. 
Conclusion 
Marita Sturken and Douglas Thomas write that "the meanings 
attributed to new technologies are some of the most important evidence 
we can find of the visions, both optimistic and an.xious, through which 
modern societies cohere".565 This case study on network neutrality has 
provided an excellent insight into the ways in which politicians 
attribute different meanings to the same technology. It has provided a 
platform from which to examine how those meanings are constructed, 
how they relate to conceptions of power, and how they unfold in terms 
of policy making which has the potential to fundamentally shape 
Internet technology. 
While network neutrality legislation would directly affect US firms or 
firms operating in the US, it is not perceived as purely a domestic issue, 
but rather one with significant implications for American power 
globally. There is unanimity in the belief amongst relevant politicians 
that the Internet is integral to American power. There is also a strong 
assumption that America, either because it was instrumental in 
developing network technology or because it has made so much of 
Internet opportunities in the past, should lead the rest of the world in 
this area. Network neutrality challenges these conceptions of US power 
because, perhaps more than any other Internet debates, it shines a 
light on America's trailing position in terms of Internet speed and 
565 Sturken and Thomas, 'Technological Visions and the Rhetoric of the New' in 
Technological Visions, pg. L 
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service. This idea that America is lagging behind in technology - is 
regarded as a political anathema. 
Having examined these two competing approaches to network 
neutrality through the lenses of both the Philosophy of Technology and 
International Relations, it is possible to conclude the following points. 
First, there are a number of shared conceptions here. Both political 
approaches continue to regard the Internet as integral to US power for 
both material and social reasons. In addition, both approaches have 
serious eoncerns about the global eompetitiveness of the United States 
in terms of its information infrastructure. 
Beyond these shared conceptions, these approaches differ in several 
important ways. They differ in the way in which they identify both the 
reverse salient and the relevant social group. The pro network 
neutrality politicians identify the absence of net neutrality legislation 
as potentially stifling innovation and future economic growth on the 
Internet and they regard individuals and small organisations with 
potential for growth as the relevant social group. The anti network 
neutrality politicians identify the lack of financial incentive for private 
sector investment in the state's information infrastructure as the 
reverse salient and they identify large teleeommunications firms who 
they expect to invest in this as the relevant social group. 
These groups also differ in how they conceptualise 'freedom' on the 
Internet - a factor which they both regard as important to US power 
but to which they attribute different meaning. Anti network neutrality 
politicians regard freedom on the Internet as freedom from government 
interference. Pro network neutrality politicians regard freedom on the 
Internet in terms of values like freedom of information, freedom of 
access and freedom of choice. 
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With regard to net neutrality, the debate takes place in the context of 
competing normative frameworks. These frameworks are a product of 
conceptions of power and approaches to technology. Those on either 
side of the debate argue that their position is best able to ensure the 
continued 'equality', 'innovation' and 'integrity' of the Internet. These 
values are regarded as desirable by every party - they simply differ on 
the best way to achieve the same outcome. Policy makers, then are left 
to choose between two competing approaches to network neutrality in 
the pursuit of agreed ends. From the perspective of those opposed to 
network neutrality, a belief in market forces suggests that a 'two-lane' 
highway is a natural solution to heavy traffic and that those who will 
pay more for the tollway should be allowed to. This willingness to 'let 
the market decide' is understood to be inextricably linked to the 'idea of 
America' and consequently, its power. For those in favour of network 
neutrality legislation, it is the 'Ellis Island' of cyberspace. All arrive 
equal and progress according to their merits with no gatekeepers and 
no limitations but their own. 
The research into political conceptions of the relationship between 
network neutrality and US power expose a decided reluctance on the 
part of many US politicians to take the kind of initiative which 
characterised policy geared towards Internet governance specifically 
but also Internet technology more broadly in the 1980s and 1990s. 
\Vhile ICAJ\'N elicitBd strong claims about its relevance to the national 
interest, including the assertion that the US had a 'special 
responsibility' for global governance of the Internet, network neutrality 
has been regarded quite differently. 
Whether there is a causal relationship between the divergence in 
approaches and the unwillingness of politicians to claim legitimate 
authority to shape this technology is not clear and would require 
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further research. However, there is certainly a distinction between the 
political conceptions of the previous case study and those found in this 
one. Politicians in the previous case study exhibited much more affinity 
with a Social Construction of Technology approach. That is, they 
believed that they could and should work to shape Internet technology 
in order to address their norms and expectations. Politicians in this 
case study are divided with one group taking a Determinist approach 
and the other an Instrumental approach. Neither of these approaches 
lend themselves to a sense of political authority or legitimacy which 
was evident in the previous chapter. 
This case study foreshadows one of the key implications of this thesis. 
Political actors who regard themselves as invested with the authority 
and legitimacy to shape and influence technology - are able to do so. 
Understanding how power works in the information age may depend 
on understanding that societies can shape technology. Possibly, it is 
the knowledge that politics can shape technology which is a key 
element of power in the information age. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Albert Borgmann has written that "living in an advanced industrial 
country, one is always and already implicated in technology" but 
because technology is so profoundly integrated into our way of being, 
our involvement normally remains implicit rather than self-consciously 
examined. 566 The same could be said of our understanding of the 
Internet and power in International Relations. Understanding power 
in the information age means understanding the relationship between 
technology and power. And yet, as a discipline, International Relations 
has approached this problem largely without engaging deeply with 
technology either in an applied or theoretical sense. 
This thesis has been oriented to the close examination of how US 
politicians conceptualise power in the context of Internet technology. 
To do so, it has been necessary to move beyond some deeply embedded 
assumptions about both technology and power that are held - not only 
by politicians - but by many International Relations scholars as well. 
By unpacking these individual technology issues and examining 
exactly which conceptions of power lead politicians to regard them as a 
'problem' for US power as well as how they arrive at solutions, we have 
learned as much about power as about technology. 
This thesis has developed a conceptual framework for combining 
methods and concepts from the Philosophy of Technology with 
International Relations theory. By integrating these fields of study, 
this conceptual framework makes an important contribution. It 
provides a means to move beyond the deeply entrenched but 
566 Borgmann, Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life, pp.104· 105. 
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unexamined assumptions about technology upon which International 
Relations literature has been premised. The view that technology 
produces the same effects regardless of social or political context is a 
product of Technological Determinism and it has informed much of the 
literature that seeks to explore the relationship between new 
technology and power. By exposing those assumptions and 
demonstrating how the Philosophy of Technology can provide 
alternative approaches, this conceptual framework lays the foundation 
for a new, more useful approach to understanding power in the 
information age. 
This thesis set out to answer the following question: 
How have politicians' conceptions of Ame11·can power influenced the 
development of the Internet? J!Vhat are the implications fol' 
w1del'Standing the relationship between new technology and poweT in 
inteTnational relations? 
Three case studies were selected usmg the reverse salient; cyber 
security, Internet governance and network neutrality. Each of these 
issues was articulated by politicians as a 'problem' for US power and 
each also had recognised technological implications. The analysis of 
these three case studies has generated a set of conclusions about the 
nature and exercise of US power in the context of Internet technology. 
It also generates conclusions about how, as International Relations 
scholars, we approach the study of global power in the information age. 
These conclusions can be organised around five themes. First, the 
thesis generates conclusions based on which conceptions of US power 
were detected in the case studies and how they have influenced the 
development of Internet technology. Second, the thesis generates 
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conclusions about the role of authority and legitimacy in information 
age power. Third, we turn to some conclusions about the future of lJS 
power in this context. Finally, some implications for understanding 
global power in the information age are drawn out. 
Conceptions of US Power and the Internet 
It was anticipated at the start of this project that multiple conceptions 
of power would emerge in the analysis, though the preliminary 
research suggested that these would take shape as more or less 
cohesive approaches to power which could be attributed to a time for 
political era) or to an administration. In fact, it was found that 
conceptions of power were articulated differently within the same time 
period and within the same administration - even with reference to a 
single technological issue. Conceptions of power as they relate to 
Internet technology are even more complex and multi-faceted than 
anticipated and this in itself is an important finding which should 
prompt a re-evaluation of the relationship between power and new 
technology. 
Complex and competing conceptions of power are not new to 
International Relations. Material power and social power 
considerations sometimes work together and sometimes compete in 
political decision making. However, finding multiple conceptions of 
power at work in each of the case studies is significant for three 
reasons. First, it highlights the complex array of implications which US 
politicians perceive Internet technology to have on social and material 
power. 
Second, these conceptions of power sometimes result in conflicting 
policy choices. In each of the case studies, there was a tension between 
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the policy options that privileged material power factors and the policy 
options that privileged social power factors. This tension provided an 
opportunity to examine the choices that politicians made about power 
through their decisions about Internet technology. These points of 
tension were particularly revealing and generate conclusions about the 
role of norms and values in information age power which will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The third reason why these multiple conceptions of power have been 
significant for this study is because they have illustrated even more 
clearly than was anticipated, the way that conceptions of power 
influence and shape technology. Politicians make choices about which 
factors of power they consider most important even within debates 
about a single issue. That matters because it means that in order to 
make sense of power in the information age we need to look closely at 
individual states, at a range of aspects of technology and over a period 
of time. Indeed, we could understand these processes as the 'political 
construction of technology'. 
There are of course, many factors which shape technology. Cultm·e, 
markets, and science all play a role. But when seeking to understand 
power in Intetnational Relations, it is impossible to ignore the 
substantial role that political decisions play. If we do, we ignore the 
role of choice and it is then easy to misunderstand the dynamics of the 
relationship between power and technology as one which is imposed 
rather than one which is selected. 
In this study, both cyber security and Internet governance 
demonstrated clearly the role of political decisions in shaping Internet 
technology. In the cyber security case, politicians were faced with a 
problem, arguably of their own making. From early on, it was 
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understood that introducing more stringent security measures on the 
Internet (such as attribution) would undermine important norms and 
values which are regarded as integral to US power. This is not to 
suggest that US politicians chose cyber insecurity in the 1990s for they 
could not have envisaged how the Internet would be integrated into the 
US infrastructure. Cyber insecurity is better understood as an 
unintended consequence of earlier decisions. However, when faced with 
that problem and despite the oppressive cost in material terms, US 
politicians continue to promote a largely open and anonymous Internet 
environment. 
Although they use the language of norms and values, this should not 
undermine the strategic reasoning behind this choice. Politicians 
repeatedly express the view that the most assured route to security 
(and the preservation of US power) is through continuing to adhere 
closely to the ideas and values which have been the foundation of US 
power in the past and that they believe will continue to be in the future. 
In short, in their calculation the reward of preserving these social 
power factors outweighs the risk which cyher insecurity poses to their 
material power. 
In the Internet governance chapter, politicians in the Clinton·Gore 
administration had a very clear vision for the Internet as a mechanism 
for rejuvenating US economic power. They openly set about 
institutionalising a governance arrangement which was specifically 
intended to address those goals. In doing so, they established the US 
with a degree of hegemonic power over the Internet which continues 
today. In large part, it is this residual control over Internet governance 
which sets the US apart from other states in terms of their ability to 
project power over the internet. \Vhen confronted by dissatisfaction in 
the international community, they chose a social power response -
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legitimacy. In this way, they hope to generate enough support to allow 
them to retain a level of control over I CANN. 
In the network neutrality chapter, politicians were found to be in a 
deadlock. A politically divisive issue, network neutrality did not reveal 
the same clear example of technology shaped by conceptions of power 
as the previous two case studies did. It is, however, still able to feed 
into this conclusion. It demonstrates again that the Internet does not 
operate to the principles of network neutrality for technical reasons 
and it does not perform the same way globally. Rather, it is an outcome 
of political conditions and decisions about power - even if they 
manifest in a stalemate as they do in the US. Again, we return to 
political context. 
Recognising the role of choice is essential because it undermines 
assumptions about the universal nature of the impact of the Internet 
on state power. US politicians weigh up the risks and benefits of issues 
like cyber security policy in relation to a whole range of factors and 
reach a conclusion about which will best profit US power. Other states 
undertake the same calculations but because their conceptions of 
power are unique, their decisions differ. States which favour more 
restricted or supervised access to the Internet have also weighed up a 
range of risks and rewards and arrived at an equation that regards the 
risks of openness (however they may define them) to be outweighed by 
the rewards of state control. 
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The Role of Authority and Legitimacy 
"Does the state have the political and institutional capacity to control 
technology?" 567 This is a key question posed by Norman Vig in 
Technology; Philosophy and tlie State and one of the big debates which 
emerge from this thesis. The case studies would indicate that in the US, 
the answer is mixed. In some circumstances, politicians have felt very 
strongly that the state has both the capacity and the authority to shape 
and control technology. In others, they have quite clearly articulated 
that it does not. In the cases in which they did claim authority, the 
effects on Internet technology have been profound. The governance 
system which prevails today and was specifically designed to address 
the US economic power agenda is perhaps the most significant example. 
It is not surprising that conceptions of power which are associated with 
a sense of authority are the most influential in shaping technology. 
However, this highlights two important aspects of power in the 
information age. First, a belief in the authority to shape and influence 
technology can in itself be regarded as a form of power in the 
information age. This will be discussed at more length later in this 
chapter. Second, the authority to act is not a given - even in a state 
such as the US which regards itself as 'destined to lead' (a finding in 
the network neutrality case) and imbued with a sense of 'historic 
authority' (Internet governance). Despite its history of linking 
innovation to US national identity and also to material and social 
power, politicians frequently exhibit a sense that they lack the 
authority t-0 shape and influence Internet technology. This raises 
567 Vig, 'Technology, Philosophy and the State', pg. 14. 
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questions about how authority and legitimacy are derived in the 
context of political decisions about Internet technology and US power. 
In the cyber security chapter, politicians explicitly expressed the belief 
that they had neither the mandate nor the capability to deal with cyber 
insecurity in critical infrastructure - even when as it related to 
national security. Instead, they abdicated responsibility to the 
public/private partnership in an Instrumental approach to technology. 
That is, they regarded the solution to a technical problem as more 
technology and they believed that it would 'naturally' emerge from the 
private sector. 
In the Internet governance case study, pressure from the international 
community for the US to relinquish its hegemonic control of !CANN 
was countered by an acknowledgment on the part of politicians that in 
order not to lose control, they must attain legitimacy. Attaining a 
balance between the desire to retain control over what they had come 
to regard as a source of power with what they understood to be a social 
dimension to this power, led to a series of concessions designed to best 
promote US power. Both of these conceptions of power were associated 
with a Social Constructivist approach to technology and both were 
instilled with authority to act. 
In the network neutrality chapter, neither conception of power was 
associated a sense of authority. Politicians on either side of this debate 
deferred their political authority to an external source. Anti network 
neutrality politicians adopted an Instrumental approach to technology 
- again, expecting a solution to emerge from the private sector. They 
regarded themselves as without a mandate to interfere, much as was 
the case with the public/private partnership in the cyber security 
chapter. The pro network neutrality politicians draw on the technology 
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itself as a source of authority. They maintain that the Internet is built 
upon a set of principles which must be sustained in order for it to 
continue to promote US power. This is a Technological Determinist 
view which places agency in the technology rather than those who use 
it. 
This analysis generated an unanticipated finding about the 
relationship between conceptions of power, approaches to technology 
and authority. It was found that there is a correlation between the 
conception of power which most significantly shaped Internet and the 
approach to technology which politicians associated with that 
conception. The most influential conception of power was always 
accompanied by a Social Constructivist approach to technology which 
was associated with a sense of authority and responsibility in 
politicians. 
Understanding the causal relationship of these factors is beyond the 
scope of this thesis - given that it was unanticipated in the research 
design. Whether politicians adopt the language of Instrumentalism or 
Technological Determinism when they perceive they lack authority or 
whether it is the approach to technology which determines their 
perception of authority is unclear but would certainly be worthy of 
further study. However, a correlative relationship was consistently 
observed in the case studies. This is a useful finding because it means 
that approaches to technology may be used as an indicator of political 
authority in studies such as this one. In addition, an awareness of the 
relationship between conceptions of power, approaches to technology 
and a sense of authority can contribute to policy formation as the 
question can now be asked - 'why do politicians perceive a lack 
authority in one case and not another?' 
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The Future of US Power in the Information Age 
In his 2011 State of the Union Address, President Obama declared the 
US to be facing another "Sputnik moment". That is, a moment of 
technological challenge so significant that the government must once 
again claim the authority and the responsibility to assume global 
technological leadership in order to "win the future". 568 
This thesis has found that state power in the information age is linked 
to a belief in the agency of political actors rather than the agency of 
technology or the market. A willingness to claim both authority and 
responsibility for shaping technology was shown in these studies to be 
fundamental to the capacity to influence Internet technology in a way 
which preferences US power. US politicians have demonstrated their 
willingness to do this in the context of both material and social power 
and they have also demonstrated a determination to strive for global 
technological leadership if not hegemony. 
The ability to set the parameters of what is acceptable and determine 
which debates are legitimate was found to be central to US politicians 
in each of the case studies. In the cyber security chapter, this took the 
form of promoting the type of access to the Internet which US 
politicians believe undermines authoritarianism and repression. In the 
Internet governance case, establishing Internet governanc<i in such a 
way as to promote a US defined agenda and then seeking to retain 
control to prevent that agenda being challenged has been very 
important. In the c-0ntext of network neutrality, politicians express a 
5iIB President Barack Obama, 'State of the Union Address', ,January 25, 2011, The 
White House, hl!J.l.1.t;;::.i!1J'l,:!'£l:til&hm!!.§!'4l!YL.!:Jb&.:.im;:i1§:iltll~filll11!1.!l:gfi.lrnnlfill!.!l: 
preside11t-state-uni9n·address. 
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deep anxiety about the Internet infrastructure, not only for material 
reasons but because it undermines US 'technological leadership'. 
Norms and values have played a substantial role in the analysis of the 
case studies but they appear to be increasingly important in US 
conceptions of power in the information age. 21"t Century Statecraft is 
specifically tailored to the task of promoting norms and values and it is 
worth considering carefully what implications this has for 
understanding both US power and power more broadly in the 
information age. Hillary Clinton has argued that "we need to 
synchronize our technological progress with our principles."569 More 
specifically, she perhaps means that the world needs to synchronise 
new technology with US principles. In a later speech, Clinton also 
observed that "we all shape and are shaped by what happens [on and 
over the Internet]. To maintain an Internet that delivers the greatest 
possible benefits to the world, we need to have a serious conversation 
about the principles that will guide us, what rules exist and should not 
exist and why, what behaviors should be encouraged or discouraged 
and how.''570 
Clinton's 21't Century Statecraft has the potential to be the next wave 
of lJS hegemonic power expressed through the Internet. Clinton has 
built a doctrine which has been specifically adapted to the projection of 
US power in the information age. \Vhile the acquisition of more 
material power than one's rival characterised the industrial age, 218' 
569 Hillary Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', The Newseum, Washington, D.C., 
January 21, 2010. 
570 Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, 'Internet Rights and Wrongs: Choices 
& Challenges in a Networked World', remarks delivered at George Washington 
University, Washington, DC on February 15, 2011, 
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Century Statecraft suggests that the currency of the information age is 
different. Power, of course, still matters. But the projection of US 
power in the Obama-Clinton era looks set to focus much more on how 
norms and values which promote US power can be embedded in global 
expectations of Internet technology. Clinton regards it as critical that 
the US takes the lead in setting the terms of debate, imbuing the 
agenda with favourable principles and establishing rules, boundaries 
and limitations. 
How this happens, whose voices are heard and whose interests are 
privileged will have profound consequences for power in the 
information age. Aided by some of the methodological and conceptual 
tools provided in the Philosophy of Technology, International Relations 
should be addressing these questions and providing the analysis and 
theory necessary to navigate through the next chapter in global power. 
Understanding Global Power in the Information Age 
This thesis demonstrates that Instrumentalism and Technological 
Determinism which have dominated International Relations theories 
about power are both inappropriate lenses through which to examine 
Internet technology. Adherence to this view promotes a 'black box' 
interpretation of technology which, when opened up as in this study, 
proves to be based on unstable foundations. The Internet does not 
possess values or norms like democracy, freedom or human rights. Nor 
can it be regarded as a universally applicable factor of material power 
- either in terms of economics or security. Rather, Internet technology 
is an exp1·ession of political decisions about power. How the Internet 
should develop, how it should be managed and how our use of it should 
be controlled, fundamentally affect both the technology itself and also 
the role it plays in our society. As scholars of International Relations 
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concerned with understanding power in the information age, it is 
essential that we recognise not only the assumptions but the 
limitations of an Instrumentalist/Technological Determinist view and 
begin to integrate a broader range of approaches to technology into our 
work. 
Given that this analysis of the relationship between conceptions of 
power and technology in the US alone has been so multifaceted, there 
can be no basis for studies which continue to assume that the Internet 
has universal power implications for other states. It has been shown 
here that US politicians make calculations about the risks and rewards 
of a range of Internet technologies and how they expect them to impact 
on multiple conceptions of power. They either try to harmonise those 
conceptions (as in the Internet governance chapter) or they decide to 
privilege one over the other (cyber security). 
Politicians in other states certainly go through the same process of 
weighing up risks and rewards of competing conceptions of power. 
Understanding more about the political context of power and the 
Internet is critical to understanding power in the information age. The 
US may be proven to have made the wrong calculation about cyber 
security. Perhaps upholding norms and values over imposing stricter 
security measures is not the surest path to security and power. 
Perhaps the approach of states like China which maintain a much 
tighter grip on Internet activity will be found to be more successful. 
But before we can make an assessment of the success or failure of the 
range of global approaches to power in the information age, we need to 
understand what those approaches are. 
There is much more comparative research needed on how state power 
is conceptualised in the context of Internet technology and much closer 
Chapter Seven ConcTusion 
scrutiny of how these different conceptualisations play out in the 
relationship between power and the Internet in the information age. 
Having unpacked the 'black box' of power and technology, patterns 
may emerge, expected or unexpected - as they did in this study which 
found there is a relationship between conceptions of power, approaches 
to technology and authority. To a degree, until International Relations 
has built up a body of work which theoretically investigates these 
questions, we are working in the dark. If International Relations 
literature has been making assumptions about the relationship 
between US power and the Internet - in a state which is so 
comprehensively studied and which has so much openly available 
information, the same is almost certainly true for other more opaque or 
less accessible states. 
Hillary Clinton has argued that "the world's information infrastructure 
will become what we and others make of it."571 This thesis represents 
one step toward better understanding the processes by which this 
happens. By demonstrating how existing approaches to understanding 
power in the information age are flawed, by developing a conceptual 
framework for addressing the gaps and applying it to the study of US 
power and the Internet, this thesis helps to move beyond the confines 
of International Relations theories specifically suited to industrial 
technology and open new pathways for examining power in the 
information age. 
571 Clinton, 'Remarks on Internet Freedom', January 21, 2010. 
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These hearings have been arranged chronologically rather than 
according to the case studies. This is because, while many of them are 
issue specific, others are more general and are used in multiple 
chapters of the thesis. 
1985 
Electronic Communication Privacy, hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary, 
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks, United States Senate, 
November 13, 1985. 
1989 
Critical Issues and Problems Facing the New Administration and Congress, hearing 
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, January 
18, 1989. 
Vulnerability of Telecommunications and Energy Resources to Terrorism, hearing 
before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, February 
7-8, 1989. 
Military and Civilian Control of Computer Security Issues, hearing before the 
Committee on Government Operations, Legislation and National Security 
Subcommittee, House of Representatives, May 4, 1989. 
Computer Viruses, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance, House of Representatives, 
July 20, 1989. 
National High-Performance Computer Technology Act of 1989, hearing before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on 
Science, Technology and Space, United States Senate, June 21,July 26 and 
September 15, I 989. 
1990 
H.R. 3131, The National High-Performance Camputing Technology Act, hearing before 
the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Science, 
Research and Technology, House of Representatives, March 14-15, 1990. 
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1999 
Critical Information Infrastructure Protection: The Threat is Real, hearing before the 
Committee on the judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and 
Government Information, United States Senate, October 6, 1999. 
2000 
Cyber Attacks: The National Protection Plan and its Privacy Implications, hearing before 
the Committee on the judiciary, Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and 
Government Information, United States Senate, February I, 2000. 
The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global Realities of Our National Security, hearing 
before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 3. 
2000. 
Cyber Attack: Is the Government Safe?, hearing before the Committee on 
Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, March 2, 2000. 
Internet Security, hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Subcommittee on Communications, United States Senate, March 
8, 2000. 
Computer Security: Are We Prepared for Cyberwar?, hearing before the Committee 
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management, 
Information, and Technology, House of Representatives, March 9, 2000. 
Deployment of Broadband Technologies, hearing before the Committee on 
Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade, and Consumer 
Protection, House of Representatives, May 25, 2000. 
Computer Security: Cyber Attacks· War Without Borders, hearing before the 
Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government 
Management, Information, and Technology, House of Representatives, July 26, 
2000. 
S.2902, Broadband Internet Regulatory Relief Act of 2000, hearing before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, United States Senate, 
July 26. 2000. 
2001 
Is ICANN's New Generation of Internet Domain Name Selection Process Thwarting 
Competition?, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, 
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Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House of 
Representatives, February 8, 200 I. 
!CANN Governance, hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Subcommittee on Communications, United States Senate, 
February 14, 200 I. 
Computer Security: Are We Prepared for Cyberwar?, hearing before the Committee 
on Government Reform, Subcommittee on Government Management, 
Information, and Technology, House of Representatives, March 9, 2001. 
How Safe is our Critical Infrastructure?, hearing before the Governmental Affairs 
Committee, United States Senate, September 12, 2001. 
Response of the Technology Sector in Times of Crisis, hearing before the Committee 
on Commerce, Science and Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, 
Technology and Space, United States Senate, December 5, 200 I. 
2002 
/CANN Governance, hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Space, United States 
Senate, June 12, 2002. 
China's Cyber-Wal/: Can Technology Break Through?, roundtable before the 
Congressional Executive Commission on China, November 4, 2002. 
2003 
Cyber Security: The Challenges Facing our Nation in Critical Infrastructure Protection, 
hearing before the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on 
Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Affairs and the Census. 
House of Representatives, April 8, 2003. 
Cyber Security Research and Development, hearing before the Committee on 
Science, House of Representatives, May 14, 2003. 
Overview of the Cyber Problem: A Nation Dependent and Dealing with Risk, hearing 
before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and Development, House of 
Representatives, June 22, 2003 
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Industry Speaks on Cybersecurity, hearing before the Select Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and 
Development. House of Representatives, July 15, 2003 
The Invisible Battleground, hearing before the Select Committee on Homeland 
Security, Subcommittee on Cybersecurity, Science, and Research and 
Development. House of Representatives, September 16, 2003. 
2004 
Virtual Threat, Real Terror: Cyberterrorism in the 21" Century, hearing before the 
Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and 
Homeland Security, United States Senate, February 24, 2004. 
The DHS Infrastructure Protection Division; Public-Private Partnerships to Secure Critical 
Infrastructures, hearing before the Select Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Infrastructure and Border Security, and Subcommittee on 
Cybersecurity, Science and Research and Development. House of 
Representatives, April 21, 2004. 
2005 
U.S.-£U. Regulatory Cooperation on Emerging Technologies, hearing before the 
Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on European Affairs, United 
States Senate, May 11, 2005. 
Securing Cyberspace: EffOrts to Protect National lnformotion lnfi'astructures Continue to 
Face Challenges, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security and 
Governmental Affairs, Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee, United 
States Senate, July 19, 2005. 
Cyber Security: U.S. Vulnerability and Preparedness, hearing before the Committee 
on Science, House of Representatives, September 15, 2005. 
SCADA Systems and the Terrorist Threat: Protecting the Nation's Critical Control 
Systems, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Economic Security, Infrastructure Protection and Cybersecurity and the 
Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives, October 18, 2005. 
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2006 
Net Neutrality, hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 
Transportation, United States Senate, February 7, 2006. 
Network Neutrality: Competition, Innovation, and Nondiscriminatory Access, hearing 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, Task Force on Telecom and Antitrust, 
House of Representatives, April 25, 2006. 
Reconsidering our Communications Laws: Ensuring Competition and Innovation, hearing 
before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, June I 4, 2006. 
Cyber Security: Recovery and Reconstitution of Critical Networks, hearing before the 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Federal Financial 
Management, Government Information, and International Security Subcommittee, 
United States Senate, July 28, 2006. 
Cybersecurity: Protecting America's Critical Infrastructure, Economy, and Consumers, 
hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Telecommunications and the Internet, House of Representatives, September 13, 
2006. 
/CANN Internet Governance: Is it Working?, hearing before the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Communications, Technology and the 
Internet and Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, 
House of Representatives, September 21, 2006. 
2007 
The Digital Future of the United States, hearing before the Committee on Energy 
and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House 
of Representatives, March 1,7, April 19, 24, May 10, October 2, 2007. 
Cyber Insecurity: Hackers ore Penetrating Federal Systems and Critical Infrastructure, 
hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives, April 19, 2007. 
Addressing the Nation's Cybersecurity Challenges: Reducing Vulnerabilities Requires 
Strategic Investment and Immediate Action, hearing before the Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and 
Science and Technology, House of Representatives, April 25, 2007. 
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Wireless Innovation and Consumer Protection, hearing before the Committee on 
Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, 
House of Representatives, July I I, 2007. 
The Cyber Threat to Control Systems: Stronger Regulations are Necessary to Secure the 
Electric Grid, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee 
on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives, October 17, 2007. 
Enhandng and Implementing the Cybersecurity Elements of the Sector-Specific Plans, 
hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity and Science and Technology and the 
Subcommittee on Transportation, Security and Infrastructure Protection, House 
of Representatives, October 3 I, 2007. 
Using the Web as a Weapon: The Internet as a Tool for Violent Radicalization and 
Homegrown Terrorism, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing, and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment, House of Representatives, November 6, 2007. 
2008 
Global Security Assessment, hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, 
House of Representatives, February I 3, 2008. 
The Cyber Initiative, hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives, February 28, 2008. 
Net Neutrality and Free Speech on the Internet, hearing before the Committee on 
the judiciary, Task Force 011 Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws, House of 
Representatives, March 11, 2008. 
H.R.5353, The Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2008, hearing before the 
Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications 
and the Internet, House of Representatives, May 6, 2008. 
Implications of Cyber Vulnerabilities on the Resilience and Security of the Electric Grid, 
hearing before the Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on 
Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, House of 
Representatives, May 21, 2008. 
Competition on the Internet, hearing before the Committee on the judiciary, Task 
Force on Competition Policy and Antitrust Laws, House of Representatives, July 
15, 2008. 
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2009 
Reviewing tile federal Cybersecurity Mission, hearing before the Committee on 
Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and 
Science and Technology, House of Representatives, March I 0, 2009. 
Current and Future Worldwide Threats to the National Security of the United States, 
hearing before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, March 
10, 2009. 
Cybersecurity: Assessing our Vulnerabilities and Developing an Effective Response, 
hearing before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 
United States Senate, March 19, 2009. 
Cyber Security, hearing before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 
United States Senate, May 7, 2009. 
Oversight of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (/CANN), 
hearing before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on 
Communications, Technology and the Internet, House of Representatives, June 4, 
2009. 
Cyber Security R&D, hearing before the Committee on Science and Technology, 
Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, House of Representatives, 
June I 0, 2009. 
Agency Response to Cyberspace Policy Review, hearing before the Committee on 
Science and Technology, Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation and the 
Subcommittee on Research and Science Education, House of Representatives, 
June 16, 2009. 
Securing the Modem Electric Grid from Physical and Cyber Attacks, hearing before the 
Committee on Homeland Security, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, 
Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, House of Representatives, July 21, 
2009. 
2010 
Cybersecurity: Next Steps to Protect Critical Infrastructure, hearing before the 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, United States Senate, 
February 23, 20 I 0. 
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